<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>litmus-rt-imx6.git/net/sctp, branch master</title>
<subtitle>LITMUS^RT and MC^2 V1 support for the i.MX6 processor family.</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Perform software checksum if packet has to be fragmented.</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:31:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vyasevich@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-16T02:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=c69ee66768490b30127bc496921a3603c9366a10'/>
<id>c69ee66768490b30127bc496921a3603c9366a10</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]

IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.

CC: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]

IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.

CC: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Use software crc32 checksum when xfrm transform will happen.</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:31:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fan Du</name>
<email>fan.du@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-16T02:01:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=935be1dc2cafe04f1421e236f75d17878920631b'/>
<id>935be1dc2cafe04f1421e236f75d17878920631b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]

igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]

igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: rfc4443: do not report ICMP redirects to user space</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T23:08:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-16T10:36:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=e4e7ba12fab4eba6eb6fe2863a6e0e91cd77c7cc'/>
<id>e4e7ba12fab4eba6eb6fe2863a6e0e91cd77c7cc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3f96a532113131d5a65ac9e00fc83cfa31b0295f ]

Adapt the same behaviour for SCTP as present in TCP for ICMP redirect
messages. For IPv6, RFC4443, section 2.4. says:

  ...
  (e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be originated as a result of
      receiving the following:
  ...
       (e.2) An ICMPv6 redirect message [IPv6-DISC].
  ...

Therefore, do not report an error to user space, just invoke dst's redirect
callback and leave, same for IPv4 as done in TCP as well. The implication
w/o having this patch could be that the reception of such packets would
generate a poll notification and in worst case it could even tear down the
whole connection. Therefore, stop updating sk_err on redirects.

Reported-by: Duan Jiong &lt;duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3f96a532113131d5a65ac9e00fc83cfa31b0295f ]

Adapt the same behaviour for SCTP as present in TCP for ICMP redirect
messages. For IPv6, RFC4443, section 2.4. says:

  ...
  (e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be originated as a result of
      receiving the following:
  ...
       (e.2) An ICMPv6 redirect message [IPv6-DISC].
  ...

Therefore, do not report an error to user space, just invoke dst's redirect
callback and leave, same for IPv4 as done in TCP as well. The implication
w/o having this patch could be that the reception of such packets would
generate a poll notification and in worst case it could even tear down the
whole connection. Therefore, stop updating sk_err on redirects.

Reported-by: Duan Jiong &lt;duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T23:08:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-11T14:58:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=872b11be53a4594c39262433c4176176fcb12bd2'/>
<id>872b11be53a4594c39262433c4176176fcb12bd2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7 ]

Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:

SCTP + IPv4:

  22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
    192.168.0.2 &gt; 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
  22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
    192.168.0.5 &gt; 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):

SCTP + IPv6:

  22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
    fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 &gt; fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
    1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]

Moreover, Alan says:

  This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
  this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
  protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
  follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
  Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
  this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
  is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.

In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):

  ...
  0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000  ]p.......}.l....
  0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000  ....plaintext...

Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.

SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.

SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp-&gt;dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6-&gt;daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np-&gt;opt-&gt;srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.

Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:

SCTP + IPv6:

  08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a &gt; 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
    AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
  08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba &gt; 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
    AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296

This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.

 [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf

Reported-by: Alan Chester &lt;alan.chester@tekelec.com&gt;
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7 ]

Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:

SCTP + IPv4:

  22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
    192.168.0.2 &gt; 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
  22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
    192.168.0.5 &gt; 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):

SCTP + IPv6:

  22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
    fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 &gt; fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
    1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]

Moreover, Alan says:

  This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
  this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
  protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
  follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
  Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
  this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
  is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.

In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):

  ...
  0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000  ]p.......}.l....
  0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000  ....plaintext...

Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.

SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.

SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp-&gt;dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6-&gt;daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np-&gt;opt-&gt;srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.

Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:

SCTP + IPv6:

  08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a &gt; 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
    AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
  08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba &gt; 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
    AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296

This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.

