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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2012-07-30 17:39:15 -0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-07-30 20:25:11 -0400
commit9520628e8ceb69fa9a4aee6b57f22675d9e1b709 (patch)
treec8e1dbd5820e818eef930cf55cbd94dec941eb44 /Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
parent779302e67835fe9a6b74327e54969ba59cb3478a (diff)
fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path
When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with user-controlled content. This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges. $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable 2 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern core $ ulimit -c unlimited $ cd / $ ls -l core ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory $ touch core touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 & $ pid=$! $ sleep 1 $ kill -SEGV $pid $ ls -l core -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core $ sudo strings core | grep evil OHAI=evil-string-here While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read any file present and skip unparsable lines. Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk via relative path). Most users of mode 2 (e.g. Chrome OS) already use a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them. For the situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths. If a relative path is defined (e.g. the default "core" pattern), dump attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully qualified path. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt18
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index 13d6166d7a27..8c235b6e4246 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -163,16 +163,22 @@ This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
163or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 163or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
164 164
1650 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed 1650 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
166 privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 166 privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped.
1671 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is 1671 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
168 owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is 168 owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is
169 intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 169 intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.
170 This is insecure as it allows regular users to examine the memory
171 contents of privileged processes.
1702 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped 1722 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
171 readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove 173 anyway, but only if the "core_pattern" kernel sysctl is set to
172 such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons 174 either a pipe handler or a fully qualified path. (For more details
173 core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or 175 on this limitation, see CVE-2006-2451.) This mode is appropriate
174 other files. This mode is appropriate when administrators are 176 when administrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal
175 attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. 177 environment, and either have a core dump pipe handler that knows
178 to treat privileged core dumps with care, or specific directory
179 defined for catching core dumps. If a core dump happens without
180 a pipe handler or fully qualifid path, a message will be emitted
181 to syslog warning about the lack of a correct setting.
176 182
177============================================================== 183==============================================================
178 184