Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
 "The sweeping change is to make add_taint() explicitly indicate whether
  to disable lockdep, but it's a mechanical change."

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  MODSIGN: Add option to not sign modules during modules_install
  MODSIGN: Add -s <signature> option to sign-file
  MODSIGN: Specify the hash algorithm on sign-file command line
  MODSIGN: Simplify Makefile with a Kconfig helper
  module: clean up load_module a little more.
  modpost: Ignore ARC specific non-alloc sections
  module: constify within_module_*
  taint: add explicit flag to show whether lock dep is still OK.
  module: printk message when module signature fail taints kernel.

43 files changed, 235 insertions, 201 deletions

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 6fccf6531770..2309b435c07f 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -720,11 +720,11 @@ endif # INSTALL_MOD_STRIP
 export mod_strip_cmd
 
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
 MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
 MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
 export MODPUBKEY
-mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
+mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
 else
 mod_sign_cmd = true
 endif
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
index 272666d006df..4037461a6493 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15)
 #endif
         printk("%s(%d): %s %ld\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, err);
         dik_show_regs(regs, r9_15);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         dik_show_trace((unsigned long *)(regs+1));
         dik_show_code((unsigned int *)regs->pc);
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
index b0179b89a04c..1c089119b2d7 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
         die_owner = -1;
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         die_nest_count--;
         if (!die_nest_count)
                 /* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 3883f842434f..b3c5f628bdb4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
                 crash_kexec(regs);
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
         oops_exit();
 
diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
index 3d760c06f024..682b2478691a 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
         show_regs_log_lvl(regs, KERN_EMERG);
         show_stack_log_lvl(current, regs->sp, regs, KERN_EMERG);
         bust_spinlocks(0);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
 
         if (in_interrupt())
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
index a41eeb8eeaa1..be5e2dd9c9d3 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
         do_show_stack(current, &regs->r30, pt_elr(regs));
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock);
 
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
index bd42b76000d1..f7f9f9c6caf0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
         die.lock_owner = -1;
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock);
 
         if (!regs)
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
index cbc624af4494..f32ab22e7ed3 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr)
         console_verbose();
         printk("%s: %08x\n",str,nr);
         show_registers(fp);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         do_exit(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
index cf7ac5483f53..9007966d56d4 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
 
         printk("%s[#%d]:\n", str, ++die_counter);
         show_registers(regs);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
 
         oops_exit();
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
index 45ba99f5080b..aeb8f8f2c07a 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 
         show_regs(regs);
         dump_stack();
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         if (in_interrupt())
                 panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
index f9b751b29558..37cc40ef5043 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs,
 {
         bust_spinlocks(0);
         die_owner = -1;
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         die_nest_count--;
         oops_exit();
         printk("\n");
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
index 70ecfc5fe8f0..13dd63fba367 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
         print_modules();
         show_regs(regs);
         bust_spinlocks(0);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
         if (in_interrupt())
                 panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
index 72246bc06884..dfdad72c61ca 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
         notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV);
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
         oops_exit();
 
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
index 0eaf0059aaef..88a127b9c69e 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void __init process_switch(char c)
                         break;
                 }
                 cheetah_pcache_forced_on = 1;
-                add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+                add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
                 cheetah_enable_pcache();
                 break;
 
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
index a5785ea2a85d..662982946a89 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
 
         printk("%s(%d): %s [#%d]\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, ++die_counter);
         show_regs(regs);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE;
         __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
index e7ecf1507d90..8d38ca97aa23 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
         notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, 255, SIGSEGV);
         __asm__ __volatile__("flushw");
         show_regs(regs);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {
                 struct thread_info *tp = current_thread_info();
                 struct reg_window *rw = (struct reg_window *)
diff --git a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
index 2054f0d4db13..0870b68d2ad9 100644
--- a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
         ret = __die(str, err, thread, regs);
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
         oops_exit();
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index edd77e7508b3..fa96eb0d02fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
          */
         WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
                 " processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
-        if (!test_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP))
-                add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
+        add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
 valid_k7:
         ;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index fc7608a89d93..7bc126346ace 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
                 /*
                  * Set taint even when machine check was not enabled.
                  */
-                add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+                add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
                 severity = mce_severity(&m, cfg->tolerant, NULL);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
index 2d5454cd2c4f..1c044b1ccc59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
                         smp_processor_id());
         }
 