 [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf

Reported-by: Alan Chester &lt;alan.chester@tekelec.com&gt;
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix smatch warning in sctp_send_asconf_del_ip</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T23:08:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-07T18:51:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=8ee62e8c9495a6d0f8d227bbe0f02e1b288bac30'/>
<id>8ee62e8c9495a6d0f8d227bbe0f02e1b288bac30</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 88362ad8f9a6cea787420b57cc27ccacef000dbe ]

This was originally reported in [1] and posted by Neil Horman [2], he said:

  Fix up a missed null pointer check in the asconf code. If we don't find
  a local address, but we pass in an address length of more than 1, we may
  dereference a NULL laddr pointer. Currently this can't happen, as the only
  users of the function pass in the value 1 as the addrcnt parameter, but
  its not hot path, and it doesn't hurt to check for NULL should that ever
  be the case.

The callpath from sctp_asconf_mgmt() looks okay. But this could be triggered
from sctp_setsockopt_bindx() call with SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR and addrcnt &gt; 1
while passing all possible addresses from the bind list to SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR
so that we do *not* find a single address in the association's bind address
list that is not in the packed array of addresses. If this happens when we
have an established association with ASCONF-capable peers, then we could get
a NULL pointer dereference as we only check for laddr == NULL &amp;&amp; addrcnt == 1
and call later sctp_make_asconf_update_ip() with NULL laddr.

BUT: this actually won't happen as sctp_bindx_rem() will catch such a case
and return with an error earlier. As this is incredably unintuitive and error
prone, add a check to catch at least future bugs here. As Neil says, its not
hot path. Introduced by 8a07eb0a5 ("sctp: Add ASCONF operation on the
single-homed host").

 [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-sctp/msg02132.html
 [2] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-sctp/msg02133.html

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Michio Honda &lt;micchie@sfc.wide.ad.jp&gt;
Acked-By: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 88362ad8f9a6cea787420b57cc27ccacef000dbe ]

This was originally reported in [1] and posted by Neil Horman [2], he said:

  Fix up a missed null pointer check in the asconf code. If we don't find
  a local address, but we pass in an address length of more than 1, we may
  dereference a NULL laddr pointer. Currently this can't happen, as the only
  users of the function pass in the value 1 as the addrcnt parameter, but
  its not hot path, and it doesn't hurt to check for NULL should that ever
  be the case.

The callpath from sctp_asconf_mgmt() looks okay. But this could be triggered
from sctp_setsockopt_bindx() call with SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR and addrcnt &gt; 1
while passing all possible addresses from the bind list to SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR
so that we do *not* find a single address in the association's bind address
list that is not in the packed array of addresses. If this happens when we
have an established association with ASCONF-capable peers, then we could get
a NULL pointer dereference as we only check for laddr == NULL &amp;&amp; addrcnt == 1
and call later sctp_make_asconf_update_ip() with NULL laddr.

BUT: this actually won't happen as sctp_bindx_rem() will catch such a case
and return with an error earlier. As this is incredably unintuitive and error
prone, add a check to catch at least future bugs here. As Neil says, its not
hot path. Introduced by 8a07eb0a5 ("sctp: Add ASCONF operation on the
single-homed host").

 [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-sctp/msg02132.html
 [2] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-sctp/msg02133.html

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Michio Honda &lt;micchie@sfc.wide.ad.jp&gt;
Acked-By: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix bug in sctp_poll for SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T23:08:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-07T14:44:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=8b1ada497191ab2be429c74817a8de63f9aa2bf6'/>
<id>8b1ada497191ab2be429c74817a8de63f9aa2bf6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a0fb05d1aef0f5df936f80b726d1b3bfd4275f95 ]

If we do not add braces around ...

  mask |= POLLERR |
          sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0;

... then this condition always evaluates to true as POLLERR is
defined as 8 and binary or'd with whatever result comes out of
sock_flag(). Hence instead of (X | Y) ? A : B, transform it into
X | (Y ? A : B). Unfortunatelty, commit 8facd5fb73 ("net: fix
smatch warnings inside datagram_poll") forgot about SCTP. :-(

Introduced by 7d4c04fc170 ("net: add option to enable error queue
packets waking select").

