Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

97 files changed, 2245 insertions, 609 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index b56aacc1fff8..e4dbbdb1bd96 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This document has the following sections:
         - Notes on accessing payload contents
         - Defining a key type
         - Request-key callback service
-        - Key access filesystem
+        - Garbage collection
 
 
 ============
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ Each key has a number of attributes:
 
      (*) Dead. The key's type was unregistered, and so the key is now useless.
 
+Keys in the last three states are subject to garbage collection.  See the
+section on "Garbage collection".
+
 
 ====================
 KEY SERVICE OVERVIEW
@@ -754,6 +757,26 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      successful.
 
 
+ (*) Install the calling process's session keyring on its parent.
+
+        long keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
+
+     This functions attempts to install the calling process's session keyring
+     on to the calling process's parent, replacing the parent's current session
+     keyring.
+
+     The calling process must have the same ownership as its parent, the
+     keyring must have the same ownership as the calling process, the calling
+     process must have LINK permission on the keyring and the active LSM module
+     mustn't deny permission, otherwise error EPERM will be returned.
+
+     Error ENOMEM will be returned if there was insufficient memory to complete
+     the operation, otherwise 0 will be returned to indicate success.
+
+     The keyring will be replaced next time the parent process leaves the
+     kernel and resumes executing userspace.
+
+
 ===============
 KERNEL SERVICES
 ===============
@@ -1231,3 +1254,17 @@ by executing:
 
 In this case, the program isn't required to actually attach the key to a ring;
 the rings are provided for reference.
+
+
+==================
+GARBAGE COLLECTION
+==================
+
+Dead keys (for which the type has been removed) will be automatically unlinked
+from those keyrings that point to them and deleted as soon as possible by a
+background garbage collector.
+
+Similarly, revoked and expired keys will be garbage collected, but only after a
+certain amount of time has passed.  This time is set as a number of seconds in:
+
+        /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 60c83abfde70..5076a8860b18 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$8");
 #define TIF_UAC_SIGBUS          7
 #define TIF_MEMDIE              8
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK     9       /* restore signal mask in do_signal */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       10      /* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_FREEZE              16      /* is freezing for suspend */
 
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE      (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
@@ -82,10 +83,12 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$8");
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED       (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG     (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    (1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE             (1<<TIF_FREEZE)
 
 /* Work to do on interrupt/exception return.  */
-#define _TIF_WORK_MASK          (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#define _TIF_WORK_MASK          (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | \
+                                 _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 
 /* Work to do on any return to userspace.  */
 #define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK       (_TIF_WORK_MASK         \
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c
index df65eaa84c4c..0932dbb1ef8e 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/sigcontext.h>
@@ -683,4 +684,11 @@ do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, struct switch_stack *sw,
 {
         if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
                 do_signal(regs, sw, r0, r19);
+
+        if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 73394e50cbca..d3a39b1e6c0f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -130,11 +130,13 @@ extern void vfp_sync_state(struct thread_info *thread);
  *  TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE   - syscall trace active
  *  TIF_SIGPENDING      - signal pending
  *  TIF_NEED_RESCHED    - rescheduling necessary
+ *  TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME   - callback before returning to user
  *  TIF_USEDFPU         - FPU was used by this task this quantum (SMP)
  *  TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG  - true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED
  */
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING          0
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED        1
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       2       /* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE       8
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG      16
 #define TIF_USING_IWMMXT        17
@@ -143,6 +145,7 @@ extern void vfp_sync_state(struct thread_info *thread);
 
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING         (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED       (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE      (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG     (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_USING_IWMMXT       (1 << TIF_USING_IWMMXT)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index 8c3de1a350b5..7813ab782fda 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ fast_work_pending:
 work_pending:
         tst     r1, #_TIF_NEED_RESCHED
         bne     work_resched
-        tst     r1, #_TIF_SIGPENDING
+        tst     r1, #_TIF_SIGPENDING|_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
         beq     no_work_pending
         mov     r0, sp                          @ 'regs'
         mov     r2, why                         @ 'syscall'
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index f6bc5d442782..b76fe06d92e7 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/elf.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -707,4 +708,11 @@ do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int thread_flags, int syscall)
 {
         if (thread_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
                 do_signal(&current->blocked, regs, syscall);
+
+        if (thread_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h
index fc42de5ca209..fd0c5d7e9337 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 #define TIF_MEMDIE              6
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK     7       /* restore signal mask in do_signal */
 #define TIF_CPU_GOING_TO_SLEEP  8       /* CPU is entering sleep 0 mode */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       9       /* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_FREEZE              29
 #define TIF_DEBUG               30      /* debugging enabled */
 #define TIF_USERSPACE           31      /* true if FS sets userspace */
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 #define _TIF_MEMDIE             (1 << TIF_MEMDIE)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    (1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_CPU_GOING_TO_SLEEP (1 << TIF_CPU_GOING_TO_SLEEP)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE             (1 << TIF_FREEZE)
 
 /* Note: The masks below must never span more than 16 bits! */
@@ -103,13 +105,15 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 /* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK                          \
         ((1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)                  \
+         | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME                   \
          | (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)              \
          | (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)            \
          | (1 << TIF_BREAKPOINT)                \
          | (1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 
 /* work to do on any return to userspace */
-#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK       (_TIF_WORK_MASK | (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
+#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK       (_TIF_WORK_MASK | (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) | \
+                                 _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 /* work to do on return from debug mode */
 #define _TIF_DBGWORK_MASK       (_TIF_WORK_MASK & ~(1 << TIF_BREAKPOINT))
 
diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S b/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S
index 009a80155d67..169268c40ae2 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S
+++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ syscall_exit_work:
         ld.w    r1, r0[TI_flags]
         rjmp    1b
 
-2:      mov     r2, _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK
+2:      mov     r2, _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
         tst     r1, r2
         breq    3f
         unmask_interrupts
diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c b/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c
index 27227561bad6..64f886fac2ef 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/ucontext.h>
@@ -322,4 +323,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, struct thread_info *ti)
 
         if (ti->flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
                 do_signal(regs, &current->blocked, syscall);
+
+        if (ti->flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c
index b326023baab2..48b0f3912632 100644
--- a/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/user.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -36,4 +37,11 @@ void do_notify_resume(int canrestart, struct pt_regs *regs,
         /* deal with pending signal delivery */
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
                 do_signal(canrestart,regs);
+
+        if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c b/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c
index 4a7a62c6e783..6b0a2b6fed6a 100644
--- a/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c
@@ -572,6 +572,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(__u32 thread_info_flags)
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(__frame);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 
 } /* end do_notify_resume() */
diff --git a/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 8bbc8b0ee45d..70e67e47d020 100644
--- a/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
                                            TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
 #define TIF_MEMDIE              4
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK     5       /* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       6       /* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_FREEZE              16      /* is freezing for suspend */
 
 /* as above, but as bit values */
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED       (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG     (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    (1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE             (1<<TIF_FREEZE)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK          0x0000FFFE      /* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
diff --git a/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c b/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c
index cf3472f7389b..af842c369d24 100644
--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -552,4 +553,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 thread_info_flags)
 {
         if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
                 do_signal(regs, NULL);
+
+        if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c
index 5d7c0e5b9e76..89969e950045 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ do_notify_resume_user(sigset_t *unused, struct sigscratch *scr, long in_syscall)
         if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(&scr->pt);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 
         /* copy user rbs to kernel rbs */
diff --git a/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 07bb5bd00e2a..71578151a403 100644
--- a/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_thread_fault_code(void)
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED        2       /* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP          3       /* restore singlestep on return to user mode */
 #define TIF_IRET                4       /* return with iret */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       5       /* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK     8       /* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
 #define TIF_USEDFPU             16      /* FPU was used by this task this quantum (SMP) */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG      17      /* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
@@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_thread_fault_code(void)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED       (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP         (1<<TIF_SINGLESTEP)
 #define _TIF_IRET               (1<<TIF_IRET)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    (1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_USEDFPU            (1<<TIF_USEDFPU)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG     (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
diff --git a/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c b/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c
index 18124542a6eb..144b0f124fc7 100644
--- a/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/ucontext.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -408,5 +409,12 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *oldset,
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
                 do_signal(regs,oldset);
 
+        if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
+
         clear_thread_flag(TIF_IRET);
 }
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
index f9df720d2e40..01cc1630b66c 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$28");
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED        2       /* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT       3       /* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP             4       /* secure computing */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       5       /* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK     9       /* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
 #define TIF_USEDFPU             16      /* FPU was used by this task this quantum (SMP) */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG      17      /* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$28");
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED       (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT      (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP            (1<<TIF_SECCOMP)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    (1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_USEDFPU            (1<<TIF_USEDFPU)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG     (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c b/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c
index 830c5ef9932b..6254041b942f 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/abi.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
@@ -700,4 +701,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, void *unused,
         /* deal with pending signal delivery */
         if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
                 do_signal(regs);
+
+        if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c b/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c
index feb2f2e810db..a21f43bc68e2 100644
--- a/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c
@@ -568,5 +568,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 thread_info_flags)
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(__frame);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 }
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 4ce0edfbe969..ac775a76bff7 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_MEMDIE              5
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK     6       /* restore saved signal mask */
 #define TIF_FREEZE              7       /* is freezing for suspend */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME       8       /* callback before returning to user */
 
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE      (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING         (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
@@ -67,8 +68,9 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_32BIT              (1 << TIF_32BIT)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    (1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE             (1 << TIF_FREEZE)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME      (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 
-#define _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK     (_TIF_SIGPENDING | \
+#define _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK     (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | \
                                  _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S b/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
index e552e547cb93..8c4712b74dc1 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ intr_check_sig:
         /* As above */
         mfctl   %cr30,%r1
         LDREG   TI_FLAGS(%r1),%r19
-        ldi     (_TIF_SIGPENDING|_TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK), %r20
+        ldi     (_TIF_SIGPENDING|_TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK|_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME), %r20
         and,COND(<>)    %r19, %r20, %r0
         b,n     intr_restore    /* skip past if we've nothing to do */
 
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c
index f82544225e8e..8eb3c63c407a 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <asm/ucontext.h>
 #include <asm/rt_sigframe.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -645,4 +646,11 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, long in_syscall)
         if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING) ||
             test_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
                 do_signal(regs, in_syscall);
+
+        if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)) {
+                clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+                tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
+        }
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c b/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c
index 062bd64e65fa..6b4fef877f9d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c
@@ -536,4 +536,6 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
         clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
         tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+        if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                key_replace_session_keyring();
 }
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c
index b5afbec1db59..04a21883f327 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -640,5 +640,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int save_r0,
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 }
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c
index 0663a0ee6021..9e5c9b1d7e98 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -772,5 +772,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long thread_info
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 }
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c
index 181d069a2d44..7ce1a1005b1d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -590,6 +590,8 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0,
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
index ec82d76dc6f2..647afbda7ae1 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -613,5 +613,8 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0, unsigned long
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 }
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 4c578751e94e..81e58238c4ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -869,6 +869,8 @@ do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, void *unused, __u32 thread_info_flags)
         if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
                 clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
                 tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+                if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                        key_replace_session_keyring();
         }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index aec1931608aa..0b73e4ec1add 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -450,6 +450,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
                 goto out_err;
         }
 
