diff options
author | Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> | 2009-01-19 22:29:19 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> | 2009-01-19 22:29:19 -0500 |
commit | c6e50f93db5bd0895ec7c7d1b6f3886c6e1f11b6 (patch) | |
tree | 3d6b2d04118bb61fb50cf7624aaf7f7e4f5916ce /arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | |
parent | 7890ba8c87604ca4c2c73f7de846bf5305d743e4 (diff) |
x86: cleanup stack protector
Impact: cleanup
Make the following cleanups.
* remove duplicate comment from boot_init_stack_canary() which fits
better in the other place - cpu_idle().
* move stack_canary offset check from __switch_to() to
boot_init_stack_canary().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 13 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h index c7f0d10bae7b..2383e5bb475c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | |||
@@ -16,13 +16,12 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) | |||
16 | u64 tsc; | 16 | u64 tsc; |
17 | 17 | ||
18 | /* | 18 | /* |
19 | * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack | 19 | * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at |
20 | * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have | 20 | * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement |
21 | * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating | 21 | */ |
22 | * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the | 22 | BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct x8664_pda, stack_canary) != 40); |
23 | * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever | 23 | |
24 | * trigger). | 24 | /* |
25 | * | ||
26 | * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source | 25 | * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source |
27 | * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, | 26 | * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, |
28 | * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later | 27 | * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later |