sctp: introduce sctp_assoc_update_frag_point

and avoid the open-coded versions of it.

Now sctp_datamsg_from_user can just re-use asoc->frag_point as it will
always be updated.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/net/sctp/chunk.c b/net/sctp/chunk.c
index be296d633e95..79daa98208c3 100644
--- a/net/sctp/chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/chunk.c
@@ -172,8 +172,6 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc,
         struct list_head *pos, *temp;
         struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
         struct sctp_datamsg *msg;
-        struct sctp_sock *sp;
-        struct sctp_af *af;
         int err;
 
         msg = sctp_datamsg_new(GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -192,12 +190,7 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc,
         /* This is the biggest possible DATA chunk that can fit into
          * the packet
          */
-        sp = sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk);
-        af = sp->pf->af;
-        max_data = asoc->pathmtu - af->net_header_len -
-                   sizeof(struct sctphdr) - sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream) -
-                   af->ip_options_len(asoc->base.sk);
-        max_data = SCTP_TRUNC4(max_data);
+        max_data = asoc->frag_point;
 
         /* If the the peer requested that we authenticate DATA chunks
          * we need to account for bundling of the AUTH chunks along with
@@ -222,9 +215,6 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                 }
         }
 
-        /* Check what's our max considering the above */
-        max_data = min_t(size_t, max_data, asoc->frag_point);
-
         /* Set first_len and then account for possible bundles on first frag */
         first_len = max_data;