diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
52 files changed, 2996 insertions, 1498 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index dbeb9bc27b24..8b4f24ae4338 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c | |||
@@ -777,9 +777,15 @@ static int cap_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | |||
777 | return 0; | 777 | return 0; |
778 | } | 778 | } |
779 | 779 | ||
780 | static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, | 780 | static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, |
781 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, | 781 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) |
782 | u32 secid) | 782 | { |
783 | return 0; | ||
784 | } | ||
785 | |||
786 | static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, | ||
787 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, | ||
788 | u32 secid) | ||
783 | { | 789 | { |
784 | return 0; | 790 | return 0; |
785 | } | 791 | } |
@@ -1101,7 +1107,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) | |||
1101 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security); | 1107 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security); |
1102 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security); | 1108 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security); |
1103 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security); | 1109 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security); |
1104 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security); | 1110 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc); |
1111 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_acquire); | ||
1105 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); | 1112 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); |
1106 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); | 1113 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); |
1107 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); | 1114 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); |
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 0b759e17a131..b4af4ebc5be2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c | |||
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { | |||
28 | }; | 28 | }; |
29 | 29 | ||
30 | int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, | 30 | int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, |
31 | const char *digest, int digestlen) | 31 | const char *digest, int digestlen) |
32 | { | 32 | { |
33 | if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX) | 33 | if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX) |
34 | return -EINVAL; | 34 | return -EINVAL; |
@@ -44,9 +44,10 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, | |||
44 | } | 44 | } |
45 | } | 45 | } |
46 | 46 | ||
47 | switch (sig[0]) { | 47 | switch (sig[1]) { |
48 | case 1: | 48 | case 1: |
49 | return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, | 49 | /* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */ |
50 | return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1, | ||
50 | digest, digestlen); | 51 | digest, digestlen); |
51 | case 2: | 52 | case 2: |
52 | return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, | 53 | return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, |
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index b4754667659d..9eae4809006b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | |||
@@ -20,17 +20,6 @@ | |||
20 | #include "integrity.h" | 20 | #include "integrity.h" |
21 | 21 | ||
22 | /* | 22 | /* |
23 | * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys | ||
24 | */ | ||
25 | struct signature_v2_hdr { | ||
26 | uint8_t version; /* signature format version */ | ||
27 | uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */ | ||
28 | uint32_t keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific*/ | ||
29 | uint16_t sig_size; /* signature size */ | ||
30 | uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */ | ||
31 | } __packed; | ||
32 | |||
33 | /* | ||
34 | * Request an asymmetric key. | 23 | * Request an asymmetric key. |
35 | */ | 24 | */ |
36 | static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) | 25 | static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) |
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index af9b6852f4e1..336b3ddfe63f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | |||
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, | |||
123 | goto out; | 123 | goto out; |
124 | } | 124 | } |
125 | 125 | ||
126 | xattr_len = rc - 1; | 126 | xattr_len = rc; |
127 | 127 | ||
128 | /* check value type */ | 128 | /* check value type */ |
129 | switch (xattr_data->type) { | 129 | switch (xattr_data->type) { |
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, | |||
143 | if (rc) | 143 | if (rc) |
144 | break; | 144 | break; |
145 | rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, | 145 | rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, |
146 | xattr_data->digest, xattr_len, | 146 | (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, |
147 | calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); | 147 | calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); |
148 | if (!rc) { | 148 | if (!rc) { |
149 | /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */ | 149 | /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */ |
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c index b1753e98bf9a..46408b9e62e8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c | |||
@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@ | |||
11 | 11 | ||
12 | #include <linux/module.h> | 12 | #include <linux/module.h> |
13 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | 13 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
14 | #include <linux/evm.h> | ||
14 | 15 | ||
15 | int posix_xattr_acl(char *xattr) | 16 | int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattr) |
16 | { | 17 | { |
17 | int xattr_len = strlen(xattr); | 18 | int xattr_len = strlen(xattr); |
18 | 19 | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 74522dbd10a6..c49d3f14cbec 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c | |||
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) | |||
70 | 70 | ||
71 | static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) | 71 | static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) |
72 | { | 72 | { |
73 | kfree(iint->ima_hash); | ||
74 | iint->ima_hash = NULL; | ||
73 | iint->version = 0; | 75 | iint->version = 0; |
74 | iint->flags = 0UL; | 76 | iint->flags = 0UL; |
75 | iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | 77 | iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 39196abaff0d..351a58ed56ab 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | |||
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config IMA | |||
9 | select CRYPTO_HMAC | 9 | select CRYPTO_HMAC |
10 | select CRYPTO_MD5 | 10 | select CRYPTO_MD5 |
11 | select CRYPTO_SHA1 | 11 | select CRYPTO_SHA1 |
12 | select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO | ||
12 | select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML | 13 | select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML |
13 | select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 | 14 | select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 |
14 | select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64 | 15 | select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64 |
@@ -45,6 +46,66 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES | |||
45 | help | 46 | help |
46 | Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. | 47 | Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. |
47 | 48 | ||
49 | choice | ||
50 | prompt "Default template" | ||
51 | default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE | ||
52 | depends on IMA | ||
53 | help | ||
54 | Select the default IMA measurement template. | ||
55 | |||
56 | The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a | ||
57 | hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, | ||
58 | limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list | ||
59 | template permits both larger hash digests and longer | ||
60 | pathnames. | ||
61 | |||
62 | config IMA_TEMPLATE | ||
63 | bool "ima" | ||
64 | config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE | ||
65 | bool "ima-ng (default)" | ||
66 | endchoice | ||
67 | |||
68 | config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE | ||
69 | string | ||
70 | depends on IMA | ||
71 | default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE | ||
72 | default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE | ||
73 | |||
74 | choice | ||
75 | prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm" | ||
76 | default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 | ||
77 | depends on IMA | ||
78 | help | ||
79 | Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement | ||
80 | list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default | ||
81 | hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command | ||
82 | line 'ima_hash=' option. | ||
83 | |||
84 | config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 | ||
85 | bool "SHA1 (default)" | ||
86 | depends on CRYPTO_SHA1 | ||
87 | |||
88 | config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 | ||
89 | bool "SHA256" | ||
90 | depends on CRYPTO_SHA256 && !IMA_TEMPLATE | ||
91 | |||
92 | config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 | ||
93 | bool "SHA512" | ||
94 | depends on CRYPTO_SHA512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE | ||
95 | |||
96 | config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 | ||
97 | bool "WP512" | ||
98 | depends on CRYPTO_WP512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE | ||
99 | endchoice | ||
100 | |||
101 | config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH | ||
102 | string | ||
103 | depends on IMA | ||
104 | default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 | ||
105 | default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 | ||
106 | default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 | ||
107 | default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 | ||
108 | |||
48 | config IMA_APPRAISE | 109 | config IMA_APPRAISE |
49 | bool "Appraise integrity measurements" | 110 | bool "Appraise integrity measurements" |
50 | depends on IMA | 111 | depends on IMA |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 56dfee7cbf61..d79263d2fdbf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile | |||
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ | |||
6 | obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o | 6 | obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o |
7 | 7 | ||
8 | ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ | 8 | ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ |
9 | ima_policy.o | 9 | ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o |
10 | ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o | 10 | ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index b3dd616560f7..72d013e190b1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h | |||
@@ -36,23 +36,47 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; | |||
36 | #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9 | 36 | #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9 |
37 | #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS) | 37 | #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS) |
38 | 38 | ||
39 | #define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN 16 | ||
40 | #define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX 15 | ||
41 | |||
42 | #define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME "ima" | ||
43 | #define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n" | ||
44 | |||
39 | /* set during initialization */ | 45 | /* set during initialization */ |
40 | extern int ima_initialized; | 46 | extern int ima_initialized; |
41 | extern int ima_used_chip; | 47 | extern int ima_used_chip; |
42 | extern char *ima_hash; | 48 | extern int ima_hash_algo; |
43 | extern int ima_appraise; | 49 | extern int ima_appraise; |
44 | 50 | ||
45 | /* IMA inode template definition */ | 51 | /* IMA template field data definition */ |
46 | struct ima_template_data { | 52 | struct ima_field_data { |
47 | u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1/md5 measurement hash */ | 53 | u8 *data; |
48 | char file_name[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1]; /* name + \0 */ | 54 | u32 len; |
55 | }; | ||
56 | |||
57 | /* IMA template field definition */ | ||
58 | struct ima_template_field { | ||
59 | const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN]; | ||
60 | int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
61 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
62 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
63 | void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
64 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
65 | }; | ||
66 | |||
67 | /* IMA template descriptor definition */ | ||
68 | struct ima_template_desc { | ||
69 | char *name; | ||
70 | char *fmt; | ||
71 | int num_fields; | ||
72 | struct ima_template_field **fields; | ||
49 | }; | 73 | }; |
50 | 74 | ||
51 | struct ima_template_entry { | 75 | struct ima_template_entry { |
52 | u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */ | 76 | u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */ |
53 | const char *template_name; | 77 | struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */ |
54 | int template_len; | 78 | u32 template_data_len; |
55 | struct ima_template_data template; | 79 | struct ima_field_data template_data[0]; /* template related data */ |
56 | }; | 80 | }; |
57 | 81 | ||
58 | struct ima_queue_entry { | 82 | struct ima_queue_entry { |
@@ -69,13 +93,21 @@ int ima_fs_init(void); | |||
69 | void ima_fs_cleanup(void); | 93 | void ima_fs_cleanup(void); |
70 | int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); | 94 | int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); |
71 | int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, | 95 | int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, |
72 | const char *op, struct inode *inode); | 96 | const char *op, struct inode *inode, |
73 | int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest); | 97 | const unsigned char *filename); |
74 | int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest); | 98 | int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash); |
75 | int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest); | 99 | int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields, |
76 | void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, | 100 | struct ima_digest_data *hash); |
101 | int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash); | ||
102 | void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | ||
77 | const char *op, const char *cause); | 103 | const char *op, const char *cause); |
78 | int ima_init_crypto(void); | 104 | int ima_init_crypto(void); |
105 | void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen); | ||
106 | void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size); | ||
107 | struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void); | ||
108 | int ima_init_template(void); | ||
109 | |||
110 | int ima_init_template(void); | ||
79 | 111 | ||
80 | /* | 112 | /* |
81 | * used to protect h_table and sha_table | 113 | * used to protect h_table and sha_table |
@@ -98,14 +130,18 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) | |||
98 | int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); | 130 | int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); |
99 | int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); | 131 | int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); |
100 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 132 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
101 | struct file *file); | 133 | struct file *file, |
134 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, | ||
135 | int *xattr_len); | ||
102 | void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | 136 | void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, |
103 | const unsigned char *filename); | 137 | const unsigned char *filename); |
104 | void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 138 | void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
105 | const unsigned char *filename); | 139 | const unsigned char *filename); |
140 | int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | ||
141 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | ||
142 | struct ima_template_entry **entry); | ||
106 | int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, | 143 | int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, |
107 | struct inode *inode); | 144 | struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename); |
108 | void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show); | ||
109 | const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf); | 145 | const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf); |
110 | 146 | ||
111 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete | 147 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete |
@@ -131,17 +167,25 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void); | |||
131 | 167 | ||
132 | #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE | 168 | #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE |
133 | int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 169 | int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
134 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename); | 170 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, |
171 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, | ||
172 | int xattr_len); | ||
135 | int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); | 173 | int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); |
136 | void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); | 174 | void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); |
137 | enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 175 | enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
138 | int func); | 176 | int func); |
177 | void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, | ||
178 | struct ima_digest_data *hash); | ||
179 | int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, | ||
180 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); | ||
139 | 181 | ||
140 | #else | 182 | #else |
141 | static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, | 183 | static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, |
142 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 184 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
143 | struct file *file, | 185 | struct file *file, |
144 | const unsigned char *filename) | 186 | const unsigned char *filename, |
187 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, | ||
188 | int xattr_len) | ||
145 | { | 189 | { |
146 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | 190 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
147 | } | 191 | } |
@@ -162,6 +206,19 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c | |||
162 | { | 206 | { |
163 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | 207 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
164 | } | 208 | } |
209 | |||
210 | static inline void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, | ||
211 | int xattr_len, | ||
212 | struct ima_digest_data *hash) | ||
213 | { | ||
214 | } | ||
215 | |||
216 | static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, | ||
217 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) | ||
218 | { | ||
219 | return 0; | ||
220 | } | ||
221 | |||
165 | #endif | 222 | #endif |
166 | 223 | ||
167 | /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ | 224 | /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 1c03e8f1e0e1..5fcc80695d87 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | |||
@@ -18,9 +18,44 @@ | |||
18 | #include <linux/fs.h> | 18 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
19 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | 19 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
20 | #include <linux/evm.h> | 20 | #include <linux/evm.h> |
21 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
21 | #include "ima.h" | 22 | #include "ima.h" |
22 | 23 | ||
23 | static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima"; | 24 | /* |
25 | * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry | ||
26 | */ | ||
27 | int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | ||
28 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | ||
29 | struct ima_template_entry **entry) | ||
30 | { | ||
31 | struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); | ||
32 | int i, result = 0; | ||
33 | |||
34 | *entry = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry) + template_desc->num_fields * | ||
35 | sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS); | ||
36 | if (!*entry) | ||
37 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
38 | |||
39 | for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) { | ||
40 | struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i]; | ||
41 | u32 len; | ||
42 | |||
43 | result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename, | ||
44 | &((*entry)->template_data[i])); | ||
45 | if (result != 0) | ||
46 | goto out; | ||
47 | |||
48 | len = (*entry)->template_data[i].len; | ||
49 | (*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len); | ||
50 | (*entry)->template_data_len += len; | ||
51 | } | ||
52 | (*entry)->template_desc = template_desc; | ||
53 | return 0; | ||
54 | out: | ||
55 | kfree(*entry); | ||
56 | *entry = NULL; | ||
57 | return result; | ||
58 | } | ||
24 | 59 | ||
25 | /* | 60 | /* |
26 | * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements | 61 | * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements |
@@ -39,28 +74,34 @@ static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima"; | |||
39 | * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise | 74 | * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise |
40 | */ | 75 | */ |
41 | int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, | 76 | int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, |
42 | int violation, struct inode *inode) | 77 | int violation, struct inode *inode, |
78 | const unsigned char *filename) | ||
43 | { | 79 | { |
44 | const char *op = "add_template_measure"; | 80 | const char *op = "add_template_measure"; |
45 | const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error"; | 81 | const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error"; |
82 | char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; | ||
46 | int result; | 83 | int result; |
47 | 84 | struct { | |
48 | memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest)); | 85 | struct ima_digest_data hdr; |
49 | entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME; | 86 | char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
50 | entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template); | 87 | } hash; |
51 | 88 | ||
52 | if (!violation) { | 89 | if (!violation) { |
53 | result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template, | 90 | int num_fields = entry->template_desc->num_fields; |
54 | entry->template_len, | 91 | |
55 | entry->digest); | 92 | /* this function uses default algo */ |
93 | hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; | ||
94 | result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0], | ||
95 | num_fields, &hash.hdr); | ||
56 | if (result < 0) { | 96 | if (result < 0) { |
57 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, | 97 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, |
58 | entry->template_name, op, | 98 | template_name, op, |
59 | audit_cause, result, 0); | 99 | audit_cause, result, 0); |
60 | return result; | 100 | return result; |
61 | } | 101 | } |
102 | memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length); | ||
62 | } | 103 | } |
63 | result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode); | 104 | result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); |
64 | return result; | 105 | return result; |
65 | } | 106 | } |
66 | 107 | ||
@@ -71,24 +112,23 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, | |||
71 | * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR | 112 | * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR |
72 | * value is invalidated. | 113 | * value is invalidated. |
73 | */ | 114 | */ |
74 | void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, | 115 | void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, |
75 | const char *op, const char *cause) | 116 | const char *op, const char *cause) |
76 | { | 117 | { |
77 | struct ima_template_entry *entry; | 118 | struct ima_template_entry *entry; |
119 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | ||
78 | int violation = 1; | 120 | int violation = 1; |
79 | int result; | 121 | int result; |
80 | 122 | ||
81 | /* can overflow, only indicator */ | 123 | /* can overflow, only indicator */ |
82 | atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations); | 124 | atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations); |
83 | 125 | ||
84 | entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); | 126 | result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename, &entry); |
