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authorMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>2005-09-09 16:10:27 -0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2005-09-09 17:03:44 -0400
commit334f485df85ac7736ebe14940bf0a059c5f26d7d (patch)
tree754e5528289048a7104f4c1b431cebc1df16e2ce /Documentation
parentd8a5ba45457e4a22aa39c939121efd7bb6c76672 (diff)
[PATCH] FUSE - device functions
This adds the FUSE device handling functions. This contains the following files: o dev.c - fuse device operations (read, write, release, poll) - registers misc device - support for sending requests to userspace Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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1Definitions
2~~~~~~~~~~~
3
4Userspace filesystem:
5
6 A filesystem in which data and metadata are provided by an ordinary
7 userspace process. The filesystem can be accessed normally through
8 the kernel interface.
9
10Filesystem daemon:
11
12 The process(es) providing the data and metadata of the filesystem.
13
14Non-privileged mount (or user mount):
15
16 A userspace filesystem mounted by a non-privileged (non-root) user.
17 The filesystem daemon is running with the privileges of the mounting
18 user. NOTE: this is not the same as mounts allowed with the "user"
19 option in /etc/fstab, which is not discussed here.
20
21Mount owner:
22
23 The user who does the mounting.
24
25User:
26
27 The user who is performing filesystem operations.
28
29What is FUSE?
30~~~~~~~~~~~~~
31
32FUSE is a userspace filesystem framework. It consists of a kernel
33module (fuse.ko), a userspace library (libfuse.*) and a mount utility
34(fusermount).
35
36One of the most important features of FUSE is allowing secure,
37non-privileged mounts. This opens up new possibilities for the use of
38filesystems. A good example is sshfs: a secure network filesystem
39using the sftp protocol.
40
41The userspace library and utilities are available from the FUSE
42homepage:
43
44 http://fuse.sourceforge.net/
45
46Mount options
47~~~~~~~~~~~~~
48
49'fd=N'
50
51 The file descriptor to use for communication between the userspace
52 filesystem and the kernel. The file descriptor must have been
53 obtained by opening the FUSE device ('/dev/fuse').
54
55'rootmode=M'
56
57 The file mode of the filesystem's root in octal representation.
58
59'user_id=N'
60
61 The numeric user id of the mount owner.
62
63'group_id=N'
64
65 The numeric group id of the mount owner.
66
67'default_permissions'
68
69 By default FUSE doesn't check file access permissions, the
70 filesystem is free to implement it's access policy or leave it to
71 the underlying file access mechanism (e.g. in case of network
72 filesystems). This option enables permission checking, restricting
73 access based on file mode. This is option is usually useful
74 together with the 'allow_other' mount option.
75
76'allow_other'
77
78 This option overrides the security measure restricting file access
79 to the user mounting the filesystem. This option is by default only
80 allowed to root, but this restriction can be removed with a
81 (userspace) configuration option.
82
83'kernel_cache'
84
85 This option disables flushing the cache of the file contents on
86 every open(). This should only be enabled on filesystems, where the
87 file data is never changed externally (not through the mounted FUSE
88 filesystem). Thus it is not suitable for network filesystems and
89 other "intermediate" filesystems.
90
91 NOTE: if this option is not specified (and neither 'direct_io') data
92 is still cached after the open(), so a read() system call will not
93 always initiate a read operation.
94
95'direct_io'
96
97 This option disables the use of page cache (file content cache) in
98 the kernel for this filesystem. This has several affects:
99
100 - Each read() or write() system call will initiate one or more
101 read or write operations, data will not be cached in the
102 kernel.
103
104 - The return value of the read() and write() system calls will
105 correspond to the return values of the read and write
106 operations. This is useful for example if the file size is not
107 known in advance (before reading it).
108
109'max_read=N'
110
111 With this option the maximum size of read operations can be set.
112 The default is infinite. Note that the size of read requests is
113 limited anyway to 32 pages (which is 128kbyte on i386).