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a0fb05d1aef0f5df936f80b726d1b3bfd4275f95 ]

If we do not add braces around ...

  mask |= POLLERR |
          sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0;

... then this condition always evaluates to true as POLLERR is
defined as 8 and binary or'd with whatever result comes out of
sock_flag(). Hence instead of (X | Y) ? A : B, transform it into
X | (Y ? A : B). Unfortunatelty, commit 8facd5fb73 ("net: fix
smatch warnings inside datagram_poll") forgot about SCTP. :-(

Introduced by 7d4c04fc170 ("net: add option to enable error queue
packets waking select").

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fully initialize sctp_outq in sctp_outq_init</title>
<updated>2013-06-14T01:05:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-12T18:26:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=c5c7774d7eb4397891edca9ebdf750ba90977a69'/>
<id>c5c7774d7eb4397891edca9ebdf750ba90977a69</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit 2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86
(refactor sctp_outq_teardown to insure proper re-initalization)
we modified sctp_outq_teardown to use sctp_outq_init to fully re-initalize the
outq structure.  Steve West recently asked me why I removed the q-&gt;error = 0
initalization from sctp_outq_teardown.  I did so because I was operating under
the impression that sctp_outq_init would properly initalize that value for us,
but it doesn't.  sctp_outq_init operates under the assumption that the outq
struct is all 0's (as it is when called from sctp_association_init), but using
it in __sctp_outq_teardown violates that assumption. We should do a memset in
sctp_outq_init to ensure that the entire structure is in a known state there
instead.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: "West, Steve (NSN - US/Fort Worth)" &lt;steve.west@nsn.com&gt;
CC: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
CC: davem@davemloft.net
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In commit 2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86
(refactor sctp_outq_teardown to insure proper re-initalization)
we modified sctp_outq_teardown to use sctp_outq_init to fully re-initalize the
outq structure.  Steve West recently asked me why I removed the q-&gt;error = 0
initalization from sctp_outq_teardown.  I did so because I was operating under
the impression that sctp_outq_init would properly initalize that value for us,
but it doesn't.  sctp_outq_init operates under the assumption that the outq
struct is all 0's (as it is when called from sctp_association_init), but using
it in __sctp_outq_teardown violates that assumption. We should do a memset in
sctp_outq_init to ensure that the entire structure is in a known state there
instead.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: "West, Steve (NSN - US/Fort Worth)" &lt;steve.west@nsn.com&gt;
CC: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
CC: davem@davemloft.net
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destruction</title>
<updated>2013-06-11T09:49:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-06T13:53:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=1abd165ed757db1afdefaac0a4bc8a70f97d258c'/>
<id>1abd165ed757db1afdefaac0a4bc8a70f97d258c</id>
<content type='text'>
While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: [&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
PGD 7cead067 PUD 7ce76067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...]
CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF            3.10.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011
task: ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti: ffff88007b568000 task.ti: ffff88007b568000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
RSP: 0018:ffff88007b569e08  EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88007db78a00 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI: ffff8800379baf38 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88007b569e18 R08: ffff88007c230da0 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880077990d00 R14: 0000000000000084 R15: ffff88007db78a00
FS:  00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007cf9d000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded
 ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e
 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffffa049fded&gt;] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff8145b60e&gt;] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff814df36e&gt;] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350
 [&lt;ffffffff81455a6f&gt;] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff81455bf0&gt;] sock_create+0x30/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff8145696c&gt;] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff815403be&gt;] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff8153cb32&gt;] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff81544e02&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f
      1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 &lt;48&gt;
      8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48
RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
 RSP &lt;ffff88007b569e08&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000020
---[ end trace e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]---

I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a
small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds,
listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills
some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this).
Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes.

This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable''
is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init()
we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate
our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario,
it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from
crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via
sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer
dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during
sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now,
if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just
leave the destruction handler.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: [&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
PGD 7cead067 PUD 7ce76067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...]
CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF            3.10.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011
task: ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti: ffff88007b568000 task.ti: ffff88007b568000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
RSP: 0018:ffff88007b569e08  EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88007db78a00 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI: ffff8800379baf38 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88007b569e18 R08: ffff88007c230da0 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880077990d00 R14: 0000000000000084 R15: ffff88007db78a00
FS:  00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007cf9d000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded
 ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e
 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffffa049fded&gt;] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff8145b60e&gt;] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff814df36e&gt;] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350
 [&lt;ffffffff81455a6f&gt;] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff81455bf0&gt;] sock_create+0x30/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff8145696c&gt;] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff815403be&gt;] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff8153cb32&gt;] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff81544e02&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f
      1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 &lt;48&gt;
      8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48
RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa0490c4e&gt;] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
 RSP &lt;ffff88007b569e08&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000020
---[ end trace e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]---

I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a
small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds,
listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills
some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this).
Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes.

