[IPSEC]: Fix bogus usage of u64 on input sequence number

Al Viro spotted a bogus use of u64 on the input sequence number which
is big-endian.  This patch fixes it by giving the input sequence number
its own member in the xfrm_skb_cb structure.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

7 files changed, 15 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index ac72116636ca..eea7785cc757 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -508,7 +508,10 @@ struct xfrm_skb_cb {
         } header;
 
         /* Sequence number for replay protection. */
-        u64 seq;
+        union {
+                u64 output;
+                __be32 input;
+        } seq;
 };
 
 #define XFRM_SKB_CB(__skb) ((struct xfrm_skb_cb *)&((__skb)->cb[0]))
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ah4.c b/net/ipv4/ah4.c
index 9d4555ec0b59..8219b7e0968d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ah4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ah4.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int ah_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
         ah->reserved = 0;
         ah->spi = x->id.spi;
-        ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+        ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
 
         spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
         err = ah_mac_digest(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index 258d17631b4b..091e6709f831 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
         }
 
         esph->spi = x->id.spi;
-        esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+        esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
 
         sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
         skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
         aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
         aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
         aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
-        aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data, XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+        aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
+                              XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
 
         ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
         err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ah6.c b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
index 379c8e04c36c..2ff0c8233e47 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static int ah6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
         ah->reserved = 0;
         ah->spi = x->id.spi;
-        ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+        ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
 
         spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
         err = ah_mac_digest(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 8e0f1428c716..0ec1402320ea 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
         *skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_ESP;
 
         esph->spi = x->id.spi;
-        esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+        esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
 
         sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
         skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
@@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
         aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
         aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
         aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
-        aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data, XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+        aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
+                              XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
 
         ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
         err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 4d6ebc633a94..62188c6a06dd 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
         if (encap_type < 0) {
                 async = 1;
                 x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
-                seq = XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
+                seq = XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input;
                 goto resume;
         }
 
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 
                 spin_unlock(&x->lock);
 
-                XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = seq;
+                XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input = seq;
 
                 nexthdr = x->type->input(x, skb);
 
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
index fc690368325f..569d377932c4 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
                 }
 
                 if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT) {
-                        XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ++x->replay.oseq;
+                        XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output = ++x->replay.oseq;
                         if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0)) {
                                 XFRM_INC_STATS(LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATESEQERROR);
                                 x->replay.oseq--;