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* drm/msm/hdmi: Use bitwise operators when building register valuesLiviu Dudau2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | Commit c0c0d9eeeb8d ("drm/msm: hdmi audio support") uses logical OR operators to build up a value to be written in the REG_HDMI_AUDIO_INFO0 and REG_HDMI_AUDIO_INFO1 registers when it should have used bitwise operators. Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu.dudau@arm.com> Fixes: c0c0d9eeeb8d ("drm/msm: hdmi audio support") Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: update generated headersRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: remove address-space idRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | Now that the msm_gem supports an arbitrary number of vma's, we no longer need to assign an id (index) to each address space. So rip out the associated code. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: support for an arbitrary number of address spacesRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | It means we have to do a list traversal where we once had an index into a table. But the list will normally have one or two entries. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: refactor how we handle vram carveout buffersRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | Pull some of the logic out into msm_gem_new() (since we don't need to care about the imported-bo case), and don't defer allocating pages. The latter is generally a good idea, since if we are using VRAM carveout to allocate contiguous buffers (ie. no IOMMU), the allocation is more likely to fail. So failing at allocation time is a more sane option. Plus this simplifies things in the next patch. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: pass address-space to _get_iova() and friendsRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | No functional change, that will come later. But this will make it easier to deal with dynamically created address spaces (ie. per- process pagetables for gpu). Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm/mdp4+5: move aspace/id to base classRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | Before we can shift to passing the address-space object to _get_iova(), we need to fix a few places (dsi+fbdev) that were hard-coding the adress space id. That gets somewhat easier if we just move these to the kms base class. Prep work for next patch. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm/mdp5: kill pipe_lockRob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | It serves no purpose, things should be sufficiently synchronized already by atomic framework. And it is somewhat awkward to be holding a spinlock when msm_gem_iova() is going to start needing to grab a mutex. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: fix locking inconsistency for gpu->hw_init()Rob Clark2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | Most, but not all, paths where calling the with struct_mutex held. The fast-path in msm_gem_get_iova() (plus some sub-code-paths that only run the first time) was masking this issue. So lets just always hold struct_mutex for hw_init(). And sprinkle some WARN_ON()'s and might_lock() to avoid this sort of problem in the future. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: Remove memptrs->wptrJordan Crouse2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | memptrs->wptr seems to be unused. Remove it to avoid confusing the upcoming preemption code. Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: Add a struct to pass configuration to msm_gpu_init()Jordan Crouse2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | The amount of information that we need to pass into msm_gpu_init() is steadily increasing, so add a new struct to stabilize the function call and make it easier to add new configuration down the line. Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: Add hint to DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GEM_INFO to return an object IOVAJordan Crouse2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | Modify the 'pad' member of struct drm_msm_gem_info to 'flags'. If the user sets 'flags' to non-zero it means that they want a IOVA for the GEM object instead of a mmap() offset. Return the iova in the 'offset' member. Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> [robclark: s/hint/flags in commit msg] Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: Remove idle function hookJordan Crouse2017-06-16
| | | | | | | There isn't any generic code that uses ->idle so remove it. Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: Remove DRM_MSM_NUM_IOCTLSJordan Crouse2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | The ioctl array is sparsely populated but the compiler will make sure that it is sufficiently sized for all the values that we have so we can safely use ARRAY_SIZE() instead of having a constantly changing #define in the uapi header. Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* drm/msm: gpu: Enable zap shader for A5XXJordan Crouse2017-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The A5XX GPU powers on in "secure" mode. In secure mode the GPU can only render to buffers that are marked as secure and inaccessible to the kernel and user through a series of hardware protections. In practice secure mode is used to draw things like a UI on a secure video frame. In order to switch out of secure mode the GPU executes a special shader that clears out the GMEM and other sensitve registers and then writes a register. Because the kernel can't be trusted the shader binary is signed and verified and programmed by the secure world. To do this we need to read the MDT header and the segments from the firmware location and put them in memory and present them for approval. For targets without secure support there is an out: if the secure world doesn't support secure then there are no hardware protections and we can freely write the SECVID_TRUST register from the CPU. We don't have 100% confidence that we can query the secure capabilities at run time but we have enough calls that need to go right to give us some confidence that we're at least doing something useful. Of course if we guess wrong you trigger a permissions violation which usually ends up in a system crash but thats a problem that shows up immediately. [v2: use child device per Bjorn] [v3: use generic MDT loader per Bjorn] [v4: use managed dma functions and ifdefs for the MDT loader] [v5: Add depends for QCOM_MDT_LOADER] Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> [robclark: fix Kconfig to use select instead of depends + #if IS_ENABLED()] Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
* BackMerge tag 'v4.12-rc5' into drm-nextDave Airlie2017-06-15
|\ | | | | | | Linux 4.12-rc5 for nouveau fixes
| * Linux 4.12-rc5Linus Torvalds2017-06-11
| |
| * Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-06-11
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull key subsystem fixes from James Morris: "Here are a bunch of fixes for Linux keyrings, including: - Fix up the refcount handling now that key structs use the refcount_t type and the refcount_t ops don't allow a 0->1 transition. - Fix a potential NULL deref after error in x509_cert_parse(). - Don't put data for the crypto algorithms to use on the stack. - Fix the handling of a null payload being passed to add_key(). - Fix incorrect cleanup an uninitialised key_preparsed_payload in key_update(). - Explicit sanitisation of potentially secure data before freeing. - Fixes for the Diffie-Helman code" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP API crypto : asymmetric_keys : verify_pefile:zero memory content before freeing KEYS: DH: add __user annotations to keyctl_kdf_params KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly aligned KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDF KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hash KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeing KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update() KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculations KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() fails KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in get_derived_key() ...
| | * KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zeroMark Rutland2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc() will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero. Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to be freed behind our back. This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment atomically. Fixes: fff292914d3a2f1e ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP APIMat Martineau2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration. This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * crypto : asymmetric_keys : verify_pefile:zero memory content before freeingLoganaden Velvindron2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Loganaden Velvindron <logan@hackers.mu> Signed-off-by: Yasir Auleear <yasirmx@hackers.mu> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: DH: add __user annotations to keyctl_kdf_paramsEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly alignedEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just make the counter a __be32 instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDFEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it. Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with EFAULT in this scenario). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hashEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeingEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this: "Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a value stored in the struct key itself." In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to determine which keys have recently been in use. This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key materialEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key materialEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys derived from the master key. Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information does not necessarily need to be kept secret. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloadsEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab caches after a key is released. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloadsEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()Eric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not initialized first. This would cause a crash if userspace called keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a ->preparse() method but not an ->update() method. Possibly it could even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked, so normally it wouldn't fail there). Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der: keyctl new_session keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s < cert.der) keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000 keyctl update $keyid data [ 150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 [ 150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 [ 150.688139] PGD 38a3d067 [ 150.688141] PUD 3b3de067 [ 150.688447] PMD 0 [ 150.688745] [ 150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 150.689455] Modules linked in: [ 150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742 [ 150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014 [ 150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000 [ 150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 [ 150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f [ 150.709720] FS: 00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 150.711504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 [ 150.714487] Call Trace: [ 150.714975] asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40 [ 150.715907] key_update+0xf7/0x140 [ 150.716560] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [ 150.717319] keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0 [ 150.718066] SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130 [ 150.718663] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 [ 150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19 [ 150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa [ 150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19 [ 150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002 [ 150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e [ 150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80 [ 150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f [ 150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb <48> 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8 [ 150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58 [ 150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001 [ 150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]--- Fixes: 4d8c0250b841 ("KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero lengthEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's ->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparisonEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent timing attacks. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculationsEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform, which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes. The following script reproduces the bug: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s for i in $(seq 2); do ( set -e for j in $(seq 1000); do keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s) keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null done ) & done Output with bug: [ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22) add_key: Invalid argument add_key: Invalid argument Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()Eric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffersEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the decryption padding. Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s) datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" [ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!" Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() failsEric Biggers2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new error label at which the keyring reference is dropped. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in ↵Markus Elfring2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | get_derived_key() Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * X.509: Fix error code in x509_cert_parse()Dan Carpenter2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We forgot to set the error code on this path so it could result in returning NULL which leads to a NULL dereference. Fixes: db6c43bd2132 ("crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * security: use READ_ONCE instead of deprecated ACCESS_ONCEDavidlohr Bueso2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the new standardized functions, we can replace all ACCESS_ONCE() calls across relevant security/keyrings/. ACCESS_ONCE() does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145 Update the new calls regardless of if it is a scalar type, this is cleaner than having three alternatives. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| | * security/keys: add CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT to KconfigBilal Amarni2017-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile. At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error. This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT. [DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric Biggers] Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | compiler, clang: properly override 'inline' for clangLinus Torvalds2017-06-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit abb2ea7dfd82 ("compiler, clang: suppress warning for unused static inline functions") just caused more warnings due to re-defining the 'inline' macro. So undef it before re-defining it, and also add the 'notrace' attribute like the gcc version that this is overriding does. Maybe this makes clang happier. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * | Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-06-11