+        /* Default timeouts */
+        chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+        chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT);
+        chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+        chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+
         if (request_locality(chip, 0) != 0) {
                 rc = -ENODEV;
                 goto out_err;
@@ -457,12 +463,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
 
         vendor = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_DID_VID(0));
 
-        /* Default timeouts */
-        chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
-        chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT);
-        chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
-        chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
-
         dev_info(dev,
                  "1.2 TPM (device-id 0x%X, rev-id %d)\n",
                  vendor >> 16, ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_RID(0)));
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index 42b6c6319bc2..87214a257d2a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -130,17 +130,10 @@ static inline struct tun_sock *tun_sk(struct sock *sk)
 static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file)
 {
         struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
-        const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
         int err;
 
         ASSERT_RTNL();
 
-        /* Check permissions */
-        if (((tun->owner != -1 && cred->euid != tun->owner) ||
-             (tun->group != -1 && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) &&
-                !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-                return -EPERM;
-
         netif_tx_lock_bh(tun->dev);
 
         err = -EINVAL;
@@ -926,6 +919,8 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 
         dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
         if (dev) {
+                const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
                 if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
                         return -EBUSY;
                 if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
@@ -935,6 +930,14 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
                 else
                         return -EINVAL;
 
+                if (((tun->owner != -1 && cred->euid != tun->owner) ||
+                     (tun->group != -1 && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) &&
+                    !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+                        return -EPERM;
+                err = security_tun_dev_attach(tun->sk);
+                if (err < 0)
+                        return err;
+
                 err = tun_attach(tun, file);
                 if (err < 0)
                         return err;
@@ -947,6 +950,9 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 
                 if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                         return -EPERM;
+                err = security_tun_dev_create();
+                if (err < 0)
+                        return err;
 
                 /* Set dev type */
                 if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
@@ -989,6 +995,8 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
                 tun->sk = sk;
                 container_of(sk, struct tun_sock, sk)->tun = tun;
 
+                security_tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+
                 tun_net_init(dev);
 
                 if (strchr(dev->name, '%')) {
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
index 9d7c99394ec6..640f65c6ef84 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
@@ -1752,12 +1752,12 @@ static int comedi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
         mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
         if (dev->attached)
                 goto ok;
-        if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) && dev->in_request_module) {
+        if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module) {
                 DPRINTK("in request module\n");
                 mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
                 return -ENODEV;
         }
-        if (capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) && dev->in_request_module)
+        if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module)
                 goto ok;
 
         dev->in_request_module = 1;
@@ -1770,8 +1770,8 @@ static int comedi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
         dev->in_request_module = 0;
 
-        if (!dev->attached && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
-                DPRINTK("not attached and not CAP_SYS_MODULE\n");
+        if (!dev->attached && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+                DPRINTK("not attached and not CAP_NET_ADMIN\n");
                 mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
                 return -ENODEV;
         }
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index b7c1603cd4bd..7c1e65d54872 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -501,22 +501,22 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,
                 }
         }
 
-        /*
-         * Now fill out the bss section.  First pad the last page up
-         * to the page boundary, and then perform a mmap to make sure
-         * that there are zero-mapped pages up to and including the 
-         * last bss page.
-         */
-        if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
-                error = -EFAULT;
-                goto out_close;
-        }
+        if (last_bss > elf_bss) {
+                /*
+                 * Now fill out the bss section.  First pad the last page up
+                 * to the page boundary, and then perform a mmap to make sure
+                 * that there are zero-mapped pages up to and including the
+                 * last bss page.
+                 */
+                if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
+                        error = -EFAULT;
+                        goto out_close;
+                }
 
-        /* What we have mapped so far */
-        elf_bss = ELF_PAGESTART(elf_bss + ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
+                /* What we have mapped so far */
+                elf_bss = ELF_PAGESTART(elf_bss + ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
 
-        /* Map the last of the bss segment */
-        if (last_bss > elf_bss) {
+                /* Map the last of the bss segment */
                 down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
                 error = do_brk(elf_bss, last_bss - elf_bss);
                 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
index b6440f52178f..52366e877d76 100644
--- a/fs/locks.c
+++ b/fs/locks.c
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(flock, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd)
         if (can_sleep)
                 lock->fl_flags |= FL_SLEEP;
 
-        error = security_file_lock(filp, cmd);
+        error = security_file_lock(filp, lock->fl_type);
         if (error)
                 goto out_free;
 
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1f13751693a5..fcfc5539252c 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1533,9 +1533,11 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
         if (error)
                 return error;
 
-        error = ima_path_check(path,
-                               acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+        error = ima_path_check(path, acc_mode ?
+                               acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC) :
+                               ACC_MODE(flag) & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE),
                                IMA_COUNT_UPDATE);
+
         if (error)
                 return error;
         /*
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 5573508f707f..36fcabbf5186 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
         int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
         int ret;
 
+        validate_process_creds();
+
         /* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
         revert_creds(get_cred(current->real_cred));
         new = prepare_creds();
@@ -86,8 +88,10 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
         else
                 new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
                                                         new->cap_permitted);
+        validate_process_creds();
         put_cred(override_creds(new));
         put_cred(new);
+        validate_process_creds();
         return 0;
 
 oom:
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
index 492c79b7800b..24d58adfe5fd 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
@@ -496,7 +496,9 @@ nfsd(void *vrqstp)
                 /* Lock the export hash tables for reading. */
                 exp_readlock();
 
+                validate_process_creds();
                 svc_process(rqstp);
+                validate_process_creds();
 
                 /* Unlock export hash tables */
                 exp_readunlock();
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 23341c1063bc..8fa09bfbcba7 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -684,6 +684,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
         __be32          err;
         int             host_err;
 
+        validate_process_creds();
+
         /*
          * If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
          * and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
@@ -740,6 +742,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
 out_nfserr:
         err = nfserrno(host_err);
 out:
+        validate_process_creds();
         return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index dd98e8076024..31191bf513e4 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ out:
 int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
         struct file *filp)
 {
-        int err;
+        int ret;
         struct iattr newattrs;
 
         /* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
@@ -214,12 +214,14 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
         }
 
         /* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
-        newattrs.ia_valid |= should_remove_suid(dentry);
+        ret = should_remove_suid(dentry);
+        if (ret)
+                newattrs.ia_valid |= ret | ATTR_FORCE;
 
         mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-        err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+        ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
         mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-        return err;
+        return ret;
 }
 
 static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
@@ -957,6 +959,8 @@ struct file *dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags,
         int error;
         struct file *f;
 
+        validate_creds(cred);
+
         /*
          * We must always pass in a valid mount pointer.   Historically
          * callers got away with not passing it, but we must enforce this at
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
index 14f2d71ea3ce..0050fc40e8c9 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ static struct dentry * sysfs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 const struct inode_operations sysfs_dir_inode_operations = {
         .lookup         = sysfs_lookup,
         .setattr        = sysfs_setattr,
+        .setxattr       = sysfs_setxattr,
 };
 
 static void remove_dir(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/inode.c b/fs/sysfs/inode.c
index 555f0ff988df..2b6a8d9de73d 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/inode.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include "sysfs.h"
 
 extern struct super_block * sysfs_sb;
@@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ static struct backing_dev_info sysfs_backing_dev_info = {
 
 static const struct inode_operations sysfs_inode_operations ={
         .setattr        = sysfs_setattr,
+        .setxattr       = sysfs_setxattr,
 };
 
 int __init sysfs_inode_init(void)
@@ -42,18 +45,37 @@ int __init sysfs_inode_init(void)
         return bdi_init(&sysfs_backing_dev_info);
 }
 
+struct sysfs_inode_attrs *sysfs_init_inode_attrs(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
+{
+        struct sysfs_inode_attrs *attrs;
+        struct iattr *iattrs;
+
+        attrs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sysfs_inode_attrs), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!attrs)
+                return NULL;
+        iattrs = &attrs->ia_iattr;
+
+        /* assign default attributes */
+        iattrs->ia_mode = sd->s_mode;
+        iattrs->ia_uid = 0;
+        iattrs->ia_gid = 0;
+        iattrs->ia_atime = iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
+
+        return attrs;
+}
 int sysfs_setattr(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * iattr)
 {
         struct inode * inode = dentry->d_inode;
         struct sysfs_dirent * sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
-        struct iattr * sd_iattr;
+        struct sysfs_inode_attrs *sd_attrs;
+        struct iattr *iattrs;
         unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
         int error;
 
         if (!sd)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        sd_iattr = sd->s_iattr;
+        sd_attrs = sd->s_iattr;
 
         error = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
         if (error)
@@ -65,42 +87,77 @@ int sysfs_setattr(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * iattr)
         if (error)
                 return error;
 
-        if (!sd_iattr) {
+        if (!sd_attrs) {
                 /* setting attributes for the first time, allocate now */
-                sd_iattr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iattr), GFP_KERNEL);
-                if (!sd_iattr)
+                sd_attrs = sysfs_init_inode_attrs(sd);
+                if (!sd_attrs)
                         return -ENOMEM;
-                /* assign default attributes */
-                sd_iattr->ia_mode = sd->s_mode;
-                sd_iattr->ia_uid = 0;
-                sd_iattr->ia_gid = 0;
-                sd_iattr->ia_atime = sd_iattr->ia_mtime = sd_iattr->ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
-                sd->s_iattr = sd_iattr;
+                sd->s_iattr = sd_attrs;
+        } else {
+                /* attributes were changed at least once in past */
+                iattrs = &sd_attrs->ia_iattr;
+
+                if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
+                        iattrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
+                if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
+                        iattrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
+                if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
+                        iattrs->ia_atime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_atime,
+                                        inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
+                if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
+                        iattrs->ia_mtime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime,
+                                        inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
+                if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
+                        iattrs->ia_ctime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime,
+                                        inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
+                if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
+                        umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode;
+
+                        if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
+                                mode &= ~S_ISGID;
+                        iattrs->ia_mode = sd->s_mode = mode;
+                }
         }
+        return error;
+}
 