This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable''
is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init()
we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate
our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario,
it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from
crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via
sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer
dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during
sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now,
if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just
leave the destruction handler.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next</title>
<updated>2013-05-01T21:08:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-01T21:08:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=73287a43cc79ca06629a88d1a199cd283f42456a'/>
<id>73287a43cc79ca06629a88d1a199cd283f42456a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Highlights (1721 non-merge commits, this has to be a record of some
  sort):

   1) Add 'random' mode to team driver, from Jiri Pirko and Eric
      Dumazet.

   2) Make it so that any driver that supports configuration of multiple
      MAC addresses can provide the forwarding database add and del
      calls by providing a default implementation and hooking that up if
      the driver doesn't have an explicit set of handlers.  From Vlad
      Yasevich.

   3) Support GSO segmentation over tunnels and other encapsulating
      devices such as VXLAN, from Pravin B Shelar.

   4) Support L2 GRE tunnels in the flow dissector, from Michael Dalton.

   5) Implement Tail Loss Probe (TLP) detection in TCP, from Nandita
      Dukkipati.

   6) In the PHY layer, allow supporting wake-on-lan in situations where
      the PHY registers have to be written for it to be configured.

      Use it to support wake-on-lan in mv643xx_eth.

      From Michael Stapelberg.

   7) Significantly improve firewire IPV6 support, from YOSHIFUJI
      Hideaki.

   8) Allow multiple packets to be sent in a single transmission using
      network coding in batman-adv, from Martin Hundebøll.

   9) Add support for T5 cxgb4 chips, from Santosh Rastapur.

  10) Generalize the VXLAN forwarding tables so that there is more
      flexibility in configurating various aspects of the endpoints.
      From David Stevens.

  11) Support RSS and TSO in hardware over GRE tunnels in bxn2x driver,
      from Dmitry Kravkov.

  12) Zero copy support in nfnelink_queue, from Eric Dumazet and Pablo
      Neira Ayuso.

  13) Start adding networking selftests.

  14) In situations of overload on the same AF_PACKET fanout socket, or
      per-cpu packet receive queue, minimize drop by distributing the
      load to other cpus/fanouts.  From Willem de Bruijn and Eric
      Dumazet.

  15) Add support for new payload offset BPF instruction, from Daniel
      Borkmann.

  16) Convert several drivers over to mdoule_platform_driver(), from
      Sachin Kamat.

  17) Provide a minimal BPF JIT image disassembler userspace tool, from
      Daniel Borkmann.

  18) Rewrite F-RTO implementation in TCP to match the final
      specification of it in RFC4138 and RFC5682.  From Yuchung Cheng.

  19) Provide netlink socket diag of netlink sockets ("Yo dawg, I hear
      you like netlink, so I implemented netlink dumping of netlink
      sockets.") From Andrey Vagin.

  20) Remove ugly passing of rtnetlink attributes into rtnl_doit
      functions, from Thomas Graf.

  21) Allow userspace to be able to see if a configuration change occurs
      in the middle of an address or device list dump, from Nicolas
      Dichtel.

  22) Support RFC3168 ECN protection for ipv6 fragments, from Hannes
      Frederic Sowa.

  23) Increase accuracy of packet length used by packet scheduler, from
      Jason Wang.

  24) Beginning set of changes to make ipv4/ipv6 fragment handling more
      scalable and less susceptible to overload and locking contention,
      from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.

  25) Get rid of using non-type-safe NLMSG_* macros and use nlmsg_*()
      instead.  From Hong Zhiguo.

  26) Optimize route usage in IPVS by avoiding reference counting where
      possible, from Julian Anastasov.

  27) Convert IPVS schedulers to RCU, also from Julian Anastasov.

