Merge branch 'next' of git://git.monstr.eu/linux-2.6-microblaze

* 'next' of git://git.monstr.eu/linux-2.6-microblaze: (42 commits)
  microblaze: Fix build with make 3.82
  fbdev/xilinxfb: Microblaze driver support
  microblaze: Support C optimized lib functions for little-endian
  microblaze: Separate library optimized functions
  microblaze: Support timer on AXI lite
  microblaze: Add support for little-endian Microblaze
  microblaze: KGDB little endian support
  microblaze: Add PVR for endians plus detection
  net: emaclite: Add support for little-endian platforms
  microblaze: trivial: Add comment for AXI pvr
  microblaze: pci-common cleanup
  microblaze: Support early console on uart16550
  microblaze: Do not compile early console support for uartlite if is disabled
  microblaze: Setup early console dynamically
  microblaze: Rename all uartlite early printk functions
  microblaze: remove early printk uarlite console dependency from header
  microblaze: Remove additional compatible properties
  microblaze: Remove hardcoded asm instraction for PVR loading
  microblaze: Use static const char * const where possible
  microblaze: Define VMALLOC_START/END
  ...

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/microblaze/Kconfig b/arch/microblaze/Kconfig
index 692fdfce2a23..dad40fc2bef8 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/microblaze/Kconfig
@@ -121,6 +121,23 @@ config CMDLINE_FORCE
           Set this to have arguments from the default kernel command string
           override those passed by the boot loader.
 
+config SECCOMP
+        bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+        depends on PROC_FS
+        default y
+        help
+          This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+          that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+          execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+          the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+          syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+          their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+          enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
+          and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+          defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+          If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+
 endmenu
 
 menu "Advanced setup"