-        /* attributes were changed atleast once in past */
-
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
-                sd_iattr->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
-                sd_iattr->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
-                sd_iattr->ia_atime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_atime,
-                                                inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
-                sd_iattr->ia_mtime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime,
-                                                inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
-                sd_iattr->ia_ctime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime,
-                                                inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
-                umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode;
-
-                if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
-                        mode &= ~S_ISGID;
-                sd_iattr->ia_mode = sd->s_mode = mode;
-        }
+int sysfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+                size_t size, int flags)
+{
+        struct sysfs_dirent *sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
+        struct sysfs_inode_attrs *iattrs;
+        void *secdata;
+        int error;
+        u32 secdata_len = 0;
+
+        if (!sd)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        if (!sd->s_iattr)
+                sd->s_iattr = sysfs_init_inode_attrs(sd);
+        if (!sd->s_iattr)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        iattrs = sd->s_iattr;
+
+        if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+                const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
+                error = security_inode_setsecurity(dentry->d_inode, suffix,
+                                                value, size, flags);
+                if (error)
+                        goto out;
+                error = security_inode_getsecctx(dentry->d_inode,
+                                                &secdata, &secdata_len);
+                if (error)
+                        goto out;
+                if (iattrs->ia_secdata)
+                        security_release_secctx(iattrs->ia_secdata,
+                                                iattrs->ia_secdata_len);
+                iattrs->ia_secdata = secdata;
+                iattrs->ia_secdata_len = secdata_len;
 
+        } else
+                return -EINVAL;
+out:
         return error;
 }
 
@@ -146,6 +203,7 @@ static int sysfs_count_nlink(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
 static void sysfs_init_inode(struct sysfs_dirent *sd, struct inode *inode)
 {
         struct bin_attribute *bin_attr;
+        struct sysfs_inode_attrs *iattrs;
 
         inode->i_private = sysfs_get(sd);
         inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &sysfs_aops;
@@ -154,16 +212,20 @@ static void sysfs_init_inode(struct sysfs_dirent *sd, struct inode *inode)
         inode->i_ino = sd->s_ino;
         lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_mutex, &sysfs_inode_imutex_key);
 
-        if (sd->s_iattr) {
+        iattrs = sd->s_iattr;
+        if (iattrs) {
                 /* sysfs_dirent has non-default attributes
                  * get them for the new inode from persistent copy
                  * in sysfs_dirent
                  */
-                set_inode_attr(inode, sd->s_iattr);
+                set_inode_attr(inode, &iattrs->ia_iattr);
+                if (iattrs->ia_secdata)
+                        security_inode_notifysecctx(inode,
+                                                iattrs->ia_secdata,
+                                                iattrs->ia_secdata_len);
         } else
                 set_default_inode_attr(inode, sd->s_mode);
 
-
         /* initialize inode according to type */
         switch (sysfs_type(sd)) {
         case SYSFS_DIR:
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/symlink.c b/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
index 1d897ad808e0..c5081ad77026 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "sysfs.h"
 
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ static void sysfs_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd, void *co
 }
 
 const struct inode_operations sysfs_symlink_inode_operations = {
+        .setxattr = sysfs_setxattr,
         .readlink = generic_readlink,
         .follow_link = sysfs_follow_link,
         .put_link = sysfs_put_link,
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h b/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h
index 3fa0d98481e2..af4c4e7482ac 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h
+++ b/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
  * This file is released under the GPLv2.
  */
 
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
 struct sysfs_open_dirent;
 
 /* type-specific structures for sysfs_dirent->s_* union members */
@@ -31,6 +33,12 @@ struct sysfs_elem_bin_attr {
         struct hlist_head       buffers;
 };
 
+struct sysfs_inode_attrs {
+        struct iattr    ia_iattr;
+        void            *ia_secdata;
+        u32             ia_secdata_len;
+};
+
 /*
  * sysfs_dirent - the building block of sysfs hierarchy.  Each and
  * every sysfs node is represented by single sysfs_dirent.
@@ -56,7 +64,7 @@ struct sysfs_dirent {
         unsigned int            s_flags;
         ino_t                   s_ino;
         umode_t                 s_mode;
-        struct iattr            *s_iattr;
+        struct sysfs_inode_attrs *s_iattr;
 };
 
 #define SD_DEACTIVATED_BIAS             INT_MIN
@@ -148,6 +156,8 @@ static inline void __sysfs_put(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
 struct inode *sysfs_get_inode(struct sysfs_dirent *sd);
 void sysfs_delete_inode(struct inode *inode);
 int sysfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr);
+int sysfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+                size_t size, int flags);
 int sysfs_hash_and_remove(struct sysfs_dirent *dir_sd, const char *name);
 int sysfs_inode_init(void);
 
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 1c3d0af59ddf..6d4f6d3449fb 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -66,22 +66,28 @@ xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, const char *name, int mask)
         return inode_permission(inode, mask);
 }
 
-int
-vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
-                size_t size, int flags)
+/**
+ *  __vfs_setxattr_noperm - perform setxattr operation without performing
+ *  permission checks.
+ *
+ *  @dentry - object to perform setxattr on
+ *  @name - xattr name to set
+ *  @value - value to set @name to
+ *  @size - size of @value
+ *  @flags - flags to pass into filesystem operations
+ *
+ *  returns the result of the internal setxattr or setsecurity operations.
+ *
+ *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
+ *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
+ *  permission checks.
+ */
+int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+                const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-        int error;
-
-        error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
-        if (error)
-                return error;
+        int error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-        error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-        if (error)
-                goto out;
-        error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
         if (inode->i_op->setxattr) {
                 error = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
                 if (!error) {
@@ -97,6 +103,29 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
                 if (!error)
                         fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
         }
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+
+int
+vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+                size_t size, int flags)
+{
+        struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+        int error;
+
+        error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
+        if (error)
+                return error;
+
+        mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+        error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+        if (error)
+                goto out;
+
+        error = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
 out:
         mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
         return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 4fa999696310..24520a539c6f 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -114,6 +114,13 @@ struct thread_group_cred {
  */
 struct cred {
         atomic_t        usage;
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        atomic_t        subscribers;    /* number of processes subscribed */
+        void            *put_addr;
+        unsigned        magic;
+#define CRED_MAGIC      0x43736564
+#define CRED_MAGIC_DEAD 0x44656144
+#endif
         uid_t           uid;            /* real UID of the task */
         gid_t           gid;            /* real GID of the task */
         uid_t           suid;           /* saved UID of the task */
@@ -143,7 +150,9 @@ struct cred {
 };
 
 extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
+extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
 extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
+extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
 extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
 extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
 extern struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void);
@@ -158,6 +167,60 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
 extern void __init cred_init(void);
 
+/*
+ * check for validity of credentials
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
+extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
+                                     const char *, unsigned);
+
+static inline bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+        if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
+                return true;
+        if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
+                return true;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+        if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
+                return true;
+        if ((*(u32*)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
+            (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
+                return true;
+#endif
+        return false;
+}
+
+static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
+                                    const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+        if (unlikely(creds_are_invalid(cred)))
+                __invalid_creds(cred, file, line);
+}
+
+#define validate_creds(cred)                            \
+do {                                                    \
+        __validate_creds((cred), __FILE__, __LINE__);   \
+} while(0)
+
+#define validate_process_creds()                                \
+do {                                                            \
+        __validate_process_creds(current, __FILE__, __LINE__);  \
+} while(0)
+
+extern void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *);
+#else
+static inline void validate_creds(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+}
+static inline void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+}
+static inline void validate_process_creds(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 /**
  * get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials
  * @cred: The new credentials to reference
@@ -186,7 +249,9 @@ static inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
  */
 static inline const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-        return get_new_cred((struct cred *) cred);
+        struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred;
+        validate_creds(cred);
+        return get_new_cred(nonconst_cred);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -204,7 +269,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
 {
         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
 
-        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(cred)->usage) <= 0);
+        validate_creds(cred);
         if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
                 __put_cred(cred);
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index e544f466d69a..cd50dfa1d4c2 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -129,7 +129,10 @@ struct key {
         struct rw_semaphore     sem;            /* change vs change sem */
         struct key_user         *user;          /* owner of this key */
         void                    *security;      /* security data for this key */
-        time_t                  expiry;         /* time at which key expires (or 0) */
+        union {
+                time_t          expiry;         /* time at which key expires (or 0) */
+                time_t          revoked_at;     /* time at which key was revoked */
+        };
         uid_t                   uid;
         gid_t                   gid;
         key_perm_t              perm;           /* access permissions */
@@ -275,6 +278,8 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key)
 extern ctl_table key_sysctls[];
 #endif
 
+extern void key_replace_session_keyring(void);
+
 /*
  * the userspace interface
  */
@@ -297,6 +302,7 @@ extern void key_init(void);
 #define key_fsuid_changed(t)            do { } while(0)
 #define key_fsgid_changed(t)            do { } while(0)
 #define key_init()                      do { } while(0)
+#define key_replace_session_keyring()   do { } while(0)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/include/linux/keyctl.h b/include/linux/keyctl.h
index c0688eb72093..bd383f1944fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -52,5 +52,6 @@
 #define KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT              15      /* set key timeout */
 #define KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY         16      /* assume request_key() authorisation */
 #define KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY             17      /* get key security label */
+#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT        18      /* apply session keyring to parent process */
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index e461b2c3d711..190c37854870 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC     4
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK    5
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY     6
+#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT     7
         struct task_struct *tsk;
         union   {
                 struct {
@@ -66,16 +67,19 @@ struct common_audit_data {
                 } key_struct;
 #endif
         } u;
-        const char *function;
         /* this union contains LSM specific data */
         union {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
                 /* SMACK data */
                 struct smack_audit_data {
+                        const char *function;
                         char *subject;
                         char *object;
                         char *request;
                         int result;
                 } smack_audit_data;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
                 /* SELinux data */
                 struct {
                         u32 ssid;
@@ -83,10 +87,12 @@ struct common_audit_data {
                         u16 tclass;
                         u32 requested;
                         u32 audited;
+                        u32 denied;
                         struct av_decision *avd;
                         int result;
                 } selinux_audit_data;
-        } lsm_priv;
+#endif
+        };
         /* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */
         void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
         void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
@@ -104,7 +110,7 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
 /* Initialize an LSM audit data structure. */
 #define COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d, _t) \
         { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct common_audit_data)); \
-         (_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; (_d)->function = __func__; }
+         (_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
 
 void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 0f1ea4a66957..9304027673b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ struct task_struct {
         struct mutex cred_guard_mutex;  /* guard against foreign influences on
                                          * credential calculations
                                          * (notably. ptrace) */
+        struct cred *replacement_session_keyring; /* for KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT */
 
         char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
                                      - access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock
@@ -2077,7 +2078,7 @@ static inline unsigned long wait_task_inactive(struct task_struct *p,
 #define for_each_process(p) \
         for (p = &init_task ; (p = next_task(p)) != &init_task ; )
 
-extern bool is_single_threaded(struct task_struct *);
+extern bool current_is_single_threaded(void);
 
