Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security

* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
  capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
  security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
  ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
  capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
  capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
  capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
  capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
  capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
  capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
  capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
  capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
  capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
  selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
  selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
  selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
  selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
  selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
  selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
  SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()

Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():

 - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
   the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")

 - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
   userspace configuration API")

causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.

24 files changed, 120 insertions, 189 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index 3ba6ef508869..16f8693cc147 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
         link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
 
-        if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 106be0d08f81..a3cd8cad532a 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
         u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
 
         /* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
-        if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
+        if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
                 size = dev->cfg_size;
         } else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
                 size = 128;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
index 44f76e8b58af..c77628afbf9f 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
                         goto next_msg;
                 }
 
-                if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
                         err = -EPERM;
                         goto next_msg;
                 }
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 9252ee3b71e3..c602b8d20f06 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 
         state = *get_task_state(task);
         vsize = eip = esp = 0;
-        permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+        permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
         mm = get_task_mm(task);
         if (mm) {
                 vsize = task_vsize(mm);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a63d13d84ad8..12d52dedb229 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -380,7 +380,6 @@ struct user_namespace;
 struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
 
 extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
 extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
 
 /*
@@ -544,9 +543,10 @@ extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
 extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
                               struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+                                      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
 extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 40308969ed00..adadf71a7327 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -358,10 +358,12 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
 #define current_security()      (current_cred_xxx(security))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
+#define current_user_ns()       (current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
+#define task_user_ns(task)      (task_cred_xxx((task), user_ns))
 #else
 extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
-#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns)
+#define current_user_ns()       (&init_user_ns)
+#define task_user_ns(task)      (&init_user_ns)
 #endif
 
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 800f113bea66..a27e56ca41a4 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -127,8 +127,9 @@ extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
                           struct task_struct *new_parent);
 extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
 extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer);
-#define PTRACE_MODE_READ   1
-#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
+#define PTRACE_MODE_READ        0x01
+#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH      0x02
+#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT     0x04
 /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
 extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
 /* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0ccceb9b1046..83c18e8c846d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ struct user_namespace;
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
  */
-extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-                       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
 extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
 struct seq_file;
 
 extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
 void reset_security_ops(void);
 
@@ -799,12 +798,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
  *      Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
  *      is allowed to be transmitted.
- * @netlink_recv:
- *      Check permission before processing the received netlink message in
- *      @skb.
- *      @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
- *      @cap indicates the capability required
- *      Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
  * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
  *
@@ -1268,7 +1261,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * @capable:
  *      Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
  *      credentials.
- *      @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
  *      @cred contains the credentials to use.
  *      @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
  *      @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
@@ -1392,8 +1384,8 @@ struct security_operations {
                        const kernel_cap_t *effective,
                        const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
                        const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-        int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-                        struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+        int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                        int cap, int audit);
         int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
         int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
         int (*syslog) (int type);
@@ -1563,7 +1555,6 @@ struct security_operations {
                           struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
 
         int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-        int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
         void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
@@ -1675,12 +1666,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                     const kernel_cap_t *effective,
                     const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
                     const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
-                        int cap);
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
                         int cap);
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                        struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                             int cap);
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_syslog(int type);
@@ -1817,7 +1806,6 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
 int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1875,32 +1863,15 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
         return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
-                                   const struct cred *cred, int cap)
-{
-        return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
-}
-
-static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+                                   struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-        int ret;
-
-        rcu_read_lock();
-        ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
-        rcu_read_unlock();
-        return ret;
+        return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-static inline
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
-        int ret;
-
-        rcu_read_lock();
-        ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap,
-                               SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-        rcu_read_unlock();
-        return ret;
+static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred,
+                                           struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) {
+        return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
@@ -2517,11 +2488,6 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 }
 
-static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-        return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-
 static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2c1d6ab7106e..57e3f5107937 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -601,13 +601,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
         case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
         case AUDIT_TRIM:
         case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
-                if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+                if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
                         err = -EPERM;
                 break;
         case AUDIT_USER:
         case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
         case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
-                if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+                if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
                         err = -EPERM;
                 break;
         default:  /* bad msg */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index b463871a4e69..0fcf1c14a297 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,74 +287,84 @@ error:
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
  * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+                       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-        int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+        int ret;
+
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+        rcu_read_unlock();
 
         return (ret == 0);
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
  * @t: The task in question
- * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
-                       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
-        int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
-
-        return (ret == 0);
+        return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * in a specific user ns.
  * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not.  Don't write an
- * audit message for the check.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * Do not write an audit message for the check.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+                               struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-        int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+        int ret;
+
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+        rcu_read_unlock();
 
         return (ret == 0);
 }
 
 /**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
+ * initial user ns
+ * @t: The task in question
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not.  Don't write an
+ * audit message for the check.
  *
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool capable(int cap)
+bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
-        return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
+        return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 
 /**
  * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
@@ -374,7 +384,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
                 BUG();
         }
 