85 | if (!entry) { | 127 | if (result < 0) { |
86 | result = -ENOMEM; | 128 | result = -ENOMEM; |
87 | goto err_out; | 129 | goto err_out; |
88 | } | 130 | } |
89 | memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); | 131 | result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename); |
90 | strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); | ||
91 | result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode); | ||
92 | if (result < 0) | 132 | if (result < 0) |
93 | kfree(entry); | 133 | kfree(entry); |
94 | err_out: | 134 | err_out: |
@@ -138,20 +178,42 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) | |||
138 | * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise | 178 | * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise |
139 | */ | 179 | */ |
140 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 180 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
141 | struct file *file) | 181 | struct file *file, |
182 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, | ||
183 | int *xattr_len) | ||
142 | { | 184 | { |
143 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); | 185 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
144 | const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name; | 186 | const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name; |
145 | int result = 0; | 187 | int result = 0; |
188 | struct { | ||
189 | struct ima_digest_data hdr; | ||
190 | char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; | ||
191 | } hash; | ||
192 | |||
193 | if (xattr_value) | ||
194 | *xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_dentry, xattr_value); | ||
146 | 195 | ||
147 | if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { | 196 | if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { |
148 | u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; | 197 | u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; |
149 | 198 | ||
150 | iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; | 199 | /* use default hash algorithm */ |
151 | result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest); | 200 | hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo; |
201 | |||
202 | if (xattr_value) | ||
203 | ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len, &hash.hdr); | ||
204 | |||
205 | result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); | ||
152 | if (!result) { | 206 | if (!result) { |
153 | iint->version = i_version; | 207 | int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; |
154 | iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; | 208 | void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, |
209 | GFP_NOFS); | ||
210 | if (tmpbuf) { | ||
211 | iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; | ||
212 | memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); | ||
213 | iint->version = i_version; | ||
214 | iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; | ||
215 | } else | ||
216 | result = -ENOMEM; | ||
155 | } | 217 | } |
156 | } | 218 | } |
157 | if (result) | 219 | if (result) |
@@ -189,19 +251,14 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
189 | if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) | 251 | if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) |
190 | return; | 252 | return; |
191 | 253 | ||
192 | entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); | 254 | result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename, &entry); |
193 | if (!entry) { | 255 | if (result < 0) { |
194 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, | 256 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, |
195 | op, audit_cause, result, 0); | 257 | op, audit_cause, result, 0); |
196 | return; | 258 | return; |
197 | } | 259 | } |
198 | memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); | ||
199 | memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | ||
200 | strcpy(entry->template.file_name, | ||
201 | (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ? | ||
202 | file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename); | ||
203 | 260 | ||
204 | result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode); | 261 | result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename); |
205 | if (!result || result == -EEXIST) | 262 | if (!result || result == -EEXIST) |
206 | iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; | 263 | iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; |
207 | if (result < 0) | 264 | if (result < 0) |
@@ -212,14 +269,16 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
212 | const unsigned char *filename) | 269 | const unsigned char *filename) |
213 | { | 270 | { |
214 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | 271 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
215 | char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1]; | 272 | char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1]; |
273 | const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo]; | ||
274 | char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2]; | ||
216 | int i; | 275 | int i; |
217 | 276 | ||
218 | if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED) | 277 | if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED) |
219 | return; | 278 | return; |
220 | 279 | ||
221 | for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) | 280 | for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++) |
222 | hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]); | 281 | hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]); |
223 | hash[i * 2] = '\0'; | 282 | hash[i * 2] = '\0'; |
224 | 283 | ||
225 | ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, | 284 | ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, |
@@ -230,7 +289,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
230 | audit_log_format(ab, "file="); | 289 | audit_log_format(ab, "file="); |
231 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename); | 290 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename); |
232 | audit_log_format(ab, " hash="); | 291 | audit_log_format(ab, " hash="); |
233 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash); | 292 | snprintf(algo_hash, sizeof(algo_hash), "%s:%s", algo_name, hash); |
293 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, algo_hash); | ||
234 | 294 | ||
235 | audit_log_task_info(ab, current); | 295 | audit_log_task_info(ab, current); |
236 | audit_log_end(ab); | 296 | audit_log_end(ab); |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 2d4becab8918..734e9468aca0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | |||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ | |||
15 | #include <linux/magic.h> | 15 | #include <linux/magic.h> |
16 | #include <linux/ima.h> | 16 | #include <linux/ima.h> |
17 | #include <linux/evm.h> | 17 | #include <linux/evm.h> |
18 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
18 | 19 | ||
19 | #include "ima.h" | 20 | #include "ima.h" |
20 | 21 | ||
@@ -43,19 +44,31 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) | |||
43 | } | 44 | } |
44 | 45 | ||
45 | static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, | 46 | static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, |
46 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) | 47 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) |
47 | { | 48 | { |
48 | iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; | 49 | int rc, offset; |
49 | return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, | 50 | u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; |
50 | (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr, | 51 | |
51 | sizeof(iint->ima_xattr), 0); | 52 | if (algo <= HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { |
53 | offset = 1; | ||
54 | iint->ima_hash->xattr.sha1.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; | ||
55 | } else { | ||
56 | offset = 0; | ||
57 | iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG; | ||
58 | iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo; | ||
59 | } | ||
60 | rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, | ||
61 | &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset], | ||
62 | (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) + | ||
63 | iint->ima_hash->length, 0); | ||
64 | return rc; | ||
52 | } | 65 | } |
53 | 66 | ||
54 | /* Return specific func appraised cached result */ | 67 | /* Return specific func appraised cached result */ |
55 | enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 68 | enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
56 | int func) | 69 | int func) |
57 | { | 70 | { |
58 | switch(func) { | 71 | switch (func) { |
59 | case MMAP_CHECK: | 72 | case MMAP_CHECK: |
60 | return iint->ima_mmap_status; | 73 | return iint->ima_mmap_status; |
61 | case BPRM_CHECK: | 74 | case BPRM_CHECK: |
@@ -71,7 +84,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
71 | static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 84 | static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
72 | int func, enum integrity_status status) | 85 | int func, enum integrity_status status) |
73 | { | 86 | { |
74 | switch(func) { | 87 | switch (func) { |
75 | case MMAP_CHECK: | 88 | case MMAP_CHECK: |
76 | iint->ima_mmap_status = status; | 89 | iint->ima_mmap_status = status; |
77 | break; | 90 | break; |
@@ -90,7 +103,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
90 | 103 | ||
91 | static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) | 104 | static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) |
92 | { | 105 | { |
93 | switch(func) { | 106 | switch (func) { |
94 | case MMAP_CHECK: | 107 | case MMAP_CHECK: |
95 | iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); | 108 | iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); |
96 | break; | 109 | break; |
@@ -107,6 +120,50 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) | |||
107 | } | 120 | } |
108 | } | 121 | } |
109 | 122 | ||
123 | void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, | ||
124 | struct ima_digest_data *hash) | ||
125 | { | ||
126 | struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; | ||
127 | |||
128 | if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) | ||
129 | return; | ||
130 | |||
131 | switch (xattr_value->type) { | ||
132 | case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: | ||
133 | sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; | ||
134 | if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)) | ||
135 | return; | ||
136 | hash->algo = sig->hash_algo; | ||
137 | break; | ||
138 | case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: | ||
139 | hash->algo = xattr_value->digest[0]; | ||
140 | break; | ||
141 | case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: | ||
142 | /* this is for backward compatibility */ | ||
143 | if (xattr_len == 21) { | ||
144 | unsigned int zero = 0; | ||
145 | if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4)) | ||
146 | hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; | ||
147 | else | ||
148 | hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; | ||
149 | } else if (xattr_len == 17) | ||
150 | hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; | ||
151 | break; | ||
152 | } | ||
153 | } | ||
154 | |||
155 | int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, | ||
156 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) | ||
157 | { | ||
158 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | ||
159 | |||
160 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) | ||
161 | return 0; | ||
162 | |||
163 | return vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value, | ||
164 | 0, GFP_NOFS); | ||
165 | } | ||
166 | |||
110 | /* | 167 | /* |
111 | * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement | 168 | * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement |
112 | * | 169 | * |
@@ -116,23 +173,22 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) | |||
116 | * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise | 173 | * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise |
117 | */ | 174 | */ |
118 | int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | 175 | int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
119 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename) | 176 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, |
177 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, | ||
178 | int xattr_len) | ||
120 | { | 179 | { |
121 | struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; | 180 | struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; |
122 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | 181 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
123 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; | ||
124 | enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | 182 | enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
125 | const char *op = "appraise_data"; | 183 | const char *op = "appraise_data"; |
126 | char *cause = "unknown"; | 184 | char *cause = "unknown"; |
127 | int rc; | 185 | int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0; |
128 | 186 | ||
129 | if (!ima_appraise) | 187 | if (!ima_appraise) |
130 | return 0; | 188 | return 0; |
131 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) | 189 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) |
132 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | 190 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
133 | 191 | ||
134 | rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value, | ||
135 | 0, GFP_NOFS); | ||
136 | if (rc <= 0) { | 192 | if (rc <= 0) { |
137 | if (rc && rc != -ENODATA) | 193 | if (rc && rc != -ENODATA) |
138 | goto out; | 194 | goto out; |
@@ -153,14 +209,25 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
153 | goto out; | 209 | goto out; |
154 | } | 210 | } |
155 | switch (xattr_value->type) { | 211 | switch (xattr_value->type) { |
212 | case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: | ||
213 | /* first byte contains algorithm id */ | ||
214 | hash_start = 1; | ||
156 | case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: | 215 | case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: |
157 | if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { | 216 | if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { |
158 | cause = "IMA signature required"; | 217 | cause = "IMA signature required"; |
159 | status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; | 218 | status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; |
160 | break; | 219 | break; |
161 | } | 220 | } |
162 | rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, | 221 | if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= |
163 | IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | 222 | iint->ima_hash->length) |
223 | /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous | ||
224 | version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 | ||
225 | */ | ||
226 | rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], | ||
227 | iint->ima_hash->digest, | ||
228 | iint->ima_hash->length); | ||
229 | else | ||
230 | rc = -EINVAL; | ||
164 | if (rc) { | 231 | if (rc) { |
165 | cause = "invalid-hash"; | 232 | cause = "invalid-hash"; |
166 | status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; | 233 | status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; |
@@ -171,9 +238,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | |||
171 | case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: | 238 | case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: |
172 | iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; | 239 | iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; |
173 | rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, | 240 | rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, |
174 | xattr_value->digest, rc - 1, | 241 | (const char *)xattr_value, rc, |
175 | iint->ima_xattr.digest, | 242 | iint->ima_hash->digest, |
176 | IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | 243 | iint->ima_hash->length); |
177 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | 244 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
178 | status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | 245 | status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
179 | } else if (rc) { | 246 | } else if (rc) { |
@@ -203,7 +270,6 @@ out: | |||
203 | ima_cache_flags(iint, func); | 270 | ima_cache_flags(iint, func); |
204 | } | 271 | } |
205 | ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status); | 272 | ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status); |
206 | kfree(xattr_value); | ||
207 | return status; | 273 | return status; |
208 | } | 274 | } |
209 | 275 | ||
@@ -219,7 +285,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) | |||
219 | if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) | 285 | if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) |
220 | return; | 286 | return; |
221 | 287 | ||
222 | rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); | 288 | rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, NULL); |
223 | if (rc < 0) | 289 | if (rc < 0) |
224 | return; | 290 | return; |
225 | 291 | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index a02e0791cf15..676e0292dfec 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | |||
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ | |||
20 | #include <linux/err.h> | 20 | #include <linux/err.h> |
21 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 21 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
22 | #include <crypto/hash.h> | 22 | #include <crypto/hash.h> |
23 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
23 | #include "ima.h" | 24 | #include "ima.h" |
24 | 25 | ||
25 | static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm; | 26 | static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm; |
@@ -28,31 +29,58 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void) | |||
28 | { | 29 | { |
29 | long rc; | 30 | long rc; |
30 | 31 | ||
31 | ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ima_hash, 0, 0); | 32 | ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], 0, 0); |
32 | if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) { | 33 | if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) { |
33 | rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm); | 34 | rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm); |
34 | pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", ima_hash, rc); | 35 | pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", |
36 | hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], rc); | ||
35 | return rc; | 37 | return rc; |
36 | } | 38 | } |
37 | return 0; | 39 | return 0; |
38 | } | 40 | } |
39 | 41 | ||
42 | static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo) | ||
43 | { | ||
44 | struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm; | ||
45 | int rc; | ||
46 | |||
47 | if (algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) { | ||
48 | tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0); | ||
49 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { | ||
50 | rc = PTR_ERR(tfm); | ||
51 | pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n", | ||
52 | hash_algo_name[algo], rc); | ||
53 | } | ||
54 | } | ||
55 | return tfm; | ||
56 | } | ||
57 | |||
58 | static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm) | ||
59 | { | ||
60 | if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm) | ||
61 | crypto_free_shash(tfm); | ||
62 | } | ||
63 | |||
40 | /* | 64 | /* |
41 | * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest | 65 | * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest |
42 | */ | 66 | */ |
43 | int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) | 67 | static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, |
68 | struct ima_digest_data *hash, | ||
69 | struct crypto_shash *tfm) | ||
44 | { | 70 | { |
45 | loff_t i_size, offset = 0; | 71 | loff_t i_size, offset = 0; |
46 | char *rbuf; | 72 | char *rbuf; |
47 | int rc, read = 0; | 73 | int rc, read = 0; |
48 | struct { | 74 | struct { |
49 | struct shash_desc shash; | 75 | struct shash_desc shash; |
50 | char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)]; | 76 | char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)]; |
51 | } desc; | 77 | } desc; |
52 | 78 | ||
53 | desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm; | 79 | desc.shash.tfm = tfm; |
54 | desc.shash.flags = 0; | 80 | desc.shash.flags = 0; |
55 | 81 | ||
82 | hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); | ||
83 | |||
56 | rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); | 84 | rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); |
57 | if (rc != 0) | 85 | if (rc != 0) |
58 | return rc; | 86 | return rc; |
@@ -85,27 +113,83 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) | |||
85 | } | 113 | } |
86 | kfree(rbuf); | 114 | kfree(rbuf); |
87 | if (!rc) | 115 | if (!rc) |
88 | rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest); | 116 | rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest); |
89 | if (read) | 117 | if (read) |
90 | file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; | 118 | file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; |
91 | out: | 119 | out: |
92 | return rc; | 120 | return rc; |
93 | } | 121 | } |
94 | 122 | ||
123 | int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) | ||
124 | { | ||
125 | struct crypto_shash *tfm; | ||
126 | int rc; | ||
127 | |||
128 | tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo); | ||
129 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) | ||
130 | return PTR_ERR(tfm); | ||
131 | |||
132 | rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(file, hash, tfm); | ||
133 | |||
134 | ima_free_tfm(tfm); | ||
135 | |||
136 | return rc; | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | |||
95 | /* | 139 | /* |
96 | * Calculate the hash of a given buffer | 140 | * Calculate the hash of template data |
97 | */ | 141 | */ |
98 | int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest) | 142 | static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, |
143 | int num_fields, | ||
144 | struct ima_digest_data *hash, | ||
145 | struct crypto_shash *tfm) | ||
99 | { | 146 | { |
100 | struct { | 147 | struct { |
101 | struct shash_desc shash; | 148 | struct shash_desc shash; |
102 | char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)]; | 149 | char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)]; |
103 | } desc; | 150 | } desc; |
151 | int rc, i; | ||
104 | 152 | ||
105 | desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm; | 153 | desc.shash.tfm = tfm; |
106 | desc.shash.flags = 0; | 154 | desc.shash.flags = 0; |
107 | 155 | ||
108 | return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, data, len, digest); | 156 | hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); |
157 | |||
158 | rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); | ||
159 | if (rc != 0) | ||
160 | return rc; | ||
161 | |||
162 | for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) { | ||
163 | rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, | ||
164 | (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len, | ||
165 | sizeof(field_data[i].len)); | ||
166 | rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data, | ||
167 | field_data[i].len); | ||
168 | if (rc) | ||
169 | break; | ||
170 | } | ||
171 | |||
172 | if (!rc) | ||
173 | rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest); | ||
174 | |||
175 | return rc; | ||
176 | } | ||
177 | |||
178 | int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields, | ||
179 | struct ima_digest_data *hash) | ||
180 | { | ||
181 | struct crypto_shash *tfm; | ||
182 | int rc; | ||
183 | |||
184 | tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo); | ||
185 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) | ||
186 | return PTR_ERR(tfm); | ||
187 | |||
188 | rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, num_fields, hash, tfm); | ||
189 | |||
190 | ima_free_tfm(tfm); | ||
191 | |||
192 | return rc; | ||
109 | } | 193 | } |
110 | 194 | ||
111 | static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) | 195 | static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) |
@@ -120,16 +204,17 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) | |||
120 | /* | 204 | /* |
121 | * Calculate the boot aggregate hash | 205 | * Calculate the boot aggregate hash |
122 | */ | 206 | */ |
123 | int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest) | 207 | static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest, |
208 | struct crypto_shash *tfm) | ||
124 | { | 209 | { |
125 | u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; | 210 | u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
126 | int rc, i; | 211 | int rc, i; |
127 | struct { | 212 | struct { |
128 | struct shash_desc shash; | 213 | struct shash_desc shash; |
129 | char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)]; | 214 | char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)]; |
130 | } desc; | 215 | } desc; |
131 | 216 | ||
132 | desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm; | 217 | desc.shash.tfm = tfm; |
133 | desc.shash.flags = 0; | 218 | desc.shash.flags = 0; |
134 | 219 | ||
135 | rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); | 220 | rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); |
@@ -140,9 +225,26 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest) | |||