-        add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+        add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 
 /* Set up machine check reporting for processors with Intel style MCE: */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
index 2d7998fb628c..e9a701aecaa1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 static void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
         printk(KERN_EMERG "CPU0: Machine Check Exception.\n");
-        add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+        add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 
 /* Set up machine check reporting on the Winchip C6 series */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
index e9fe907cd249..fa72a39e5d46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
 
                 if (tmp != mask_lo) {
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "mtrr: your BIOS has configured an incorrect mask, fixing it.\n");
-                        add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND);
+                        add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
                         mask_lo = tmp;
                 }
         }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index ae42418bc50f..c8797d55b245 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 
         bust_spinlocks(0);
         die_owner = -1;
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         die_nest_count--;
         if (!die_nest_count)
                 /* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
index 01e0111bf787..ded955d45155 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
         if (!user_mode(regs))
                 show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)regs->areg[1]);
 
-        add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
 
         if (in_interrupt())
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index 6adfc706a1de..12b62f2cdb3f 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
                 buf = NULL;
                 if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
                         return -EINVAL;
-                add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
+                add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         }
 
         return count;
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index 908b02d5da1b..8080588f88cb 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void acpi_table_taint(struct acpi_table_header *table)
         pr_warn(PREFIX
                 "Override [%4.4s-%8.8s], this is unsafe: tainting kernel\n",
                 table->signature, table->oem_table_id);
-        add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 
 
diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
index 78d5f20c5f5b..81d6f605c92e 100644
--- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static ssize_t regmap_map_write_file(struct file *file,
                 return -EINVAL;
 
         /* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */
-        add_taint(TAINT_USER);
+        add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         regmap_write(map, reg, value);
         return buf_size;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index c566927efcbd..80d36874689b 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -398,7 +398,11 @@ extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi;
 extern int panic_on_io_nmi;
 extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow;
 extern const char *print_tainted(void);
-extern void add_taint(unsigned flag);
+enum lockdep_ok {
+        LOCKDEP_STILL_OK,
+        LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE
+};
+extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok);
 extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
 extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
 extern int root_mountflags;
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 1375ee3f03aa..ead1b5719a12 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -396,13 +396,13 @@ bool is_module_address(unsigned long addr);
 bool is_module_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
 bool is_module_text_address(unsigned long addr);
 
-static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod)
+static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod)
 {
         return (unsigned long)mod->module_core <= addr &&
                addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_core + mod->core_size;
 }
 
-static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod)
+static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod)
 {
         return (unsigned long)mod->module_init <= addr &&
                addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_init + mod->init_size;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 28c5b9dcc91e..968c539f0ac3 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1670,6 +1670,17 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
           Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
           key.  Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
 
+config MODULE_SIG_ALL
+        bool "Automatically sign all modules"
+        default y
+        depends on MODULE_SIG
+        help
+          Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option,
+          modules must be signed manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool.
+
+comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file"
+        depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL
+
 choice
         prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
         depends on MODULE_SIG
@@ -1702,6 +1713,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_SHA512
 
 endchoice
 
+config MODULE_SIG_HASH
+        string
+        depends on MODULE_SIG
+        default "sha1" if MODULE_SIG_SHA1
+        default "sha224" if MODULE_SIG_SHA224
+        default "sha256" if MODULE_SIG_SHA256
+        default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384
+        default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512
+
 endif # MODULES
 
 config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 6c072b6da239..eceac38f3c65 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -153,23 +153,7 @@ kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates
 # fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards.
 #
 ###############################################################################
-sign_key_with_hash :=
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha1
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha224
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha256
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha384
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha512
-endif
-ifeq ($(sign_key_with_hash),)
+ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
 $(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
 endif
 
@@ -182,8 +166,8 @@ signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
         @echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random"
         @echo "### number generator if one is available."
         @echo "###"
-        openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 $(sign_key_with_hash) -days 36500 -batch \
-                -x509 -config x509.genkey \
+        openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
+                -batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \
                 -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
                 -keyout signing_key.priv
         @echo "###"
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index eab08274ec9b..921bed4794e9 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -197,9 +197,10 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod)
                 return -ENOENT;
 }
 