 /*
  * Careful: do_each_thread/while_each_thread is a double loop so
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1f16eea2017b..d050b66ab9ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
 extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
                        int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -653,6 +653,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
  *      @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
  *      Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @cred_alloc_blank:
+ *      @cred points to the credentials.
+ *      @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ *      Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
+ *      cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
  * @cred_free:
  *      @cred points to the credentials.
  *      Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
@@ -665,6 +670,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      @new points to the new credentials.
  *      @old points to the original credentials.
  *      Install a new set of credentials.
+ * @cred_transfer:
+ *      @new points to the new credentials.
+ *      @old points to the original credentials.
+ *      Transfer data from original creds to new creds
  * @kernel_act_as:
  *      Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
  *      @new points to the credentials to be modified.
@@ -678,6 +687,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
  *      The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
  *      Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_module_request:
+ *      Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
+ *      userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ *      Return 0 if successful.
  * @task_setuid:
  *      Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
  *      attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates
@@ -994,6 +1007,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
  * @req_classify_flow:
  *      Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @tun_dev_create:
+ *      Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
+ * @tun_dev_post_create:
+ *      This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
+ *      structure.
+ *      @sk contains the newly created sock structure.
+ * @tun_dev_attach:
+ *      Check permissions prior to attaching to a persistent TUN device.  This
+ *      hook can also be used by the module to update any security state
+ *      associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
+ *      @sk contains the existing sock structure.
  *
  * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
  *
@@ -1088,6 +1112,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
  *      an error.
  *      May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ * @key_session_to_parent:
+ *      Forcibly assign the session keyring from a process to its parent
+ *      process.
+ *      @cred: Pointer to process's credentials
+ *      @parent_cred: Pointer to parent process's credentials
+ *      @keyring: Proposed new session keyring
+ *      Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
  *
  * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
  *
@@ -1229,7 +1260,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
  *      Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
- * @ptrace_may_access:
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
  *      Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
  *      @child process.
  *      Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
@@ -1244,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
  *      current process before allowing the current process to present itself
  *      to the @parent process for tracing.
- *      The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
+ *      The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
  *      checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
  *      @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
  *      Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1351,12 +1382,47 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *      audit_rule_init.
  *      @rule contains the allocated rule
  *
+ * @inode_notifysecctx:
+ *      Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
+ *      should be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the
+ *      security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS client invokes
+ *      this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
+ *      value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
+ *      file's attributes to the client.
+ *
+ *      Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ *      @inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ *      @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ *      @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_setsecctx:
+ *      Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
+ *      incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
+ *      fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
+ *      xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
+ *      this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
+ *      backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
+ *      operation.
+ *
+ *      Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ *      @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ *      @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ *      @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_getsecctx:
+ *      Returns a string containing all relavent security context information
+ *
+ *      @inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ *      @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
+ *      @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
  * This is the main security structure.
  */
 struct security_operations {
         char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-        int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+        int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
         int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
         int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
                        kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1483,12 +1549,15 @@ struct security_operations {
         int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 
         int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
+        int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
         void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
         int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                             gfp_t gfp);
         void (*cred_commit)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+        void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
         int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
         int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+        int (*kernel_module_request)(void);
         int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
         int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                 int flags);
@@ -1556,6 +1625,10 @@ struct security_operations {
         int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
         void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+        int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+        int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+        int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
         int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket *sock,
                                     struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1592,6 +1665,9 @@ struct security_operations {
         void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
         void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
         void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
+        int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
+        void (*tun_dev_post_create)(struct sock *sk);
+        int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1620,6 +1696,9 @@ struct security_operations {
                                const struct cred *cred,
                                key_perm_t perm);
         int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+        int (*key_session_to_parent)(const struct cred *cred,
+                                     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                     struct key *key);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -1637,7 +1716,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 /* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
                     kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1736,11 +1815,14 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
 int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+int security_kernel_module_request(void);
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                              int flags);
@@ -1796,6 +1878,9 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 struct security_mnt_opts {
 };
@@ -1818,10 +1903,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
                                              unsigned int mode)
 {
-        return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -2266,6 +2351,11 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 { }
 
@@ -2281,6 +2371,11 @@ static inline void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new,
 {
 }
 
+static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
+                                           const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -2292,6 +2387,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
         return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
                                        int flags)
 {
@@ -2537,6 +2637,19 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
 static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
+
+static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
@@ -2575,6 +2688,9 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
                         const struct request_sock *req);
 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
                         struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_tun_dev_create(void);
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk);
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk);
 
 #else   /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
@@ -2725,6 +2841,20 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
                         struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
+
+static inline int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2881,6 +3011,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key);
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
                             const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                   struct key *key);
 
 #else
 
@@ -2908,6 +3041,13 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                                 const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                                 struct key *key)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
index d131e352cfe1..5c84af8c5f6f 100644
--- a/include/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct xattr_handler {
 ssize_t xattr_getsecurity(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
+int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
 int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
 int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);
 
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
index 9f3391090b3e..9a4715a2f6bf 100644
--- a/kernel/acct.c
+++ b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -491,13 +491,17 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct,
         u64 run_time;
         struct timespec uptime;
         struct tty_struct *tty;
+        const struct cred *orig_cred;
+
+        /* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled accounting */
+        orig_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);
 
         /*
          * First check to see if there is enough free_space to continue
          * the process accounting system.
          */
         if (!check_free_space(acct, file))
-                return;
+                goto out;
 
         /*
          * Fill the accounting struct with the needed info as recorded
@@ -578,6 +582,8 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct,
                                sizeof(acct_t), &file->f_pos);
         current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = flim;
         set_fs(fs);
+out:
+        revert_creds(orig_cred);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 1bb4d7e5d616..006fcab009d5 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
 #include "cred-internals.h"
 
+#if 0
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+        printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
+void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+}
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+        no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
 
 /*
@@ -36,6 +48,10 @@ static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
  */
 struct cred init_cred = {
         .usage                  = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        .subscribers            = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
+        .magic                  = CRED_MAGIC,
+#endif
         .securebits             = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
         .cap_inheritable        = CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
         .cap_permitted          = CAP_FULL_SET,
@@ -48,6 +64,31 @@ struct cred init_cred = {
 #endif
 };
 
+static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
+#else
+        return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
+
+        atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
+#endif
+}
+
 /*
  * Dispose of the shared task group credentials
  */
@@ -85,9 +126,22 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
         struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
 
+        kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
+            atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
+            read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
+                panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
+                      " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
+                      cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
+                      atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+                      read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+#else
         if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
                 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
                       cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
+#endif
 
         security_cred_free(cred);
         key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
@@ -106,12 +160,90 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
  */
 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
 {
+        kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
+               atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+
         BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
+        cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
+        cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
+#endif
+        BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
+        BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
 
         call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
 
+/*
+ * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
+ */
+void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+        struct cred *cred;
+
+        kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
+               atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
+
+        cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
+        tsk->real_cred = NULL;
+        validate_creds(cred);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
+        put_cred(cred);
+
+        cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
+        tsk->cred = NULL;
+        validate_creds(cred);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
+        put_cred(cred);
+
+        cred = (struct cred *) tsk->replacement_session_keyring;
+        if (cred) {
+                tsk->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+                validate_creds(cred);
+                put_cred(cred);
+        }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
+ * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
+ */
+struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
+{
+        struct cred *new;
+
+        new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!new)
+                return NULL;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+        new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!new->tgcred) {
+                kfree(new);
+                return NULL;
+        }
+        atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1);
+#endif
+
+        atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+
+        if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
+                goto error;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
+#endif
+        return new;
+
+error:
+        abort_creds(new);
+        return NULL;
+}
+
 /**
  * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
  *
@@ -132,16 +264,19 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
         const struct cred *old;
         struct cred *new;
 
-        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);
+        validate_process_creds();
 
         new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!new)
                 return NULL;
 
+        kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
         old = task->cred;
         memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
 
         atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+        set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
         get_group_info(new->group_info);
         get_uid(new->user);
 
@@ -157,6 +292,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
 
         if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
                 goto error;
+        validate_creds(new);
         return new;
 
 error:
@@ -229,9 +365,12 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
         if (!new)
                 return NULL;
 
+        kdebug("prepare_usermodehelper_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
         memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
 
         atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+        set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
         get_group_info(new->group_info);
         get_uid(new->user);
 
@@ -250,6 +389,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
 #endif
         if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
                 goto error;
+        validate_creds(new);
 
         BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
         return new;
@@ -286,6 +426,10 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
             ) {
                 p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
                 get_cred(p->cred);
+                alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
+                kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
+                       p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
+                       read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
                 atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
                 return 0;
         }
@@ -331,6 +475,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
 
         atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
         p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
+        validate_creds(new);
         return 0;
 
 error_put:
@@ -355,13 +501,20 @@ error_put:
 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 {
         struct task_struct *task = current;
-        const struct cred *old;
+        const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
 
-        BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
-        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
+        kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+               atomic_read(&new->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+        BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
+        validate_creds(old);
+        validate_creds(new);
+#endif
         BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
 
-        old = task->real_cred;
         security_commit_creds(new, old);
 
         get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
@@ -390,12 +543,14 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
          *   cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
          *   we should be checking for it.  -DaveM
          */
+        alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
         if (new->user != old->user)
                 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
         rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
         rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
         if (new->user != old->user)
                 atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
 
         sched_switch_user(task);
 
@@ -428,6 +583,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
  */
 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
 {
+        kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+               atomic_read(&new->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
+#endif
         BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
         put_cred(new);
 }
@@ -444,7 +606,20 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
         const struct cred *old = current->cred;
 
-        rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
+        kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+               atomic_read(&new->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+        validate_creds(old);
+        validate_creds(new);
+        get_cred(new);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
+        rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
+
+        kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
+               atomic_read(&old->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(old));
         return old;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
@@ -460,7 +635,15 @@ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
 {
         const struct cred *override = current->cred;
 
+        kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
+               atomic_read(&old->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(old));
+
+        validate_creds(old);
+        validate_creds(override);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
         rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
+        alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
         put_cred(override);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
@@ -502,11 +685,15 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
         if (!new)
                 return NULL;
 
+        kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
+
         if (daemon)
                 old = get_task_cred(daemon);
         else
                 old = get_cred(&init_cred);
 
+        validate_creds(old);
+
         *new = *old;
         get_uid(new->user);
         get_group_info(new->group_info);
@@ -526,7 +713,9 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
                 goto error;
 
         atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+        set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
         put_cred(old);
+        validate_creds(new);
         return new;
 
 error:
@@ -589,3 +778,95 @@ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+
+/*
+ * dump invalid credentials
+ */
+static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
+                               const struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
+               label, cred,
+               cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
+               cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
+               cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
+               cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
+               atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
+               cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid);
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
+               cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
+        if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
+            (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
+             (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
+                printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
+                       ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
+                       ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * report use of invalid credentials
+ */
+void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
+        dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
+        BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
+
+/*
+ * check the credentials on a process
+ */
+void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
+                              const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+        if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
+                if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
+                             creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
+                        goto invalid_creds;
+        } else {
+                if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
+                             read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
+                             creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
+                             creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
+                        goto invalid_creds;
+        }
+        return;
+
+invalid_creds:
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
+        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
+
+        dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
+        if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
+                dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
+        else
+                printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
+        BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
+
+/*
+ * check creds for do_exit()
+ */
+void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+        kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
+               tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
+               atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
+               read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
+
+        __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 869dc221733e..c98ff7a8025f 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
 
         tracehook_report_exit(&code);
 
