[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype

* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
  about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
  MAY_... found in mask.

The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)

folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index 51d0035ff07e..48a7934cb950 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int fuse_access(struct inode *inode, int mask)
                 return PTR_ERR(req);
 
         memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
-        inarg.mask = mask;
+        inarg.mask = mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
         req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_ACCESS;
         req->in.h.nodeid = get_node_id(inode);
         req->in.numargs = 1;
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static int fuse_access(struct inode *inode, int mask)
  * access request is sent.  Execute permission is still checked
  * locally based on file mode.
  */
-static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
+static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
         struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
         bool refreshed = false;
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
                    exist.  So if permissions are revoked this won't be
                    noticed immediately, only after the attribute
                    timeout has expired */
-        } else if (nd && (nd->flags & (LOOKUP_ACCESS | LOOKUP_CHDIR))) {
+        } else if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) {
                 err = fuse_access(inode, mask);
         } else if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
                 if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) {