diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-01-10 19:42:48 -0500 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-01-10 19:42:48 -0500 |
commit | 40ba587923ae67090d9f141c1d3c951be5c1420e (patch) | |
tree | 342a72fc0ee13a0d2496ef970b64dfeadf1355d2 /Documentation/filesystems | |
parent | 54c2c5761febcca46c8037d3a81612991e6c209a (diff) | |
parent | 6b550f9495947fc279d12c38feaf98500e8d0646 (diff) |
Merge branch 'akpm' (aka "Andrew's patch-bomb")
Andrew elucidates:
- First installmeant of MM. We have a HUGE number of MM patches this
time. It's crazy.
- MAINTAINERS updates
- backlight updates
- leds
- checkpatch updates
- misc ELF stuff
- rtc updates
- reiserfs
- procfs
- some misc other bits
* akpm: (124 commits)
user namespace: make signal.c respect user namespaces
workqueue: make alloc_workqueue() take printf fmt and args for name
procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options
procfs: parse mount options
procfs: introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directory
procfs: make proc_get_link to use dentry instead of inode
signal: add block_sigmask() for adding sigmask to current->blocked
sparc: make SA_NOMASK a synonym of SA_NODEFER
reiserfs: don't lock root inode searching
reiserfs: don't lock journal_init()
reiserfs: delay reiserfs lock until journal initialization
reiserfs: delete comments referring to the BKL
drivers/rtc/interface.c: fix alarm rollover when day or month is out-of-range
drivers/rtc/rtc-twl.c: add DT support for RTC inside twl4030/twl6030
drivers/rtc/: remove redundant spi driver bus initialization
drivers/rtc/rtc-jz4740.c: make jz4740_rtc_driver static
drivers/rtc/rtc-mc13xxx.c: make mc13xxx_rtc_idtable static
rtc: convert drivers/rtc/* to use module_platform_driver()
drivers/rtc/rtc-wm831x.c: convert to devm_kzalloc()
drivers/rtc/rtc-wm831x.c: remove unused period IRQ handler
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/filesystems')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 39 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt index 0ec91f03422e..12fee132fbe2 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | |||
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ Table of Contents | |||
41 | 3.5 /proc/<pid>/mountinfo - Information about mounts | 41 | 3.5 /proc/<pid>/mountinfo - Information about mounts |
42 | 3.6 /proc/<pid>/comm & /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm | 42 | 3.6 /proc/<pid>/comm & /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm |
43 | 43 | ||
44 | 4 Configuring procfs | ||
45 | 4.1 Mount options | ||
44 | 46 | ||
45 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | 47 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
46 | Preface | 48 | Preface |
@@ -1542,3 +1544,40 @@ a task to set its own or one of its thread siblings comm value. The comm value | |||
1542 | is limited in size compared to the cmdline value, so writing anything longer | 1544 | is limited in size compared to the cmdline value, so writing anything longer |
1543 | then the kernel's TASK_COMM_LEN (currently 16 chars) will result in a truncated | 1545 | then the kernel's TASK_COMM_LEN (currently 16 chars) will result in a truncated |
1544 | comm value. | 1546 | comm value. |
1547 | |||
1548 | |||
1549 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ||
1550 | Configuring procfs | ||
1551 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ||
1552 | |||
1553 | 4.1 Mount options | ||
1554 | --------------------- | ||
1555 | |||
1556 | The following mount options are supported: | ||
1557 | |||
1558 | hidepid= Set /proc/<pid>/ access mode. | ||
1559 | gid= Set the group authorized to learn processes information. | ||
1560 | |||
1561 | hidepid=0 means classic mode - everybody may access all /proc/<pid>/ directories | ||
1562 | (default). | ||
1563 | |||
1564 | hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories but their | ||
1565 | own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected against | ||
1566 | other users. This makes it impossible to learn whether any user runs | ||
1567 | specific program (given the program doesn't reveal itself by its behaviour). | ||
1568 | As an additional bonus, as /proc/<pid>/cmdline is unaccessible for other users, | ||
1569 | poorly written programs passing sensitive information via program arguments are | ||
1570 | now protected against local eavesdroppers. | ||
1571 | |||
1572 | hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/<pid>/ will be fully invisible to other | ||
1573 | users. It doesn't mean that it hides a fact whether a process with a specific | ||
1574 | pid value exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by "kill -0 $PID"), | ||
1575 | but it hides process' uid and gid, which may be learned by stat()'ing | ||
1576 | /proc/<pid>/ otherwise. It greatly complicates an intruder's task of gathering | ||
1577 | information about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated | ||
1578 | privileges, whether other user runs some sensitive program, whether other users | ||
1579 | run any program at all, etc. | ||
1580 | |||
1581 | gid= defines a group authorized to learn processes information otherwise | ||
1582 | prohibited by hidepid=. If you use some daemon like identd which needs to learn | ||
1583 | information about processes information, just add identd to this group. | ||