1 files changed, 35 insertions, 21 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b332e2cc0954..d58946dca8c9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
-                        if (opt_dentry) {
-                                isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-                                rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
-                                                          isec->sclass,
-                                                          &sid);
-                                if (rc)
-                                        goto out_unlock;
-                                isec->sid = sid;
-                        }
+                        /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+                         * procfs inodes */
+                        if (opt_dentry)
+                                /* Called from d_instantiate or
+                                 * d_splice_alias. */
+                                dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+                        else
+                                /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+                                 * find a dentry. */
+                                dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+                        /*
+                         * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+                         * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+                         * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+                         * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+                         * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+                         * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+                         * could be used again by userspace.
+                         */
+                        if (!dentry)
+                                goto out_unlock;
+                        isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+                        rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+                        dput(dentry);
+                        if (rc)
+                                goto out_unlock;
+                        isec->sid = sid;
                 }
                 break;
         }
@@ -3205,24 +3223,20 @@ error:
 
 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-        int rc = 0;
-        u32 sid = current_sid();
+        int rc;
+
+        /* do DAC check on address space usage */
+        rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+        if (rc)
+                return rc;
 
-        /*
-         * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
-         * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
-         * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
-         * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
-         */
         if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+                u32 sid = current_sid();
                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
-                if (rc)
-                        return rc;
         }
 
-        /* do DAC check on address space usage */
-        return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+        return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,