+        validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
+
         /*
          * We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
          * leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
@@ -1009,6 +1011,8 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
         if (tsk->splice_pipe)
                 __free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
 
+        validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
+
         preempt_disable();
         /* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
         tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index e6c04d462ab2..aab8579c6093 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -152,8 +152,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
         WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
         WARN_ON(tsk == current);
 
-        put_cred(tsk->real_cred);
-        put_cred(tsk->cred);
+        exit_creds(tsk);
         delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
 
         if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk))
@@ -1297,8 +1296,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
         module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
 bad_fork_cleanup_count:
         atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
-        put_cred(p->real_cred);
-        put_cred(p->cred);
+        exit_creds(p);
 bad_fork_free:
         free_task(p);
 fork_out:
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 385c31a1bdbf..4e8cae2e9148 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
 #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50  /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
         static int kmod_loop_msg;
 
+        ret = security_kernel_module_request();
+        if (ret)
+                return ret;
+
         va_start(args, fmt);
         ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
         va_end(args);
@@ -462,6 +466,7 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info,
         int retval = 0;
 
         BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
+        validate_creds(sub_info->cred);
 
         helper_lock();
         if (sub_info->path[0] == '\0')
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 082c320e4dbf..307c285af59e 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
         if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                 return -EPERM;
 
-        return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+        return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
 }
 
 bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 58be76017fd0..71d8dc7f9920 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/slow-work.h>
 #include <linux/perf_counter.h>
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 12327b2bb785..fbb87cf138c5 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -653,6 +653,21 @@ config DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
           This is a relatively cheap check but if you care about maximum
           performance, say N.
 
+config DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+        bool "Debug credential management"
+        depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
+        help
+          Enable this to turn on some debug checking for credential
+          management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
+          pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to
+          see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred
+          struct.
+
+          Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, this also checks that the
+          security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
+
+          If unsure, say N.
+
 #
 # Select this config option from the architecture Kconfig, if it
 # it is preferred to always offer frame pointers as a config
diff --git a/lib/is_single_threaded.c b/lib/is_single_threaded.c
index f1ed2fe76c65..bd2bea963364 100644
--- a/lib/is_single_threaded.c
+++ b/lib/is_single_threaded.c
@@ -12,34 +12,47 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
-/**
- * is_single_threaded - Determine if a thread group is single-threaded or not
- * @p: A task in the thread group in question
- *
- * This returns true if the thread group to which a task belongs is single
- * threaded, false if it is not.
+/*
+ * Returns true if the task does not share ->mm with another thread/process.
  */
-bool is_single_threaded(struct task_struct *p)
+bool current_is_single_threaded(void)
 {
-        struct task_struct *g, *t;
-        struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
+        struct task_struct *task = current;
+        struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
+        struct task_struct *p, *t;
+        bool ret;
 
-        if (atomic_read(&p->signal->count) != 1)
-                goto no;
+        if (atomic_read(&task->signal->live) != 1)
+                return false;
 
-        if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
-                read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-                do_each_thread(g, t) {
-                        if (t->mm == mm && t != p)
-                                goto no_unlock;
-                } while_each_thread(g, t);
-                read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-        }
+        if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) == 1)
+                return true;
 
-        return true;
+        ret = false;
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        for_each_process(p) {
+                if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+                        continue;
+                if (unlikely(p == task->group_leader))
+                        continue;
+
+                t = p;
+                do {
+                        if (unlikely(t->mm == mm))
+                                goto found;
+                        if (likely(t->mm))
+                                break;
+                        /*
+                         * t->mm == NULL. Make sure next_thread/next_task
+                         * will see other CLONE_VM tasks which might be
+                         * forked before exiting.
+                         */
+                        smp_rmb();
+                } while_each_thread(p, t);
+        }
+        ret = true;
+found:
+        rcu_read_unlock();
 
-no_unlock:
-        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-no:
-        return false;
+        return ret;
 }
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 6a94475aee85..278d489aad3b 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ void dev_load(struct net *net, const char *name)
         dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, name);
         read_unlock(&dev_base_lock);
 
-        if (!dev && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+        if (!dev && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
                 request_module("%s", name);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
index e92beb9e55e0..6428b342b164 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int tcp_set_default_congestion_control(const char *name)
         spin_lock(&tcp_cong_list_lock);
         ca = tcp_ca_find(name);
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
-        if (!ca && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
+        if (!ca && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
                 spin_unlock(&tcp_cong_list_lock);
 
                 request_module("tcp_%s", name);
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
         /* not found attempt to autoload module */
-        if (!ca && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
+        if (!ca && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 request_module("tcp_%s", name);
                 rcu_read_lock();
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index b56e7f9ecbc2..95ecc06392d7 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)          += selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)            += smack/built-in.o
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)            += lsm_audit.o
-endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)                     += lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)           += tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)         += root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)             += device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 88f752e8152c..fce07a7bc825 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -386,6 +391,10 @@ static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
 
+static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -396,6 +405,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -701,10 +715,26 @@ static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
 
+
+
 static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
                                   struct flowi *fl)
 {
 }
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void cap_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -792,6 +822,20 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
                          unsigned long flags)
@@ -815,6 +859,13 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                     struct key *key)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -854,7 +905,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 
 void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
@@ -940,11 +991,14 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
@@ -992,6 +1046,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
@@ -1020,6 +1077,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
@@ -1038,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e3097c0a1311..fe30751a6cd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
  *                         another
  * @child: The process to be accessed
  * @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
  * granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
         int ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 747a464943af..74d5447d7df7 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-y := \
+        gc.o \
         key.o \
         keyring.o \
         keyctl.o \
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c766c68a63bc..792c0a611a6d 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
         case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
                 return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
 
+        case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+                return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
         default:
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1e616aef55fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/* Key garbage collector
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Delay between key revocation/expiry in seconds
+ */
+unsigned key_gc_delay = 5 * 60;
+
+/*
+ * Reaper
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long);
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *);
+static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0);
+static DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
+static key_serial_t key_gc_cursor; /* the last key the gc considered */
+static unsigned long key_gc_executing;
+static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+
+/*
+ * Schedule a garbage collection run
+ * - precision isn't particularly important
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
+{
+        unsigned long expires;
+        time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+
+        kenter("%ld", gc_at - now);
+
+        gc_at += key_gc_delay;
+
+        if (now >= gc_at) {
+                schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+        } else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
+                expires = jiffies + (gc_at - now) * HZ;
+                mod_timer(&key_gc_timer, expires);
+        }
+}
+
+/*
+ * The garbage collector timer kicked off
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
+{
+        kenter("");
+        key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+        schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring
+ * - return true if we altered the keyring
+ */
+static bool key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+        __releases(key_serial_lock)
+{
+        struct keyring_list *klist;
+        struct key *key;
+        int loop;
+
+        kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+        if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+                goto dont_gc;
+
+        /* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
+        klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+        if (!klist)
+                goto dont_gc;
+
+        for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+                key = klist->keys[loop];
+                if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+                    (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit))
+                        goto do_gc;
+        }
+
+dont_gc:
+        kleave(" = false");
+        return false;
+
+do_gc:
+        key_gc_cursor = keyring->serial;
+        key_get(keyring);
+        spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+        keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
+        key_put(keyring);
+        kleave(" = true");
+        return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collector for keys
+ * - this involves scanning the keyrings for dead, expired and revoked keys
+ *   that have overstayed their welcome
+ */
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+        struct rb_node *rb;
+        key_serial_t cursor;
+        struct key *key, *xkey;
+        time_t new_timer = LONG_MAX, limit;
+
+        kenter("");
+
+        if (test_and_set_bit(0, &key_gc_executing)) {
+                key_schedule_gc(current_kernel_time().tv_sec);
+                return;
+        }
+
+        limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+        if (limit > key_gc_delay)
+                limit -= key_gc_delay;
+        else
+                limit = key_gc_delay;
+
+        spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+        if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&key_serial_tree))
+                goto reached_the_end;
+
+        cursor = key_gc_cursor;
+        if (cursor < 0)
+                cursor = 0;
+
+        /* find the first key above the cursor */
+        key = NULL;
+        rb = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+        while (rb) {
+                xkey = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+                if (cursor < xkey->serial) {
+                        key = xkey;
+                        rb = rb->rb_left;
+                } else if (cursor > xkey->serial) {
+                        rb = rb->rb_right;
+                } else {
+                        rb = rb_next(rb);
+                        if (!rb)
+                                goto reached_the_end;
+                        key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+                        break;
+                }
+        }
+
+        if (!key)
+                goto reached_the_end;
+
+        /* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
+        for (;;) {
+                if (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry < new_timer)
+                        new_timer = key->expiry;
+
+                if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
+                    key_gc_keyring(key, limit)) {
+                        /* the gc ate our lock */
+                        schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+                        goto no_unlock;
+                }
+
+                rb = rb_next(&key->serial_node);
+                if (!rb) {
+                        key_gc_cursor = 0;
+                        break;
+                }
+                key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+        }
+
+out:
+        spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+no_unlock:
+        clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+        if (new_timer < LONG_MAX)
+                key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+
+        kleave("");
+        return;
+
+reached_the_end:
+        key_gc_cursor = 0;
+        goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 9fb679c66b8a..24ba0307b7ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -124,11 +124,18 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
                                         struct key *dest_keyring,
                                         unsigned long flags);
 
-extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
                                  key_perm_t perm);
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE       0x01
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL      0x02
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK   0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
 
+extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
+extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t expiry_at);
+
 /*
  * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way
  */
@@ -194,6 +201,7 @@ extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
 extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
                                 size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
 
 /*
  * debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 4a1297d1ada4..08531ad0f252 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
                 set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
                 now = current_kernel_time();
                 key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
+                key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
 
                 if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
                         awaken = 1;
@@ -642,10 +643,8 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
         goto error;
 
  found:
-        /* pretend it doesn't exist if it's dead */
-        if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0 ||
-            test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
-            key->type == &key_type_dead)
+        /* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
+        if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
                 goto not_found;
 
         /* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
@@ -890,6 +889,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
  */
 void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 {
+        struct timespec now;
+        time_t time;
+
         key_check(key);
 
         /* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
@@ -902,6 +904,14 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
             key->type->revoke)
                 key->type->revoke(key);
 
+        /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
+        now = current_kernel_time();
+        time = now.tv_sec;
+        if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
+                key->revoked_at = time;
+                key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at);
+        }
+
         up_write(&key->sem);
 
 } /* end key_revoke() */
@@ -958,8 +968,10 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
         for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
                 key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
 
-                if (key->type == ktype)
+                if (key->type == ktype) {
                         key->type = &key_type_dead;
+                        set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
+                }
         }
 
         spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
@@ -984,6 +996,8 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
         spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
         up_write(&key_types_sem);
 