140 | for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) { | 225 | for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) { |
141 | ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i); | 226 | ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i); |
142 | /* now accumulate with current aggregate */ | 227 | /* now accumulate with current aggregate */ |
143 | rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | 228 | rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); |
144 | } | 229 | } |
145 | if (!rc) | 230 | if (!rc) |
146 | crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest); | 231 | crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest); |
147 | return rc; | 232 | return rc; |
148 | } | 233 | } |
234 | |||
235 | int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash) | ||
236 | { | ||
237 | struct crypto_shash *tfm; | ||
238 | int rc; | ||
239 | |||
240 | tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo); | ||
241 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) | ||
242 | return PTR_ERR(tfm); | ||
243 | |||
244 | hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); | ||
245 | rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, tfm); | ||
246 | |||
247 | ima_free_tfm(tfm); | ||
248 | |||
249 | return rc; | ||
250 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 38477c9c3415..d47a7c86a21d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | |||
@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) | |||
88 | * against concurrent list-extension | 88 | * against concurrent list-extension |
89 | */ | 89 | */ |
90 | rcu_read_lock(); | 90 | rcu_read_lock(); |
91 | qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next, | 91 | qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next, struct ima_queue_entry, later); |
92 | struct ima_queue_entry, later); | ||
93 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 92 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
94 | (*pos)++; | 93 | (*pos)++; |
95 | 94 | ||
@@ -100,7 +99,7 @@ static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
100 | { | 99 | { |
101 | } | 100 | } |
102 | 101 | ||
103 | static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen) | 102 | void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen) |
104 | { | 103 | { |
105 | while (datalen--) | 104 | while (datalen--) |
106 | seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++); | 105 | seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++); |
@@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen) | |||
111 | * char[20]=template digest | 110 | * char[20]=template digest |
112 | * 32bit-le=template name size | 111 | * 32bit-le=template name size |
113 | * char[n]=template name | 112 | * char[n]=template name |
113 | * [eventdata length] | ||
114 | * eventdata[n]=template specific data | 114 | * eventdata[n]=template specific data |
115 | */ | 115 | */ |
116 | static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | 116 | static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) |
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
120 | struct ima_template_entry *e; | 120 | struct ima_template_entry *e; |
121 | int namelen; | 121 | int namelen; |
122 | u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; | 122 | u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; |
123 | int i; | ||
123 | 124 | ||
124 | /* get entry */ | 125 | /* get entry */ |
125 | e = qe->entry; | 126 | e = qe->entry; |
@@ -134,18 +135,25 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
134 | ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr); | 135 | ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr); |
135 | 136 | ||
136 | /* 2nd: template digest */ | 137 | /* 2nd: template digest */ |
137 | ima_putc(m, e->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | 138 | ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); |
138 | 139 | ||
139 | /* 3rd: template name size */ | 140 | /* 3rd: template name size */ |
140 | namelen = strlen(e->template_name); | 141 | namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name); |
141 | ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); | 142 | ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); |
142 | 143 | ||
143 | /* 4th: template name */ | 144 | /* 4th: template name */ |
144 | ima_putc(m, (void *)e->template_name, namelen); | 145 | ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen); |
146 | |||
147 | /* 5th: template length (except for 'ima' template) */ | ||
148 | if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) | ||
149 | ima_putc(m, &e->template_data_len, | ||
150 | sizeof(e->template_data_len)); | ||
145 | 151 | ||
146 | /* 5th: template specific data */ | 152 | /* 6th: template specific data */ |
147 | ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template, | 153 | for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) { |
148 | IMA_SHOW_BINARY); | 154 | e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_BINARY, |
155 | &e->template_data[i]); | ||
156 | } | ||
149 | return 0; | 157 | return 0; |
150 | } | 158 | } |
151 | 159 | ||
@@ -168,41 +176,21 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = { | |||
168 | .release = seq_release, | 176 | .release = seq_release, |
169 | }; | 177 | }; |
170 | 178 | ||
171 | static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest) | 179 | void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size) |
172 | { | 180 | { |
173 | int i; | 181 | int i; |
174 | 182 | ||
175 | for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) | 183 | for (i = 0; i < size; i++) |
176 | seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i)); | 184 | seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i)); |
177 | } | 185 | } |
178 | 186 | ||
179 | void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show) | ||
180 | { | ||
181 | struct ima_template_data *entry = e; | ||
182 | int namelen; | ||
183 | |||
184 | switch (show) { | ||
185 | case IMA_SHOW_ASCII: | ||
186 | ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest); | ||
187 | seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name); | ||
188 | break; | ||
189 | case IMA_SHOW_BINARY: | ||
190 | ima_putc(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | ||
191 | |||
192 | namelen = strlen(entry->file_name); | ||
193 | ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); | ||
194 | ima_putc(m, entry->file_name, namelen); | ||
195 | default: | ||
196 | break; | ||
197 | } | ||
198 | } | ||
199 | |||
200 | /* print in ascii */ | 187 | /* print in ascii */ |
201 | static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | 188 | static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) |
202 | { | 189 | { |
203 | /* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */ | 190 | /* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */ |
204 | struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; | 191 | struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; |
205 | struct ima_template_entry *e; | 192 | struct ima_template_entry *e; |
193 | int i; | ||
206 | 194 | ||
207 | /* get entry */ | 195 | /* get entry */ |
208 | e = qe->entry; | 196 | e = qe->entry; |
@@ -213,14 +201,21 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
213 | seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); | 201 | seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); |
214 | 202 | ||
215 | /* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */ | 203 | /* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */ |
216 | ima_print_digest(m, e->digest); | 204 | ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); |
217 | 205 | ||
218 | /* 3th: template name */ | 206 | /* 3th: template name */ |
219 | seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name); | 207 | seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name); |
220 | 208 | ||
221 | /* 4th: template specific data */ | 209 | /* 4th: template specific data */ |
222 | ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template, | 210 | for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) { |
223 | IMA_SHOW_ASCII); | 211 | seq_puts(m, " "); |
212 | if (e->template_data[i].len == 0) | ||
213 | continue; | ||
214 | |||
215 | e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_ASCII, | ||
216 | &e->template_data[i]); | ||
217 | } | ||
218 | seq_puts(m, "\n"); | ||
224 | return 0; | 219 | return 0; |
225 | } | 220 | } |
226 | 221 | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 162ea723db3d..f84aec5412f3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | |||
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ | |||
18 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> | 18 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> |
19 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 19 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
20 | #include <linux/err.h> | 20 | #include <linux/err.h> |
21 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
21 | #include "ima.h" | 22 | #include "ima.h" |
22 | 23 | ||
23 | /* name for boot aggregate entry */ | 24 | /* name for boot aggregate entry */ |
@@ -42,28 +43,38 @@ int ima_used_chip; | |||
42 | static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) | 43 | static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) |
43 | { | 44 | { |
44 | struct ima_template_entry *entry; | 45 | struct ima_template_entry *entry; |
46 | struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; | ||
45 | const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate"; | 47 | const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate"; |
46 | const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; | 48 | const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; |
47 | int result = -ENOMEM; | 49 | int result = -ENOMEM; |
48 | int violation = 1; | 50 | int violation = 0; |
51 | struct { | ||
52 | struct ima_digest_data hdr; | ||
53 | char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; | ||
54 | } hash; | ||
49 | 55 | ||
50 | entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); | 56 | memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); |
51 | if (!entry) | 57 | memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); |
52 | goto err_out; | 58 | iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr; |
59 | iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; | ||
60 | iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; | ||
53 | 61 | ||
54 | memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); | ||
55 | strncpy(entry->template.file_name, boot_aggregate_name, | ||
56 | IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); | ||
57 | if (ima_used_chip) { | 62 | if (ima_used_chip) { |
58 | violation = 0; | 63 | result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr); |
59 | result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(entry->template.digest); | ||
60 | if (result < 0) { | 64 | if (result < 0) { |
61 | audit_cause = "hashing_error"; | 65 | audit_cause = "hashing_error"; |
62 | kfree(entry); | 66 | kfree(entry); |
63 | goto err_out; | 67 | goto err_out; |
64 | } | 68 | } |
65 | } | 69 | } |
66 | result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL); | 70 | |
71 | result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, | ||
72 | &entry); | ||
73 | if (result < 0) | ||
74 | return; | ||
75 | |||
76 | result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, | ||
77 | boot_aggregate_name); | ||
67 | if (result < 0) | 78 | if (result < 0) |
68 | kfree(entry); | 79 | kfree(entry); |
69 | return; | 80 | return; |
@@ -74,7 +85,7 @@ err_out: | |||
74 | 85 | ||
75 | int __init ima_init(void) | 86 | int __init ima_init(void) |
76 | { | 87 | { |
77 | u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; | 88 | u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
78 | int rc; | 89 | int rc; |
79 | 90 | ||
80 | ima_used_chip = 0; | 91 | ima_used_chip = 0; |
@@ -88,6 +99,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void) | |||
88 | rc = ima_init_crypto(); | 99 | rc = ima_init_crypto(); |
89 | if (rc) | 100 | if (rc) |
90 | return rc; | 101 | return rc; |
102 | rc = ima_init_template(); | ||
103 | if (rc != 0) | ||
104 | return rc; | ||
105 | |||
91 | ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */ | 106 | ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */ |
92 | ima_init_policy(); | 107 | ima_init_policy(); |
93 | 108 | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e9508d5bbfcf..14d4cb557894 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | |||
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ | |||
24 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 24 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
25 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | 25 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
26 | #include <linux/ima.h> | 26 | #include <linux/ima.h> |
27 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
27 | 28 | ||
28 | #include "ima.h" | 29 | #include "ima.h" |
29 | 30 | ||
@@ -35,11 +36,33 @@ int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; | |||
35 | int ima_appraise; | 36 | int ima_appraise; |
36 | #endif | 37 | #endif |
37 | 38 | ||
38 | char *ima_hash = "sha1"; | 39 | int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; |
40 | static int hash_setup_done; | ||
41 | |||
39 | static int __init hash_setup(char *str) | 42 | static int __init hash_setup(char *str) |
40 | { | 43 | { |
41 | if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) | 44 | struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); |
42 | ima_hash = "md5"; | 45 | int i; |
46 | |||
47 | if (hash_setup_done) | ||
48 | return 1; | ||
49 | |||
50 | if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) { | ||
51 | if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) | ||
52 | ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; | ||
53 | else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) | ||
54 | ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; | ||
55 | goto out; | ||
56 | } | ||
57 | |||
58 | for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { | ||
59 | if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) { | ||
60 | ima_hash_algo = i; | ||
61 | break; | ||
62 | } | ||
63 | } | ||
64 | out: | ||
65 | hash_setup_done = 1; | ||
43 | return 1; | 66 | return 1; |
44 | } | 67 | } |
45 | __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); | 68 | __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); |
@@ -92,10 +115,9 @@ out: | |||
92 | pathname = dentry->d_name.name; | 115 | pathname = dentry->d_name.name; |
93 | 116 | ||
94 | if (send_tomtou) | 117 | if (send_tomtou) |
95 | ima_add_violation(inode, pathname, | 118 | ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); |
96 | "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); | ||
97 | if (send_writers) | 119 | if (send_writers) |
98 | ima_add_violation(inode, pathname, | 120 | ima_add_violation(file, pathname, |
99 | "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); | 121 | "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); |
100 | kfree(pathbuf); | 122 | kfree(pathbuf); |
101 | } | 123 | } |
@@ -144,9 +166,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, | |||
144 | { | 166 | { |
145 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); | 167 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
146 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; | 168 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; |
169 | struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); | ||
147 | char *pathbuf = NULL; | 170 | char *pathbuf = NULL; |
148 | const char *pathname = NULL; | 171 | const char *pathname = NULL; |
149 | int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func; | 172 | int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func; |
173 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL; | ||
174 | int xattr_len = 0; | ||
150 | 175 | ||
151 | if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) | 176 | if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) |
152 | return 0; | 177 | return 0; |
@@ -185,7 +210,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, | |||
185 | goto out_digsig; | 210 | goto out_digsig; |
186 | } | 211 | } |
187 | 212 | ||
188 | rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); | 213 | if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) { |
214 | if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) | ||
215 | xattr_ptr = &xattr_value; | ||
216 | } else | ||
217 | xattr_ptr = &xattr_value; | ||
218 | |||
219 | rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len); | ||
189 | if (rc != 0) | 220 | if (rc != 0) |
190 | goto out_digsig; | 221 | goto out_digsig; |
191 | 222 | ||
@@ -196,7 +227,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, | |||
196 | if (action & IMA_MEASURE) | 227 | if (action & IMA_MEASURE) |
197 | ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname); | 228 | ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname); |
198 | if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) | 229 | if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) |
199 | rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname); | 230 | rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname, |
231 | xattr_value, xattr_len); | ||
200 | if (action & IMA_AUDIT) | 232 | if (action & IMA_AUDIT) |
201 | ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); | 233 | ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); |
202 | kfree(pathbuf); | 234 | kfree(pathbuf); |
@@ -205,6 +237,7 @@ out_digsig: | |||
205 | rc = -EACCES; | 237 | rc = -EACCES; |
206 | out: | 238 | out: |
207 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); | 239 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); |
240 | kfree(xattr_value); | ||
208 | if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) | 241 | if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) |
209 | return -EACCES; | 242 | return -EACCES; |
210 | return 0; | 243 | return 0; |
@@ -244,9 +277,9 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) | |||
244 | int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | 277 | int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
245 | { | 278 | { |
246 | return process_measurement(bprm->file, | 279 | return process_measurement(bprm->file, |
247 | (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ? | 280 | (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ? |
248 | bprm->filename : bprm->interp, | 281 | bprm->filename : bprm->interp, |
249 | MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); | 282 | MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); |
250 | } | 283 | } |
251 | 284 | ||
252 | /** | 285 | /** |
@@ -263,8 +296,8 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) | |||
263 | { | 296 | { |
264 | ima_rdwr_violation_check(file); | 297 | ima_rdwr_violation_check(file); |
265 | return process_measurement(file, NULL, | 298 | return process_measurement(file, NULL, |
266 | mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), | 299 | mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), |
267 | FILE_CHECK); | 300 | FILE_CHECK); |
268 | } | 301 | } |
269 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); | 302 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); |
270 | 303 | ||
@@ -294,6 +327,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) | |||
294 | { | 327 | { |
295 | int error; | 328 | int error; |
296 | 329 | ||
330 | hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); | ||
297 | error = ima_init(); | 331 | error = ima_init(); |
298 | if (!error) | 332 | if (!error) |
299 | ima_initialized = 1; | 333 | ima_initialized = 1; |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 399433ad614e..a9c3d3cd1990 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | |||
@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { | |||
73 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | 73 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, |
74 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | 74 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, |
75 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | 75 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, |
76 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
77 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | 76 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, |
78 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | 77 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, |
79 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | 78 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index ff63fe00c195..d85e99761f4f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | |||
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value) | |||
50 | key = ima_hash_key(digest_value); | 50 | key = ima_hash_key(digest_value); |
51 | rcu_read_lock(); | 51 | rcu_read_lock(); |
52 | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) { | 52 | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) { |
53 | rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); | 53 | rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); |
54 | if (rc == 0) { | 54 | if (rc == 0) { |
55 | ret = qe; | 55 | ret = qe; |
56 | break; | 56 | break; |
@@ -104,9 +104,10 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash) | |||
104 | * and extend the pcr. | 104 | * and extend the pcr. |
105 | */ | 105 | */ |
106 | int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, | 106 | int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, |
107 | const char *op, struct inode *inode) | 107 | const char *op, struct inode *inode, |
108 | const unsigned char *filename) | ||
108 | { | 109 | { |
109 | u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; | 110 | u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
110 | const char *audit_cause = "hash_added"; | 111 | const char *audit_cause = "hash_added"; |
111 | char tpm_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX]; | 112 | char tpm_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX]; |
112 | int audit_info = 1; | 113 | int audit_info = 1; |
@@ -141,8 +142,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, | |||
141 | } | 142 | } |
142 | out: | 143 | out: |
143 | mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); | 144 | mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); |
144 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, | 145 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, |
145 | entry->template.file_name, | ||
146 | op, audit_cause, result, audit_info); | 146 | op, audit_cause, result, audit_info); |
147 | return result; | 147 | return result; |
148 | } | 148 | } |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..000221419f6c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy | ||
3 | * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
8 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | ||
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | ||
10 | * License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: ima_template.c | ||
13 | * Helpers to manage template descriptors. | ||
14 | */ | ||
15 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
16 | |||
17 | #include "ima.h" | ||
18 | #include "ima_template_lib.h" | ||
19 | |||
20 | static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = { | ||
21 | {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT}, | ||
22 | {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, | ||
23 | }; | ||
24 | |||
25 | static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { | ||
26 | {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, | ||
27 | .field_show = ima_show_template_digest}, | ||
28 | {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init, | ||
29 | .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, | ||
30 | {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, | ||
31 | .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, | ||
32 | {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, | ||
33 | .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, | ||
34 | }; | ||
35 | |||
36 | static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template; | ||
37 | static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name); | ||
38 | |||
39 | static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str) | ||
40 | { | ||
41 | struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; | ||
42 | int template_len = strlen(str); | ||
43 | |||
44 | /* | ||
45 | * Verify that a template with the supplied name exists. | ||
46 | * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE. | ||
47 | */ | ||
48 | template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str); | ||
49 | if (!template_desc) | ||
50 | return 1; | ||
51 | |||
52 | /* | ||
53 | * Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported | ||
54 | * by the 'ima' template. | ||
55 | */ | ||
56 | if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 && | ||
57 | ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) { | ||
58 | pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n"); | ||
59 | return 1; | ||
60 | } | ||
61 | |||
62 | ima_template = template_desc; | ||
63 | return 1; | ||
64 | } | ||
65 | __setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup); | ||
66 | |||
67 | static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name) | ||
68 | { | ||
69 | int i; | ||
70 | |||
71 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) { | ||
72 | if (strcmp(defined_templates[i].name, name) == 0) | ||
