dm ioctl: add flag to wipe buffers for secure data

Add DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG which userspace can use to ensure
that all buffers allocated for dm-ioctl are wiped
immediately after use.

The user buffer is wiped as well (we do not want to keep
and return sensitive data back to userspace if the flag is set).

Wiping is useful for cryptsetup to ensure that the key
is present in memory only in defined places and only
for the time needed.

(For crypt, key can be present in table during load or table
status, wait and message commands).

Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
index 3a8f6a0e6eb5..4cacdad2270a 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
@@ -1504,6 +1504,7 @@ static int check_version(unsigned int cmd, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
 static int copy_params(struct dm_ioctl __user *user, struct dm_ioctl **param)
 {
         struct dm_ioctl tmp, *dmi;
+        int secure_data;
 
         if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp) - sizeof(tmp.data)))
                 return -EFAULT;
@@ -1511,17 +1512,28 @@ static int copy_params(struct dm_ioctl __user *user, struct dm_ioctl **param)
         if (tmp.data_size < (sizeof(tmp) - sizeof(tmp.data)))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
+        secure_data = tmp.flags & DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG;
+
         dmi = vmalloc(tmp.data_size);
-        if (!dmi)
+        if (!dmi) {
+                if (secure_data && clear_user(user, tmp.data_size))
+                        return -EFAULT;
                 return -ENOMEM;
+        }
 
         if (copy_from_user(dmi, user, tmp.data_size))
                 goto bad;
 
+        /* Wipe the user buffer so we do not return it to userspace */
+        if (secure_data && clear_user(user, tmp.data_size))
+                goto bad;
+
         *param = dmi;
         return 0;
 
 bad:
+        if (secure_data)
+                memset(dmi, 0, tmp.data_size);
         vfree(dmi);
         return -EFAULT;
 }
@@ -1531,6 +1543,7 @@ static int validate_params(uint cmd, struct dm_ioctl *param)
         /* Always clear this flag */
         param->flags &= ~DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG;
         param->flags &= ~DM_UEVENT_GENERATED_FLAG;
+        param->flags &= ~DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG;
 
         /* Ignores parameters */
         if (cmd == DM_REMOVE_ALL_CMD ||
@@ -1558,6 +1571,7 @@ static int validate_params(uint cmd, struct dm_ioctl *param)
 static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
 {
         int r = 0;
+        int wipe_buffer;
         unsigned int cmd;
         struct dm_ioctl *uninitialized_var(param);
         ioctl_fn fn = NULL;
@@ -1602,13 +1616,15 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
          * Copy the parameters into kernel space.
          */
         r = copy_params(user, &param);
-        input_param_size = param->data_size;
 
         current->flags &= ~PF_MEMALLOC;
 
         if (r)
                 return r;
 
+        input_param_size = param->data_size;
+        wipe_buffer = param->flags & DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG;
+
         r = validate_params(cmd, param);
         if (r)
                 goto out;
@@ -1623,6 +1639,9 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
                 r = -EFAULT;
 
 out:
+        if (wipe_buffer)
+                memset(param, 0, input_param_size);
+
         vfree(param);
         return r;
 }