/*
* NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
*
* This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
*
* Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
* Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
*
* Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
*
* Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
*
* Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
* Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
/*
* USAGE:
* NOTES:
* 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
* CONFIG_SECURITY=y
* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
* ISSUES:
* 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
* 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
* 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/xfrm.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/checksum.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
/*
* Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
*/
static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
return (ctx &&
(ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
(ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
}
/*
* Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
*/
static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
* a xfrm policy rule.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
int rc;
u32 sel_sid;
/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
if (ctx) {
if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
return -EINVAL;
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
} else
/*
* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
* otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
* would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
*/
return 0;
rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
NULL);
if (rc == -EACCES)
return -ESRCH;
return rc;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
* the given policy, flow combo.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
struct flowi *fl)
{
u32 state_sid;
int rc;
if (!xp->security)
if (x->security)
/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
return 0;
else
/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
return 1;
else
if (!x->security)
/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
return 0;
else
if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
/* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
return 0;
state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
if (fl->secid != state_sid)
return 0;
rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
NULL)? 0:1;
/*
* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
* since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
* a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
* in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
*/
return rc;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
* incoming packet.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
{
struct sec_path *sp;
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (skb == NULL)
return 0;
sp = skb->sp;
if (sp) {
int i, sid_set = 0;
for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
if (!sid_set) {
*sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
sid_set = 1;
if (!ckall)
break;
} else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
* CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
{
int rc = 0;
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
char *ctx_str = NULL;
u32 str_len;
BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
if (!uctx)
goto not_from_user;
if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
return -EINVAL;
str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
str_len + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
uctx+1,
str_len);
ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0;
rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
str_len,
&ctx->ctx_sid);
if (rc)
goto out;
/*
* Does the subject have permission to set security context?
*/
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
return rc;
not_from_user:
rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
if (rc)
goto out;
*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
str_len,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ctx) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
ctx_str,
str_len);
goto out2;
out:
*ctxp = NULL;
kfree(ctx);
out2:
kfree(ctx_str);
return rc;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
* xfrm_policy.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
{
int err;
BUG_ON(!uctx);
err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
if (err == 0)
atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
return err;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
* new for policy cloning.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
if (old_ctx) {
new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
*/
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
kfree(ctx);
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
int rc = 0;
if (ctx) {
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
}
return rc;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
* xfrm_state.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
u32 secid)
{
int err;
BUG_ON(!x);
err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
if (err == 0)
atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
return err;
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
*/
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
kfree(ctx);
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
int rc = 0;
if (ctx) {
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
}
return rc;
}
/*
* LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
* a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
* already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
* we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
* gone thru the IPSec process.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct sec_path *sp;
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sp = skb->sp;
if (sp) {
for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* This check even when there's no association involved is
* intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
* process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
* explicitly allowed by policy.
*/
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
return rc;
}
/*
* POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
* If we have no security association, then we need to determine
* whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
* checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
dst = skb->dst;
if (dst) {
struct dst_entry *dst_test;
for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
dst_test = dst_test->child) {
struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
goto out;
}
}
switch (proto) {
case IPPROTO_AH:
case IPPROTO_ESP:
case IPPROTO_COMP:
/*
* We should have already seen this packet once before
* it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
* unlabeled check.
*/
goto out;
default:
break;
}
/*
* This check even when there's no association involved is
* intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
* process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
* explicitly allowed by policy.
*/
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
out:
return rc;
}