73 | return defined_templates + i; | ||
74 | } | ||
75 | |||
76 | return NULL; | ||
77 | } | ||
78 | |||
79 | static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id) | ||
80 | { | ||
81 | int i; | ||
82 | |||
83 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(supported_fields); i++) | ||
84 | if (strncmp(supported_fields[i].field_id, field_id, | ||
85 | IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) == 0) | ||
86 | return &supported_fields[i]; | ||
87 | return NULL; | ||
88 | } | ||
89 | |||
90 | static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt) | ||
91 | { | ||
92 | char c; | ||
93 | int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt); | ||
94 | int i = 0, j = 0; | ||
95 | |||
96 | while (i < template_fmt_len) { | ||
97 | c = template_fmt[i]; | ||
98 | if (c == '|') | ||
99 | j++; | ||
100 | i++; | ||
101 | } | ||
102 | |||
103 | return j + 1; | ||
104 | } | ||
105 | |||
106 | static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt, | ||
107 | struct ima_template_field ***fields, | ||
108 | int *num_fields) | ||
109 | { | ||
110 | char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; | ||
111 | int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt); | ||
112 | int i, result = 0; | ||
113 | |||
114 | if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) | ||
115 | return -EINVAL; | ||
116 | |||
117 | *fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); | ||
118 | if (*fields == NULL) { | ||
119 | result = -ENOMEM; | ||
120 | goto out; | ||
121 | } | ||
122 | for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL && | ||
123 | i < template_num_fields; i++) { | ||
124 | struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c); | ||
125 | |||
126 | if (!f) { | ||
127 | result = -ENOENT; | ||
128 | goto out; | ||
129 | } | ||
130 | (*fields)[i] = f; | ||
131 | } | ||
132 | *num_fields = i; | ||
133 | return 0; | ||
134 | out: | ||
135 | kfree(*fields); | ||
136 | *fields = NULL; | ||
137 | return result; | ||
138 | } | ||
139 | |||
140 | static int init_defined_templates(void) | ||
141 | { | ||
142 | int i = 0; | ||
143 | int result = 0; | ||
144 | |||
145 | /* Init defined templates. */ | ||
146 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) { | ||
147 | struct ima_template_desc *template = &defined_templates[i]; | ||
148 | |||
149 | result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt, | ||
150 | &(template->fields), | ||
151 | &(template->num_fields)); | ||
152 | if (result < 0) | ||
153 | return result; | ||
154 | } | ||
155 | return result; | ||
156 | } | ||
157 | |||
158 | struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void) | ||
159 | { | ||
160 | if (!ima_template) | ||
161 | ima_template = | ||
162 | lookup_template_desc(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE); | ||
163 | return ima_template; | ||
164 | } | ||
165 | |||
166 | int ima_init_template(void) | ||
167 | { | ||
168 | int result; | ||
169 | |||
170 | result = init_defined_templates(); | ||
171 | if (result < 0) | ||
172 | return result; | ||
173 | |||
174 | return 0; | ||
175 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d841448f246 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy | ||
3 | * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
8 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | ||
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | ||
10 | * License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: ima_template_lib.c | ||
13 | * Library of supported template fields. | ||
14 | */ | ||
15 | #include <crypto/hash_info.h> | ||
16 | |||
17 | #include "ima_template_lib.h" | ||
18 | |||
19 | static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo) | ||
20 | { | ||
21 | if (algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1 || algo == HASH_ALGO_MD5) | ||
22 | return true; | ||
23 | |||
24 | return false; | ||
25 | } | ||
26 | |||
27 | enum data_formats { | ||
28 | DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, | ||
29 | DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO, | ||
30 | DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, | ||
31 | DATA_FMT_STRING | ||
32 | }; | ||
33 | |||
34 | static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen, | ||
35 | enum data_formats datafmt, | ||
36 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
37 | { | ||
38 | u8 *buf, *buf_ptr; | ||
39 | u32 buflen; | ||
40 | |||
41 | switch (datafmt) { | ||
42 | case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME: | ||
43 | buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1; | ||
44 | break; | ||
45 | case DATA_FMT_STRING: | ||
46 | buflen = datalen + 1; | ||
47 | break; | ||
48 | default: | ||
49 | buflen = datalen; | ||
50 | } | ||
51 | |||
52 | buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); | ||
53 | if (!buf) | ||
54 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
55 | |||
56 | memcpy(buf, data, datalen); | ||
57 | |||
58 | /* | ||
59 | * Replace all space characters with underscore for event names and | ||
60 | * strings. This avoid that, during the parsing of a measurements list, | ||
61 | * filenames with spaces or that end with the suffix ' (deleted)' are | ||
62 | * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator | ||
63 | * character for measurements lists in ASCII format). | ||
64 | */ | ||
65 | if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) { | ||
66 | for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++) | ||
67 | if (*buf_ptr == ' ') | ||
68 | *buf_ptr = '_'; | ||
69 | } | ||
70 | |||
71 | field_data->data = buf; | ||
72 | field_data->len = buflen; | ||
73 | return 0; | ||
74 | } | ||
75 | |||
76 | static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m, | ||
77 | enum ima_show_type show, | ||
78 | enum data_formats datafmt, | ||
79 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
80 | { | ||
81 | u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len; | ||
82 | |||
83 | switch (datafmt) { | ||
84 | case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: | ||
85 | buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':'); | ||
86 | if (buf_ptr != field_data->data) | ||
87 | seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data); | ||
88 | |||
89 | /* skip ':' and '\0' */ | ||
90 | buf_ptr += 2; | ||
91 | buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data; | ||
92 | case DATA_FMT_DIGEST: | ||
93 | ima_print_digest(m, buf_ptr, buflen); | ||
94 | break; | ||
95 | case DATA_FMT_STRING: | ||
96 | seq_printf(m, "%s", buf_ptr); | ||
97 | break; | ||
98 | default: | ||
99 | break; | ||
100 | } | ||
101 | } | ||
102 | |||
103 | static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m, | ||
104 | enum ima_show_type show, | ||
105 | enum data_formats datafmt, | ||
106 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
107 | { | ||
108 | ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32)); | ||
109 | if (!field_data->len) | ||
110 | return; | ||
111 | ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len); | ||
112 | } | ||
113 | |||
114 | static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m, | ||
115 | enum ima_show_type show, | ||
116 | enum data_formats datafmt, | ||
117 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
118 | { | ||
119 | switch (show) { | ||
120 | case IMA_SHOW_ASCII: | ||
121 | ima_show_template_data_ascii(m, show, datafmt, field_data); | ||
122 | break; | ||
123 | case IMA_SHOW_BINARY: | ||
124 | ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data); | ||
125 | break; | ||
126 | default: | ||
127 | break; | ||
128 | } | ||
129 | } | ||
130 | |||
131 | void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
132 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
133 | { | ||
134 | ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data); | ||
135 | } | ||
136 | |||
137 | void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
138 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
139 | { | ||
140 | ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO, | ||
141 | field_data); | ||
142 | } | ||
143 | |||
144 | void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
145 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
146 | { | ||
147 | ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); | ||
148 | } | ||
149 | |||
150 | static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo, | ||
151 | struct ima_field_data *field_data, | ||
152 | bool size_limit) | ||
153 | { | ||
154 | /* | ||
155 | * digest formats: | ||
156 | * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest | ||
157 | * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest, | ||
158 | * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algoritm is not | ||
159 | * SHA1 or MD5 | ||
160 | */ | ||
161 | u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 }; | ||
162 | enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST; | ||
163 | u32 offset = 0; | ||
164 | |||
165 | if (!size_limit) { | ||
166 | fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO; | ||
167 | if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) | ||
168 | offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, | ||
169 | "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]); | ||
170 | buffer[offset] = ':'; | ||
171 | offset += 2; | ||
172 | } | ||
173 | |||
174 | if (digest) | ||
175 | memcpy(buffer + offset, digest, digestsize); | ||
176 | else | ||
177 | /* | ||
178 | * If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation. | ||
179 | * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset of | ||
180 | * IMA_DIGEST_SIZE. | ||
181 | */ | ||
182 | offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; | ||
183 | |||
184 | return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize, | ||
185 | fmt, field_data); | ||
186 | } | ||
187 | |||
188 | /* | ||
189 | * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit). | ||
190 | */ | ||
191 | int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
192 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
193 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
194 | { | ||
195 | struct { | ||
196 | struct ima_digest_data hdr; | ||
197 | char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; | ||
198 | } hash; | ||
199 | u8 *cur_digest = NULL; | ||
200 | u32 cur_digestsize = 0; | ||
201 | struct inode *inode; | ||
202 | int result; | ||
203 | |||
204 | memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); | ||
205 | |||
206 | if (!iint) /* recording a violation. */ | ||
207 | goto out; | ||
208 | |||
209 | if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) { | ||
210 | cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest; | ||
211 | cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length; | ||
212 | goto out; | ||
213 | } | ||
214 | |||
215 | if (!file) /* missing info to re-calculate the digest */ | ||
216 | return -EINVAL; | ||
217 | |||
218 | inode = file_inode(file); | ||
219 | hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ? | ||
220 | ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; | ||
221 | result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); | ||
222 | if (result) { | ||
223 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, | ||
224 | filename, "collect_data", | ||
225 | "failed", result, 0); | ||
226 | return result; | ||
227 | } | ||
228 | cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest; | ||
229 | cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length; | ||
230 | out: | ||
231 | return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, -1, | ||
232 | field_data, true); | ||
233 | } | ||
234 | |||
235 | /* | ||
236 | * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit). | ||
237 | */ | ||
238 | int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | ||
239 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | ||
240 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
241 | { | ||
242 | u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST; | ||
243 | u32 cur_digestsize = 0; | ||
244 | |||
245 | /* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */ | ||
246 | if (!iint) | ||
247 | goto out; | ||
248 | |||
249 | cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest; | ||
250 | cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length; | ||
251 | |||
252 | hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; | ||
253 | out: | ||
254 | return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, | ||
255 | hash_algo, field_data, false); | ||
256 | } | ||
257 | |||
258 | static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | ||
259 | struct file *file, | ||
260 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
261 | struct ima_field_data *field_data, | ||
262 | bool size_limit) | ||
263 | { | ||
264 | const char *cur_filename = NULL; | ||
265 | u32 cur_filename_len = 0; | ||
266 | enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ? | ||
267 | DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING; | ||
268 | |||
269 | BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL); | ||
270 | |||
271 | if (filename) { | ||
272 | cur_filename = filename; | ||
273 | cur_filename_len = strlen(filename); | ||
274 | |||
275 | if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) | ||
276 | goto out; | ||
277 | } | ||
278 | |||
279 | if (file) { | ||
280 | cur_filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name; | ||
281 | cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); | ||
282 | } else | ||
283 | /* | ||
284 | * Truncate filename if the latter is too long and | ||
285 | * the file descriptor is not available. | ||
286 | */ | ||
287 | cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; | ||
288 | out: | ||
289 | return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, | ||
290 | fmt, field_data); | ||
291 | } | ||
292 | |||
293 | /* | ||
294 | * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit). | ||
295 | */ | ||
296 | int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
297 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
298 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
299 | { | ||
300 | return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename, | ||
301 | field_data, true); | ||
302 | } | ||
303 | |||
304 | /* | ||
305 | * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit). | ||
306 | */ | ||
307 | int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
308 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
309 | struct ima_field_data *field_data) | ||
310 | { | ||
311 | return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename, | ||
312 | field_data, false); | ||
313 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..16c5e7810234 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy | ||
3 | * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
8 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | ||
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | ||
10 | * License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: ima_template_lib.h | ||
13 | * Header for the library of supported template fields. | ||
14 | */ | ||
15 | #ifndef __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H | ||
16 | #define __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H | ||
17 | |||
18 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> | ||
19 | #include "ima.h" | ||
20 | |||
21 | void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
22 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
23 | void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
24 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
25 | void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, | ||
26 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
27 | int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
28 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
29 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
30 | int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
31 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
32 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
33 | int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, | ||
34 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | ||
35 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
36 | int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
37 | const unsigned char *filename, | ||
38 | struct ima_field_data *field_data); | ||
39 | #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */ | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index c42fb7a70dee..2fb5e53e927f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h | |||
@@ -54,25 +54,57 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { | |||
54 | IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, | 54 | IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, |
55 | EVM_XATTR_HMAC, | 55 | EVM_XATTR_HMAC, |
56 | EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, | 56 | EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, |
57 | IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, | ||
57 | }; | 58 | }; |
58 | 59 | ||
59 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data { | 60 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data { |
60 | u8 type; | 61 | u8 type; |
61 | u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | 62 | u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
62 | } __attribute__((packed)); | 63 | } __packed; |
64 | |||
65 | #define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 | ||
66 | |||
67 | struct ima_digest_data { | ||
68 | u8 algo; | ||
69 | u8 length; | ||
70 | union { | ||
71 | struct { | ||
72 | u8 unused; | ||
73 | u8 type; | ||
74 | } sha1; | ||
75 | struct { | ||
76 | u8 type; | ||
77 | u8 algo; | ||
78 | } ng; | ||
79 | u8 data[2]; | ||
80 | } xattr; | ||
81 | u8 digest[0]; | ||
82 | } __packed; | ||
83 | |||
84 | /* | ||
85 | * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys | ||
86 | */ | ||
87 | struct signature_v2_hdr { | ||
88 | uint8_t type; /* xattr type */ | ||
89 | uint8_t version; /* signature format version */ | ||
90 | uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */ | ||
91 | uint32_t keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */ | ||
92 | uint16_t sig_size; /* signature size */ | ||
93 | uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */ | ||
94 | } __packed; | ||
63 | 95 | ||
64 | /* integrity data associated with an inode */ | 96 | /* integrity data associated with an inode */ |
65 | struct integrity_iint_cache { | 97 | struct integrity_iint_cache { |
66 | struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ | 98 | struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ |
67 | struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ | 99 | struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ |
68 | u64 version; /* track inode changes */ | 100 | u64 version; /* track inode changes */ |
69 | unsigned long flags; | 101 | unsigned long flags; |
70 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr; | ||
71 | enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; | 102 | enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; |
72 | enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; | 103 | enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; |
73 | enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; | 104 | enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; |
74 | enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4; | 105 | enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4; |
75 | enum integrity_status evm_status:4; | 106 | enum integrity_status evm_status:4; |
107 | struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; | ||
76 | }; | 108 | }; |
77 | 109 | ||
78 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete | 110 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete |
@@ -89,7 +121,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); | |||
89 | #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE | 121 | #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE |
90 | 122 | ||
91 | int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, | 123 | int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, |
92 | const char *digest, int digestlen); | 124 | const char *digest, int digestlen); |
93 | 125 | ||
94 | #else | 126 | #else |
95 | 127 | ||
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index a90d6d300dbd..53d8748c9564 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig | |||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ | |||
4 | 4 | ||
5 | config KEYS | 5 | config KEYS |
6 | bool "Enable access key retention support" | 6 | bool "Enable access key retention support" |
7 | select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY | ||
7 | help | 8 | help |
8 | This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and | 9 | This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and |
9 | access keys in the kernel. | 10 | access keys in the kernel. |
@@ -19,6 +20,34 @@ config KEYS | |||
19 | 20 | ||
20 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. | 21 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
21 | 22 | ||
23 | config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS | ||
24 | bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings" | ||
25 | depends on KEYS | ||
26 | help | ||
27 | This option provides a register of persistent per-UID keyrings, | ||
28 | primarily aimed at Kerberos key storage. The keyrings are persistent | ||
29 | in the sense that they stay around after all processes of that UID | ||
30 | have exited, not that they survive the machine being rebooted. | ||
31 | |||
32 | A particular keyring may be accessed by either the user whose keyring | ||
33 | it is or by a process with administrative privileges. The active | ||
34 | LSMs gets to rule on which admin-level processes get to access the | ||
35 | cache. | ||
36 | |||
37 | Keyrings are created and added into the register upon demand and get | ||
38 | removed if they expire (a default timeout is set upon creation). | ||
39 | |||
40 | config BIG_KEYS | ||
41 | tristate "Large payload keys" | ||
42 | depends on KEYS | ||
43 | depends on TMPFS | ||
44 | help | ||
45 | This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel | ||
46 | (for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to | ||
47 | swapspace by tmpfs. | ||
48 | |||
49 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. | ||
50 | |||
22 | config TRUSTED_KEYS | 51 | config TRUSTED_KEYS |
23 | tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" | 52 | tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" |
24 | depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM | 53 | depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM |
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 504aaa008388..dfb3a7bededf 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile | |||
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@ obj-y := \ | |||
18 | obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o | 18 | obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o |
19 | obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o | 19 | obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o |
20 | obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o | 20 | obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o |
21 | obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o | ||
21 | 22 | ||
22 | # | 23 | # |
23 | # Key types | 24 | # Key types |
24 | # | 25 | # |
26 | obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o | ||
25 | obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o | 27 | obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o |
26 | obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ | 28 | obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ |
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5f9defc4a807 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ | |||
1 | /* Large capacity key type | ||
2 | * | ||
3 | * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. | ||
4 | * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) | ||
5 | * | ||
6 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
7 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence | ||
8 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version | ||
9 | * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. | ||
10 | */ | ||
11 | |||
12 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
13 | #include <linux/init.h> | ||
14 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> | ||
15 | #include <linux/file.h> | ||
16 | #include <linux/shmem_fs.h> | ||
17 | #include <linux/err.h> | ||
18 | #include <keys/user-type.h> | ||
19 | #include <keys/big_key-type.h> | ||
20 | |||
21 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | ||
22 | |||
23 | /* | ||
24 | * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to | ||
25 | * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at | ||
26 | * least as large as the data. | ||
27 | */ | ||
28 | #define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry)) | ||
29 | |||
30 | /* | ||
31 | * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an | ||
32 | * arbitrary blob of data as the payload | ||
33 | */ | ||
34 | struct key_type key_type_big_key = { | ||
35 | .name = "big_key", | ||
36 | .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, | ||
37 | .instantiate = big_key_instantiate, | ||
38 | .match = user_match, | ||
39 | .revoke = big_key_revoke, | ||
40 | .destroy = big_key_destroy, | ||
41 | .describe = big_key_describe, | ||
42 | .read = big_key_read, | ||