-static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag)
+static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag,
+                                    enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
 {
-        add_taint(flag);
+        add_taint(flag, lockdep_ok);
         mod->taints |= (1U << flag);
 }
 
@@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ static inline int try_force_unload(unsigned int flags)
 {
         int ret = (flags & O_TRUNC);
         if (ret)
-                add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD);
+                add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         return ret;
 }
 #else
@@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *reason)
         if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s: kernel tainted.\n",
                        mod->name, reason);
-        add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
+        add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         return 0;
 #else
         return -ENOEXEC;
@@ -2147,7 +2148,8 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license)
                 if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints "
                                 "kernel.\n", mod->name, license);
-                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
+                                 LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
         }
 }
 
@@ -2700,10 +2702,10 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
         }
 
         if (!get_modinfo(info, "intree"))
-                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE);
+                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 
         if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
-                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP);
+                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module is from the staging directory,"
                        " the quality is unknown, you have been warned.\n",
                        mod->name);
@@ -2869,15 +2871,17 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod)
          * using GPL-only symbols it needs.
          */
         if (strcmp(mod->name, "ndiswrapper") == 0)
-                add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+                add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         /* driverloader was caught wrongly pretending to be under GPL */
         if (strcmp(mod->name, "driverloader") == 0)
-                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
+                                 LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         /* lve claims to be GPL but upstream won't provide source */
         if (strcmp(mod->name, "lve") == 0)
-                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
+                                 LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS
         if ((mod->num_syms && !mod->crcs)
@@ -3141,12 +3145,72 @@ static int may_init_module(void)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique before
+ * we dedicate too many resources.  In particular, temporary percpu
+ * memory exhaustion.
+ */
+static int add_unformed_module(struct module *mod)
+{
+        int err;
+        struct module *old;
+
+        mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
+
+again:
+        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+        if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) {
+                if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
+                    || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
+                        /* Wait in case it fails to load. */
+                        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+                        err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
+                                               finished_loading(mod->name));
+                        if (err)
+                                goto out_unlocked;
+                        goto again;
+                }
+                err = -EEXIST;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules);
+        err = 0;
+
+out:
+        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+out_unlocked:
+        return err;
+}
+
+static int complete_formation(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+        int err;
+
+        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+
+        /* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */
+        err = verify_export_symbols(mod);
+        if (err < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        /* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */
+        module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod);
+
+        /* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
+         * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */
+        mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING;
+
+out:
+        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+        return err;
+}
+
 /* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
    zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
 static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
                        int flags)
 {
-        struct module *mod, *old;
+        struct module *mod;
         long err;
 
         err = module_sig_check(info);
@@ -3164,36 +3228,20 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
                 goto free_copy;
         }
 
-        /*
-         * We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique
-         * before we dedicate too many resources.  In particular,
-         * temporary percpu memory exhaustion.
-         */
-        mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
-again:
-        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
-        if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) {
-                if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
-                    || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
-                        /* Wait in case it fails to load. */
-                        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
-                        err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
-                                               finished_loading(mod->name));
-                        if (err)
-                                goto free_module;
-                        goto again;
-                }
-                err = -EEXIST;
-                mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+        /* Reserve our place in the list. */
+        err = add_unformed_module(mod);
+        if (err)
                 goto free_module;
-        }
-        list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules);
-        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
         mod->sig_ok = info->sig_ok;
-        if (!mod->sig_ok)
-                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
+        if (!mod->sig_ok) {
+                printk_once(KERN_NOTICE
+                            "%s: module verification failed: signature and/or"
+                            " required key missing - tainting kernel\n",
+                            mod->name);
+                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+        }
 #endif
 
         /* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */
@@ -3236,21 +3284,11 @@ again:
 
         dynamic_debug_setup(info->debug, info->num_debug);
 
-        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
-        /* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */
-        err = verify_export_symbols(mod);
-        if (err < 0)
+        /* Finally it's fully formed, ready to start executing. */
+        err = complete_formation(mod, info);
+        if (err)
                 goto ddebug_cleanup;
 
-        /* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */
-        module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod);
-
-        /* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
-         * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */
-        mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING;
-
-        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
-
         /* Module is ready to execute: parsing args may do that. */
         err = parse_args(mod->name, mod->args, mod->kp, mod->num_kp,
                          -32768, 32767, &ddebug_dyndbg_module_param_cb);
@@ -3274,8 +3312,8 @@ again:
         /* module_bug_cleanup needs module_mutex protection */
         mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
         module_bug_cleanup(mod);
- ddebug_cleanup:
         mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ ddebug_cleanup:
         dynamic_debug_remove(info->debug);
         synchronize_sched();
         kfree(mod->args);
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index e1b2822fff97..7c57cc9eee2c 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -259,26 +259,19 @@ unsigned long get_taint(void)
         return tainted_mask;
 }
 
-void add_taint(unsigned flag)
+/**
+ * add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set.
+ * @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants.
+ * @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK.
+ *
+ * If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for
+ * some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true.
+ */
+void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
 {
-        /*
-         * Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore.
-         * We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue
-         * is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1
-         * Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging/out-of-tree
-         * development and post-warning case.
-         */
-        switch (flag) {
-        case TAINT_CRAP:
-        case TAINT_OOT_MODULE:
-        case TAINT_WARN:
-        case TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND:
-                break;
-
-        default:
-                if (__debug_locks_off())
-                        printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
-        }
+        if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off())
+                printk(KERN_WARNING
+                       "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
 
         set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
 }
@@ -421,7 +414,8 @@ static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller,
         print_modules();
         dump_stack();
         print_oops_end_marker();
-        add_taint(taint);
+        /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
+        add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 }
 
 void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index f1bdecf09afb..fc9103e9ff03 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
         if (irqs_disabled())
                 print_irqtrace_events(prev);
         dump_stack();
-        add_taint(TAINT_WARN);
+        add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 95e9e55602a8..d8df00e69c14 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
                 int i;
                 for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
                         if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
-                                add_taint(i);
+                                add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
                 }
         }
 
diff --git a/lib/bug.c b/lib/bug.c
index d0cdf14c651a..168603477f02 100644
--- a/lib/bug.c
+++ b/lib/bug.c
@@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned long bugaddr, struct pt_regs *regs)
                 print_modules();
                 show_regs(regs);
                 print_oops_end_marker();
-                add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug));
+                /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
+                add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug), LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
                 return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN;
         }
 
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 705473afc1f4..494526ae024a 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
                 print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: %s\n",
                                 (unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap);
         dump_stack();
-        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 
 static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index e9075fdef695..0dade3f18f7d 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static void bad_page(struct page *page)
 out:
         /* Leave bad fields for debug, except PageBuddy could make trouble */
         page_mapcount_reset(page); /* remove PageBuddy */
-        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index e7667a3584bc..856e4a192d25 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ static void __slab_error(const char *function, struct kmem_cache *cachep,
         printk(KERN_ERR "slab error in %s(): cache `%s': %s\n",
                function, cachep->name, msg);
         dump_stack();
-        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index ebcc44eb43b9..4aec53705e4f 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)
         printk(KERN_ERR "----------------------------------------"
                         "-------------------------------------\n\n");
 
-        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+        add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 }
 
 static void slab_fix(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index ff36c508a10e..1c6fbb1a4f8e 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -830,6 +830,8 @@ static const char *section_white_list[] =
         ".toc*",
         ".xt.prop",                              /* xtensa */
         ".xt.lit",         /* xtensa */
+        ".arcextmap*",                  /* arc */
+        ".gnu.linkonce.arcext*",        /* arc : modules */
         NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file b/scripts/sign-file
index 974a20b661b7..2b7c4484d46c 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file
+++ b/scripts/sign-file
@@ -2,51 +2,45 @@
 #
 # Sign a module file using the given key.
 #
-# Format:
-#
-#       ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]
-#
-#
+
+my $USAGE =
+"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" .
+"       scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n";
+
 use strict;
 use FileHandle;
 use IPC::Open2;
+use Getopt::Std;
 