  28) Support cpu fanouts in xt_NFQUEUE netfilter target, from Holger
      Eitzenberger.

  29) Network namespace support for nf_log, ebt_log, xt_LOG, ipt_ULOG,
      nfnetlink_log, and nfnetlink_queue.  From Gao feng.

  30) Implement RFC3168 ECN protection, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.

  31) Support several new r8169 chips, from Hayes Wang.

  32) Support tokenized interface identifiers in ipv6, from Daniel
      Borkmann.

  33) Use usbnet_link_change() helper in USB net driver, from Ming Lei.

  34) Add 802.1ad vlan offload support, from Patrick McHardy.

  35) Support mmap() based netlink communication, also from Patrick
      McHardy.

  36) Support HW timestamping in mlx4 driver, from Amir Vadai.

  37) Rationalize AF_PACKET packet timestamping when transmitting, from
      Willem de Bruijn and Daniel Borkmann.

  38) Bring parity to what's provided by /proc/net/packet socket dumping
      and the info provided by netlink socket dumping of AF_PACKET
      sockets.  From Nicolas Dichtel.

  39) Fix peeking beyond zero sized SKBs in AF_UNIX, from Benjamin
      Poirier"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1722 commits)
  filter: fix va_list build error
  af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields
  bnx2x: Prevent memory leak when cnic is absent
  bnx2x: correct reading of speed capabilities
  net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks
  netlink: kconfig: move mmap i/o into netlink kconfig
  netpoll: convert mutex into a semaphore
  netlink: Fix skb ref counting.
  net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtables
  mlx4_en: fix a build error on 32bit arches
  Revert "bnx2x: allow nvram test to run when device is down"
  bridge: avoid OOPS if root port not found
  drivers: net: cpsw: fix kernel warn on cpsw irq enable
  sh_eth: use random MAC address if no valid one supplied
  3c509.c: call SET_NETDEV_DEV for all device types (ISA/ISAPnP/EISA)
  tg3: fix to append hardware time stamping flags
  unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
  unix/dgram: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
  unix/dgram: peek beyond 0-sized skbs
  openvswitch: Remove unneeded ovs_netdev_get_ifindex()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Highlights (1721 non-merge commits, this has to be a record of some
  sort):

   1) Add 'random' mode to team driver, from Jiri Pirko and Eric
      Dumazet.

   2) Make it so that any driver that supports configuration of multiple
      MAC addresses can provide the forwarding database add and del
      calls by providing a default implementation and hooking that up if
      the driver doesn't have an explicit set of handlers.  From Vlad
      Yasevich.

   3) Support GSO segmentation over tunnels and other encapsulating
      devices such as VXLAN, from Pravin B Shelar.

   4) Support L2 GRE tunnels in the flow dissector, from Michael Dalton.

   5) Implement Tail Loss Probe (TLP) detection in TCP, from Nandita
      Dukkipati.

   6) In the PHY layer, allow supporting wake-on-lan in situations where
      the PHY registers have to be written for it to be configured.

      Use it to support wake-on-lan in mv643xx_eth.

      From Michael Stapelberg.

   7) Significantly improve firewire IPV6 support, from YOSHIFUJI
      Hideaki.

   8) Allow multiple packets to be sent in a single transmission using
      network coding in batman-adv, from Martin Hundebøll.

   9) Add support for T5 cxgb4 chips, from Santosh Rastapur.

  10) Generalize the VXLAN forwarding tables so that there is more
      flexibility in configurating various aspects of the endpoints.
      From David Stevens.

  11) Support RSS and TSO in hardware over GRE tunnels in bxn2x driver,
      from Dmitry Kravkov.

  12) Zero copy support in nfnelink_queue, from Eric Dumazet and Pablo
      Neira Ayuso.

  13) Start adding networking selftests.

  14) In situations of overload on the same AF_PACKET fanout socket, or
      per-cpu packet receive queue, minimize drop by distributing the
      load to other cpus/fanouts.  From Willem de Bruijn and Eric
      Dumazet.

  15) Add support for new payload offset BPF instruction, from Daniel
      Borkmann.

  16) Convert several drivers over to mdoule_platform_driver(), from
      Sachin Kamat.