43 | }; | ||
44 | |||
45 | /* | ||
46 | * Instantiate a big key | ||
47 | */ | ||
48 | int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | ||
49 | { | ||
50 | struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; | ||
51 | struct file *file; | ||
52 | ssize_t written; | ||
53 | size_t datalen = prep->datalen; | ||
54 | int ret; | ||
55 | |||
56 | ret = -EINVAL; | ||
57 | if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data) | ||
58 | goto error; | ||
59 | |||
60 | /* Set an arbitrary quota */ | ||
61 | ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16); | ||
62 | if (ret < 0) | ||
63 | goto error; | ||
64 | |||
65 | key->type_data.x[1] = datalen; | ||
66 | |||
67 | if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { | ||
68 | /* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data | ||
69 | * to be swapped out if needed. | ||
70 | * | ||
71 | * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key. | ||
72 | */ | ||
73 | file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0); | ||
74 | if (IS_ERR(file)) | ||
75 | goto err_quota; | ||
76 | |||
77 | written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0); | ||
78 | if (written != datalen) { | ||
79 | if (written >= 0) | ||
80 | ret = -ENOMEM; | ||
81 | goto err_fput; | ||
82 | } | ||
83 | |||
84 | /* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again | ||
85 | * later | ||
86 | */ | ||
87 | *path = file->f_path; | ||
88 | path_get(path); | ||
89 | fput(file); | ||
90 | } else { | ||
91 | /* Just store the data in a buffer */ | ||
92 | void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); | ||
93 | if (!data) { | ||
94 | ret = -ENOMEM; | ||
95 | goto err_quota; | ||
96 | } | ||
97 | |||
98 | key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); | ||
99 | } | ||
100 | return 0; | ||
101 | |||
102 | err_fput: | ||
103 | fput(file); | ||
104 | err_quota: | ||
105 | key_payload_reserve(key, 0); | ||
106 | error: | ||
107 | return ret; | ||
108 | } | ||
109 | |||
110 | /* | ||
111 | * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring | ||
112 | * - called with the key sem write-locked | ||
113 | */ | ||
114 | void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) | ||
115 | { | ||
116 | struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; | ||
117 | |||
118 | /* clear the quota */ | ||
119 | key_payload_reserve(key, 0); | ||
120 | if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) | ||
121 | vfs_truncate(path, 0); | ||
122 | } | ||
123 | |||
124 | /* | ||
125 | * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key | ||
126 | */ | ||
127 | void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) | ||
128 | { | ||
129 | if (key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { | ||
130 | struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; | ||
131 | path_put(path); | ||
132 | path->mnt = NULL; | ||
133 | path->dentry = NULL; | ||
134 | } else { | ||
135 | kfree(key->payload.data); | ||
136 | key->payload.data = NULL; | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | } | ||
139 | |||
140 | /* | ||
141 | * describe the big_key key | ||
142 | */ | ||
143 | void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) | ||
144 | { | ||
145 | unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1]; | ||
146 | |||
147 | seq_puts(m, key->description); | ||
148 | |||
149 | if (key_is_instantiated(key)) | ||
150 | seq_printf(m, ": %lu [%s]", | ||
151 | datalen, | ||
152 | datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); | ||
153 | } | ||
154 | |||
155 | /* | ||
156 | * read the key data | ||
157 | * - the key's semaphore is read-locked | ||
158 | */ | ||
159 | long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) | ||
160 | { | ||
161 | unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1]; | ||
162 | long ret; | ||
163 | |||
164 | if (!buffer || buflen < datalen) | ||
165 | return datalen; | ||
166 | |||
167 | if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { | ||
168 | struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; | ||
169 | struct file *file; | ||
170 | loff_t pos; | ||
171 | |||
172 | file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred()); | ||
173 | if (IS_ERR(file)) | ||
174 | return PTR_ERR(file); | ||
175 | |||
176 | pos = 0; | ||
177 | ret = vfs_read(file, buffer, datalen, &pos); | ||
178 | fput(file); | ||
179 | if (ret >= 0 && ret != datalen) | ||
180 | ret = -EIO; | ||
181 | } else { | ||
182 | ret = datalen; | ||
183 | if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data, datalen) != 0) | ||
184 | ret = -EFAULT; | ||
185 | } | ||
186 | |||
187 | return ret; | ||
188 | } | ||
189 | |||
190 | /* | ||
191 | * Module stuff | ||
192 | */ | ||
193 | static int __init big_key_init(void) | ||
194 | { | ||
195 | return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key); | ||
196 | } | ||
197 | |||
198 | static void __exit big_key_cleanup(void) | ||
199 | { | ||
200 | unregister_key_type(&key_type_big_key); | ||
201 | } | ||
202 | |||
203 | module_init(big_key_init); | ||
204 | module_exit(big_key_cleanup); | ||
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index d65fa7fa29ba..bbd32c729dbb 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c | |||
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option, | |||
138 | case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE: | 138 | case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE: |
139 | return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2); | 139 | return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2); |
140 | 140 | ||
141 | case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT: | ||
142 | return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3); | ||
143 | |||
141 | default: | 144 | default: |
142 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 145 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
143 | } | 146 | } |
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index d67c97bb1025..cce621c33dce 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c | |||
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype) | |||
130 | kleave(""); | 130 | kleave(""); |
131 | } | 131 | } |
132 | 132 | ||
133 | static int key_gc_keyring_func(const void *object, void *iterator_data) | ||
134 | { | ||
135 | const struct key *key = object; | ||
136 | time_t *limit = iterator_data; | ||
137 | return key_is_dead(key, *limit); | ||
138 | } | ||
139 | |||
133 | /* | 140 | /* |
134 | * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring. | 141 | * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring. |
135 | * | 142 | * |
@@ -138,10 +145,9 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype) | |||
138 | */ | 145 | */ |
139 | static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) | 146 | static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) |
140 | { | 147 | { |
141 | struct keyring_list *klist; | 148 | int result; |
142 | int loop; | ||
143 | 149 | ||
144 | kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring)); | 150 | kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: ""); |
145 | 151 | ||
146 | if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | | 152 | if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | |
147 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) | 153 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) |
@@ -149,27 +155,17 @@ static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) | |||
149 | 155 | ||
150 | /* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */ | 156 | /* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */ |
151 | rcu_read_lock(); | 157 | rcu_read_lock(); |
152 | klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); | 158 | result = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, |
153 | if (!klist) | 159 | key_gc_keyring_func, &limit); |
154 | goto unlock_dont_gc; | ||
155 | |||
156 | loop = klist->nkeys; | ||
157 | smp_rmb(); | ||
158 | for (loop--; loop >= 0; loop--) { | ||
159 | struct key *key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]); | ||
160 | if (key_is_dead(key, limit)) | ||
161 | goto do_gc; | ||
162 | } | ||
163 | |||
164 | unlock_dont_gc: | ||
165 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 160 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
161 | if (result == true) | ||
162 | goto do_gc; | ||
163 | |||
166 | dont_gc: | 164 | dont_gc: |
167 | kleave(" [no gc]"); | 165 | kleave(" [no gc]"); |
168 | return; | 166 | return; |
169 | 167 | ||
170 | do_gc: | 168 | do_gc: |
171 | rcu_read_unlock(); | ||
172 | |||
173 | keyring_gc(keyring, limit); | 169 | keyring_gc(keyring, limit); |
174 | kleave(" [gc]"); | 170 | kleave(" [gc]"); |
175 | } | 171 | } |
@@ -392,7 +388,6 @@ found_unreferenced_key: | |||
392 | */ | 388 | */ |
393 | found_keyring: | 389 | found_keyring: |
394 | spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock); | 390 | spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock); |
395 | kdebug("scan keyring %d", key->serial); | ||
396 | key_gc_keyring(key, limit); | 391 | key_gc_keyring(key, limit); |
397 | goto maybe_resched; | 392 | goto maybe_resched; |
398 | 393 | ||
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index d4f1468b9b50..80b2aac4f50c 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h | |||
@@ -89,42 +89,53 @@ extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type); | |||
89 | extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype); | 89 | extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype); |
90 | 90 | ||
91 | extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, | 91 | extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, |
92 | const struct key_type *type, | 92 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key, |
93 | const char *description, | 93 | struct assoc_array_edit **_edit); |
94 | unsigned long *_prealloc); | ||
95 | extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key); | 94 | extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key); |
96 | extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, | 95 | extern void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit); |
97 | unsigned long *_prealloc); | ||
98 | extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, | 96 | extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, |
99 | struct key_type *type, | 97 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key, |
100 | unsigned long prealloc); | 98 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit); |
101 | 99 | ||
102 | extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | 100 | extern key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, |
103 | const struct key_type *type, | 101 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key); |
104 | const char *description, | ||
105 | key_perm_t perm); | ||
106 | 102 | ||
107 | extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring, | 103 | extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring, |
108 | key_serial_t target_id); | 104 | key_serial_t target_id); |
109 | 105 | ||
106 | extern int iterate_over_keyring(const struct key *keyring, | ||
107 | int (*func)(const struct key *key, void *data), | ||
108 | void *data); | ||
109 | |||
110 | typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *); | 110 | typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *); |
111 | 111 | ||
112 | struct keyring_search_context { | ||
113 | struct keyring_index_key index_key; | ||
114 | const struct cred *cred; | ||
115 | key_match_func_t match; | ||
116 | const void *match_data; | ||
117 | unsigned flags; | ||
118 | #define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE 0x0001 /* [as type->def_lookup_type] */ | ||
119 | #define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK 0x0002 /* Skip state checks */ | ||
120 | #define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK 0x0004 /* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */ | ||
121 | #define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME 0x0008 /* Don't update times */ | ||
122 | #define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM 0x0010 /* Don't check permissions */ | ||
123 | #define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP 0x0020 /* Give an error on excessive depth */ | ||
124 | |||
125 | int (*iterator)(const void *object, void *iterator_data); | ||
126 | |||
127 | /* Internal stuff */ | ||
128 | int skipped_ret; | ||
129 | bool possessed; | ||
130 | key_ref_t result; | ||
131 | struct timespec now; | ||
132 | }; | ||
133 | |||
112 | extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | 134 | extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, |
113 | const struct cred *cred, | 135 | struct keyring_search_context *ctx); |
114 | struct key_type *type, | 136 | |
115 | const void *description, | 137 | extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx); |
116 | key_match_func_t match, | 138 | extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx); |
117 | bool no_state_check); | ||
118 | |||
119 | extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | ||
120 | const void *description, | ||
121 | key_match_func_t match, | ||
122 | bool no_state_check, | ||
123 | const struct cred *cred); | ||
124 | extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | ||
125 | const void *description, | ||
126 | key_match_func_t match, | ||
127 | const struct cred *cred); | ||
128 | 139 | ||
129 | extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); | 140 | extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); |
130 | 141 | ||
@@ -202,7 +213,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id); | |||
202 | /* | 213 | /* |
203 | * Determine whether a key is dead. | 214 | * Determine whether a key is dead. |
204 | */ | 215 | */ |
205 | static inline bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit) | 216 | static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit) |
206 | { | 217 | { |
207 | return | 218 | return |
208 | key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) | | 219 | key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) | |
@@ -244,6 +255,15 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t); | |||
244 | extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t, | 255 | extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t, |
245 | const struct iovec *, | 256 | const struct iovec *, |
246 | unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t); | 257 | unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t); |
258 | #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS | ||
259 | extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t, key_serial_t); | ||
260 | extern unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry; | ||
261 | #else | ||
262 | static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring) | ||
263 | { | ||
264 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | ||
265 | } | ||
266 | #endif | ||
247 | 267 | ||
248 | /* | 268 | /* |
249 | * Debugging key validation | 269 | * Debugging key validation |
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 8fb7c7bd4657..d331ea9ef380 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c | |||
@@ -242,8 +242,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, | |||
242 | } | 242 | } |
243 | } | 243 | } |
244 | 244 | ||
245 | desclen = strlen(desc) + 1; | 245 | desclen = strlen(desc); |
246 | quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen; | 246 | quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen; |
247 | 247 | ||
248 | /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */ | 248 | /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */ |
249 | user = key_user_lookup(uid); | 249 | user = key_user_lookup(uid); |
@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, | |||
277 | goto no_memory_2; | 277 | goto no_memory_2; |
278 | 278 | ||
279 | if (desc) { | 279 | if (desc) { |
280 | key->description = kmemdup(desc, desclen, GFP_KERNEL); | 280 | key->index_key.desc_len = desclen; |
281 | key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | ||
281 | if (!key->description) | 282 | if (!key->description) |
282 | goto no_memory_3; | 283 | goto no_memory_3; |
283 | } | 284 | } |
@@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, | |||
285 | atomic_set(&key->usage, 1); | 286 | atomic_set(&key->usage, 1); |
286 | init_rwsem(&key->sem); | 287 | init_rwsem(&key->sem); |
287 | lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class); | 288 | lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class); |
288 | key->type = type; | 289 | key->index_key.type = type; |
289 | key->user = user; | 290 | key->user = user; |
290 | key->quotalen = quotalen; | 291 | key->quotalen = quotalen; |
291 | key->datalen = type->def_datalen; | 292 | key->datalen = type->def_datalen; |
@@ -299,6 +300,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, | |||
299 | 300 | ||
300 | if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) | 301 | if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) |
301 | key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; | 302 | key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; |
303 | if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED) | ||
304 | key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED; | ||
302 | 305 | ||
303 | memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data)); | 306 | memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data)); |
304 | 307 | ||
@@ -408,7 +411,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
408 | struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, | 411 | struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, |
409 | struct key *keyring, | 412 | struct key *keyring, |
410 | struct key *authkey, | 413 | struct key *authkey, |
411 | unsigned long *_prealloc) | 414 | struct assoc_array_edit **_edit) |
412 | { | 415 | { |
413 | int ret, awaken; | 416 | int ret, awaken; |
414 | 417 | ||
@@ -435,7 +438,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
435 | 438 | ||
436 | /* and link it into the destination keyring */ | 439 | /* and link it into the destination keyring */ |
437 | if (keyring) | 440 | if (keyring) |
438 | __key_link(keyring, key, _prealloc); | 441 | __key_link(key, _edit); |
439 | 442 | ||
440 | /* disable the authorisation key */ | 443 | /* disable the authorisation key */ |
441 | if (authkey) | 444 | if (authkey) |
@@ -475,7 +478,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
475 | struct key *authkey) | 478 | struct key *authkey) |
476 | { | 479 | { |
477 | struct key_preparsed_payload prep; | 480 | struct key_preparsed_payload prep; |
478 | unsigned long prealloc; | 481 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
479 | int ret; | 482 | int ret; |
480 | 483 | ||
481 | memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); | 484 | memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); |
@@ -489,17 +492,15 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
489 | } | 492 | } |
490 | 493 | ||
491 | if (keyring) { | 494 | if (keyring) { |
492 | ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, | 495 | ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); |
493 | &prealloc); | ||
494 | if (ret < 0) | 496 | if (ret < 0) |
495 | goto error_free_preparse; | 497 | goto error_free_preparse; |
496 | } | 498 | } |
497 | 499 | ||
498 | ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, | 500 | ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit); |
499 | &prealloc); | ||
500 | 501 | ||
501 | if (keyring) | 502 | if (keyring) |
502 | __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); | 503 | __key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit); |
503 | 504 | ||
504 | error_free_preparse: | 505 | error_free_preparse: |
505 | if (key->type->preparse) | 506 | if (key->type->preparse) |
@@ -537,7 +538,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
537 | struct key *keyring, | 538 | struct key *keyring, |
538 | struct key *authkey) | 539 | struct key *authkey) |
539 | { | 540 | { |
540 | unsigned long prealloc; | 541 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
541 | struct timespec now; | 542 | struct timespec now; |
542 | int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0; | 543 | int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0; |
543 | 544 | ||
@@ -548,8 +549,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
548 | ret = -EBUSY; | 549 | ret = -EBUSY; |
549 | 550 | ||
550 | if (keyring) | 551 | if (keyring) |
551 | link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, | 552 | link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); |
552 | key->description, &prealloc); | ||
553 | 553 | ||
554 | mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); | 554 | mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); |
555 | 555 | ||
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
571 | 571 | ||
572 | /* and link it into the destination keyring */ | 572 | /* and link it into the destination keyring */ |
573 | if (keyring && link_ret == 0) | 573 | if (keyring && link_ret == 0) |
574 | __key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc); | 574 | __key_link(key, &edit); |
575 | 575 | ||
576 | /* disable the authorisation key */ | 576 | /* disable the authorisation key */ |
577 | if (authkey) | 577 | if (authkey) |
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, | |||
581 | mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex); | 581 | mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex); |
582 | 582 | ||
583 | if (keyring) | 583 | if (keyring) |
584 | __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); | 584 | __key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit); |
585 | 585 | ||
586 | /* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */ | 586 | /* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */ |
587 | if (awaken) | 587 | if (awaken) |
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ found: | |||
645 | /* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put() | 645 | /* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put() |
646 | * doesn't actually change the key | 646 | * doesn't actually change the key |
647 | */ | 647 | */ |
648 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 648 | __key_get(key); |
649 | 649 | ||
650 | error: | 650 | error: |
651 | spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock); | 651 | spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock); |
@@ -780,25 +780,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | |||
780 | key_perm_t perm, | 780 | key_perm_t perm, |
781 | unsigned long flags) | 781 | unsigned long flags) |
782 | { | 782 | { |
783 | unsigned long prealloc; | 783 | struct keyring_index_key index_key = { |
784 | .description = description, | ||
785 | }; | ||
784 | struct key_preparsed_payload prep; | 786 | struct key_preparsed_payload prep; |
787 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; | ||
785 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | 788 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
786 | struct key_type *ktype; | ||
787 | struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; | 789 | struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; |
788 | key_ref_t key_ref; | 790 | key_ref_t key_ref; |
789 | int ret; | 791 | int ret; |
790 | 792 | ||
791 | /* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel | 793 | /* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel |
792 | * types */ | 794 | * types */ |
793 | ktype = key_type_lookup(type); | 795 | index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type); |
794 | if (IS_ERR(ktype)) { | 796 | if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) { |
795 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); | 797 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); |
796 | goto error; | 798 | goto error; |
797 | } | 799 | } |
798 | 800 | ||
799 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 801 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
800 | if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate || | 802 | if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate || |
801 | (!description && !ktype->preparse)) | 803 | (!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse)) |
802 | goto error_put_type; | 804 | goto error_put_type; |
803 | 805 | ||
804 | keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); | 806 | keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); |
@@ -812,21 +814,28 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | |||
812 | memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); | 814 | memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); |
813 | prep.data = payload; | 815 | prep.data = payload; |
814 | prep.datalen = plen; | 816 | prep.datalen = plen; |
815 | prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen; | 817 | prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; |
816 | if (ktype->preparse) { | 818 | prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED; |
817 | ret = ktype->preparse(&prep); | 819 | if (index_key.type->preparse) { |
820 | ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); | ||
818 | if (ret < 0) { | 821 | if (ret < 0) { |
819 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); | 822 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); |
820 | goto error_put_type; | 823 | goto error_put_type; |
821 | } | 824 | } |
822 | if (!description) | 825 | if (!index_key.description) |
823 | description = prep.description; | 826 | index_key.description = prep.description; |
824 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 827 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
