Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Conflicts:
	drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_sriov_pf.c
	net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
	net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c

ipv6 tunnel statistic bug fixes conflicting with consolidation into
generic sw per-cpu net stats.

qlogic conflict between queue counting bug fix and the addition
of multiple MAC address support.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

3 files changed, 314 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/block/null_blk.txt b/Documentation/block/null_blk.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b2830b435895
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/block/null_blk.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+Null block device driver
+================================================================================
+
+I. Overview
+
+The null block device (/dev/nullb*) is used for benchmarking the various
+block-layer implementations. It emulates a block device of X gigabytes in size.
+The following instances are possible:
+
+  Single-queue block-layer
+    - Request-based.
+    - Single submission queue per device.
+    - Implements IO scheduling algorithms (CFQ, Deadline, noop).
+  Multi-queue block-layer
+    - Request-based.
+    - Configurable submission queues per device.
+  No block-layer (Known as bio-based)
+    - Bio-based. IO requests are submitted directly to the device driver.
+    - Directly accepts bio data structure and returns them.
+
+All of them have a completion queue for each core in the system.
+
+II. Module parameters applicable for all instances:
+
+queue_mode=[0-2]: Default: 2-Multi-queue
+  Selects which block-layer the module should instantiate with.
+
+  0: Bio-based.
+  1: Single-queue.
+  2: Multi-queue.
+
+home_node=[0--nr_nodes]: Default: NUMA_NO_NODE
+  Selects what CPU node the data structures are allocated from.
+
+gb=[Size in GB]: Default: 250GB
+  The size of the device reported to the system.
+
+bs=[Block size (in bytes)]: Default: 512 bytes
+  The block size reported to the system.
+
+nr_devices=[Number of devices]: Default: 2
+  Number of block devices instantiated. They are instantiated as /dev/nullb0,
+  etc.
+
+irq_mode=[0-2]: Default: 1-Soft-irq
+  The completion mode used for completing IOs to the block-layer.
+
+  0: None.
+  1: Soft-irq. Uses IPI to complete IOs across CPU nodes. Simulates the overhead
+     when IOs are issued from another CPU node than the home the device is
+     connected to.
+  2: Timer: Waits a specific period (completion_nsec) for each IO before
+     completion.
+
+completion_nsec=[ns]: Default: 10.000ns
+  Combined with irq_mode=2 (timer). The time each completion event must wait.
+
+submit_queues=[0..nr_cpus]:
+  The number of submission queues attached to the device driver. If unset, it
+  defaults to 1 on single-queue and bio-based instances. For multi-queue,
+  it is ignored when use_per_node_hctx module parameter is 1.
+
+hw_queue_depth=[0..qdepth]: Default: 64
+  The hardware queue depth of the device.
+
+III: Multi-queue specific parameters
+
+use_per_node_hctx=[0/1]: Default: 0
+  0: The number of submit queues are set to the value of the submit_queues
+     parameter.
+  1: The multi-queue block layer is instantiated with a hardware dispatch
+     queue for each CPU node in the system.
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 50680a59a2ff..b9e9bd854298 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1529,6 +1529,8 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
                         * atapi_dmadir: Enable ATAPI DMADIR bridge support
 
+                        * disable: Disable this device.
+
                         If there are multiple matching configurations changing
                         the same attribute, the last one is used.
 