114
115How do non-privileged mounts work?
116~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
117
118Since the mount() system call is a privileged operation, a helper
119program (fusermount) is needed, which is installed setuid root.
120
121The implication of providing non-privileged mounts is that the mount
122owner must not be able to use this capability to compromise the
123system. Obvious requirements arising from this are:
124
125 A) mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the
126 help of the mounted filesystem
127
128 B) mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from
129 other users' and the super user's processes
130
131 C) mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in
132 other users' or the super user's processes
133
134How are requirements fulfilled?
135~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
136
137 A) The mount owner could gain elevated privileges by either:
138
139 1) creating a filesystem containing a device file, then opening
140 this device
141
142 2) creating a filesystem containing a suid or sgid application,
143 then executing this application
144
145 The solution is not to allow opening device files and ignore
146 setuid and setgid bits when executing programs. To ensure this
147 fusermount always adds "nosuid" and "nodev" to the mount options
148 for non-privileged mounts.
149
150 B) If another user is accessing files or directories in the
151 filesystem, the filesystem daemon serving requests can record the
152 exact sequence and timing of operations performed. This
153 information is otherwise inaccessible to the mount owner, so this
154 counts as an information leak.
155
156 The solution to this problem will be presented in point 2) of C).
157
158 C) There are several ways in which the mount owner can induce
159 undesired behavior in other users' processes, such as:
160
161 1) mounting a filesystem over a file or directory which the mount
162 owner could otherwise not be able to modify (or could only
163 make limited modifications).
164
165 This is solved in fusermount, by checking the access
166 permissions on the mountpoint and only allowing the mount if
167 the mount owner can do unlimited modification (has write
168 access to the mountpoint, and mountpoint is not a "sticky"
169 directory)
170
171 2) Even if 1) is solved the mount owner can change the behavior
172 of other users' processes.
173
174 i) It can slow down or indefinitely delay the execution of a
175 filesystem operation creating a DoS against the user or the
176 whole system. For example a suid application locking a
177 system file, and then accessing a file on the mount owner's
178 filesystem could be stopped, and thus causing the system
179 file to be locked forever.
180
181 ii) It can present files or directories of unlimited length, or
182 directory structures of unlimited depth, possibly causing a
183 system process to eat up diskspace, memory or other
184 resources, again causing DoS.
185
186 The solution to this as well as B) is not to allow processes
187 to access the filesystem, which could otherwise not be
188 monitored or manipulated by the mount owner. Since if the
189 mount owner can ptrace a process, it can do all of the above
190 without using a FUSE mount, the same criteria as used in
191 ptrace can be used to check if a process is allowed to access
192 the filesystem or not.
193
194 Note that the ptrace check is not strictly necessary to
195 prevent B/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough
196 privilege to send signal to the process accessing the
197 filesystem, since SIGSTOP can be used to get a similar effect.
198
199I think these limitations are unacceptable?
200~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
201
202If a sysadmin trusts the users enough, or can ensure through other
203measures, that system processes will never enter non-privileged
204mounts, it can relax the last limitation with a "user_allow_other"
205config option. If this config option is set, the mounting user can
206add the "allow_other" mount option which disables the check for other
207users' processes.
208
209Kernel - userspace interface
210~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
211
212The following diagram shows how a filesystem operation (in this
213example unlink) is performed in FUSE.
