Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  Take ima_file_free() to proper place.
  ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK
  ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check
  ima: initialize ima before inodes can be allocated
  fix ima breakage
  Take ima_path_check() in nfsd past dentry_open() in nfsd_open()
  freeze_bdev: don't deactivate successfully frozen MS_RDONLY sb
  befs: fix leak

14 files changed, 123 insertions, 178 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6434f0df012e..6cd6daefaaed 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description:
                         lsm:    [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
                                  [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 
-                base:   func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+                base:   func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK]
                         mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
                         fsmagic:= hex value
                         uid:= decimal value
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description:
 
                         measure func=BPRM_CHECK
                         measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
-                        measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+                        measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
 
                 The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
                 all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
-                open for read by root in inode_permission.
+                open for read by root in do_filp_open.
 
                 Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description:
 
                         dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
                         dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
-                        measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
-                        measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+                        measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+                        measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
                 Smack:
-                        measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+                        measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
index 33baf27fac78..34ddda888e63 100644
--- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
+++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
@@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ befs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
         brelse(bh);
 
       unacquire_priv_sbp:
+        kfree(befs_sb->mount_opts.iocharset);
         kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
 
       unacquire_none:
diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c
index 73d6a735b8f3..d11d0289f3d2 100644
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ struct super_block *freeze_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
         if (!sb)
                 goto out;
         if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
-                deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+                sb->s_frozen = SB_FREEZE_TRANS;
+                up_write(&sb->s_umount);
                 mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
                 return sb;
         }
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
         BUG_ON(sb->s_bdev != bdev);
         down_write(&sb->s_umount);
         if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
-                goto out_deactivate;
+                goto out_unfrozen;
 
         if (sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs) {
                 error = sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs(sb);
@@ -321,11 +322,11 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
                 }
         }
 
+out_unfrozen:
         sb->s_frozen = SB_UNFROZEN;
         smp_wmb();
         wake_up(&sb->s_wait_unfrozen);
 
-out_deactivate:
         if (sb)
                 deactivate_locked_super(sb);
 out_unlock:
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 69652c5bd5f0..b98404b54383 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file)
         if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
                 file->f_op->release(inode, file);
         security_file_free(file);
+        ima_file_free(file);
         if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
                 cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
         fops_put(file->f_op);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 94a5e60779f9..d62fdc875f22 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1736,8 +1736,7 @@ do_last:
                 if (nd.root.mnt)
                         path_put(&nd.root);
                 if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
-                        error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
-                                       (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+                        error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
                         if (error) {
                                 fput(filp);
                                 filp = ERR_PTR(error);
@@ -1797,8 +1796,7 @@ ok:
         }
         filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
         if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
-                error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
-                               (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+                error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
                 if (error) {
                         fput(filp);
                         filp = ERR_PTR(error);
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index c194793b642b..97d79eff6b7f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
                             flags, current_cred());
         if (IS_ERR(*filp))
                 host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
+        host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, access);
 out_nfserr:
         err = nfserrno(host_err);
 out:
@@ -2127,7 +2128,6 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
          */
         path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt;
         path.dentry = dentry;
-        err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
 nfsd_out:
         return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 99dc6d5cf7e5..975837e7d6c0 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
 extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
-extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
+extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file);
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
         return;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index dac44a9356a5..4cb47a159f02 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -657,9 +657,9 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void)
         proc_caches_init();
         buffer_init();
         key_init();
+        radix_tree_init();
         security_init();
         vfs_caches_init(totalram_pages);
-        radix_tree_init();
         signals_init();
         /* rootfs populating might need page-writeback */
         page_writeback_init();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c41afe6639a0..47fb65d1fcbd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
                          const char *cause, int result, int info);
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
-void ima_iintcache_init(void);
 int ima_init(void);
 void ima_cleanup(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
 void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 3cd58b60afd2..2a5e0bcf3887 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out:
  * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *              subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *      subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- *      func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ *      func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
  *      mask: contains the permission mask
  *      fsmagic: hex value
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index fa592ff1ac1c..0d83edcfc402 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
         int rc = 0;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized)
-                return 0;
-
         iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
         if (!iint)
                 return -ENOMEM;
@@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized)
-                return;
         spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
         iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
         spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
@@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
         kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
 }
 
