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authorSuresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>2010-02-18 14:51:40 -0500
committerH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>2010-02-22 18:09:31 -0500
commit281ff33b7c1b1ba2a5f9b03425e5f692a94913fa (patch)
tree975d0a1d0e7afd680e03c863b2b5d22619791e48 /arch/x86/mm
parenteb5b3794062824ba12d883901eea49ea89d0a678 (diff)
x86_64, cpa: Don't work hard in preserving kernel 2M mappings when using 4K already
We currently enforce the !RW mapping for the kernel mapping that maps holes between different text, rodata and data sections. However, kernel identity mappings will have different RWX permissions to the pages mapping to text and to the pages padding (which are freed) the text, rodata sections. Hence kernel identity mappings will be broken to smaller pages. For 64-bit, kernel text and kernel identity mappings are different, so we can enable protection checks that come with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, as well as retain 2MB large page mappings for kernel text. Konrad reported a boot failure with the Linux Xen paravirt guest because of this. In this paravirt guest case, the kernel text mapping and the kernel identity mapping share the same page-table pages. Thus forcing the !RW mapping for some of the kernel mappings also cause the kernel identity mappings to be read-only resulting in the boot failure. Linux Xen paravirt guest also uses 4k mappings and don't use 2M mapping. Fix this issue and retain large page performance advantage for native kernels by not working hard and not enforcing !RW for the kernel text mapping, if the current mapping is already using small page mapping. Reported-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <1266522700.2909.34.camel@sbs-t61.sc.intel.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.32, 2.6.33] Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c25
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 1d4eb93d333c..cf07c26d9a4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -291,8 +291,29 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
291 */ 291 */
292 if (kernel_set_to_readonly && 292 if (kernel_set_to_readonly &&
293 within(address, (unsigned long)_text, 293 within(address, (unsigned long)_text,
294 (unsigned long)__end_rodata_hpage_align)) 294 (unsigned long)__end_rodata_hpage_align)) {
295 pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW; 295 unsigned int level;
296
297 /*
298 * Don't enforce the !RW mapping for the kernel text mapping,
299 * if the current mapping is already using small page mapping.
300 * No need to work hard to preserve large page mappings in this
301 * case.
302 *
303 * This also fixes the Linux Xen paravirt guest boot failure
304 * (because of unexpected read-only mappings for kernel identity
305 * mappings). In this paravirt guest case, the kernel text
306 * mapping and the kernel identity mapping share the same
307 * page-table pages. Thus we can't really use different
308 * protections for the kernel text and identity mappings. Also,
309 * these shared mappings are made of small page mappings.
310 * Thus this don't enforce !RW mapping for small page kernel
311 * text mapping logic will help Linux Xen parvirt guest boot
312 * aswell.
313 */
314 if (lookup_address(address, &level) && (level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
315 pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
316 }
296#endif 317#endif
297 318
298 prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~pgprot_val(forbidden)); 319 prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~pgprot_val(forbidden));