/*
* Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
*
* Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
* Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/route.h>
/* Timestamps: lowest bits store TCP options */
#define TSBITS 6
#define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
__u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
EXPORT_SYMBOL(syncookie_secret);
static __init int init_syncookies(void)
{
get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
return 0;
}
__initcall(init_syncookies);
#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS],
ipv4_cookie_scratch);
static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
u32 count, int c)
{
__u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
tmp[3] = count;
sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
return tmp[17];
}
/*
* when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
* tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
* sent in the syn-ack.
* Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
* must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
*/
__u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_time_stamp;
u32 options = 0;
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : 0xf;
options |= ireq->sack_ok << 4;
options |= ireq->ecn_ok << 5;
ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK;
ts |= options;
if (ts > ts_now) {
ts >>= TSBITS;
ts--;
ts <<= TSBITS;
ts |= options;
}
return ts;
}
static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
__u32 data)
{
/*
* Compute the secure sequence number.
* The output should be:
* HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
* + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
* Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
* minute by 1.
* As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
* MSS into the second hash value.
*/
return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
& COOKIEMASK));
}
/*
* This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
* If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
* range. This must be checked by the caller.
*
* The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
* "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
* is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
*/
static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
__u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{
__u32 diff;
/* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
if (diff >= maxdiff)
return (__u32)-1;
return (cookie -
cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
& COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
}
/*
* MSS Values are taken from the 2009 paper
* 'Measuring TCP Maximum Segment Size' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson:
* - values 1440 to 1460 accounted for 80% of observed mss values
* - values outside the 536-1460 range are rare (<0.2%).
*
* Table must be sorted.
*/
static __u16 const msstab[] = {
64,
512,
536,
1024,
1440,
1460,
4312,
8960,
};
/*
* Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
* rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
*/
__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
int mssind;
const __u16 mss = *mssp;
tcp_synq_overflow(sk);
for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--)
if (mss >= msstab[mssind])
break;
*mssp = msstab[mssind];
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT);
return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
}
/*
* This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
* Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
* sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
* backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
*/
#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
/*
* Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
* Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
*/
static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 cookie)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
__u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, seq,
jiffies / (HZ * 60),
COUNTER_TRIES);
return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
}
static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct sock *child;
child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
if (child)
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
else
reqsk_free(req);
return child;
}
/*
* when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
* additional tcp options in the timestamp.
* This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
*
* The lowest 4 bits store snd_wscale.
* next 2 bits indicate SACK and ECN support.
*
* return false if we decode an option that should not be.
*/
bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, bool *ecn_ok)
{
/* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TSMASK;
if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
return true;
}
if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps)
return false;
tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & (1 << 4)) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0;
*ecn_ok = (options >> 5) & 1;
if (*ecn_ok && !sysctl_tcp_ecn)
return false;
if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !sysctl_tcp_sack)
return false;
if ((options & 0xf) == 0xf)
return true; /* no window scaling */
tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & 0xf;
return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_check_timestamp);
struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_options *opt)
{
struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
const u8 *hash_location;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
struct sock *ret = sk;
struct request_sock *req;
int mss;
struct rtable *rt;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
bool ecn_ok = false;
struct flowi4 fl4;
if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
goto out;
if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk) ||
(mss = cookie_check(skb, cookie)) == 0) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
goto out;
}
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
/* check for timestamp cookie support */
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &hash_location, 0, NULL);
if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt, &ecn_ok))
goto out;
ret = NULL;
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
if (!req)
goto out;
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
treq = tcp_rsk(req);
treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
treq->snt_isn = cookie;
req->mss = mss;
ireq->loc_port = th->dest;
ireq->rmt_port = th->source;
ireq->loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
ireq->rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
ireq->ecn_ok = ecn_ok;
ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
treq->snt_synack = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr : 0;
/* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
* the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
*/
if (opt && opt->optlen) {
int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu) + opt->optlen;
ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(&ireq->opt->opt, skb)) {
kfree(ireq->opt);
ireq->opt = NULL;
}
}
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
reqsk_free(req);
goto out;
}
req->expires = 0UL;
req->retrans = 0;
/*
* We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
* window size. We should better make sure that the window size
* hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
* no easy way to do this.
*/
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, 0, sk->sk_mark, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->loc_addr, th->source, th->dest);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
reqsk_free(req);
goto out;
}
/* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
&req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
/* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
* Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
*/
if (ret)
inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4;
out: return ret;
}
