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authorWei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>2013-04-21 22:20:43 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2013-04-22 15:37:01 -0400
commit03393fd5cc2b6cdeec32b704ecba64dbb0feae3c (patch)
treee5e6484266da2624a56aa8fca0828e16a19037bb /drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
parent2810e5b9a7731ca5fce22bfbe12c96e16ac44b6f (diff)
xen-netback: don't disconnect frontend when seeing oversize packet
Some frontend drivers are sending packets > 64 KiB in length. This length overflows the length field in the first slot making the following slots have an invalid length. Turn this error back into a non-fatal error by dropping the packet. To avoid having the following slots having fatal errors, consume all slots in the packet. This does not reopen the security hole in XSA-39 as if the packet as an invalid number of slots it will still hit fatal error case. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c22
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index d9292c59789b..a2865f17c667 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -975,12 +975,22 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
975 975
976 memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots), 976 memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots),
977 sizeof(*txp)); 977 sizeof(*txp));
978 if (txp->size > first->size) { 978
979 netdev_err(vif->dev, 979 /* If the guest submitted a frame >= 64 KiB then
980 "Invalid tx request, slot size %u > remaining size %u\n", 980 * first->size overflowed and following slots will
981 txp->size, first->size); 981 * appear to be larger than the frame.
982 netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif); 982 *
983 return -EIO; 983 * This cannot be fatal error as there are buggy
984 * frontends that do this.
985 *
986 * Consume all slots and drop the packet.
987 */
988 if (!drop_err && txp->size > first->size) {
989 if (net_ratelimit())
990 netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
991 "Invalid tx request, slot size %u > remaining size %u\n",
992 txp->size, first->size);
993 drop_err = -EIO;
984 } 994 }
985 995
986 first->size -= txp->size; 996 first->size -= txp->size;