825 | if (!description) | 828 | if (!index_key.description) |
826 | goto error_free_prep; | 829 | goto error_free_prep; |
827 | } | 830 | } |
831 | index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description); | ||
832 | |||
833 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); | ||
834 | if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags)) | ||
835 | goto error_free_prep; | ||
836 | flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0; | ||
828 | 837 | ||
829 | ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); | 838 | ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit); |
830 | if (ret < 0) { | 839 | if (ret < 0) { |
831 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); | 840 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); |
832 | goto error_free_prep; | 841 | goto error_free_prep; |
@@ -844,10 +853,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | |||
844 | * key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and | 853 | * key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and |
845 | * update that instead if possible | 854 | * update that instead if possible |
846 | */ | 855 | */ |
847 | if (ktype->update) { | 856 | if (index_key.type->update) { |
848 | key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description, | 857 | key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key); |
849 | 0); | 858 | if (key_ref) |
850 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | ||
851 | goto found_matching_key; | 859 | goto found_matching_key; |
852 | } | 860 | } |
853 | 861 | ||
@@ -856,23 +864,24 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | |||
856 | perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR; | 864 | perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR; |
857 | perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; | 865 | perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; |
858 | 866 | ||
859 | if (ktype->read) | 867 | if (index_key.type->read) |
860 | perm |= KEY_POS_READ; | 868 | perm |= KEY_POS_READ; |
861 | 869 | ||
862 | if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update) | 870 | if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring || |
871 | index_key.type->update) | ||
863 | perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; | 872 | perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; |
864 | } | 873 | } |
865 | 874 | ||
866 | /* allocate a new key */ | 875 | /* allocate a new key */ |
867 | key = key_alloc(ktype, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, | 876 | key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description, |
868 | perm, flags); | 877 | cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags); |
869 | if (IS_ERR(key)) { | 878 | if (IS_ERR(key)) { |
870 | key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); | 879 | key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); |
871 | goto error_link_end; | 880 | goto error_link_end; |
872 | } | 881 | } |
873 | 882 | ||
874 | /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ | 883 | /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ |
875 | ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc); | 884 | ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit); |
876 | if (ret < 0) { | 885 | if (ret < 0) { |
877 | key_put(key); | 886 | key_put(key); |
878 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); | 887 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); |
@@ -882,12 +891,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | |||
882 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); | 891 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); |
883 | 892 | ||
884 | error_link_end: | 893 | error_link_end: |
885 | __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); | 894 | __key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit); |
886 | error_free_prep: | 895 | error_free_prep: |
887 | if (ktype->preparse) | 896 | if (index_key.type->preparse) |
888 | ktype->free_preparse(&prep); | 897 | index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep); |
889 | error_put_type: | 898 | error_put_type: |
890 | key_type_put(ktype); | 899 | key_type_put(index_key.type); |
891 | error: | 900 | error: |
892 | return key_ref; | 901 | return key_ref; |
893 | 902 | ||
@@ -895,7 +904,7 @@ error: | |||
895 | /* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it | 904 | /* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it |
896 | * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned | 905 | * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned |
897 | */ | 906 | */ |
898 | __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); | 907 | __key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit); |
899 | 908 | ||
900 | key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); | 909 | key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); |
901 | goto error_free_prep; | 910 | goto error_free_prep; |
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 33cfd27b4de2..cee72ce64222 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c | |||
@@ -1667,6 +1667,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, | |||
1667 | case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE: | 1667 | case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE: |
1668 | return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2); | 1668 | return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2); |
1669 | 1669 | ||
1670 | case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT: | ||
1671 | return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3); | ||
1672 | |||
1670 | default: | 1673 | default: |
1671 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 1674 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1672 | } | 1675 | } |
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 6ece7f2e5707..9b6f6e09b50c 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c | |||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ | |||
1 | /* Keyring handling | 1 | /* Keyring handling |
2 | * | 2 | * |
3 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. | 3 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. |
4 | * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) | 4 | * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) |
5 | * | 5 | * |
6 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | 6 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
@@ -17,25 +17,11 @@ | |||
17 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> | 17 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> |
18 | #include <linux/err.h> | 18 | #include <linux/err.h> |
19 | #include <keys/keyring-type.h> | 19 | #include <keys/keyring-type.h> |
20 | #include <keys/user-type.h> | ||
21 | #include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h> | ||
20 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> | 22 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
21 | #include "internal.h" | 23 | #include "internal.h" |
22 | 24 | ||
23 | #define rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring) \ | ||
24 | (rcu_dereference_protected( \ | ||
25 | (keyring)->payload.subscriptions, \ | ||
26 | rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem))) | ||
27 | |||
28 | #define rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, index, keyring) \ | ||
29 | (rcu_dereference_protected( \ | ||
30 | (klist)->keys[index], \ | ||
31 | rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem))) | ||
32 | |||
33 | #define MAX_KEYRING_LINKS \ | ||
34 | min_t(size_t, USHRT_MAX - 1, \ | ||
35 | ((PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct keyring_list)) / sizeof(struct key *))) | ||
36 | |||
37 | #define KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA 1UL | ||
38 | |||
39 | /* | 25 | /* |
40 | * When plumbing the depths of the key tree, this sets a hard limit | 26 | * When plumbing the depths of the key tree, this sets a hard limit |
41 | * set on how deep we're willing to go. | 27 | * set on how deep we're willing to go. |
@@ -47,6 +33,28 @@ | |||
47 | */ | 33 | */ |
48 | #define KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE (1 << 5) | 34 | #define KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE (1 << 5) |
49 | 35 | ||
36 | /* | ||
37 | * We mark pointers we pass to the associative array with bit 1 set if | ||
38 | * they're keyrings and clear otherwise. | ||
39 | */ | ||
40 | #define KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE 0x2UL | ||
41 | |||
42 | static inline bool keyring_ptr_is_keyring(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x) | ||
43 | { | ||
44 | return (unsigned long)x & KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE; | ||
45 | } | ||
46 | static inline struct key *keyring_ptr_to_key(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x) | ||
47 | { | ||
48 | void *object = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(x); | ||
49 | return (struct key *)((unsigned long)object & ~KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE); | ||
50 | } | ||
51 | static inline void *keyring_key_to_ptr(struct key *key) | ||
52 | { | ||
53 | if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) | ||
54 | return (void *)((unsigned long)key | KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE); | ||
55 | return key; | ||
56 | } | ||
57 | |||
50 | static struct list_head keyring_name_hash[KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE]; | 58 | static struct list_head keyring_name_hash[KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE]; |
51 | static DEFINE_RWLOCK(keyring_name_lock); | 59 | static DEFINE_RWLOCK(keyring_name_lock); |
52 | 60 | ||
@@ -67,7 +75,6 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) | |||
67 | */ | 75 | */ |
68 | static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, | 76 | static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, |
69 | struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); | 77 | struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); |
70 | static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); | ||
71 | static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); | 78 | static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); |
72 | static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); | 79 | static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); |
73 | static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m); | 80 | static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m); |
@@ -76,9 +83,9 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, | |||
76 | 83 | ||
77 | struct key_type key_type_keyring = { | 84 | struct key_type key_type_keyring = { |
78 | .name = "keyring", | 85 | .name = "keyring", |
79 | .def_datalen = sizeof(struct keyring_list), | 86 | .def_datalen = 0, |
80 | .instantiate = keyring_instantiate, | 87 | .instantiate = keyring_instantiate, |
81 | .match = keyring_match, | 88 | .match = user_match, |
82 | .revoke = keyring_revoke, | 89 | .revoke = keyring_revoke, |
83 | .destroy = keyring_destroy, | 90 | .destroy = keyring_destroy, |
84 | .describe = keyring_describe, | 91 | .describe = keyring_describe, |
@@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, | |||
127 | 134 | ||
128 | ret = -EINVAL; | 135 | ret = -EINVAL; |
129 | if (prep->datalen == 0) { | 136 | if (prep->datalen == 0) { |
137 | assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys); | ||
130 | /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ | 138 | /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ |
131 | keyring_publish_name(keyring); | 139 | keyring_publish_name(keyring); |
132 | ret = 0; | 140 | ret = 0; |
@@ -136,15 +144,226 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, | |||
136 | } | 144 | } |
137 | 145 | ||
138 | /* | 146 | /* |
139 | * Match keyrings on their name | 147 | * Multiply 64-bits by 32-bits to 96-bits and fold back to 64-bit. Ideally we'd |
148 | * fold the carry back too, but that requires inline asm. | ||
149 | */ | ||
150 | static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y) | ||
151 | { | ||
152 | u64 hi = (u64)(u32)(x >> 32) * y; | ||
153 | u64 lo = (u64)(u32)(x) * y; | ||
154 | return lo + ((u64)(u32)hi << 32) + (u32)(hi >> 32); | ||
155 | } | ||
156 | |||
157 | /* | ||
158 | * Hash a key type and description. | ||
140 | */ | 159 | */ |
141 | static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description) | 160 | static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *index_key) |
142 | { | 161 | { |
143 | return keyring->description && | 162 | const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP; |
144 | strcmp(keyring->description, description) == 0; | 163 | const unsigned long level_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK; |
164 | const char *description = index_key->description; | ||
165 | unsigned long hash, type; | ||
166 | u32 piece; | ||
167 | u64 acc; | ||
168 | int n, desc_len = index_key->desc_len; | ||
169 | |||
170 | type = (unsigned long)index_key->type; | ||
171 | |||
172 | acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(type, desc_len + 13); | ||
173 | acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207); | ||
174 | for (;;) { | ||
175 | n = desc_len; | ||
176 | if (n <= 0) | ||
177 | break; | ||
178 | if (n > 4) | ||
179 | n = 4; | ||
180 | piece = 0; | ||
181 | memcpy(&piece, description, n); | ||
182 | description += n; | ||
183 | desc_len -= n; | ||
184 | acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece); | ||
185 | acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207); | ||
186 | } | ||
187 | |||
188 | /* Fold the hash down to 32 bits if need be. */ | ||
189 | hash = acc; | ||
190 | if (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE == 32) | ||
191 | hash ^= acc >> 32; | ||
192 | |||
193 | /* Squidge all the keyrings into a separate part of the tree to | ||
194 | * ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is | ||
195 | * zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise. | ||
196 | */ | ||
197 | if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) == 0) | ||
198 | return hash | (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1; | ||
199 | if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) != 0) | ||
200 | return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~level_mask; | ||
201 | return hash; | ||
145 | } | 202 | } |
146 | 203 | ||
147 | /* | 204 | /* |
205 | * Build the next index key chunk. | ||
206 | * | ||
207 | * On 32-bit systems the index key is laid out as: | ||
208 | * | ||
209 | * 0 4 5 9... | ||
210 | * hash desclen typeptr desc[] | ||
211 | * | ||
212 | * On 64-bit systems: | ||
213 | * | ||
214 | * 0 8 9 17... | ||
215 | * hash desclen typeptr desc[] | ||
216 | * | ||
217 | * We return it one word-sized chunk at a time. | ||
218 | */ | ||
219 | static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level) | ||
220 | { | ||
221 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data; | ||
222 | unsigned long chunk = 0; | ||
223 | long offset = 0; | ||
224 | int desc_len = index_key->desc_len, n = sizeof(chunk); | ||
225 | |||
226 | level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE; | ||
227 | switch (level) { | ||
228 | case 0: | ||
229 | return hash_key_type_and_desc(index_key); | ||
230 | case 1: | ||
231 | return ((unsigned long)index_key->type << 8) | desc_len; | ||
232 | case 2: | ||
233 | if (desc_len == 0) | ||
234 | return (u8)((unsigned long)index_key->type >> | ||
235 | (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 8)); | ||
236 | n--; | ||
237 | offset = 1; | ||
238 | default: | ||
239 | offset += sizeof(chunk) - 1; | ||
240 | offset += (level - 3) * sizeof(chunk); | ||
241 | if (offset >= desc_len) | ||
242 | return 0; | ||
243 | desc_len -= offset; | ||
244 | if (desc_len > n) | ||
245 | desc_len = n; | ||
246 | offset += desc_len; | ||
247 | do { | ||
248 | chunk <<= 8; | ||
249 | chunk |= ((u8*)index_key->description)[--offset]; | ||
250 | } while (--desc_len > 0); | ||
251 | |||
252 | if (level == 2) { | ||
253 | chunk <<= 8; | ||
254 | chunk |= (u8)((unsigned long)index_key->type >> | ||
255 | (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 8)); | ||
256 | } | ||
257 | return chunk; | ||
258 | } | ||
259 | } | ||
260 | |||
261 | static unsigned long keyring_get_object_key_chunk(const void *object, int level) | ||
262 | { | ||
263 | const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); | ||
264 | return keyring_get_key_chunk(&key->index_key, level); | ||
265 | } | ||
266 | |||
267 | static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data) | ||
268 | { | ||
269 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data; | ||
270 | const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); | ||
271 | |||
272 | return key->index_key.type == index_key->type && | ||
273 | key->index_key.desc_len == index_key->desc_len && | ||
274 | memcmp(key->index_key.description, index_key->description, | ||
275 | index_key->desc_len) == 0; | ||
276 | } | ||
277 | |||
278 | /* | ||
279 | * Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position | ||
280 | * at which they differ - if they differ. | ||
281 | */ | ||
282 | static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *_a, const void *_b) | ||
283 | { | ||
284 | const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(_a); | ||
285 | const struct key *key_b = keyring_ptr_to_key(_b); | ||
286 | const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key; | ||
287 | const struct keyring_index_key *b = &key_b->index_key; | ||
288 | unsigned long seg_a, seg_b; | ||
289 | int level, i; | ||
290 | |||
291 | level = 0; | ||
292 | seg_a = hash_key_type_and_desc(a); | ||
293 | seg_b = hash_key_type_and_desc(b); | ||
294 | if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0) | ||
295 | goto differ; | ||
296 | |||
297 | /* The number of bits contributed by the hash is controlled by a | ||
298 | * constant in the assoc_array headers. Everything else thereafter we | ||
299 | * can deal with as being machine word-size dependent. | ||
300 | */ | ||
301 | level += ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE / 8; | ||
302 | seg_a = a->desc_len; | ||
303 | seg_b = b->desc_len; | ||
304 | if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0) | ||
305 | goto differ; | ||
306 | |||
307 | /* The next bit may not work on big endian */ | ||
308 | level++; | ||
309 | seg_a = (unsigned long)a->type; | ||
310 | seg_b = (unsigned long)b->type; | ||
311 | if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0) | ||
312 | goto differ; | ||
313 | |||
314 | level += sizeof(unsigned long); | ||
315 | if (a->desc_len == 0) | ||
316 | goto same; | ||
317 | |||
318 | i = 0; | ||
319 | if (((unsigned long)a->description | (unsigned long)b->description) & | ||
320 | (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)) { | ||
321 | do { | ||
322 | seg_a = *(unsigned long *)(a->description + i); | ||
323 | seg_b = *(unsigned long *)(b->description + i); | ||
324 | if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0) | ||
325 | goto differ_plus_i; | ||
326 | i += sizeof(unsigned long); | ||
327 | } while (i < (a->desc_len & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1))); | ||
328 | } | ||
329 | |||
330 | for (; i < a->desc_len; i++) { | ||
331 | seg_a = *(unsigned char *)(a->description + i); | ||
332 | seg_b = *(unsigned char *)(b->description + i); | ||
333 | if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0) | ||
334 | goto differ_plus_i; | ||
335 | } | ||
336 | |||
337 | same: | ||
338 | return -1; | ||
339 | |||
340 | differ_plus_i: | ||
341 | level += i; | ||
342 | differ: | ||
343 | i = level * 8 + __ffs(seg_a ^ seg_b); | ||
344 | return i; | ||
345 | } | ||
346 | |||
347 | /* | ||
348 | * Free an object after stripping the keyring flag off of the pointer. | ||
349 | */ | ||
350 | static void keyring_free_object(void *object) | ||
351 | { | ||
352 | key_put(keyring_ptr_to_key(object)); | ||
353 | } | ||
354 | |||
355 | /* | ||
356 | * Operations for keyring management by the index-tree routines. | ||
357 | */ | ||
358 | static const struct assoc_array_ops keyring_assoc_array_ops = { | ||
359 | .get_key_chunk = keyring_get_key_chunk, | ||
360 | .get_object_key_chunk = keyring_get_object_key_chunk, | ||
361 | .compare_object = keyring_compare_object, | ||
362 | .diff_objects = keyring_diff_objects, | ||
363 | .free_object = keyring_free_object, | ||
364 | }; | ||
365 | |||
366 | /* | ||
148 | * Clean up a keyring when it is destroyed. Unpublish its name if it had one | 367 | * Clean up a keyring when it is destroyed. Unpublish its name if it had one |
149 | * and dispose of its data. | 368 | * and dispose of its data. |
150 | * | 369 | * |
@@ -155,9 +374,6 @@ static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description) | |||
155 | */ | 374 | */ |
156 | static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring) | 375 | static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring) |
157 | { | 376 | { |
158 | struct keyring_list *klist; | ||
159 | int loop; | ||
160 | |||
161 | if (keyring->description) { | 377 | if (keyring->description) { |
162 | write_lock(&keyring_name_lock); | 378 | write_lock(&keyring_name_lock); |
163 | 379 | ||
@@ -168,12 +384,7 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring) | |||
168 | write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock); | 384 | write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock); |
169 | } | 385 | } |
170 | 386 | ||
171 | klist = rcu_access_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions); | 387 | assoc_array_destroy(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops); |
172 | if (klist) { | ||
173 | for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) | ||
174 | key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop])); | ||
175 | kfree(klist); | ||
176 | } | ||
177 | } | 388 | } |
178 | 389 | ||
179 | /* | 390 | /* |
@@ -181,76 +392,88 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring) | |||
181 | */ | 392 | */ |
182 | static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) | 393 | static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) |
183 | { | 394 | { |
184 | struct keyring_list *klist; | ||
185 | |||
186 | if (keyring->description) | 395 | if (keyring->description) |
187 | seq_puts(m, keyring->description); | 396 | seq_puts(m, keyring->description); |
188 | else | 397 | else |
189 | seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); | 398 | seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); |
190 | 399 | ||
191 | if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { | 400 | if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { |
192 | rcu_read_lock(); | 401 | if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) |
193 | klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); | 402 | seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree); |
194 | if (klist) | ||
195 | seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); | ||
196 | else | 403 | else |
197 | seq_puts(m, ": empty"); | 404 | seq_puts(m, ": empty"); |
198 | rcu_read_unlock(); | ||
199 | } | 405 | } |
200 | } | 406 | } |
201 | 407 | ||
408 | struct keyring_read_iterator_context { | ||
409 | size_t qty; | ||
410 | size_t count; | ||
411 | key_serial_t __user *buffer; | ||
412 | }; | ||
413 | |||
414 | static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) | ||
415 | { | ||
416 | struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data; | ||
417 | const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); | ||
418 | int ret; | ||
419 | |||
420 | kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}", | ||
421 | key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->qty); | ||
422 | |||
423 | if (ctx->count >= ctx->qty) | ||
424 | return 1; | ||
425 | |||
426 | ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer); | ||
427 | if (ret < 0) | ||
428 | return ret; | ||
429 | ctx->buffer++; | ||
430 | ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial); | ||
431 | return 0; | ||
432 | } | ||
433 | |||
202 | /* | 434 | /* |
203 | * Read a list of key IDs from the keyring's contents in binary form | 435 | * Read a list of key IDs from the keyring's contents in binary form |
204 | * | 436 | * |
205 | * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller. | 437 | * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller. This prevents someone |
438 | * from modifying it under us - which could cause us to read key IDs multiple | ||
439 | * times. | ||
206 | */ | 440 | */ |
207 | static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, | 441 | static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, |
208 | char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) | 442 | char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) |
209 | { | 443 | { |
210 | struct keyring_list *klist; | 444 | struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx; |
211 | struct key *key; | 445 | unsigned long nr_keys; |
212 | size_t qty, tmp; | 446 | int ret; |
213 | int loop, ret; | ||
214 | 447 | ||
215 | ret = 0; | 448 | kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen); |
216 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | ||
217 | if (klist) { | ||
218 | /* calculate how much data we could return */ | ||
219 | qty = klist->nkeys * sizeof(key_serial_t); | ||
220 | |||
221 | if (buffer && buflen > 0) { | ||
222 | if (buflen > qty) | ||
223 | buflen = qty; | ||
224 | |||
225 | /* copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the | ||
226 | * buffer */ | ||