-my $verbose = 0;
-if ($#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] eq "-v") {
-    $verbose = 1;
-    shift;
-}
+my %opts;
+getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE;
+my $verbose = $opts{'v'};
+my $signature_file = $opts{'s'};
 
-die "Format: ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n"
-    if ($#ARGV != 2 && $#ARGV != 3);
+die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4);
+die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2);
 
-my $private_key = $ARGV[0];
-my $x509 = $ARGV[1];
-my $module = $ARGV[2];
-my $dest = ($#ARGV == 3) ? $ARGV[3] : $ARGV[2] . "~";
+my $dgst = shift @ARGV;
+my $private_key;
+if (!$signature_file) {
+        $private_key = shift @ARGV;
+}
+my $x509 = shift @ARGV;
+my $module = shift @ARGV;
+my ($dest, $keep_orig);
+if (@ARGV) {
+        $dest = $ARGV[0];
+        $keep_orig = 1;
+} else {
+        $dest = $module . "~";
+}
 
-die "Can't read private key\n" unless (-r $private_key);
+die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key);
+die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file);
 die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509);
 die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module);
 
 #
-# Read the kernel configuration
-#
-my %config = (
-    CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 => 1
-    );
-
-if (-r ".config") {
-    open(FD, "<.config") || die ".config";
-    while (<FD>) {
-        if ($_ =~ /^(CONFIG_.*)=[ym]/) {
-            $config{$1} = 1;
-        }
-    }
-    close(FD);
-}
-
-#
 # Function to read the contents of a file into a variable.
 #
 sub read_file($)
@@ -321,73 +315,71 @@ my $id_type = 1;	# Identifier type: X.509
 #
 # Digest the data
 #
-my ($dgst, $prologue) = ();
-if (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1"}) {
+my $prologue;
+if ($dgst eq "sha1") {
     $prologue = pack("C*",
                      0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
                      0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
                      0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14);
-    $dgst = "-sha1";
     $hash = 2;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") {
     $prologue = pack("C*",
                      0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
                      0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
                      0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C);
-    $dgst = "-sha224";
     $hash = 7;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") {
     $prologue = pack("C*",
                      0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
                      0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
                      0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20);
-    $dgst = "-sha256";
     $hash = 4;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") {
     $prologue = pack("C*",
                      0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
                      0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
                      0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30);
-    $dgst = "-sha384";
     $hash = 5;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") {
     $prologue = pack("C*",
                      0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
                      0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
                      0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40);
-    $dgst = "-sha512";
     $hash = 6;
 } else {
-    die "Can't determine hash algorithm";
+    die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n";
 }
 
-#
-# Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
-#
-my $digest;
-$digest = readpipe("openssl dgst $dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
-
-#
-# Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that comprises
-# the signature with no metadata attached.
-#
-my $pid;
-$pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
-             "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
-    die "openssl rsautl";
-binmode write_to;
-print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-
-binmode read_from;
 my $signature;
-read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
-close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
+if ($signature_file) {
+        $signature = read_file($signature_file);
+} else {
+        #
+        # Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
+        #
+        my $digest;
+        $digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
+
+        #
+        # Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that
+        # comprises the signature with no metadata attached.
+        #
+        my $pid;
+        $pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
+                     "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
+            die "openssl rsautl";
+        binmode write_to;
+        print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
+        close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
+
+        binmode read_from;
+        read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
+        close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
+        waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
+        die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
+}
 $signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
 
-waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
-die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
-
 #
 # Build the signed binary
 #
@@ -424,6 +416,6 @@ print FD
     ;
 close FD || die $dest;
 
-if ($#ARGV != 3) {
+if (!$keep_orig) {
     rename($dest, $module) || die $module;
 }
diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-core.c b/sound/soc/soc-core.c
index 8df1b3feaf2b..b7e84a7cd9ee 100644
--- a/sound/soc/soc-core.c
+++ b/sound/soc/soc-core.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static ssize_t codec_reg_write_file(struct file *file,
                 return -EINVAL;
 
         /* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */
-        add_taint(TAINT_USER);
+        add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 
         snd_soc_write(codec, reg, value);
         return buf_size;