USB: usbfs: don't leak kernel data in siginfo

When a signal is delivered, the information in the siginfo structure
is copied to userspace.  Good security practice dicatates that the
unused fields in this structure should be initialized to 0 so that
random kernel stack data isn't exposed to the user.  This patch adds
such an initialization to the two places where usbfs raises signals.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Dave Mielke <dave@mielke.cc>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
index 66abdbcfbfa5..11635537c052 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
         as->status = urb->status;
         signr = as->signr;
         if (signr) {
+                memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
                 sinfo.si_signo = as->signr;
                 sinfo.si_errno = as->status;
                 sinfo.si_code = SI_ASYNCIO;
@@ -2382,6 +2383,7 @@ static void usbdev_remove(struct usb_device *udev)
                 wake_up_all(&ps->wait);
                 list_del_init(&ps->list);
                 if (ps->discsignr) {
+                        memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
                         sinfo.si_signo = ps->discsignr;
                         sinfo.si_errno = EPIPE;
                         sinfo.si_code = SI_ASYNCIO;