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2b40e04d3c49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+                        ==============================
+                        KERNEL MODULE SIGNING FACILITY
+                        ==============================
+
+CONTENTS
+
+ - Overview.
+ - Configuring module signing.
+ - Generating signing keys.
+ - Public keys in the kernel.
+ - Manually signing modules.
+ - Signed modules and stripping.
+ - Loading signed modules.
+ - Non-valid signatures and unsigned modules.
+ - Administering/protecting the private key.
+
+
+========
+OVERVIEW
+========
+
+The kernel module signing facility cryptographically signs modules during
+installation and then checks the signature upon loading the module.  This
+allows increased kernel security by disallowing the loading of unsigned modules
+or modules signed with an invalid key.  Module signing increases security by
+making it harder to load a malicious module into the kernel.  The module
+signature checking is done by the kernel so that it is not necessary to have
+trusted userspace bits.
+
+This facility uses X.509 ITU-T standard certificates to encode the public keys
+involved.  The signatures are not themselves encoded in any industrial standard
+type.  The facility currently only supports the RSA public key encryption
+standard (though it is pluggable and permits others to be used).  The possible
+hash algorithms that can be used are SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
+SHA-512 (the algorithm is selected by data in the signature).
+
+
+==========================
+CONFIGURING MODULE SIGNING
+==========================
+
+The module signing facility is enabled by going to the "Enable Loadable Module
+Support" section of the kernel configuration and turning on
+
+        CONFIG_MODULE_SIG       "Module signature verification"
+
+This has a number of options available:
+
+ (1) "Require modules to be validly signed" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE)
+
+     This specifies how the kernel should deal with a module that has a
+     signature for which the key is not known or a module that is unsigned.
+
+     If this is off (ie. "permissive"), then modules for which the key is not
+     available and modules that are unsigned are permitted, but the kernel will
+     be marked as being tainted.
+
+     If this is on (ie. "restrictive"), only modules that have a valid
+     signature that can be verified by a public key in the kernel's possession
+     will be loaded.  All other modules will generate an error.
+
+     Irrespective of the setting here, if the module has a signature block that
+     cannot be parsed, it will be rejected out of hand.
+
+
+ (2) "Automatically sign all modules" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL)
+
+     If this is on then modules will be automatically signed during the
+     modules_install phase of a build.  If this is off, then the modules must
+     be signed manually using:
+
+        scripts/sign-file
+
+
+ (3) "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
+
+     This presents a choice of which hash algorithm the installation phase will
+     sign the modules with:
+
+        CONFIG_SIG_SHA1         "Sign modules with SHA-1"
+        CONFIG_SIG_SHA224       "Sign modules with SHA-224"
+        CONFIG_SIG_SHA256       "Sign modules with SHA-256"
+        CONFIG_SIG_SHA384       "Sign modules with SHA-384"
+        CONFIG_SIG_SHA512       "Sign modules with SHA-512"
+
+     The algorithm selected here will also be built into the kernel (rather
+     than being a module) so that modules signed with that algorithm can have
+     their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop.
+
+
+=======================
+GENERATING SIGNING KEYS
+=======================
+
+Cryptographic keypairs are required to generate and check signatures.  A
+private key is used to generate a signature and the corresponding public key is
+used to check it.  The private key is only needed during the build, after which
+it can be deleted or stored securely.  The public key gets built into the
+kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are
+loaded.
+
+Under normal conditions, the kernel build will automatically generate a new
+keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files:
+
+        signing_key.priv
+        signing_key.x509
+
+during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built
+into vmlinux) using parameters in the:
+
+        x509.genkey
+
+file (which is also generated if it does not already exist).
+
+It is strongly recommended that you provide your own x509.genkey file.
+
+Most notably, in the x509.genkey file, the req_distinguished_name section
+should be altered from the default:
+
+        [ req_distinguished_name ]
+        O = Magrathea
+        CN = Glacier signing key
+        emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2
+
+The generated RSA key size can also be set with:
+
+        [ req ]
+        default_bits = 4096
+
+
+It is also possible to manually generate the key private/public files using the
+x509.genkey key generation configuration file in the root node of the Linux
+kernel sources tree and the openssl command.  The following is an example to
+generate the public/private key files:
+
+        openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
+           -config x509.genkey -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
+           -keyout signing_key.priv
+
+
+=========================
+PUBLIC KEYS IN THE KERNEL
+=========================
+
+The kernel contains a ring of public keys that can be viewed by root.  They're
+in a keyring called ".system_keyring" that can be seen by:
+
+        [root@deneb ~]# cat /proc/keys
+        ...
+        223c7853 I------     1 perm 1f030000     0     0 keyring   .system_keyring: 1
+        302d2d52 I------     1 perm 1f010000     0     0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 []
+        ...
+
+Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, any file
+placed in the kernel source root directory or the kernel build root directory
+whose name is suffixed with ".x509" will be assumed to be an X.509 public key
+and will be added to the keyring.
+
+Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and
+add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database).
+
+Finally, it is possible to add additional public keys by doing:
+
+        keyctl padd asymmetric "" [.system_keyring-ID] <[key-file]
+
+e.g.:
+
+        keyctl padd asymmetric "" 0x223c7853 <my_public_key.x509
+
+Note, however, that the kernel will only permit keys to be added to
+.system_keyring _if_ the new key's X.509 wrapper is validly signed by a key
+that is already resident in the .system_keyring at the time the key was added.
+
+
+=========================
+MANUALLY SIGNING MODULES
+=========================
+
+To manually sign a module, use the scripts/sign-file tool available in
+the Linux kernel source tree.  The script requires 4 arguments:
+
+        1.  The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256)
+        2.  The private key filename
+        3.  The public key filename
+        4.  The kernel module to be signed
+
+The following is an example to sign a kernel module:
+
+        scripts/sign-file sha512 kernel-signkey.priv \
+                kernel-signkey.x509 module.ko
+
+The hash algorithm used does not have to match the one configured, but if it
+doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the
+kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself.
+
+
+============================
+SIGNED MODULES AND STRIPPING
+============================
+
+A signed module has a digital signature simply appended at the end.  The string
+"~Module signature appended~." at the end of the module's file confirms that a
+signature is present but it does not confirm that the signature is valid!
+
+Signed modules are BRITTLE as the signature is outside of the defined ELF
+container.  Thus they MAY NOT be stripped once the signature is computed and
+attached.  Note the entire module is the signed payload, including any and all
+debug information present at the time of signing.
+
+
+======================
+LOADING SIGNED MODULES
+======================
+
+Modules are loaded with insmod, modprobe, init_module() or finit_module(),
+exactly as for unsigned modules as no processing is done in userspace.  The
+signature checking is all done within the kernel.
+
+
+=========================================
+NON-VALID SIGNATURES AND UNSIGNED MODULES
+=========================================
+
+If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled or enforcemodulesig=1 is supplied on
+the kernel command line, the kernel will only load validly signed modules
+for which it has a public key.   Otherwise, it will also load modules that are
+unsigned.   Any module for which the kernel has a key, but which proves to have
+a signature mismatch will not be permitted to load.
+
+Any module that has an unparseable signature will be rejected.
+
+
+=========================================
+ADMINISTERING/PROTECTING THE PRIVATE KEY
+=========================================
+
+Since the private key is used to sign modules, viruses and malware could use
+the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system.  The
+private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept
+in the root node of the kernel source tree.