diff options
author | Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky@linux.intel.com> | 2007-07-31 23:34:08 -0400 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> | 2007-10-12 17:55:08 -0400 |
commit | 732bb9ee8195053a7dc00b9eec7be48891ad8668 (patch) | |
tree | b48810ba9716c8a5cbd228e4a8b572ac6c5ec514 /Documentation/usb/authorization.txt | |
parent | e03f2e8a530e0ed46af43093e23a70b7c7215263 (diff) |
usb: document device authorization
Signed-off-by: Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/usb/authorization.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/usb/authorization.txt | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/usb/authorization.txt b/Documentation/usb/authorization.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2af400609498 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/usb/authorization.txt | |||
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1 | |||
2 | Authorizing (or not) your USB devices to connect to the system | ||
3 | |||
4 | (C) 2007 Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky@linux.intel.com> Intel Corporation | ||
5 | |||
6 | This feature allows you to control if a USB device can be used (or | ||
7 | not) in a system. This feature will allow you to implement a lock-down | ||
8 | of USB devices, fully controlled by user space. | ||
9 | |||
10 | As of now, when a USB device is connected it is configured and | ||
11 | it's interfaces inmediately made available to the users. With this | ||
12 | modification, only if root authorizes the device to be configured will | ||
13 | then it be possible to use it. | ||
14 | |||
15 | Usage: | ||
16 | |||
17 | Authorize a device to connect: | ||
18 | |||
19 | $ echo 1 > /sys/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized | ||
20 | |||
21 | Deauthorize a device: | ||
22 | |||
23 | $ echo 0 > /sys/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized | ||
24 | |||
25 | Set new devices connected to hostX to be deauthorized by default (ie: | ||
26 | lock down): | ||
27 | |||
28 | $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/devices/usbX/authorized_default | ||
29 | |||
30 | Remove the lock down: | ||
31 | |||
32 | $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/devices/usbX/authorized_default | ||
33 | |||
34 | By default, Wired USB devices are authorized by default to | ||
35 | connect. Wireless USB hosts deauthorize by default all new connected | ||
36 | devices (this is so because we need to do an authentication phase | ||
37 | before authorizing). | ||
38 | |||
39 | |||
40 | Example system lockdown (lame) | ||
41 | ----------------------- | ||
42 | |||
43 | Imagine you want to implement a lockdown so only devices of type XYZ | ||
44 | can be connected (for example, it is a kiosk machine with a visible | ||
45 | USB port): | ||
46 | |||
47 | boot up | ||
48 | rc.local -> | ||
49 | |||
50 | for host in /sys/bus/devices/usb* | ||
51 | do | ||
52 | echo 0 > $host/authorized_default | ||
53 | done | ||
54 | |||
55 | Hookup an script to udev, for new USB devices | ||
56 | |||
57 | if device_is_my_type $DEV | ||
58 | then | ||
59 | echo 1 > $device_path/authorized | ||
60 | done | ||
61 | |||
62 | |||
63 | Now, device_is_my_type() is where the juice for a lockdown is. Just | ||
64 | checking if the class, type and protocol match something is the worse | ||
65 | security verification you can make (or the best, for someone willing | ||
66 | to break it). If you need something secure, use crypto and Certificate | ||
67 | Authentication or stuff like that. Something simple for an storage key | ||
68 | could be: | ||
69 | |||
70 | function device_is_my_type() | ||
71 | { | ||
72 | echo 1 > authorized # temporarily authorize it | ||
73 | # FIXME: make sure none can mount it | ||
74 | mount DEVICENODE /mntpoint | ||
75 | sum=$(md5sum /mntpoint/.signature) | ||
76 | if [ $sum = $(cat /etc/lockdown/keysum) ] | ||
77 | then | ||
78 | echo "We are good, connected" | ||
79 | umount /mntpoint | ||
80 | # Other stuff so others can use it | ||
81 | else | ||
82 | echo 0 > authorized | ||
83 | fi | ||
84 | } | ||
85 | |||
86 | |||
87 | Of course, this is lame, you'd want to do a real certificate | ||
88 | verification stuff with PKI, so you don't depend on a shared secret, | ||
89 | etc, but you get the idea. Anybody with access to a device gadget kit | ||
90 | can fake descriptors and device info. Don't trust that. You are | ||
91 | welcome. | ||
92 | |||