litmus-rt-odroidx.git/include/linux, branch odroidx

Merge LITMUS^RT staging (as of time of this commit).

2012-09-29T20:50:30+00:00

Conflicts:
	Makefile
	include/linux/sched.h

net: new counter for tx_timeout errors in sysfs

2012-09-29T17:32:06+00:00

This adds the /sys/class/net/DEV/queues/Q/tx_timeout attribute
containing the total number of timeout events on the given queue. It
is always available with CONFIG_SYSFS, independently of
CONFIG_RPS/XPS.

Credits to Stephen Hemminger for a preliminary version of this patch.

Tested:
  without CONFIG_SYSFS (compilation only)
  with sysfs and without CONFIG_RPS & CONFIG_XPS
  with sysfs and without CONFIG_RPS
  with sysfs and without CONFIG_XPS
  with defaults

Signed-off-by: David Decotigny 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 

Conflicts:

	include/linux/netdevice.h

Signed-off-by: Christopher Kenna

Add exynos video header file.

2012-09-28T20:32:27+00:00

Apply k4412 kernel from HardKernel for ODROID-X.

2012-09-28T18:50:15+00:00

USB: add USB_VENDOR_AND_INTERFACE_INFO() macro

2012-08-26T22:12:12+00:00

commit d81a5d1956731c453b85c141458d4ff5d6cc5366 upstream.

A lot of Broadcom Bluetooth devices provides vendor specific interface
class and we are getting flooded by patches adding new device support.
This change will help us enable support for any other Broadcom with vendor
specific device that arrives in the future.

Only the product id changes for those devices, so this macro would be
perfect for us:

{ USB_VENDOR_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x0a5c, 0xff, 0x01, 0x01) }

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann 
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan 
Acked-by: Henrik Rydberg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: pxa: remove irq_to_gpio from ezx-pcap driver

2012-08-15T19:04:30+00:00

commit 59ee93a528b94ef4e81a08db252b0326feff171f upstream.

The irq_to_gpio function was removed from the pxa platform
in linux-3.2, and this driver has been broken since.

There is actually no in-tree user of this driver that adds
this platform device, but the driver can and does get enabled
on some platforms.

Without this patch, building ezx_defconfig results in:

drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c: In function 'pcap_isr_work':
drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c:205:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_to_gpio' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Acked-by: Haojian Zhuang 
Cc: Samuel Ortiz 
Cc: Daniel Ribeiro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: remove rand_initialize_irq()

2012-08-15T19:04:28+00:00

commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream.

With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.

[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
  rand_initialize_irq() ]

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function

2012-08-15T19:04:13+00:00

commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream.

Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present.  Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.

The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door.  (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)

It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
  --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener.  Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel.  Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.

Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.

This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities.  The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.

For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: create add_device_randomness() interface

2012-08-15T19:04:12+00:00

commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream.

Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).

[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
  in question. ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

2012-08-15T19:04:12+00:00

commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow 
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow 
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger 
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric 
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman