[CRYPTO] api: Get rid of flags argument to setkey

Now that the tfm is passed directly to setkey instead of the ctx, we no
longer need to pass the &tfm->crt_flags pointer.

This patch also gets rid of a few unnecessary checks on the key length
for ciphers as the cipher layer guarantees that the key length is within
the bounds specified by the algorithm.

Rather than testing dia_setkey every time, this patch does it only once
during crypto_alloc_tfm.  The redundant check from crypto_digest_setkey
is also removed.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

4 files changed, 15 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c b/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c
index d3806daa3de..49aad9397f1 100644
--- a/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c
+++ b/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c
@@ -379,12 +379,13 @@ static void gen_tabs(void)
 }
 
 static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
-                       unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
+                       unsigned int key_len)
 {
         int i;
         u32 ss[8];
         struct aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
         const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
+        u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
 
         /* encryption schedule */
         
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
index 5713c7e5bd1..c7c43c9de0d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ struct s390_aes_ctx {
 };
 
 static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
-                       unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
+                       unsigned int key_len)
 {
         struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+        u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
 
         switch (key_len) {
         case 16:
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
index b3f7496a79b..170757b3451 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
@@ -45,9 +45,10 @@ struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx {
 };
 
 static int des_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
-                      unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+                      unsigned int keylen)
 {
         struct crypt_s390_des_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+        u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
         int ret;
 
         /* test if key is valid (not a weak key) */
@@ -167,11 +168,12 @@ static struct crypto_alg des_alg = {
  *
  */
 static int des3_128_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
-                           unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+                           unsigned int keylen)
 {
         int i, ret;
         struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-        const u8* temp_key = key;
+        const u8 *temp_key = key;
+        u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
 
         if (!(memcmp(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE))) {
                 *flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;
@@ -303,11 +305,12 @@ static struct crypto_alg des3_128_alg = {
  *
  */
 static int des3_192_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
-                           unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+                           unsigned int keylen)
 {
         int i, ret;
         struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-        const u8* temp_key = key;
+        const u8 *temp_key = key;
+        u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
 
         if (!(memcmp(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
             memcmp(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c b/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c
index 68866fab37a..5cdb13ea5cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c
+++ b/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c
@@ -228,13 +228,14 @@ static void __init gen_tabs(void)
 }
 
 static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
-                       unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
+                       unsigned int key_len)
 {
         struct aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
         const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
+        u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
         u32 i, j, t, u, v, w;
 
-        if (key_len != 16 && key_len != 24 && key_len != 32) {
+        if (key_len % 8) {
                 *flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
                 return -EINVAL;
         }