-        if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+        if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) {
                 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
                 return true;
         }
@@ -383,18 +393,20 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 
 /**
- * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
- * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
- * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
- * @cap: The capability in question.
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
  *
- *  Return true if it does, false otherwise.
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
  */
-bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool capable(int cap)
 {
-        return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
+        return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 
 /**
  * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 78ab24a7b0e4..00ab2ca5ed11 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
         return ret;
 }
 
+static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+{
+        if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+                return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+        else
+                return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
 int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
              cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
              cred->gid == tcred->gid))
                 goto ok;
-        if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+        if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user->user_ns, mode))
                 goto ok;
         rcu_read_unlock();
         return -EPERM;
@@ -207,7 +215,7 @@ ok:
         smp_rmb();
         if (task->mm)
                 dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
-        if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+        if (!dumpable  && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
@@ -277,7 +285,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
         task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
         if (seize)
                 task->ptrace |= PT_SEIZED;
-        if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+        if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                 task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
 
         __ptrace_link(task, current);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index fd7b25e90079..df00cb09263e 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4330,7 +4330,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
                 goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
         }
         retval = -EPERM;
-        if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+        if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE))
                 goto out_unlock;
 
         retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index dbf2ddafd52d..f16444bc6cbb 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         sz_idx = type>>2;
         kind = type&3;
 
-        if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (kind != 2 && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index 69975e0bcdea..1531135130db 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
         if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
                 return;
 
-        if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
         /* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
index a057fe64debd..94d45e1f8882 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
         if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
                 return;
 
-        if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
         spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
index fb80a23c6640..a34c9e4c792c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
         if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
                 return;
 
-        if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
         spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index b4f8d849480c..4d70785b953d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
         int type, err;
 
-        if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         /* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index a403b618faa5..c29d2568c9e0 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static int genl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
-            security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+            !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 637f11a1e4df..66b84fbf2746 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
 
         /* All operations require privileges, even GET */
-        if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 68d50c54e431..97ce8fae49b3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
-                            struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                            int cap, int audit)
 {
         struct aa_profile *profile;
         /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-        int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+        int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
         if (!error) {
                 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
                 if (!unconfined(profile))
-                        error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+                        error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
         }
         return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 3b5883b7179f..2f680eb02b59 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -998,7 +998,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
-        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f8486e5f5..7ce191ea29a0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -56,17 +56,8 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return 0;
 }
 
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-        if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
-                return -EPERM;
-        return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
  * @cred: The credentials to use
  * @ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
  * @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +71,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
  * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
  */
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-                struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+                int cap, int audit)
 {
         for (;;) {
                 /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +213,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
         /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
          * capability
          */
-        if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
-                        current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
-                        SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+        if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+                        CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
                 return 0;
         return 1;
 }
@@ -874,7 +864,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                      & (new->securebits ^ arg2))                        /*[1]*/
                     || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
-                    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+                    || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
                                     current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
                                     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)           /*[4]*/
                         /*
@@ -940,7 +930,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+        if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
                         SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -967,7 +957,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         int ret = 0;
 
         if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
-                ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+                ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
                                   SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
                 /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
                 if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 214502c772ab..d7542493454d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -155,35 +155,16 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                     effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
                      int cap)
 {
-        return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
-                                     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+        return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
-                          int cap)
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                             int cap)
 {
-        const struct cred *cred;
-        int ret;
-
-        cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
-        ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
-        put_cred(cred);
-        return ret;
-}
-
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                                  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
-        const struct cred *cred;
-        int ret;
-
-        cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
-        ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-        put_cred(cred);
-        return ret;
+        return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -994,12 +975,6 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
 }
 
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-        return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
-
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
         return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7cd4c3affac8..6a3683e28426 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1415,8 +1415,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
 #endif
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                               const struct cred *cred,
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
                                int cap, int audit)
 {
         struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1427,7 +1426,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
         int rc;
 
         COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-        ad.tsk = tsk;
+        ad.tsk = current;
         ad.u.cap = cap;
 
         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1811,7 +1810,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
+        if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
                 u32 sid = current_sid();
                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
@@ -1868,16 +1867,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
  */
 
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-                           struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                           int cap, int audit)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+        rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+        return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -1954,8 +1953,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
-                             &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+        rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (rc == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2859,8 +2857,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
          * in-core context value, not a denial.
          */
-        error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
-                                &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+        error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (!error)
                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2993,8 +2990,8 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
         case KDSKBENT:
         case KDSKBSENT:
-                error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
-                                        SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+                error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+                                            SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
                 break;
 
         /* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -4718,24 +4715,6 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 }
 
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
-{
-        int err;
-        struct common_audit_data ad;
-        u32 sid;
-
-        err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
-        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-        ad.u.cap = capability;
-
-        security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-        return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-                            CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
-}
-
 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
                               u16 sclass)
@@ -5464,7 +5443,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
 
         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
-        .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
 
         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,