+        key_schedule_gc(0);
+
 } /* end unregister_key_type() */
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 7f09fb897d2b..74c968524592 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
         }
 
         /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error3;
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
         /* get the destination keyring if specified */
         dest_ref = NULL;
         if (destringid) {
-                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+                                           KEY_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
                         goto error3;
@@ -233,9 +234,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 {
         key_ref_t key_ref;
+        unsigned long lflags;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+        lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -309,7 +312,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
         }
 
         /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -337,10 +340,16 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
         key_ref_t key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
-                goto error;
+                if (ret != -EACCES)
+                        goto error;
+                key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+                if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+                        ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+                        goto error;
+                }
         }
 
         key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
@@ -363,7 +372,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -389,13 +398,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
         }
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -423,13 +432,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
         }
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, 0);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -465,7 +474,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
         char *tmpbuf;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
                  * authorisation token handy */
@@ -474,7 +483,8 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
                         if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
                                 key_put(instkey);
                                 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
-                                                          0, 1, 0);
+                                                          KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                                          0);
                                 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
                                         goto okay;
                         }
@@ -558,7 +568,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
         }
 
         /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -567,7 +577,8 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
         /* get the destination keyring if specified */
         dest_ref = NULL;
         if (destringid) {
-                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+                                           KEY_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
                         goto error3;
@@ -637,7 +648,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
         long ret;
 
         /* find the key first */
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0, 0);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = -ENOKEY;
                 goto error;
@@ -700,7 +711,8 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
         if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
                 goto error;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                  KEY_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -805,7 +817,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
         if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
                 goto error;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                  KEY_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -847,7 +860,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
         /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
         if (ringid > 0) {
-                dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+                dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dkref))
                         return PTR_ERR(dkref);
                 *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1083,7 +1096,8 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
         time_t expiry;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                  KEY_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -1101,6 +1115,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
         }
 
         key->expiry = expiry;
+        key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
 
         up_write(&key->sem);
         key_put(key);
@@ -1170,7 +1185,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
         char *context;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1182,7 +1197,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 key_put(instkey);
 
-                key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+                key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
                 if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
         }
@@ -1213,6 +1228,105 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
         return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
+ * parent process
+ * - the keyring must exist and must grant us LINK permission
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT)
+ */
+long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
+{
+        struct task_struct *me, *parent;
+        const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
+        struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+        key_ref_t keyring_r;
+        int ret;
+
+        keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+        if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
+                return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+
+        /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
+         * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
+         * our parent */
+        ret = -ENOMEM;
+        cred = cred_alloc_blank();
+        if (!cred)
+                goto error_keyring;
+
+        cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+        keyring_r = NULL;
+
+        me = current;
+        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+        parent = me->real_parent;
+        ret = -EPERM;
+
+        /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
+        if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the parent must be single threaded */
+        if (atomic_read(&parent->signal->count) != 1)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
+         * there's no point */
+        mycred = current_cred();
+        pcred = __task_cred(parent);
+        if (mycred == pcred ||
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+                goto already_same;
+
+        /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
+         * SUID/SGID */
+        if (pcred-> uid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred-> gid != mycred->egid ||
+            pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
+            pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
+        if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
+         * keyring from this process */
+        ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
+                                             key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
+        if (ret < 0)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
+         * that */
+        oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+
+        /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
+         * restarting */
+        parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
+        cred = NULL;
+        set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        if (oldcred)
+                put_cred(oldcred);
+        return 0;
+
+already_same:
+        ret = 0;
+not_permitted:
+        put_cred(cred);
+        return ret;
+
+error_keyring:
+        key_ref_put(keyring_r);
+        return ret;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * the key control system call
@@ -1298,6 +1412,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
                                            (char __user *) arg3,
                                            (size_t) arg4);
 
+        case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+                return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
         default:
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 3dba81c2eba3..ac977f661a79 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1000,3 +1000,88 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
         }
 
 } /* end keyring_revoke() */
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a key is dead
+ */
+static bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
+{
+        return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+                (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect garbage from the contents of a keyring
+ */
+void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+{
+        struct keyring_list *klist, *new;
+        struct key *key;
+        int loop, keep, max;
+
+        kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+        down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+        klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
+        if (!klist)
+                goto just_return;
+
+        /* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
+        keep = 0;
+        for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
+                if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit));
+                        keep++;
+
+        if (keep == klist->nkeys)
+                goto just_return;
+
+        /* allocate a new keyring payload */
+        max = roundup(keep, 4);
+        new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
+                      GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!new)
+                goto just_return;
+        new->maxkeys = max;
+        new->nkeys = 0;
+        new->delkey = 0;
+
+        /* install the live keys
+         * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life
+         */
+        keep = 0;
+        for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+                key = klist->keys[loop];
+                if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
+                        if (keep >= max)
+                                goto discard_new;
+                        new->keys[keep++] = key_get(key);
+                }
+        }
+        new->nkeys = keep;
+
+        /* adjust the quota */
+        key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+                            sizeof(struct keyring_list) +
+                            KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep);
+
+        if (keep == 0) {
+                rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
+                kfree(new);
+        } else {
+                rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new);
+        }
+
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+        call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
+        kleave(" [yes]");
+        return;
+
+discard_new:
+        new->nkeys = keep;
+        keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
+just_return:
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+        kleave(" [no]");
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 769f9bdfd2b3..9d01021ca0c8 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -91,59 +91,94 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
 
-static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
 {
+        struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+        n = rb_next(n);
         while (n) {
                 struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
-                if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+                if (key->user->user_ns == user_ns)
                         break;
                 n = rb_next(n);
         }
         return n;
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-        return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n));
+        return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r)
+static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
-        struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
-        return __key_serial_next(n);
-}
+        struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+        struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+        struct key *minkey = NULL;
 
-static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-        return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
+        while (n) {
+                struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+                if (id < key->serial) {
+                        if (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)
+                                minkey = key;
+                        n = n->rb_left;
+                } else if (id > key->serial) {
+                        n = n->rb_right;
+                } else {
+                        minkey = key;
+                        break;
+                }
+                key = NULL;
+        }
 
+        if (!minkey)
+                return NULL;
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (minkey->user->user_ns == user_ns)
+                        return minkey;
+                n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
+                if (!n)
+                        return NULL;
+                minkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+        }
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+        __acquires(key_serial_lock)
 {
-        struct rb_node *_p;
-        loff_t pos = *_pos;
+        key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
+        struct key *key;
 
         spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
 
-        _p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree);
-        while (pos > 0 && _p) {
-                pos--;
-                _p = key_serial_next(_p);
-        }
-
-        return _p;
+        if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
+                return NULL;
+        key = find_ge_key(pos);
+        if (!key)
+                return NULL;
+        *_pos = key->serial;
+        return &key->serial_node;
+}
 
+static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+        struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+        return key->serial;
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
-        (*_pos)++;
-        return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+        struct rb_node *n;
 
+        n = key_serial_next(v);
+        if (n)
+                *_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+        return n;
 }
 
 static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+        __releases(key_serial_lock)
 {
         spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
 }
@@ -174,11 +209,9 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
         /* come up with a suitable timeout value */
         if (key->expiry == 0) {
                 memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
-        }
-        else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+        } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
                 memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
-        }
-        else {
+        } else {
                 timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
 
                 if (timo < 60)
@@ -218,9 +251,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
         seq_putc(m, '\n');
 
         rcu_read_unlock();
-
         return 0;
-
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
@@ -246,6 +277,7 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
         struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
         return __key_user_next(n);
 }
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users
@@ -253,10 +285,10 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
 static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
         return seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+        __acquires(key_user_lock)
 {
         struct rb_node *_p;
         loff_t pos = *_pos;
@@ -270,17 +302,16 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
         }
 
         return _p;
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
         (*_pos)++;
         return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
-
 }
 
 static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+        __releases(key_user_lock)
 {
         spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 276d27882ce8..5c23afb31ece 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
  * - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
  * - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
  */
-key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
                           key_perm_t perm)
 {
         struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ try_again:
         switch (id) {
         case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
                 if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
-                        if (!create)
+                        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
                                 goto error;
 
                         ret = install_thread_keyring();
@@ -521,7 +522,7 @@ try_again:
 
         case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
                 if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
-                        if (!create)
+                        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
                                 goto error;
 
                         ret = install_process_keyring();
@@ -642,7 +643,14 @@ try_again:
                 break;
         }
 
-        if (!partial) {
+        /* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
+         * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
+        if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
+                ret = 0;
+                goto error;
+        }
+
+        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
                 ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
                 switch (ret) {
                 case -ERESTARTSYS:
@@ -660,7 +668,8 @@ try_again:
         }
 
         ret = -EIO;
-        if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
+            !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
                 goto invalid_key;
 
         /* check the permissions */
@@ -702,7 +711,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
         /* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
          * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
          * ENOMEM */
-        if (!is_single_threaded(current))
+        if (!current_is_single_threaded())
                 return -EMLINK;
 
         new = prepare_creds();
@@ -760,3 +769,51 @@ error:
         abort_creds(new);
         return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Replace a process's session keyring when that process resumes userspace on
+ * behalf of one of its children
+ */
+void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+{
+        const struct cred *old;
+        struct cred *new;
+
+        if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                return;
+
+        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
+        current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+        if (!new)
+                return;
+
+        old = current_cred();
+        new->  uid      = old->  uid;
+        new-> euid      = old-> euid;
+        new-> suid      = old-> suid;
+        new->fsuid      = old->fsuid;
+        new->  gid      = old->  gid;
+        new-> egid      = old-> egid;
+        new-> sgid      = old-> sgid;
+        new->fsgid      = old->fsgid;
+        new->user       = get_uid(old->user);
+        new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
+
+        new->securebits = old->securebits;
+        new->cap_inheritable    = old->cap_inheritable;
+        new->cap_permitted      = old->cap_permitted;
+        new->cap_effective      = old->cap_effective;
+        new->cap_bset           = old->cap_bset;
+
+        new->jit_keyring        = old->jit_keyring;
+        new->thread_keyring     = key_get(old->thread_keyring);
+        new->tgcred->tgid       = old->tgcred->tgid;
+        new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
+
+        security_transfer_creds(new, old);
+
+        commit_creds(new);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index b611d493c2d8..5e05dc09e2db 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
+
 ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -20,7 +22,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -28,7 +32,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_maxbytes,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -36,7 +42,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_root_maxkeys,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -44,7 +52,19 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_root_maxbytes,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
+        },
+        {
+                .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+                .procname = "gc_delay",
+                .data = &key_gc_delay,
+                .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+                .mode = 0644,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &zero,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         { .ctl_name = 0 }
 };
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 94b868494b31..500aad0ebd6a 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
         }
 
         switch (a->type) {
+        case LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT:
+                return;
         case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
                 audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
                 break;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674fbfc7a..c4c673240c1c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-        return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -684,6 +684,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
         security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -699,6 +704,11 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
         security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
 }
 