  17) Provide a minimal BPF JIT image disassembler userspace tool, from
      Daniel Borkmann.

  18) Rewrite F-RTO implementation in TCP to match the final
      specification of it in RFC4138 and RFC5682.  From Yuchung Cheng.

  19) Provide netlink socket diag of netlink sockets ("Yo dawg, I hear
      you like netlink, so I implemented netlink dumping of netlink
      sockets.") From Andrey Vagin.

  20) Remove ugly passing of rtnetlink attributes into rtnl_doit
      functions, from Thomas Graf.

  21) Allow userspace to be able to see if a configuration change occurs
      in the middle of an address or device list dump, from Nicolas
      Dichtel.

  22) Support RFC3168 ECN protection for ipv6 fragments, from Hannes
      Frederic Sowa.

  23) Increase accuracy of packet length used by packet scheduler, from
      Jason Wang.

  24) Beginning set of changes to make ipv4/ipv6 fragment handling more
      scalable and less susceptible to overload and locking contention,
      from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.

  25) Get rid of using non-type-safe NLMSG_* macros and use nlmsg_*()
      instead.  From Hong Zhiguo.

  26) Optimize route usage in IPVS by avoiding reference counting where
      possible, from Julian Anastasov.

  27) Convert IPVS schedulers to RCU, also from Julian Anastasov.

  28) Support cpu fanouts in xt_NFQUEUE netfilter target, from Holger
      Eitzenberger.

  29) Network namespace support for nf_log, ebt_log, xt_LOG, ipt_ULOG,
      nfnetlink_log, and nfnetlink_queue.  From Gao feng.

  30) Implement RFC3168 ECN protection, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.

  31) Support several new r8169 chips, from Hayes Wang.

  32) Support tokenized interface identifiers in ipv6, from Daniel
      Borkmann.

  33) Use usbnet_link_change() helper in USB net driver, from Ming Lei.

  34) Add 802.1ad vlan offload support, from Patrick McHardy.

  35) Support mmap() based netlink communication, also from Patrick
      McHardy.

  36) Support HW timestamping in mlx4 driver, from Amir Vadai.

  37) Rationalize AF_PACKET packet timestamping when transmitting, from
      Willem de Bruijn and Daniel Borkmann.

  38) Bring parity to what's provided by /proc/net/packet socket dumping
      and the info provided by netlink socket dumping of AF_PACKET
      sockets.  From Nicolas Dichtel.

  39) Fix peeking beyond zero sized SKBs in AF_UNIX, from Benjamin
      Poirier"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1722 commits)
  filter: fix va_list build error
  af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields
  bnx2x: Prevent memory leak when cnic is absent
  bnx2x: correct reading of speed capabilities
  net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks
  netlink: kconfig: move mmap i/o into netlink kconfig
  netpoll: convert mutex into a semaphore
  netlink: Fix skb ref counting.
  net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtables
  mlx4_en: fix a build error on 32bit arches
  Revert "bnx2x: allow nvram test to run when device is down"
  bridge: avoid OOPS if root port not found
  drivers: net: cpsw: fix kernel warn on cpsw irq enable
  sh_eth: use random MAC address if no valid one supplied
  3c509.c: call SET_NETDEV_DEV for all device types (ISA/ISAPnP/EISA)
  tg3: fix to append hardware time stamping flags
  unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
  unix/dgram: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
  unix/dgram: peek beyond 0-sized skbs
  openvswitch: Remove unneeded ovs_netdev_get_ifindex()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks</title>
<updated>2013-05-01T19:04:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-01T02:59:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-imx6.git/commit/?id=be3e45810bb1ee0bdfa93f6b9532d8c451e50f48'/>
<id>be3e45810bb1ee0bdfa93f6b9532d8c451e50f48</id>
<content type='text'>
Let GCC check for format string errors in sctp's probe printl
function. This patch fixes the warning when compiled with W=1:

net/sctp/probe.c:73:2: warning: function might be possible candidate
for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wmissing-format-attribute]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Let GCC check for format string errors in sctp's probe printl
function. This patch fixes the warning when compiled with W=1:

net/sctp/probe.c:73:2: warning: function might be possible candidate
for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wmissing-format-attribute]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
