diff options
author | Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | 2006-03-27 04:16:23 -0500 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> | 2006-03-27 11:44:49 -0500 |
commit | 2eec9ad91f71a3dbacece5c4fb5adc09fad53a96 (patch) | |
tree | 4e4e9373c6d3e2b2d0d0e18d563fbf7d1faea52e /Documentation/robust-futexes.txt | |
parent | 0771dfefc9e538f077d0b43b6dec19a5a67d0e70 (diff) |
[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: docs
Add robust-futex documentation.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/robust-futexes.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/robust-futexes.txt | 218 |
1 files changed, 218 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt b/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7aecc67b1361 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt | |||
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1 | Started by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> | ||
2 | |||
3 | Background | ||
4 | ---------- | ||
5 | |||
6 | what are robust futexes? To answer that, we first need to understand | ||
7 | what futexes are: normal futexes are special types of locks that in the | ||
8 | noncontended case can be acquired/released from userspace without having | ||
9 | to enter the kernel. | ||
10 | |||
11 | A futex is in essence a user-space address, e.g. a 32-bit lock variable | ||
12 | field. If userspace notices contention (the lock is already owned and | ||
13 | someone else wants to grab it too) then the lock is marked with a value | ||
14 | that says "there's a waiter pending", and the sys_futex(FUTEX_WAIT) | ||
15 | syscall is used to wait for the other guy to release it. The kernel | ||
16 | creates a 'futex queue' internally, so that it can later on match up the | ||
17 | waiter with the waker - without them having to know about each other. | ||
18 | When the owner thread releases the futex, it notices (via the variable | ||
19 | value) that there were waiter(s) pending, and does the | ||
20 | sys_futex(FUTEX_WAKE) syscall to wake them up. Once all waiters have | ||
21 | taken and released the lock, the futex is again back to 'uncontended' | ||
22 | state, and there's no in-kernel state associated with it. The kernel | ||
23 | completely forgets that there ever was a futex at that address. This | ||
24 | method makes futexes very lightweight and scalable. | ||
25 | |||
26 | "Robustness" is about dealing with crashes while holding a lock: if a | ||
27 | process exits prematurely while holding a pthread_mutex_t lock that is | ||
28 | also shared with some other process (e.g. yum segfaults while holding a | ||
29 | pthread_mutex_t, or yum is kill -9-ed), then waiters for that lock need | ||
30 | to be notified that the last owner of the lock exited in some irregular | ||
31 | way. | ||
32 | |||
33 | To solve such types of problems, "robust mutex" userspace APIs were | ||
34 | created: pthread_mutex_lock() returns an error value if the owner exits | ||
35 | prematurely - and the new owner can decide whether the data protected by | ||
36 | the lock can be recovered safely. | ||
37 | |||
38 | There is a big conceptual problem with futex based mutexes though: it is | ||
39 | the kernel that destroys the owner task (e.g. due to a SEGFAULT), but | ||
40 | the kernel cannot help with the cleanup: if there is no 'futex queue' | ||
41 | (and in most cases there is none, futexes being fast lightweight locks) | ||
42 | then the kernel has no information to clean up after the held lock! | ||
43 | Userspace has no chance to clean up after the lock either - userspace is | ||
44 | the one that crashes, so it has no opportunity to clean up. Catch-22. | ||
45 | |||
46 | In practice, when e.g. yum is kill -9-ed (or segfaults), a system reboot | ||
47 | is needed to release that futex based lock. This is one of the leading | ||
48 | bugreports against yum. | ||
49 | |||
50 | To solve this problem, the traditional approach was to extend the vma | ||
51 | (virtual memory area descriptor) concept to have a notion of 'pending | ||
52 | robust futexes attached to this area'. This approach requires 3 new | ||
53 | syscall variants to sys_futex(): FUTEX_REGISTER, FUTEX_DEREGISTER and | ||
54 | FUTEX_RECOVER. At do_exit() time, all vmas are searched to see whether | ||
55 | they have a robust_head set. This approach has two fundamental problems | ||
56 | left: | ||
57 | |||
58 | - it has quite complex locking and race scenarios. The vma-based | ||
59 | approach had been pending for years, but they are still not completely | ||
60 | reliable. | ||
61 | |||
62 | - they have to scan _every_ vma at sys_exit() time, per thread! | ||
63 | |||
64 | The second disadvantage is a real killer: pthread_exit() takes around 1 | ||
65 | microsecond on Linux, but with thousands (or tens of thousands) of vmas | ||
66 | every pthread_exit() takes a millisecond or more, also totally | ||
67 | destroying the CPU's L1 and L2 caches! | ||
68 | |||
69 | This is very much noticeable even for normal process sys_exit_group() | ||
70 | calls: the kernel has to do the vma scanning unconditionally! (this is | ||
71 | because the kernel has no knowledge about how many robust futexes there | ||
72 | are to be cleaned up, because a robust futex might have been registered | ||
73 | in another task, and the futex variable might have been simply mmap()-ed | ||
74 | into this process's address space). | ||
75 | |||
76 | This huge overhead forced the creation of CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST so that | ||
77 | normal kernels can turn it off, but worse than that: the overhead makes | ||
78 | robust futexes impractical for any type of generic Linux distribution. | ||
79 | |||
80 | So something had to be done. | ||
81 | |||
82 | New approach to robust futexes | ||
83 | ------------------------------ | ||
84 | |||
85 | At the heart of this new approach there is a per-thread private list of | ||
86 | robust locks that userspace is holding (maintained by glibc) - which | ||
87 | userspace list is registered with the kernel via a new syscall [this | ||
88 | registration happens at most once per thread lifetime]. At do_exit() | ||
89 | time, the kernel checks this user-space list: are there any robust futex | ||
90 | locks to be cleaned up? | ||
91 | |||
92 | In the common case, at do_exit() time, there is no list registered, so | ||
93 | the cost of robust futexes is just a simple current->robust_list != NULL | ||
94 | comparison. If the thread has registered a list, then normally the list | ||
95 | is empty. If the thread/process crashed or terminated in some incorrect | ||
96 | way then the list might be non-empty: in this case the kernel carefully | ||
97 | walks the list [not trusting it], and marks all locks that are owned by | ||
98 | this thread with the FUTEX_OWNER_DEAD bit, and wakes up one waiter (if | ||
99 | any). | ||
100 | |||
101 | The list is guaranteed to be private and per-thread at do_exit() time, | ||
102 | so it can be accessed by the kernel in a lockless way. | ||
103 | |||
104 | There is one race possible though: since adding to and removing from the | ||
105 | list is done after the futex is acquired by glibc, there is a few | ||
106 | instructions window for the thread (or process) to die there, leaving | ||
107 | the futex hung. To protect against this possibility, userspace (glibc) | ||
108 | also maintains a simple per-thread 'list_op_pending' field, to allow the | ||
109 | kernel to clean up if the thread dies after acquiring the lock, but just | ||
110 | before it could have added itself to the list. Glibc sets this | ||
111 | list_op_pending field before it tries to acquire the futex, and clears | ||
112 | it after the list-add (or list-remove) has finished. | ||
113 | |||
114 | That's all that is needed - all the rest of robust-futex cleanup is done | ||
115 | in userspace [just like with the previous patches]. | ||
116 | |||
117 | Ulrich Drepper has implemented the necessary glibc support for this new | ||
118 | mechanism, which fully enables robust mutexes. | ||
119 | |||
120 | Key differences of this userspace-list based approach, compared to the | ||
121 | vma based method: | ||
122 | |||
123 | - it's much, much faster: at thread exit time, there's no need to loop | ||
124 | over every vma (!), which the VM-based method has to do. Only a very | ||
125 | simple 'is the list empty' op is done. | ||
126 | |||
127 | - no VM changes are needed - 'struct address_space' is left alone. | ||