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+}
+
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
@@ -709,6 +719,11 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
+}
+
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
         return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
@@ -959,6 +974,24 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
+
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
+
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
@@ -1112,6 +1145,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
         security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
 }
 
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1218,6 +1269,13 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
 }
 
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                   struct key *key)
+{
+        return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
+}
+
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b2ab60859832..e3d19014259b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @av: access vector
  */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 {
         const char **common_pts = NULL;
         u32 common_base = 0;
@@ -492,23 +492,35 @@ out:
         return node;
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
-                                       struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
-                                       char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-        if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
-        if (port)
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+        audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
+                         ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+        avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
+                        ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
-                                       __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-        if (addr)
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
-        if (port)
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+        audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+        avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
+                           ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
+                           ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -532,13 +544,10 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
  */
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-        struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-        struct inode *inode = NULL;
+        struct common_audit_data stack_data;
         u32 denied, audited;
-        struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
         denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
         if (denied) {
                 audited = denied;
@@ -551,144 +560,20 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                 if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
                         return;
         }
-
-        ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
-        if (!ab)
-                return;         /* audit_panic has been called */
-        audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-        avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited);
-        audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
-        if (a && a->tsk)
-                tsk = a->tsk;
-        if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
-                audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
-                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+        if (!a) {
+                a = &stack_data;
+                memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+                a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
         }
-        if (a) {
-                switch (a->type) {
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id);
-                        break;
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
-                        break;
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
-                        if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
-                                struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
-                                if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
-                                        audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-                                                         &a->u.fs.path);
-                                } else {
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-                                        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-                                }
-                                inode = dentry->d_inode;
-                        } else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
-                                struct dentry *dentry;
-                                inode = a->u.fs.inode;
-                                dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
-                                if (dentry) {
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-                                        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-                                        dput(dentry);
-                                }
-                        }
-                        if (inode)
-                                audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
-                                                 inode->i_sb->s_id,
-                                                 inode->i_ino);
-                        break;
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
-                        if (a->u.net.sk) {
-                                struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
-                                struct unix_sock *u;
-                                int len = 0;
-                                char *p = NULL;
-
-                                switch (sk->sk_family) {
-                                case AF_INET: {
-                                        struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-
-                                        avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
-                                                            inet->sport,
-                                                            "laddr", "lport");
-                                        avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
-                                                            inet->dport,
-                                                            "faddr", "fport");
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                                case AF_INET6: {
-                                        struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-                                        struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
-
-                                        avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
-                                                            inet->sport,
-                                                            "laddr", "lport");
-                                        avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
-                                                            inet->dport,
-                                                            "faddr", "fport");
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                                case AF_UNIX:
-                                        u = unix_sk(sk);
-                                        if (u->dentry) {
-                                                struct path path = {
-                                                        .dentry = u->dentry,
-                                                        .mnt = u->mnt
-                                                };
-                                                audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-                                                                 &path);
-                                                break;
-                                        }
-                                        if (!u->addr)
-                                                break;
-                                        len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
-                                        p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
-                                        if (*p)
-                                                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
-                                        else
-                                                audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                        }
-
-                        switch (a->u.net.family) {
-                        case AF_INET:
-                                avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.sport,
-                                                    "saddr", "src");
-                                avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.dport,
-                                                    "daddr", "dest");
-                                break;
-                        case AF_INET6:
-                                avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.sport,
-                                                    "saddr", "src");
-                                avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.dport,
-                                                    "daddr", "dest");
-                                break;
-                        }
-                        if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
-                                struct net_device *dev;
-
-                                /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
-                                dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
-                                                       a->u.net.netif);
-                                if (dev) {
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
-                                                         dev->name);
-                                        dev_put(dev);
-                                }
-                        }
-                        break;
-                }
-        }
-        audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-        avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass);
-        audit_log_end(ab);
+        a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+        a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
+        a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
+        common_lsm_audit(a);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -956,7 +841,7 @@ out:
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-                 u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+                 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
         struct av_decision avd;
         int rc;
@@ -970,3 +855,9 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
 {
         return avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
+
+void avc_disable(void)
+{
+        if (avc_node_cachep)
+                kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8d8b69c5664e..417f7c994522 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *      Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  *
@@ -448,6 +448,10 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
             sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
                 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 
+        /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+        if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+                sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
         /* Initialize the root inode. */
         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -1479,14 +1483,14 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                const struct cred *cred,
                                int cap, int audit)
 {
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         struct av_decision avd;
         u16 sclass;
         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
         int rc;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
         ad.tsk = tsk;
         ad.u.cap = cap;
 
@@ -1525,12 +1529,14 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                           struct inode *inode,
                           u32 perms,
-                          struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+                          struct common_audit_data *adp)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid;
 
+        validate_creds(cred);
+
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
 
@@ -1539,7 +1545,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
         if (!adp) {
                 adp = &ad;
-                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
         }
 
@@ -1555,9 +1561,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                                   u32 av)
 {
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
@@ -1577,11 +1583,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
         int rc;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
 
         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -1612,7 +1618,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
         u32 sid, newsid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
         dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1621,7 +1627,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         sid = tsec->sid;
         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1665,7 +1671,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         u32 av;
         int rc;
@@ -1673,7 +1679,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
         dsec = dir->i_security;
         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
         av = DIR__SEARCH;
@@ -1708,7 +1714,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         u32 av;
         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1719,7 +1725,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1761,7 +1767,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                                struct super_block *sb,
                                u32 perms,
-                               struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                               struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1855,12 +1861,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
                                      unsigned int mode)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         int rc;
 
@@ -2139,7 +2145,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                         return rc;
         }
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2232,7 +2238,7 @@ extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                                             struct files_struct *files)
 {
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
         struct tty_struct *tty;
         struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2266,7 +2272,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
         for (;;) {
@@ -2515,7 +2521,7 @@ out:
 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2526,7 +2532,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
                 return 0;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
@@ -2534,9 +2540,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
@@ -2711,12 +2717,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+        unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+
+        /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+        if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+                ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+                              ATTR_FORCE);
+                if (!ia_valid)
+                        return 0;
+        }
 
-        if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
-                return 0;
-
-        if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
-                               ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+        if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+                        ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
@@ -2756,7 +2768,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
         int rc = 0;
 
@@ -2770,7 +2782,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
                 return -EPERM;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2915,6 +2927,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
                 return rc;
 
         isec->sid = newsid;
+        isec->initialized = 1;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2939,11 +2952,6 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
-        if (!mask) {
-                /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
@@ -2954,10 +2962,20 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
+        struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+        struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+        struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+        u32 sid = current_sid();
+
         if (!mask)
                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
                 return 0;
 
+        if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+            fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+                /* No change since dentry_open check. */
+                return 0;
+
         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -3220,12 +3238,29 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 }
 
 /*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+        tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+        if (!tsec)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        cred->security = tsec;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-        cred->security = NULL;
+
+        BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+        cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
         kfree(tsec);
 }
 
@@ -3249,6 +3284,17 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+        *tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3292,6 +3338,11 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3409,7 +3460,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -3490,7 +3541,7 @@ out:
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
         u8 nexthdr;
         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -3561,7 +3612,7 @@ out:
 
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
-static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
         char *addrp;
@@ -3643,7 +3694,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
                            u32 perms)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid;
         int err = 0;
 
@@ -3653,7 +3704,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
                 goto out;
         sid = task_sid(task);
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
         err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 
@@ -3740,7 +3791,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
                 char *addrp;
                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-                struct avc_audit_data ad;
+                struct common_audit_data ad;
                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
                 unsigned short snum;
@@ -3769,7 +3820,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
                                                       snum, &sid);
                                 if (err)
                                         goto out;
-                                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+                                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
@@ -3802,7 +3853,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
                 if (err)
                         goto out;
 
-                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
                 ad.u.net.family = family;
 
@@ -3836,7 +3887,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
-                struct avc_audit_data ad;
+                struct common_audit_data ad;
                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
                 unsigned short snum;
@@ -3861,7 +3912,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
-                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -3951,13 +4002,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3983,13 +4034,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -4002,7 +4053,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 
 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
                                     u32 peer_sid,
-                                    struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                    struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         int err;
         u32 if_sid;
@@ -4030,10 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
         u32 peer_sid;
         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4071,7 +4122,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
         u8 secmark_active;
         u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4095,7 +4146,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
                 return 0;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4309,6 +4360,59 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
         fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+        /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+         * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+         * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+         * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+         * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+         * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+        return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+                            NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+        /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+         * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+         * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+         * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+         * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+         * protocols were being used */
+
+        /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
+         * the sockcreate SID here */
+
+        sksec->sid = current_sid();
+        sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+        u32 sid = current_sid();
+        int err;
+
+        err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+                           TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+        if (err)
+                return err;
+        err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+                           TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+        if (err)
+                return err;
+
+        sksec->sid = sid;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         int err = 0;
@@ -4353,7 +4457,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
         int err;
         char *addrp;
         u32 peer_sid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u8 secmark_active;
         u8 netlbl_active;
         u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4370,7 +4474,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
                 return NF_DROP;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4458,7 +4562,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
         u8 proto;
 
@@ -4466,7 +4570,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
                 return NF_ACCEPT;
         sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4490,7 +4594,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
         u32 secmark_perm;
         u32 peer_sid;
         struct sock *sk;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
         u8 secmark_active;
         u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4549,7 +4653,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
         }
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4619,13 +4723,13 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 {
         int err;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
 
         err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
         ad.u.cap = capability;
 
         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
@@ -4684,12 +4788,12 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
                         u32 perms)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4709,7 +4813,7 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4719,7 +4823,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4739,12 +4843,12 @@ static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4783,7 +4887,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4804,7 +4908,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
                         return rc;
         }
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4828,14 +4932,14 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
         int rc;
 
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
         msec = msg->security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4850,7 +4954,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4860,7 +4964,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 
         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4880,12 +4984,12 @@ static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4942,7 +5046,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4952,7 +5056,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 
         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -4972,12 +5076,12 @@ static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5195,7 +5299,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 
                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
                 error = -EPERM;
-                if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+                if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
                         if (error)
                                 goto abort_change;
@@ -5252,6 +5356,32 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
         kfree(secdata);
 }
 
+/*
+ *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        int len = 0;
+        len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+                                                ctx, true);
+        if (len < 0)
+                return len;
+        *ctxlen = len;
+        return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
@@ -5323,7 +5453,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .name =                         "selinux",
 
-        .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+        .ptrace_access_check =          selinux_ptrace_access_check,
         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
@@ -5396,10 +5526,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
 
         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer =                selinux_cred_transfer,
         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
+        .kernel_module_request =        selinux_kernel_module_request,
         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
@@ -5448,6 +5581,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
+        .inode_notifysecctx =           selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
+        .inode_setsecctx =              selinux_inode_setsecctx,
+        .inode_getsecctx =              selinux_inode_getsecctx,
 