227 | ret = -EFAULT; | ||
228 | |||
229 | for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) { | ||
230 | key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, | ||
231 | keyring); | ||
232 | |||
233 | tmp = sizeof(key_serial_t); | ||
234 | if (tmp > buflen) | ||
235 | tmp = buflen; | ||
236 | |||
237 | if (copy_to_user(buffer, | ||
238 | &key->serial, | ||
239 | tmp) != 0) | ||
240 | goto error; | ||
241 | |||
242 | buflen -= tmp; | ||
243 | if (buflen == 0) | ||
244 | break; | ||
245 | buffer += tmp; | ||
246 | } | ||
247 | } | ||
248 | 449 | ||
249 | ret = qty; | 450 | if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1)) |
451 | return -EINVAL; | ||
452 | |||
453 | nr_keys = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree; | ||
454 | if (nr_keys == 0) | ||
455 | return 0; | ||
456 | |||
457 | /* Calculate how much data we could return */ | ||
458 | ctx.qty = nr_keys * sizeof(key_serial_t); | ||
459 | |||
460 | if (!buffer || !buflen) | ||
461 | return ctx.qty; | ||
462 | |||
463 | if (buflen > ctx.qty) | ||
464 | ctx.qty = buflen; | ||
465 | |||
466 | /* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */ | ||
467 | ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; | ||
468 | ctx.count = 0; | ||
469 | ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); | ||
470 | if (ret < 0) { | ||
471 | kleave(" = %d [iterate]", ret); | ||
472 | return ret; | ||
250 | } | 473 | } |
251 | 474 | ||
252 | error: | 475 | kleave(" = %zu [ok]", ctx.count); |
253 | return ret; | 476 | return ctx.count; |
254 | } | 477 | } |
255 | 478 | ||
256 | /* | 479 | /* |
@@ -277,227 +500,360 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, | |||
277 | } | 500 | } |
278 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc); | 501 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc); |
279 | 502 | ||
280 | /** | 503 | /* |
281 | * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria | 504 | * Iteration function to consider each key found. |
282 | * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator. | ||
283 | * @cred: The credentials to use for permissions checks. | ||
284 | * @type: The type of key to search for. | ||
285 | * @description: Parameter for @match. | ||
286 | * @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required. | ||
287 | * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad | ||
288 | * | ||
289 | * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given. | ||
290 | * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the | ||
291 | * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search | ||
292 | * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use | ||
293 | * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree. In | ||
294 | * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches. | ||
295 | * | ||
296 | * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed | ||
297 | * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH). | ||
298 | * | ||
299 | * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match | ||
300 | * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit. The | ||
301 | * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to | ||
302 | * determine the match. Normally the match function from the key type would be | ||
303 | * used. | ||
304 | * | ||
305 | * RCU is used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without the | ||
306 | * need to take lots of locks. | ||
307 | * | ||
308 | * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if | ||
309 | * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked | ||
310 | * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the | ||
311 | * specified keyring wasn't a keyring. | ||
312 | * | ||
313 | * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from | ||
314 | * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference. | ||
315 | */ | 505 | */ |
316 | key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | 506 | static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) |
317 | const struct cred *cred, | ||
318 | struct key_type *type, | ||
319 | const void *description, | ||
320 | key_match_func_t match, | ||
321 | bool no_state_check) | ||
322 | { | 507 | { |
323 | struct { | 508 | struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data; |
324 | /* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */ | 509 | const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); |
325 | struct key *keyring; | 510 | unsigned long kflags = key->flags; |
326 | struct keyring_list *keylist; | ||
327 | int kix; | ||
328 | } stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH]; | ||
329 | 511 | ||
330 | struct keyring_list *keylist; | 512 | kenter("{%d}", key->serial); |
331 | struct timespec now; | ||
332 | unsigned long possessed, kflags; | ||
333 | struct key *keyring, *key; | ||
334 | key_ref_t key_ref; | ||
335 | long err; | ||
336 | int sp, nkeys, kix; | ||
337 | |||
338 | keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); | ||
339 | possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref); | ||
340 | key_check(keyring); | ||
341 | 513 | ||
342 | /* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */ | 514 | /* ignore keys not of this type */ |
343 | err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH); | 515 | if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type) { |
344 | if (err < 0) { | 516 | kleave(" = 0 [!type]"); |
345 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(err); | 517 | return 0; |
346 | goto error; | ||
347 | } | 518 | } |
348 | 519 | ||
349 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); | 520 | /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ |
350 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) | 521 | if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { |
351 | goto error; | 522 | if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | |
523 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { | ||
524 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); | ||
525 | kleave(" = %d [invrev]", ctx->skipped_ret); | ||
526 | goto skipped; | ||
527 | } | ||
352 | 528 | ||
353 | rcu_read_lock(); | 529 | if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { |
530 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED); | ||
531 | kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret); | ||
532 | goto skipped; | ||
533 | } | ||
534 | } | ||
354 | 535 | ||
355 | now = current_kernel_time(); | 536 | /* keys that don't match */ |
356 | err = -EAGAIN; | 537 | if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data)) { |
357 | sp = 0; | 538 | kleave(" = 0 [!match]"); |
358 | 539 | return 0; | |
359 | /* firstly we should check to see if this top-level keyring is what we | 540 | } |
360 | * are looking for */ | ||
361 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); | ||
362 | kflags = keyring->flags; | ||
363 | if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) { | ||
364 | key = keyring; | ||
365 | if (no_state_check) | ||
366 | goto found; | ||
367 | 541 | ||
368 | /* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been | 542 | /* key must have search permissions */ |
369 | * revoked */ | 543 | if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) && |
370 | if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)) | 544 | key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed), |
371 | goto error_2; | 545 | ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) { |
372 | if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) | 546 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES); |
373 | goto error_2; | 547 | kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret); |
374 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error); | 548 | goto skipped; |
375 | if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) | ||
376 | goto error_2; | ||
377 | goto found; | ||
378 | } | 549 | } |
379 | 550 | ||
380 | /* otherwise, the top keyring must not be revoked, expired, or | 551 | if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { |
381 | * negatively instantiated if we are to search it */ | 552 | /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ |
382 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); | 553 | if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { |
383 | if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | | 554 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error); |
384 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) | | 555 | kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); |
385 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) || | 556 | goto skipped; |
386 | (keyring->expiry && now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry)) | 557 | } |
387 | goto error_2; | 558 | } |
388 | |||
389 | /* start processing a new keyring */ | ||
390 | descend: | ||
391 | kflags = keyring->flags; | ||
392 | if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | | ||
393 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) | ||
394 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
395 | 559 | ||
396 | keylist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); | 560 | /* Found */ |
397 | if (!keylist) | 561 | ctx->result = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed); |
398 | goto not_this_keyring; | 562 | kleave(" = 1 [found]"); |
563 | return 1; | ||
399 | 564 | ||
400 | /* iterate through the keys in this keyring first */ | 565 | skipped: |
401 | nkeys = keylist->nkeys; | 566 | return ctx->skipped_ret; |
402 | smp_rmb(); | 567 | } |
403 | for (kix = 0; kix < nkeys; kix++) { | ||
404 | key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]); | ||
405 | kflags = key->flags; | ||
406 | 568 | ||
407 | /* ignore keys not of this type */ | 569 | /* |
408 | if (key->type != type) | 570 | * Search inside a keyring for a key. We can search by walking to it |
409 | continue; | 571 | * directly based on its index-key or we can iterate over the entire |
572 | * tree looking for it, based on the match function. | ||
573 | */ | ||
574 | static int search_keyring(struct key *keyring, struct keyring_search_context *ctx) | ||
575 | { | ||
576 | if ((ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE) == | ||
577 | KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) { | ||
578 | const void *object; | ||
579 | |||
580 | object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys, | ||
581 | &keyring_assoc_array_ops, | ||
582 | &ctx->index_key); | ||
583 | return object ? ctx->iterator(object, ctx) : 0; | ||
584 | } | ||
585 | return assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, ctx->iterator, ctx); | ||
586 | } | ||
410 | 587 | ||
411 | /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ | 588 | /* |
412 | if (!no_state_check) { | 589 | * Search a tree of keyrings that point to other keyrings up to the maximum |
413 | if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | | 590 | * depth. |
414 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) | 591 | */ |
415 | continue; | 592 | static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring, |
593 | struct keyring_search_context *ctx) | ||
594 | { | ||
595 | struct { | ||
596 | struct key *keyring; | ||
597 | struct assoc_array_node *node; | ||
598 | int slot; | ||
599 | } stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH]; | ||
416 | 600 | ||
417 | if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) | 601 | struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut; |
418 | continue; | 602 | struct assoc_array_node *node; |
419 | } | 603 | struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr; |
604 | struct key *key; | ||
605 | int sp = 0, slot; | ||
420 | 606 | ||
421 | /* keys that don't match */ | 607 | kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}", |
422 | if (!match(key, description)) | 608 | keyring->serial, |
423 | continue; | 609 | ctx->index_key.type->name, |
610 | ctx->index_key.description); | ||
424 | 611 | ||
425 | /* key must have search permissions */ | 612 | if (ctx->index_key.description) |
426 | if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed), | 613 | ctx->index_key.desc_len = strlen(ctx->index_key.description); |
427 | cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) | ||
428 | continue; | ||
429 | 614 | ||
430 | if (no_state_check) | 615 | /* Check to see if this top-level keyring is what we are looking for |
616 | * and whether it is valid or not. | ||
617 | */ | ||
618 | if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE || | ||
619 | keyring_compare_object(keyring, &ctx->index_key)) { | ||
620 | ctx->skipped_ret = 2; | ||
621 | ctx->flags |= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK; | ||
622 | switch (ctx->iterator(keyring_key_to_ptr(keyring), ctx)) { | ||
623 | case 1: | ||
431 | goto found; | 624 | goto found; |
432 | 625 | case 2: | |
433 | /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ | 626 | return false; |
434 | if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { | 627 | default: |
435 | err = key->type_data.reject_error; | 628 | break; |
436 | continue; | ||
437 | } | 629 | } |
630 | } | ||
438 | 631 | ||
632 | ctx->skipped_ret = 0; | ||
633 | if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK) | ||
634 | ctx->flags &= ~KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK; | ||
635 | |||
636 | /* Start processing a new keyring */ | ||
637 | descend_to_keyring: | ||
638 | kdebug("descend to %d", keyring->serial); | ||
639 | if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | | ||
640 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) | ||
641 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
642 | |||
643 | /* Search through the keys in this keyring before its searching its | ||
644 | * subtrees. | ||
645 | */ | ||
646 | if (search_keyring(keyring, ctx)) | ||
439 | goto found; | 647 | goto found; |
440 | } | ||
441 | 648 | ||
442 | /* search through the keyrings nested in this one */ | 649 | /* Then manually iterate through the keyrings nested in this one. |
443 | kix = 0; | 650 | * |
444 | ascend: | 651 | * Start from the root node of the index tree. Because of the way the |
445 | nkeys = keylist->nkeys; | 652 | * hash function has been set up, keyrings cluster on the leftmost |
446 | smp_rmb(); | 653 | * branch of the root node (root slot 0) or in the root node itself. |
447 | for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) { | 654 | * Non-keyrings avoid the leftmost branch of the root entirely (root |
448 | key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]); | 655 | * slots 1-15). |
449 | if (key->type != &key_type_keyring) | 656 | */ |
450 | continue; | 657 | ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(keyring->keys.root); |
658 | if (!ptr) | ||
659 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
451 | 660 | ||
452 | /* recursively search nested keyrings | 661 | if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) { |
453 | * - only search keyrings for which we have search permission | 662 | /* If the root is a shortcut, either the keyring only contains |
663 | * keyring pointers (everything clusters behind root slot 0) or | ||
664 | * doesn't contain any keyring pointers. | ||
454 | */ | 665 | */ |
455 | if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH) | 666 | shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr); |
667 | smp_read_barrier_depends(); | ||
668 | if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0) | ||
669 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
670 | |||
671 | ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node); | ||
672 | node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); | ||
673 | goto begin_node; | ||
674 | } | ||
675 | |||
676 | node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); | ||
677 | smp_read_barrier_depends(); | ||
678 | |||
679 | ptr = node->slots[0]; | ||
680 | if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) | ||
681 | goto begin_node; | ||
682 | |||
683 | descend_to_node: | ||
684 | /* Descend to a more distal node in this keyring's content tree and go | ||
685 | * through that. | ||
686 | */ | ||
687 | kdebug("descend"); | ||
688 | if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) { | ||
689 | shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr); | ||
690 | smp_read_barrier_depends(); | ||
691 | ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node); | ||
692 | BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)); | ||
693 | node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); | ||
694 | } | ||
695 | |||
696 | begin_node: | ||
697 | kdebug("begin_node"); | ||
698 | smp_read_barrier_depends(); | ||
699 | slot = 0; | ||
700 | ascend_to_node: | ||
701 | /* Go through the slots in a node */ | ||
702 | for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) { | ||
703 | ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]); | ||
704 | |||
705 | if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer) | ||
706 | goto descend_to_node; | ||
707 | |||
708 | if (!keyring_ptr_is_keyring(ptr)) | ||
456 | continue; | 709 | continue; |
457 | 710 | ||
458 | if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed), | 711 | key = keyring_ptr_to_key(ptr); |
459 | cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) | 712 | |
713 | if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH) { | ||
714 | if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP) { | ||
715 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-ELOOP); | ||
716 | return false; | ||
717 | } | ||
718 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
719 | } | ||
720 | |||
721 | /* Search a nested keyring */ | ||
722 | if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) && | ||
723 | key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed), | ||
724 | ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) | ||
460 | continue; | 725 | continue; |
461 | 726 | ||
462 | /* stack the current position */ | 727 | /* stack the current position */ |
463 | stack[sp].keyring = keyring; | 728 | stack[sp].keyring = keyring; |
464 | stack[sp].keylist = keylist; | 729 | stack[sp].node = node; |
465 | stack[sp].kix = kix; | 730 | stack[sp].slot = slot; |
466 | sp++; | 731 | sp++; |
467 | 732 | ||
468 | /* begin again with the new keyring */ | 733 | /* begin again with the new keyring */ |
469 | keyring = key; | 734 | keyring = key; |
470 | goto descend; | 735 | goto descend_to_keyring; |
736 | } | ||
737 | |||
738 | /* We've dealt with all the slots in the current node, so now we need | ||
739 | * to ascend to the parent and continue processing there. | ||
740 | */ | ||
741 | ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer); | ||
742 | slot = node->parent_slot; | ||
743 | |||
744 | if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) { | ||
745 | shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr); | ||
746 | smp_read_barrier_depends(); | ||
747 | ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer); | ||
748 | slot = shortcut->parent_slot; | ||
749 | } | ||
750 | if (!ptr) | ||
751 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
752 | node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); | ||
753 | smp_read_barrier_depends(); | ||
754 | slot++; | ||
755 | |||
756 | /* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just | ||
757 | * finished processing the leftmost branch rather than the root slots - | ||
758 | * so there can't be any more keyrings for us to find. | ||
759 | */ | ||
760 | if (node->back_pointer) { | ||
761 | kdebug("ascend %d", slot); | ||
762 | goto ascend_to_node; | ||
471 | } | 763 | } |
472 | 764 | ||
473 | /* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a | 765 | /* The keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a |
474 | * matching key */ | 766 | * matching key. |
767 | */ | ||
475 | not_this_keyring: | 768 | not_this_keyring: |
476 | if (sp > 0) { | 769 | kdebug("not_this_keyring %d", sp); |
477 | /* resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */ | 770 | if (sp <= 0) { |
478 | sp--; | 771 | kleave(" = false"); |
479 | keyring = stack[sp].keyring; | 772 | return false; |
480 | keylist = stack[sp].keylist; | ||
481 | kix = stack[sp].kix + 1; | ||
482 | goto ascend; | ||
483 | } | 773 | } |
484 | 774 | ||
485 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(err); | 775 | /* Resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */ |
486 | goto error_2; | 776 | sp--; |
777 | keyring = stack[sp].keyring; | ||
778 | node = stack[sp].node; | ||
779 | slot = stack[sp].slot + 1; | ||
780 | kdebug("ascend to %d [%d]", keyring->serial, slot); | ||
781 | goto ascend_to_node; | ||
487 | 782 | ||
488 | /* we found a viable match */ | 783 | /* We found a viable match */ |
489 | found: | 784 | found: |
490 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 785 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result); |
491 | key->last_used_at = now.tv_sec; | ||
492 | keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec; | ||
493 | while (sp > 0) | ||
494 | stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec; | ||
495 | key_check(key); | 786 | key_check(key); |
496 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, possessed); | 787 | if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) { |
497 | error_2: | 788 | key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; |
789 | keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; | ||
790 | while (sp > 0) | ||
791 | stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; | ||
792 | } | ||
793 | kleave(" = true"); | ||
794 | return true; | ||
795 | } | ||
796 | |||
797 | /** | ||
798 | * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria | ||
799 | * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator. | ||
800 | * @ctx: The keyring search context. | ||
801 | * | ||
802 | * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given. | ||
803 | * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the | ||
804 | * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search | ||
805 | * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use | ||
806 | * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree. In | ||
807 | * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches. | ||
808 | * | ||
809 | * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed | ||
810 | * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH). | ||
811 | * | ||
812 | * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match | ||
813 | * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit. The | ||
814 | * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to | ||
815 | * determine the match. Normally the match function from the key type would be | ||
816 | * used. | ||
817 | * | ||
818 | * RCU can be used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without | ||
819 | * the need to take lots of locks. | ||
820 | * | ||
821 | * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if | ||
822 | * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked | ||
823 | * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the | ||
824 | * specified keyring wasn't a keyring. | ||
825 | * | ||
826 | * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from | ||
827 | * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference. | ||
828 | */ | ||
829 | key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | ||
830 | struct keyring_search_context *ctx) | ||
831 | { | ||
832 | struct key *keyring; | ||
833 | long err; | ||
834 | |||
835 | ctx->iterator = keyring_search_iterator; | ||
836 | ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref); | ||
837 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); | ||
838 | |||
839 | keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); | ||
840 | key_check(keyring); | ||
841 | |||
842 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) | ||
843 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); | ||
844 | |||
845 | if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) { | ||
846 | err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH); | ||
847 | if (err < 0) | ||
848 | return ERR_PTR(err); | ||
849 | } | ||
850 | |||
851 | rcu_read_lock(); | ||
852 | ctx->now = current_kernel_time(); | ||
853 | if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx)) | ||
854 | __key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result)); | ||
498 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 855 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
499 | error: | 856 | return ctx->result; |
500 | return key_ref; | ||
501 | } | 857 | } |
502 | 858 | ||
503 | /** | 859 | /** |
@@ -507,77 +863,73 @@ error: | |||
507 | * @description: The name of the keyring we want to find. | 863 | * @description: The name of the keyring we want to find. |
508 | * | 864 | * |
509 | * As keyring_search_aux() above, but using the current task's credentials and | 865 | * As keyring_search_aux() above, but using the current task's credentials and |
510 | * type's default matching function. | 866 | * type's default matching function and preferred search method. |
511 | */ | 867 | */ |
512 | key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, | 868 | key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, |
513 | struct key_type *type, | 869 | struct key_type *type, |
514 | const char *description) | 870 | const char *description) |
515 | { | 871 | { |
516 | if (!type->match) | 872 | struct keyring_search_context ctx = { |
873 | .index_key.type = type, | ||
874 | .index_key.description = description, | ||
875 | .cred = current_cred(), | ||
876 | .match = type->match, | ||