-void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
 {
         iint_cache =
             kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
                               SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+        return 0;
 }
+security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a89f44d5e030..294b005d6520 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  * File: ima_main.c
  *      implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- *      and ima_path_check.
+ *      and ima_file_check.
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ out:
         return found;
 }
 
+/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
+ *
+ * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
+ * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
+ * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *
+ * In either case invalidate the PCR.
+ */
+enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
+static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
+                                 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+                                 struct inode *inode,
+                                 const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+        switch (error) {
+        case TOMTOU:
+                if (iint->readcount > 0)
+                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+                                          "ToMToU");
+                break;
+        case OPEN_WRITERS:
+                if (iint->writecount > 0)
+                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+                                          "open_writers");
+                break;
+        }
+}
+
 /*
  * Update the counts given an fmode_t
  */
@@ -99,6 +129,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
 }
 
 /*
+ * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
+ * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ *      - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *        results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *      - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ *        could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+{
+        struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+        struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+        fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+        struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+        int rc;
+
+        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+                return;
+        iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+        if (!iint)
+                return;
+        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+        rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+        if (rc < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+                ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+                goto out;
+        }
+        ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+out:
+        ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
+        mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+        kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/*
  * Decrement ima counts
  */
 static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
@@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
         kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
 }
 
-/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
- *
- * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
- * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
- * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *
- * In either case invalidate the PCR.
- */
-enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
-static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
-                                 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
-                                 struct inode *inode,
-                                 const unsigned char *filename)
-{
-        switch (error) {
-        case TOMTOU:
-                if (iint->readcount > 0)
-                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
-                                          "ToMToU");
-                break;
-        case OPEN_WRITERS:
-                if (iint->writecount > 0)
-                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
-                                          "open_writers");
-                break;
-        }
-}
-
-static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-                                const unsigned char *filename)
-{
-        int rc = 0;
-
-        ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-
-        rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
-        if (!rc)
-                ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
-        return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
- * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
- *
- * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
- * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
- *
- * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- *      - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
- *        results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *      - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- *        could result in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
- */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
-{
-        struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
-        struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-        struct file *file = NULL;
-        int rc;
-
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-                return 0;
-        iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
-        if (!iint)
-                return 0;
-
-        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-
-        rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
-        if (rc < 0)
-                goto out;
-
-        if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
-                ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
-                                     path->dentry->d_name.name);
-
-        if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
-                goto out;
-
-        ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
-                             path->dentry->d_name.name);
-        if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
-                struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
-                struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
-
-                file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
-                                   current_cred());
-                if (IS_ERR(file)) {
-                        int audit_info = 0;
-
-                        integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-                                            dentry->d_name.name,
-                                            "add_measurement",
-                                            "dentry_open failed",
-                                            1, audit_info);
-                        file = NULL;
-                        goto out;
-                }
-                rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
-        }
-out:
-        mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-        if (file)
-                fput(file);
-        kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-        return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
-
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
                                int mask, int function)
 {
@@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ out:
         return rc;
 }
 
-/*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
- *
- * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
- * - for nfsd exported files.
- *
- * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
-{
-        struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-        struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-                return;
-        iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
-        if (!iint)
-                return;
-        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-        ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-        mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-
-        kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
-
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
@@ -369,11 +296,31 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
+ */
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+        int rc;
+
+        rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+                                 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+                                 FILE_CHECK);
+        return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
         int error;
 
-        ima_iintcache_init();
         error = ima_init();
         ima_initialized = 1;
         return error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e1278399b345..4759d0f99335 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
         {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-        {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+        {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
                         break;
                 case Opt_func:
                         audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
-                        if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
-                                entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+                        if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+                                entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+                        /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+                        else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+                                entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
                                 entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 24e060be9fa5..122b748d0f4c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
         security_ops->file_free_security(file);
-        if (file->f_dentry)
-                ima_file_free(file);
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)