         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
@@ -5477,6 +5613,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
+        .tun_dev_create =               selinux_tun_dev_create,
+        .tun_dev_post_create =          selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
+        .tun_dev_attach =               selinux_tun_dev_attach,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
@@ -5691,6 +5830,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
         selinux_disabled = 1;
         selinux_enabled = 0;
 
+        /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+        avc_disable();
+
         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
         security_ops = secondary_ops;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index 8377a4ba3b95..abedcd704dae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7c1aee..2b683ad83d21 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192ee950..0546d616ccac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,6 +423,28 @@
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
 #define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
 #define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
 #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
@@ -508,6 +530,7 @@
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ                       0x00000002UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD                        0x00000004UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE                    0x00000008UL
+#define SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST                    0x00000010UL
 #define CAPABILITY__CHOWN                         0x00000001UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE                  0x00000002UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH               0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index d12ff1a9c0aa..e94e82f73818 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
 #include <asm/system.h>
@@ -36,48 +37,6 @@ struct inode;
 struct sock;
 struct sk_buff;
 
-/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
-struct avc_audit_data {
-        char    type;
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS   1
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET  2
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP  3
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC  4
-        struct task_struct *tsk;
-        union   {
-                struct {
-                        struct path path;
-                        struct inode *inode;
-                } fs;
-                struct {
-                        int netif;
-                        struct sock *sk;
-                        u16 family;
-                        __be16 dport;
-                        __be16 sport;
-                        union {
-                                struct {
-                                        __be32 daddr;
-                                        __be32 saddr;
-                                } v4;
-                                struct {
-                                        struct in6_addr daddr;
-                                        struct in6_addr saddr;
-                                } v6;
-                        } fam;
-                } net;
-                int cap;
-                int ipc_id;
-        } u;
-};
-
-#define v4info fam.v4
-#define v6info fam.v6
-
-/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
-
 /*
  * AVC statistics
  */
@@ -98,7 +57,9 @@ void __init avc_init(void);
 
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+               struct av_decision *avd,
+               int result,
+               struct common_audit_data *a);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -108,7 +69,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                  u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+                 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
@@ -127,13 +88,13 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                      u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                      u16 tclass, u32 perms);
 
-/* Shows permission in human readable form */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av);
-
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
 int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
 extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
 
+/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
+void avc_disable(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 21ec786611d4..7ab9299bfb6b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -77,3 +77,4 @@
     S_(NULL)
     S_(NULL)
     S_("kernel_service")
+    S_("tun_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 882f27d66fac..f248500a1e3c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_PEER                                    68
 #define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             69
 #define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          74
+#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              75
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index b4b5b9b2f0be..8d7384280a7a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
                                 u16 family,
-                                struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
                                      int level,
                                      int optname);
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
                                               struct sk_buff *skb,
                                               u16 family,
-                                              struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                              struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 289e24b39e3e..13128f9a3e5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2e984413c7b2..e68823741ad5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
                                 u16 family,
-                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         int rc;
         u32 nlbl_sid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 500e6f78e115..ff17820d35ec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
  *
  *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
  *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
  * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
@@ -279,6 +284,95 @@ mls_ops:
 }
 
 /*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+        struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+        char **permission_names = args;
+
+        BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+        permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+                                    struct context *tcontext,
+                                    u16 tclass,
+                                    u32 permissions,
+                                    const char *reason)
+{
+        struct common_datum *common_dat;
+        struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+        struct audit_buffer *ab;
+        char *tclass_name;
+        char *scontext_name = NULL;
+        char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+        char *permission_names[32];
+        int index, length;
+        bool need_comma = false;
+
+        if (!permissions)
+                return;
+
+        tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+        tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+        common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+        /* init permission_names */
+        if (common_dat &&
+            hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+                        dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+                        dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+        if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+                                     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+                                     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        /* audit a message */
+        ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+                             GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+        if (!ab)
+                goto out;
+
+        audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+                         "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+                         reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+        for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+                u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+                if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+                        continue;
+
+                audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+                                 need_comma ? "," : "",
+                                 permission_names[index]
+                                 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+                need_comma = true;
+        }
+        audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+        /* release scontext/tcontext */
+        kfree(tcontext_name);
+        kfree(scontext_name);
+
+        return;
+}
+
+/*
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
@@ -347,28 +441,12 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
         }
 
         if (masked) {
-                struct audit_buffer *ab;
-                char *stype_name
-                        = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[source->value - 1];
-                char *ttype_name
-                        = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[target->value - 1];
-                char *tclass_name
-                        = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
-
                 /* mask violated permissions */
                 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
-                /* notice to userspace via audit message */
-                ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
-                                     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
-                if (!ab)
-                        return;
-
-                audit_log_format(ab, "av boundary violation: "
-                                 "source=%s target=%s tclass=%s",
-                                 stype_name, ttype_name, tclass_name);
-                avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, masked);
-                audit_log_end(ab);
+                /* audit masked permissions */
+                security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+                                        tclass, masked, "bounds");
         }
 }
 
@@ -480,7 +558,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
                 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
                     !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
                                           constraint->expr)) {
-                        avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+                        avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
                 }
                 constraint = constraint->next;
         }
@@ -499,8 +577,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
                                 break;
                 }
                 if (!ra)
-                        avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
-                                                        PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+                        avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+                                          PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
         }
 
         /*
@@ -687,6 +765,26 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
                 }
                 index = type->bounds;
         }
+
+        if (rc) {
+                char *old_name = NULL;
+                char *new_name = NULL;
+                int length;
+
+                if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+                                              &old_name, &length) &&
+                    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+                                              &new_name, &length)) {
+                        audit_log(current->audit_context,
+                                  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+                                  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+                                  "result=denied "
+                                  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+                                  old_name, new_name);
+                }
+                kfree(new_name);
+                kfree(old_name);
+        }
 out:
         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 72b18452e1a1..f3cb9ed731a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         int i, rc = 0;
         struct sec_path *sp;
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+                                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         struct dst_entry *dst;
         int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 243bec175be0..c6e9acae72e4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
 {
         memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
         a->a.type = type;
-        a->a.function = func;
+        a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func;
 }
 
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 513dc1aa16dd..0f9ac8146900 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -240,8 +240,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
         struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
-        struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
-        audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", ad->function,
+        struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data;
+        audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+                         ad->smack_audit_data.function,
                          sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
         audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
@@ -274,11 +275,11 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
         if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
                 return;
 
-        if (a->function == NULL)
-                a->function = "unknown";
+        if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL)
+                a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown";
 
         /* end preparing the audit data */
-        sad = &a->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+        sad = &a->smack_audit_data;
         smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
         sad->subject = subject_label;
         sad->object  = object_label;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182078c7..acae7ef4092d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
         int rc;
         struct smk_audit_info ad;
         char *sp, *tsp;
 
-        rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
         if (rc != 0)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1080,6 +1080,22 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        cred->security = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
@@ -1117,6 +1133,18 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        new->security = old->security;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
  * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
@@ -1638,6 +1666,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
                 nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+                nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
                 return 0;
         }
         /*
@@ -2464,7 +2493,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
         /*
          * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
          */
-        if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+        if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
                 return 0;
 
         return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
@@ -3029,10 +3058,31 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        int len = 0;
+        len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+
+        if (len < 0)
+                return len;
+        *ctxlen = len;
+        return 0;
+}
+
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .name =                         "smack",
 
-        .ptrace_may_access =            smack_ptrace_may_access,
+        .ptrace_access_check =          smack_ptrace_access_check,
         .ptrace_traceme =               smack_ptrace_traceme,
         .syslog =                       smack_syslog,
 
@@ -3073,9 +3123,11 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .file_send_sigiotask =          smack_file_send_sigiotask,
         .file_receive =                 smack_file_receive,
 
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             smack_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_free =                    smack_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 smack_cred_prepare,
         .cred_commit =                  smack_cred_commit,
+        .cred_transfer =                smack_cred_transfer,
         .kernel_act_as =                smack_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       smack_kernel_create_files_as,
         .task_setpgid =                 smack_task_setpgid,
@@ -3155,6 +3207,9 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .secid_to_secctx =              smack_secid_to_secctx,
         .secctx_to_secid =              smack_secctx_to_secid,
         .release_secctx =               smack_release_secctx,
+        .inode_notifysecctx =           smack_inode_notifysecctx,
+        .inode_setsecctx =              smack_inode_setsecctx,
+        .inode_getsecctx =              smack_inode_getsecctx,
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index fdd1f4b8c448..3c8bd8ee0b95 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1285,6 +1285,36 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 }
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+        struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+        struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+        name.name = domainname;
+        tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+        down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+        /* Is there an active domain? */
+        list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+                /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+                if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+                        continue;
+                if (domain->is_deleted ||
+                    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+                        continue;
+                domain->is_deleted = true;
+                break;
+        }
+        up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
  *
  * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 6d6ba09af457..31df541911f7 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -339,8 +339,6 @@ const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
 const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
 /* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
 const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
-/* Delete a domain. */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data);
 /* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
 int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 /*
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 1d8b16960576..fcf52accce2b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -717,38 +717,6 @@ int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
         return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
 }
 
-/* Domain create/delete handler. */
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
- *
- * @domainname: The name of domain.
- *
- * Returns 0.
- */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
-{
-        struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
-        struct tomoyo_path_info name;
-
-        name.name = domainname;
-        tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
-        down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-        /* Is there an active domain? */
-        list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
-                /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
-                if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
-                        continue;
-                if (domain->is_deleted ||
-                    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
-                        continue;
-                domain->is_deleted = true;
-                break;
-        }
-        up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-        return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
  *
@@ -818,13 +786,11 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
  *
- * @bprm:           Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
- * @next_domain:    Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
  */
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-                            struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain)
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         /*
          * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
@@ -946,9 +912,11 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
                 tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
                                        TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
  out:
+        if (!domain)
+                domain = old_domain;
+        bprm->cred->security = domain;
         tomoyo_free(real_program_name);
         tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name);
-        *next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
         tomoyo_free(tmp);
         return retval;
 }
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 3194d09fe0f4..9548a0984cc4 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 #include "tomoyo.h"
 #include "realpath.h"
 
+static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        new->security = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -25,6 +31,15 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
         return 0;
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        /*
+         * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+         * we don't need to duplicate.
+         */
+        new->security = old->security;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         int rc;
@@ -61,14 +76,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
          * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
          * using current domain.
          */
-        if (!domain) {
-                struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
-                int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
-
-                if (!retval)
-                        bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
-                return retval;
-        }
+        if (!domain)
+                return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
         /*
          * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
          * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
@@ -268,7 +277,9 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
  */
 static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
         .name                = "tomoyo",
+        .cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer       = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
         .bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
         .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
index 0fd588a629cf..cd6ba0bf7069 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
                             struct path *path2);
 int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
                                     struct file *filp);
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-                            struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
 /* Index numbers for Access Controls. */