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random Pull randomness fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Improve performance by using a lockless update mechanism suggested by Linus, and make sure we refresh per-CPU entropy returned get_random_* as soon as the CRNG is initialized" * tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random: random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init random: use lockless method of accessing and updating f->reg_idx
| | * | random: invalidate batched entropy after crng initJason A. Donenfeld2017-06-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the *_wait variety of functions, but even with that, there's a subtle issue: what happens to our batched entropy that was generated before initialization. Prior to this commit, it'd stick around, supplying bad numbers. After this commit, we force the entropy to be re-extracted after each phase of the crng has initialized. In order to avoid a race condition with the position counter, we introduce a simple rwlock for this invalidation. Since it's only during this awkward transition period, after things are all set up, we stop using it, so that it doesn't have an impact on performance. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
| | * | random: use lockless method of accessing and updating f->reg_idxTheodore Ts'o2017-06-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Linus pointed out that there is a much more efficient way of avoiding the problem that we were trying to address in commit 9dfa7bba35ac0: "fix race in drivers/char/random.c:get_reg()". Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * | | Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-06-11
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Fix various bug fixes in ext4 caused by races and memory allocation failures" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after extent manipulation operations ext4: fix data corruption for mmap writes ext4: fix data corruption with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_ZERO ext4: fix quota charging for shared xattr blocks ext4: remove redundant check for encrypted file on dio write path ext4: remove unused d_name argument from ext4_search_dir() et al. ext4: fix off-by-one error when writing back pages before dio read ext4: fix off-by-one on max nr_pages in ext4_find_unwritten_pgoff() ext4: keep existing extra fields when inode expands ext4: handle the rest of ext4_mb_load_buddy() ENOMEM errors ext4: fix off-by-in in loop termination in ext4_find_unwritten_pgoff() ext4: fix SEEK_HOLE jbd2: preserve original nofs flag during journal restart ext4: clear lockdep subtype for quota files on quota off
| | * | | ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after extent manipulation operationsJan Kara2017-05-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, extent manipulation operations such as hole punch, range zeroing, or extent shifting do not record the fact that file data has changed and thus fdatasync(2) has a work to do. As a result if we crash e.g. after a punch hole and fdatasync, user can still possibly see the punched out data after journal replay. Test generic/392 fails due to these problems. Fix the problem by properly marking that file data has changed in these operations. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a4bb6b64e39abc0e41ca077725f2a72c868e7622 Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| | * | | ext4: fix data corruption for mmap writesJan Kara2017-05-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mpage_submit_page() can race with another process growing i_size and writing data via mmap to the written-back page. As mpage_submit_page() samples i_size too early, it may happen that ext4_bio_write_page() zeroes out too large tail of the page and thus corrupts user data. Fix the problem by sampling i_size only after the page has been write-protected in page tables by clear_page_dirty_for_io() call. Reported-by: Michael Zimmer <michael@swarm64.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: cb20d5188366f04d96d2e07b1240cc92170ade40 Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| | * | | ext4: fix data corruption with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_ZEROJan Kara2017-05-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When ext4_map_blocks() is called with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_ZERO to zero-out allocated blocks and these blocks are actually converted from unwritten extent the following race can happen: CPU0 CPU1 page fault page fault ... ... ext4_map_blocks() ext4_ext_map_blocks() ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents() ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() - zero out converted extent ext4_zeroout_es() - inserts extent as initialized in status tree ext4_map_blocks() ext4_es_lookup_extent() - finds initialized extent write data ext4_issue_zeroout() - zeroes out new extent overwriting data This problem can be reproduced by generic/340 for the fallocated case for the last block in the file. Fix the problem by avoiding zeroing out the area we are mapping with ext4_map_blocks() in ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(). It is pointless to zero out this area in the first place as the caller asked us to convert the area to initialized because he is just going to write data there before the transaction finishes. To achieve this we delete the special case of zeroing out full extent as that will be handled by the cases below zeroing only the part of the extent that needs it. We also instruct ext4_split_extent() that the middle of extent being split contains data so that ext4_split_extent_at() cannot zero out full extent in case of ENOSPC. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 12735f881952c32b31bc4e433768f18489f79ec9 Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| | * | | ext4: fix quota charging for shared xattr blocksTahsin Erdogan2017-05-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ext4_xattr_block_set() calls dquot_alloc_block() to charge for an xattr block when new references are made. However if dquot_initialize() hasn't been called on an inode, request for charging is effectively ignored because ext4_inode_info->i_dquot is not initialized yet. Add dquot_initialize() to call paths that lead to ext4_xattr_block_set(). Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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