<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>litmus-rt.git/security/integrity/evm, branch test</title>
<subtitle>The LITMUS^RT kernel.</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T19:06:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T22:26:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=c6f493d631c4d40cea5c36055f9148f547b200af'/>
<id>c6f493d631c4d40cea5c36055f9148f547b200af</id>
<content type='text'>
most of the -&gt;d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
most of the -&gt;d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes</title>
<updated>2015-01-07T12:08:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Jaeger</name>
<email>cj@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-20T20:41:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=6341e62b212a2541efb0160c470e90bd226d5496'/>
<id>6341e62b212a2541efb0160c470e90bd226d5496</id>
<content type='text'>
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.

No functional change.

Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger &lt;cj@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.

No functional change.

Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger &lt;cj@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2014-12-15T04:36:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-15T04:36:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95'/>
<id>67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: check xattr value length and type in evm_inode_setxattr()</title>
<updated>2014-10-28T14:06:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-28T12:28:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f'/>
<id>3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f</id>
<content type='text'>
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce the
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC
  and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then.

Changes in v2:
* testing for validity of xattr type

[ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[ 1106.398192] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0
[ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936
[ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000
[ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8
[ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df
[ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00
[ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] FS:  00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1106.400020] Stack:
[ 1106.400020]  ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98
[ 1106.400020]  ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020]  0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8
[ 1106.400020] Call Trace:
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff812a1030&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020]  RSP &lt;ffff88002917fd50&gt;
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce the
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC
  and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then.

Changes in v2:
* testing for validity of xattr type

[ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[ 1106.398192] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0
[ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936
[ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000
[ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8
[ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df
[ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00
[ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] FS:  00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1106.400020] Stack:
[ 1106.400020]  ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98
[ 1106.400020]  ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020]  0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8
[ 1106.400020] Call Trace:
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff812a1030&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020]  RSP &lt;ffff88002917fd50&gt;
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: skip replacing EVM signature with HMAC on read-only filesystem</title>
<updated>2014-10-07T18:32:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-01T18:43:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=c2baec7ffaf6a2c15e03028ed9ef82a92cc49a94'/>
<id>c2baec7ffaf6a2c15e03028ed9ef82a92cc49a94</id>
<content type='text'>
If filesystem is mounted read-only or file is immutable, updating
xattr will fail. This is a usual case during early boot until
filesystem is remount read-write. This patch verifies conditions
to skip unnecessary attempt to calculate HMAC and set xattr.

Changes in v2:
* indention changed according to Lindent (requested by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If filesystem is mounted read-only or file is immutable, updating
xattr will fail. This is a usual case during early boot until
filesystem is remount read-write. This patch verifies conditions
to skip unnecessary attempt to calculate HMAC and set xattr.

Changes in v2:
* indention changed according to Lindent (requested by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: base integrity subsystem kconfig options on integrity</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T14:28:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-17T12:07:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=7ef84e65ecc60289281e8e7e83a8bb6a97d7df5c'/>
<id>7ef84e65ecc60289281e8e7e83a8bb6a97d7df5c</id>
<content type='text'>
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu.  This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled.  This change
does not affect existing configurations.  Re-configuration is not
needed.

Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description

Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'

Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
  This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu.  This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled.  This change
does not affect existing configurations.  Re-configuration is not
needed.

Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description

Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'

Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
  This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: properly handle INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS EVM status</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T14:26:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-02T13:31:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=3dcbad52cf18c3c379e96b992d22815439ebbe53'/>
<id>3dcbad52cf18c3c379e96b992d22815439ebbe53</id>
<content type='text'>
Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created
files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until
the file closes.  EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr
to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good.
For newly created files without a security.evm label, this
verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs,
until the file closes.

Following is the example when this happens:
fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644);
setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0);
close(fd);

While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such
as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in
evm_protect_xattr().  By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to
newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs.

Changelog:
- limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;  3.14+
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created
files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until
the file closes.  EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr
to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good.
For newly created files without a security.evm label, this
verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs,
until the file closes.

Following is the example when this happens:
fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644);
setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0);
close(fd);

While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such
as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in
evm_protect_xattr().  By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to
newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs.

Changelog:
- limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;  3.14+
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: prevent passing integrity check if xattr read fails</title>
<updated>2014-09-08T21:36:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-15T10:49:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=1f1009791b2e81f106d4809007720495ba3ed90c'/>
<id>1f1009791b2e81f106d4809007720495ba3ed90c</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes a bug, where evm_verify_hmac() returns INTEGRITY_PASS
if inode-&gt;i_op-&gt;getxattr() returns an error in evm_find_protected_xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
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This patch fixes a bug, where evm_verify_hmac() returns INTEGRITY_PASS
if inode-&gt;i_op-&gt;getxattr() returns an error in evm_find_protected_xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix checkpatch warnings</title>
<updated>2014-09-02T21:03:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-15T11:09:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=e7d021e28328e0cc47b21cb9c6d8885326b0c2f5'/>
<id>e7d021e28328e0cc47b21cb9c6d8885326b0c2f5</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes checkpatch 'return' warnings introduced with commit
9819cf2 "checkpatch: warn on unnecessary void function return statements".

Use scripts/checkpatch.pl --file security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
to produce the warnings.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
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This patch fixes checkpatch 'return' warnings introduced with commit
9819cf2 "checkpatch: warn on unnecessary void function return statements".

Use scripts/checkpatch.pl --file security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
to produce the warnings.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-11T04:05:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt.git/commit/?id=2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4'/>
<id>2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4</id>
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Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
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Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
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