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authorTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>2009-01-19 22:29:19 -0500
committerTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>2009-01-19 22:29:19 -0500
commitc6e50f93db5bd0895ec7c7d1b6f3886c6e1f11b6 (patch)
tree3d6b2d04118bb61fb50cf7624aaf7f7e4f5916ce /arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
parent7890ba8c87604ca4c2c73f7de846bf5305d743e4 (diff)
x86: cleanup stack protector
Impact: cleanup Make the following cleanups. * remove duplicate comment from boot_init_stack_canary() which fits better in the other place - cpu_idle(). * move stack_canary offset check from __switch_to() to boot_init_stack_canary(). Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h13
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
index c7f0d10bae7b..2383e5bb475c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
@@ -16,13 +16,12 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
16 u64 tsc; 16 u64 tsc;
17 17
18 /* 18 /*
19 * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack 19 * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at
20 * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have 20 * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement
21 * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating 21 */
22 * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the 22 BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct x8664_pda, stack_canary) != 40);
23 * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever 23
24 * trigger). 24 /*
25 *
26 * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source 25 * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source
27 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, 26 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
28 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later 27 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later