<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>litmus-rt.git/security/keys, branch v2.6.27-rc3</title>
<subtitle>The LITMUS^RT kernel.</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>keys: remove unused key_alloc_sem</title>
<updated>2008-06-06T18:29:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Walker</name>
<email>dwalker@mvista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-06T05:46:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=dba6a4d32d8677c99e73798d3375417f8a6d46de'/>
<id>dba6a4d32d8677c99e73798d3375417f8a6d46de</id>
<content type='text'>
This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker &lt;dwalker@mvista.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker &lt;dwalker@mvista.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: explicitly include required slab.h header file.</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert P. J. Day</name>
<email>rpjday@crashcourse.ca</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=fdb89bce6c9ccb17dae13ec43a25d2fdd405233f'/>
<id>fdb89bce6c9ccb17dae13ec43a25d2fdd405233f</id>
<content type='text'>
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include &lt;linux/slab.h&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day &lt;rpjday@crashcourse.ca&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include &lt;linux/slab.h&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day &lt;rpjday@crashcourse.ca&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=0b77f5bfb45c13e1e5142374f9d6ca75292252a4'/>
<id>0b77f5bfb45c13e1e5142374f9d6ca75292252a4</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9'/>
<id>69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update()</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arun Raghavan</name>
<email>arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc'/>
<id>6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc</id>
<content type='text'>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satyam Sharma &lt;ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satyam Sharma &lt;ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: switch to proc_create()</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@sw.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=da91d2ef9fe4fd84cc0a8a729201d38e40ac9f2e'/>
<id>da91d2ef9fe4fd84cc0a8a729201d38e40ac9f2e</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: add keyctl function to get a security label</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=70a5bb72b55e82fbfbf1e22cae6975fac58a1e2d'/>
<id>70a5bb72b55e82fbfbf1e22cae6975fac58a1e2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=4a38e122e2cc6294779021ff4ccc784a3997059e'/>
<id>4a38e122e2cc6294779021ff4ccc784a3997059e</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key().  request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.

The functions that change are:

	request_key_with_auxdata()
	request_key_async()
	request_key_async_with_auxdata()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key().  request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.

The functions that change are:

	request_key_with_auxdata()
	request_key_async()
	request_key_async_with_auxdata()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: check starting keyring as part of search</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kevin Coffman</name>
<email>kwc@citi.umich.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=dceba9944181b1fd5993417b5c8fa0e3dda38f8d'/>
<id>dceba9944181b1fd5993417b5c8fa0e3dda38f8d</id>
<content type='text'>
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.

The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring.  The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B.  The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.

Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd.  When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.

The order of calls is:

   keyctl_instantiate_key()
      lookup_user_key()				    (the default: case)
         search_process_keyrings(current)
	    search_process_keyrings(rka-&gt;context)   (recursive call)
	       keyring_search_aux()

keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.

This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for

Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.

The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring.  The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B.  The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.

Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd.  When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.

The order of calls is:

   keyctl_instantiate_key()
      lookup_user_key()				    (the default: case)
         search_process_keyrings(current)
	    search_process_keyrings(rka-&gt;context)   (recursive call)
	       keyring_search_aux()

keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.

This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for

Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: increase the payload size when instantiating a key</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=38bbca6b6f164e08a4a9cdfd719fff679af98375'/>
<id>38bbca6b6f164e08a4a9cdfd719fff679af98375</id>
<content type='text'>
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key().  This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around.  The limit is raised to 1MB.  If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Steven French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key().  This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around.  The limit is raised to 1MB.  If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Steven French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