214
215NOTE: everything in this description is greatly simplified
216
217 | "rm /mnt/fuse/file" | FUSE filesystem daemon
218 | |
219 | | >sys_read()
220 | | >fuse_dev_read()
221 | | >request_wait()
222 | | [sleep on fc->waitq]
223 | |
224 | >sys_unlink() |
225 | >fuse_unlink() |
226 | [get request from |
227 | fc->unused_list] |
228 | >request_send() |
229 | [queue req on fc->pending] |
230 | [wake up fc->waitq] | [woken up]
231 | >request_wait_answer() |
232 | [sleep on req->waitq] |
233 | | <request_wait()
234 | | [remove req from fc->pending]
235 | | [copy req to read buffer]
236 | | [add req to fc->processing]
237 | | <fuse_dev_read()
238 | | <sys_read()
239 | |
240 | | [perform unlink]
241 | |
242 | | >sys_write()
243 | | >fuse_dev_write()
244 | | [look up req in fc->processing]
245 | | [remove from fc->processing]
246 | | [copy write buffer to req]
247 | [woken up] | [wake up req->waitq]
248 | | <fuse_dev_write()
249 | | <sys_write()
250 | <request_wait_answer() |
251 | <request_send() |
252 | [add request to |
253 | fc->unused_list] |
254 | <fuse_unlink() |
255 | <sys_unlink() |
256
257There are a couple of ways in which to deadlock a FUSE filesystem.
258Since we are talking about unprivileged userspace programs,
259something must be done about these.
260
261Scenario 1 - Simple deadlock
262-----------------------------
263
264 | "rm /mnt/fuse/file" | FUSE filesystem daemon
265 | |
266 | >sys_unlink("/mnt/fuse/file") |
267 | [acquire inode semaphore |
268 | for "file"] |
269 | >fuse_unlink() |
270 | [sleep on req->waitq] |
271 | | <sys_read()
272 | | >sys_unlink("/mnt/fuse/file")
273 | | [acquire inode semaphore
274 | | for "file"]
275 | | *DEADLOCK*
276
277The solution for this is to allow requests to be interrupted while
278they are in userspace:
279
280 | [interrupted by signal] |
281 | <fuse_unlink() |
282 | [release semaphore] | [semaphore acquired]
283 | <sys_unlink() |
284 | | >fuse_unlink()
285 | | [queue req on fc->pending]
286 | | [wake up fc->waitq]
287 | | [sleep on req->waitq]
288
289If the filesystem daemon was single threaded, this will stop here,
290since there's no other thread to dequeue and execute the request.
291In this case the solution is to kill the FUSE daemon as well. If
292there are multiple serving threads, you just have to kill them as
293long as any remain.
294
295Moral: a filesystem which deadlocks, can soon find itself dead.
296
297Scenario 2 - Tricky deadlock
298----------------------------
299
300This one needs a carefully crafted filesystem. It's a variation on
301the above, only the call back to the filesystem is not explicit,
302but is caused by a pagefault.
303
304 | Kamikaze filesystem thread 1 | Kamikaze filesystem thread 2
305 | |
306 | [fd = open("/mnt/fuse/file")] | [request served normally]
307 | [mmap fd to 'addr'] |
308 | [close fd] | [FLUSH triggers 'magic' flag]
309 | [read a byte from addr] |
310 | >do_page_fault() |
311 | [find or create page] |
312 | [lock page] |
313 | >fuse_readpage() |
314 | [queue READ request] |
315 | [sleep on req->waitq] |
316 | | [read request to buffer]
317 | | [create reply header before addr]
318 | | >sys_write(addr - headerlength)
319 | | >fuse_dev_write()
320 | | [look up req in fc->processing]
321 | | [remove from fc->processing]
322 | | [copy write buffer to req]
323 | | >do_page_fault()
324 | | [find or create page]
325 | | [lock page]
326 | | * DEADLOCK *
327
328Solution is again to let the the request be interrupted (not
329elaborated further).
330
331An additional problem is that while the write buffer is being
332copied to the request, the request must not be interrupted. This
333is because the destination address of the copy may not be valid
334after the request is interrupted.
335
336This is solved with doing the copy atomically, and allowing
337interruption while the page(s) belonging to the write buffer are
338faulted with get_user_pages(). The 'req->locked' flag indicates
339when the copy is taking place, and interruption is delayed until
340this flag is unset.
341