128 | |||
129 | - no registration of individual locks is needed: robust mutexes dont | ||
130 | need any extra per-lock syscalls. Robust mutexes thus become a very | ||
131 | lightweight primitive - so they dont force the application designer | ||
132 | to do a hard choice between performance and robustness - robust | ||
133 | mutexes are just as fast. | ||
134 | |||
135 | - no per-lock kernel allocation happens. | ||
136 | |||
137 | - no resource limits are needed. | ||
138 | |||
139 | - no kernel-space recovery call (FUTEX_RECOVER) is needed. | ||
140 | |||
141 | - the implementation and the locking is "obvious", and there are no | ||
142 | interactions with the VM. | ||
143 | |||
144 | Performance | ||
145 | ----------- | ||
146 | |||
147 | I have benchmarked the time needed for the kernel to process a list of 1 | ||
148 | million (!) held locks, using the new method [on a 2GHz CPU]: | ||
149 | |||
150 | - with FUTEX_WAIT set [contended mutex]: 130 msecs | ||
151 | - without FUTEX_WAIT set [uncontended mutex]: 30 msecs | ||
152 | |||
153 | I have also measured an approach where glibc does the lock notification | ||
154 | [which it currently does for !pshared robust mutexes], and that took 256 | ||
155 | msecs - clearly slower, due to the 1 million FUTEX_WAKE syscalls | ||
156 | userspace had to do. | ||
157 | |||
158 | (1 million held locks are unheard of - we expect at most a handful of | ||
159 | locks to be held at a time. Nevertheless it's nice to know that this | ||
160 | approach scales nicely.) | ||
161 | |||
162 | Implementation details | ||
163 | ---------------------- | ||
164 | |||
165 | The patch adds two new syscalls: one to register the userspace list, and | ||
166 | one to query the registered list pointer: | ||
167 | |||
168 | asmlinkage long | ||
169 | sys_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head, | ||
170 | size_t len); | ||
171 | |||
172 | asmlinkage long | ||
173 | sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user **head_ptr, | ||
174 | size_t __user *len_ptr); | ||
175 | |||
176 | List registration is very fast: the pointer is simply stored in | ||
177 | current->robust_list. [Note that in the future, if robust futexes become | ||
178 | widespread, we could extend sys_clone() to register a robust-list head | ||
179 | for new threads, without the need of another syscall.] | ||
180 | |||
181 | So there is virtually zero overhead for tasks not using robust futexes, | ||
182 | and even for robust futex users, there is only one extra syscall per | ||
183 | thread lifetime, and the cleanup operation, if it happens, is fast and | ||
184 | straightforward. The kernel doesnt have any internal distinction between | ||
185 | robust and normal futexes. | ||
186 | |||
187 | If a futex is found to be held at exit time, the kernel sets the | ||
188 | following bit of the futex word: | ||
189 | |||
190 | #define FUTEX_OWNER_DIED 0x40000000 | ||
191 | |||
192 | and wakes up the next futex waiter (if any). User-space does the rest of | ||
193 | the cleanup. | ||
194 | |||
195 | Otherwise, robust futexes are acquired by glibc by putting the TID into | ||
196 | the futex field atomically. Waiters set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit: | ||
197 | |||
198 | #define FUTEX_WAITERS 0x80000000 | ||
199 | |||
200 | and the remaining bits are for the TID. | ||
201 | |||
202 | Testing, architecture support | ||
203 | ----------------------------- | ||
204 | |||
205 | i've tested the new syscalls on x86 and x86_64, and have made sure the | ||
206 | parsing of the userspace list is robust [ ;-) ] even if the list is | ||
207 | deliberately corrupted. | ||
208 | |||
209 | i386 and x86_64 syscalls are wired up at the moment, and Ulrich has | ||
210 | tested the new glibc code (on x86_64 and i386), and it works for his | ||
211 | robust-mutex testcases. | ||
212 | |||
213 | All other architectures should build just fine too - but they wont have | ||
214 | the new syscalls yet. | ||
215 | |||
216 | Architectures need to implement the new futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inuser() | ||
217 | inline function before writing up the syscalls (that function returns | ||
218 | -ENOSYS right now). | ||