877 | .match_data = description, | ||
878 | .flags = (type->def_lookup_type | | ||
879 | KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK), | ||
880 | }; | ||
881 | |||
882 | if (!ctx.match) | ||
517 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); | 883 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); |
518 | 884 | ||
519 | return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred, | 885 | return keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx); |
520 | type, description, type->match, false); | ||
521 | } | 886 | } |
522 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search); | 887 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search); |
523 | 888 | ||
524 | /* | 889 | /* |
525 | * Search the given keyring only (no recursion). | 890 | * Search the given keyring for a key that might be updated. |
526 | * | 891 | * |
527 | * The caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring and that the | 892 | * The caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring and that the |
528 | * permission is granted to search the keyring as no check is made here. | 893 | * permission is granted to modify the keyring as no check is made here. The |
529 | * | 894 | * caller must also hold a lock on the keyring semaphore. |
530 | * RCU is used to make it unnecessary to lock the keyring key list here. | ||
531 | * | 895 | * |
532 | * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if | 896 | * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if |
533 | * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found. Revoked keys and keys not | 897 | * successful and returns NULL if not found. Revoked and invalidated keys are |
534 | * providing the requested permission are skipped over. | 898 | * skipped over. |
535 | * | 899 | * |
536 | * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref | 900 | * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref |
537 | * to the returned key reference. | 901 | * to the returned key reference. |
538 | */ | 902 | */ |
539 | key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref, | 903 | key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, |
540 | const struct key_type *ktype, | 904 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key) |
541 | const char *description, | ||
542 | key_perm_t perm) | ||
543 | { | 905 | { |
544 | struct keyring_list *klist; | ||
545 | unsigned long possessed; | ||
546 | struct key *keyring, *key; | 906 | struct key *keyring, *key; |
547 | int nkeys, loop; | 907 | const void *object; |
548 | 908 | ||
549 | keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); | 909 | keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); |
550 | possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref); | ||
551 | 910 | ||
552 | rcu_read_lock(); | 911 | kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}", |
912 | keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description); | ||
553 | 913 | ||
554 | klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); | 914 | object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops, |
555 | if (klist) { | 915 | index_key); |
556 | nkeys = klist->nkeys; | ||
557 | smp_rmb(); | ||
558 | for (loop = 0; loop < nkeys ; loop++) { | ||
559 | key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]); | ||
560 | if (key->type == ktype && | ||
561 | (!key->type->match || | ||
562 | key->type->match(key, description)) && | ||
563 | key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed), | ||
564 | perm) == 0 && | ||
565 | !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | | ||
566 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) | ||
567 | ) | ||
568 | goto found; | ||
569 | } | ||
570 | } | ||
571 | 916 | ||
572 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 917 | if (object) |
573 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); | 918 | goto found; |
919 | |||
920 | kleave(" = NULL"); | ||
921 | return NULL; | ||
574 | 922 | ||
575 | found: | 923 | found: |
576 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 924 | key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); |
577 | keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at = | 925 | if (key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | |
578 | current_kernel_time().tv_sec; | 926 | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { |
579 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 927 | kleave(" = NULL [x]"); |
580 | return make_key_ref(key, possessed); | 928 | return NULL; |
929 | } | ||
930 | __key_get(key); | ||
931 | kleave(" = {%d}", key->serial); | ||
932 | return make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); | ||
581 | } | 933 | } |
582 | 934 | ||
583 | /* | 935 | /* |
@@ -640,6 +992,19 @@ out: | |||
640 | return keyring; | 992 | return keyring; |
641 | } | 993 | } |
642 | 994 | ||
995 | static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object, | ||
996 | void *iterator_data) | ||
997 | { | ||
998 | struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data; | ||
999 | const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); | ||
1000 | |||
1001 | kenter("{%d}", key->serial); | ||
1002 | |||
1003 | BUG_ON(key != ctx->match_data); | ||
1004 | ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK); | ||
1005 | return 1; | ||
1006 | } | ||
1007 | |||
643 | /* | 1008 | /* |
644 | * See if a cycle will will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic | 1009 | * See if a cycle will will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic |
645 | * tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A). | 1010 | * tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A). |
@@ -649,116 +1014,39 @@ out: | |||
649 | */ | 1014 | */ |
650 | static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B) | 1015 | static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B) |
651 | { | 1016 | { |
652 | struct { | 1017 | struct keyring_search_context ctx = { |
653 | struct keyring_list *keylist; | 1018 | .index_key = A->index_key, |
654 | int kix; | 1019 | .match_data = A, |
655 | } stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH]; | 1020 | .iterator = keyring_detect_cycle_iterator, |
656 | 1021 | .flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT | | |
657 | struct keyring_list *keylist; | 1022 | KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK | |
658 | struct key *subtree, *key; | 1023 | KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME | |
659 | int sp, nkeys, kix, ret; | 1024 | KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM | |
1025 | KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP), | ||
1026 | }; | ||
660 | 1027 | ||
661 | rcu_read_lock(); | 1028 | rcu_read_lock(); |
662 | 1029 | search_nested_keyrings(B, &ctx); | |
663 | ret = -EDEADLK; | ||
664 | if (A == B) | ||
665 | goto cycle_detected; | ||
666 | |||
667 | subtree = B; | ||
668 | sp = 0; | ||
669 | |||
670 | /* start processing a new keyring */ | ||
671 | descend: | ||
672 | if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &subtree->flags)) | ||
673 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
674 | |||
675 | keylist = rcu_dereference(subtree->payload.subscriptions); | ||
676 | if (!keylist) | ||
677 | goto not_this_keyring; | ||
678 | kix = 0; | ||
679 | |||
680 | ascend: | ||
681 | /* iterate through the remaining keys in this keyring */ | ||
682 | nkeys = keylist->nkeys; | ||
683 | smp_rmb(); | ||
684 | for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) { | ||
685 | key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]); | ||
686 | |||
687 | if (key == A) | ||
688 | goto cycle_detected; | ||
689 | |||
690 | /* recursively check nested keyrings */ | ||
691 | if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) { | ||
692 | if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH) | ||
693 | goto too_deep; | ||
694 | |||
695 | /* stack the current position */ | ||
696 | stack[sp].keylist = keylist; | ||
697 | stack[sp].kix = kix; | ||
698 | sp++; | ||
699 | |||
700 | /* begin again with the new keyring */ | ||
701 | subtree = key; | ||
702 | goto descend; | ||
703 | } | ||
704 | } | ||
705 | |||
706 | /* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a | ||
707 | * matching key */ | ||
708 | not_this_keyring: | ||
709 | if (sp > 0) { | ||
710 | /* resume the checking of a keyring higher up in the tree */ | ||
711 | sp--; | ||
712 | keylist = stack[sp].keylist; | ||
713 | kix = stack[sp].kix + 1; | ||
714 | goto ascend; | ||
715 | } | ||
716 | |||
717 | ret = 0; /* no cycles detected */ | ||
718 | |||
719 | error: | ||
720 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 1030 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
721 | return ret; | 1031 | return PTR_ERR(ctx.result) == -EAGAIN ? 0 : PTR_ERR(ctx.result); |
722 | |||
723 | too_deep: | ||
724 | ret = -ELOOP; | ||
725 | goto error; | ||
726 | |||
727 | cycle_detected: | ||
728 | ret = -EDEADLK; | ||
729 | goto error; | ||
730 | } | ||
731 | |||
732 | /* | ||
733 | * Dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, freeing the unlinked | ||
734 | * key | ||
735 | */ | ||
736 | static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) | ||
737 | { | ||
738 | struct keyring_list *klist = | ||
739 | container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu); | ||
740 | |||
741 | if (klist->delkey != USHRT_MAX) | ||
742 | key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey])); | ||
743 | kfree(klist); | ||
744 | } | 1032 | } |
745 | 1033 | ||
746 | /* | 1034 | /* |
747 | * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring. | 1035 | * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring. |
748 | */ | 1036 | */ |
749 | int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type, | 1037 | int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, |
750 | const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc) | 1038 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key, |
1039 | struct assoc_array_edit **_edit) | ||
751 | __acquires(&keyring->sem) | 1040 | __acquires(&keyring->sem) |
752 | __acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) | 1041 | __acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) |
753 | { | 1042 | { |
754 | struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist; | 1043 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
755 | unsigned long prealloc; | 1044 | int ret; |
756 | unsigned max; | 1045 | |
757 | time_t lowest_lru; | 1046 | kenter("%d,%s,%s,", |
758 | size_t size; | 1047 | keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description); |
759 | int loop, lru, ret; | ||
760 | 1048 | ||
761 | kenter("%d,%s,%s,", key_serial(keyring), type->name, description); | 1049 | BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0); |
762 | 1050 | ||
763 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) | 1051 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) |
764 | return -ENOTDIR; | 1052 | return -ENOTDIR; |
@@ -771,91 +1059,28 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type, | |||
771 | 1059 | ||
772 | /* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle | 1060 | /* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle |
773 | * when linking two keyring in opposite orders */ | 1061 | * when linking two keyring in opposite orders */ |
774 | if (type == &key_type_keyring) | 1062 | if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring) |
775 | down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); | 1063 | down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); |
776 | 1064 | ||
777 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | ||
778 | |||
779 | /* see if there's a matching key we can displace */ | ||
780 | lru = -1; | ||
781 | if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) { | ||
782 | lowest_lru = TIME_T_MAX; | ||
783 | for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) { | ||
784 | struct key *key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, | ||
785 | keyring); | ||
786 | if (key->type == type && | ||
787 | strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) { | ||
788 | /* Found a match - we'll replace the link with | ||
789 | * one to the new key. We record the slot | ||
790 | * position. | ||
791 | */ | ||
792 | klist->delkey = loop; | ||
793 | prealloc = 0; | ||
794 | goto done; | ||
795 | } | ||
796 | if (key->last_used_at < lowest_lru) { | ||
797 | lowest_lru = key->last_used_at; | ||
798 | lru = loop; | ||
799 | } | ||
800 | } | ||
801 | } | ||
802 | |||
803 | /* If the keyring is full then do an LRU discard */ | ||
804 | if (klist && | ||
805 | klist->nkeys == klist->maxkeys && | ||
806 | klist->maxkeys >= MAX_KEYRING_LINKS) { | ||
807 | kdebug("LRU discard %d\n", lru); | ||
808 | klist->delkey = lru; | ||
809 | prealloc = 0; | ||
810 | goto done; | ||
811 | } | ||
812 | |||
813 | /* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */ | 1065 | /* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */ |
814 | ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring, | 1066 | ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring, |
815 | keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); | 1067 | keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); |
816 | if (ret < 0) | 1068 | if (ret < 0) |
817 | goto error_sem; | 1069 | goto error_sem; |
818 | 1070 | ||
819 | if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) { | 1071 | /* Create an edit script that will insert/replace the key in the |
820 | /* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */ | 1072 | * keyring tree. |
821 | klist->delkey = klist->nkeys; | 1073 | */ |
822 | prealloc = KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA; | 1074 | edit = assoc_array_insert(&keyring->keys, |
823 | } else { | 1075 | &keyring_assoc_array_ops, |
824 | /* grow the key list */ | 1076 | index_key, |
825 | max = 4; | 1077 | NULL); |
826 | if (klist) { | 1078 | if (IS_ERR(edit)) { |
827 | max += klist->maxkeys; | 1079 | ret = PTR_ERR(edit); |
828 | if (max > MAX_KEYRING_LINKS) | 1080 | goto error_quota; |
829 | max = MAX_KEYRING_LINKS; | ||
830 | BUG_ON(max <= klist->maxkeys); | ||
831 | } | ||
832 | |||
833 | size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max; | ||
834 | |||
835 | ret = -ENOMEM; | ||
836 | nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); | ||
837 | if (!nklist) | ||
838 | goto error_quota; | ||
839 | |||
840 | nklist->maxkeys = max; | ||
841 | if (klist) { | ||
842 | memcpy(nklist->keys, klist->keys, | ||
843 | sizeof(struct key *) * klist->nkeys); | ||
844 | nklist->delkey = klist->nkeys; | ||
845 | nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys + 1; | ||
846 | klist->delkey = USHRT_MAX; | ||
847 | } else { | ||
848 | nklist->nkeys = 1; | ||
849 | nklist->delkey = 0; | ||
850 | } | ||
851 | |||
852 | /* add the key into the new space */ | ||
853 | RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], NULL); | ||
854 | prealloc = (unsigned long)nklist | KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA; | ||
855 | } | 1081 | } |
856 | 1082 | ||
857 | done: | 1083 | *_edit = edit; |
858 | *_prealloc = prealloc; | ||
859 | kleave(" = 0"); | 1084 | kleave(" = 0"); |
860 | return 0; | 1085 | return 0; |
861 | 1086 | ||
@@ -864,7 +1089,7 @@ error_quota: | |||
864 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, | 1089 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, |
865 | keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); | 1090 | keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); |
866 | error_sem: | 1091 | error_sem: |
867 | if (type == &key_type_keyring) | 1092 | if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring) |
868 | up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); | 1093 | up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); |
869 | error_krsem: | 1094 | error_krsem: |
870 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | 1095 | up_write(&keyring->sem); |
@@ -895,60 +1120,12 @@ int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) | |||
895 | * holds at most one link to any given key of a particular type+description | 1120 | * holds at most one link to any given key of a particular type+description |
896 | * combination. | 1121 | * combination. |
897 | */ | 1122 | */ |
898 | void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, | 1123 | void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit) |
899 | unsigned long *_prealloc) | ||
900 | { | 1124 | { |
901 | struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist; | 1125 | __key_get(key); |
902 | struct key *discard; | 1126 | assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key)); |
903 | 1127 | assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit); | |
904 | nklist = (struct keyring_list *)(*_prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA); | 1128 | *_edit = NULL; |
905 | *_prealloc = 0; | ||
906 | |||
907 | kenter("%d,%d,%p", keyring->serial, key->serial, nklist); | ||
908 | |||
909 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | ||
910 | |||
911 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | ||
912 | keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at = | ||
913 | current_kernel_time().tv_sec; | ||
914 | |||
915 | /* there's a matching key we can displace or an empty slot in a newly | ||
916 | * allocated list we can fill */ | ||
917 | if (nklist) { | ||
918 | kdebug("reissue %hu/%hu/%hu", | ||
919 | nklist->delkey, nklist->nkeys, nklist->maxkeys); | ||
920 | |||
921 | RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], key); | ||
922 | |||
923 | rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist); | ||
924 | |||
925 | /* dispose of the old keyring list and, if there was one, the | ||
926 | * displaced key */ | ||
927 | if (klist) { | ||
928 | kdebug("dispose %hu/%hu/%hu", | ||
929 | klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); | ||
930 | call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal); | ||
931 | } | ||
932 | } else if (klist->delkey < klist->nkeys) { | ||
933 | kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu", | ||
934 | klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); | ||
935 | |||
936 | discard = rcu_dereference_protected( | ||
937 | klist->keys[klist->delkey], | ||
938 | rwsem_is_locked(&keyring->sem)); | ||
939 | rcu_assign_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key); | ||
940 | /* The garbage collector will take care of RCU | ||
941 | * synchronisation */ | ||
942 | key_put(discard); | ||
943 | } else { | ||
944 | /* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */ | ||
945 | kdebug("append %hu/%hu/%hu", | ||
946 | klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); | ||
947 | |||
948 | RCU_INIT_POINTER(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key); | ||
949 | smp_wmb(); | ||
950 | klist->nkeys++; | ||
951 | } | ||
952 | } | 1129 | } |
953 | 1130 | ||
954 | /* | 1131 | /* |
@@ -956,24 +1133,22 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, | |||
956 | * | 1133 | * |
957 | * Must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called. | 1134 | * Must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called. |
958 | */ | 1135 | */ |
959 | void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type, | 1136 | void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, |
960 | unsigned long prealloc) | 1137 | const struct keyring_index_key *index_key, |
1138 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit) | ||
961 | __releases(&keyring->sem) | 1139 | __releases(&keyring->sem) |
962 | __releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) | 1140 | __releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) |
963 | { | 1141 | { |
964 | BUG_ON(type == NULL); | 1142 | BUG_ON(index_key->type == NULL); |
965 | BUG_ON(type->name == NULL); | 1143 | kenter("%d,%s,", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name); |
966 | kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, type->name, prealloc); | ||
967 | 1144 | ||
968 | if (type == &key_type_keyring) | 1145 | if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring) |
969 | up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); | 1146 | up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); |
970 | 1147 | ||
971 | if (prealloc) { | 1148 | if (edit) { |
972 | if (prealloc & KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA) | 1149 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, |
973 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, | 1150 | keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); |
974 | keyring->datalen - | 1151 | assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit); |
975 | KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); | ||
976 | kfree((struct keyring_list *)(prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA)); | ||
977 | } | 1152 | } |
978 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | 1153 | up_write(&keyring->sem); |
979 | } | 1154 | } |
@@ -1000,20 +1175,28 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type, | |||
1000 | */ | 1175 | */ |
1001 | int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) | 1176 | int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) |
1002 | { | 1177 | { |
1003 | unsigned long prealloc; | 1178 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
1004 | int ret; | 1179 | int ret; |
1005 | 1180 | ||
1181 | kenter("{%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage)); | ||
1182 | |||
1006 | key_check(keyring); | 1183 | key_check(keyring); |
1007 | key_check(key); | 1184 | key_check(key); |
1008 | 1185 | ||
1009 | ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc); | 1186 | if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) && |
1187 | !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags)) | ||
1188 | return -EPERM; | ||
1189 | |||
1190 | ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); | ||
1010 | if (ret == 0) { | 1191 | if (ret == 0) { |
1192 | kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage)); | ||
1011 | ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key); | 1193 | ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key); |
1012 | if (ret == 0) | 1194 | if (ret == 0) |
1013 | __key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc); | 1195 | __key_link(key, &edit); |
1014 | __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); | 1196 | __key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit); |
1015 | } | 1197 | } |
1016 | 1198 | ||
1199 | kleave(" = %d {%d,%d}", ret, keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage)); | ||
1017 | return ret; | 1200 | return ret; |
1018 | } | 1201 | } |
1019 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link); | 1202 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link); |
@@ -1037,90 +1220,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link); | |||
1037 | */ | 1220 | */ |
1038 | int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) | 1221 | int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) |
1039 | { | 1222 | { |
1040 | struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist; | 1223 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
1041 | int loop, ret; | 1224 | int ret; |
1042 | 1225 | ||
1043 | key_check(keyring); | 1226 | key_check(keyring); |
1044 | key_check(key); | 1227 | key_check(key); |
1045 | 1228 | ||
1046 | ret = -ENOTDIR; | ||
1047 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) | 1229 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) |
1048 | goto error; | 1230 | return -ENOTDIR; |
1049 | 1231 | ||
1050 | down_write(&keyring->sem); | 1232 | down_write(&keyring->sem); |
1051 | 1233 | ||
1052 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | 1234 | edit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops, |
1053 | if (klist) { | 1235 | &key->index_key); |
1054 | /* search the keyring for the key */ | 1236 | if (IS_ERR(edit)) { |
1055 | for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) | 1237 | ret = PTR_ERR(edit); |
1056 | if (rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]) == key) | 1238 | goto error; |
1057 | goto key_is_present; | ||
1058 | } | 1239 | } |
1059 | |||
1060 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1061 | ret = -ENOENT; | 1240 | ret = -ENOENT; |
1062 | goto error; | 1241 | if (edit == NULL) |
1063 | 1242 | goto error; | |
1064 | key_is_present: | ||
1065 | /* we need to copy the key list for RCU purposes */ | ||
1066 | nklist = kmalloc(sizeof(*klist) + | ||
1067 | sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys, | ||
1068 | GFP_KERNEL); | ||
1069 | if (!nklist) | ||
1070 | goto nomem; | ||
1071 | nklist->maxkeys = klist->maxkeys; | ||
1072 | nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys - 1; | ||
1073 | |||
1074 | if (loop > 0) | ||
1075 | memcpy(&nklist->keys[0], | ||
1076 | &klist->keys[0], | ||
1077 | loop * sizeof(struct key *)); | ||
1078 | |||
1079 | if (loop < nklist->nkeys) | ||
1080 | memcpy(&nklist->keys[loop], | ||
1081 | &klist->keys[loop + 1], | ||
1082 | (nklist->nkeys - loop) * sizeof(struct key *)); | ||
1083 | |||
1084 | /* adjust the user's quota */ | ||
1085 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, | ||
1086 | keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); | ||
1087 | |||
1088 | rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist); | ||
1089 | |||
1090 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1091 | |||
1092 | /* schedule for later cleanup */ | ||
1093 | klist->delkey = loop; | ||
1094 | call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal); | ||
1095 | 1243 | ||
1244 | assoc_array_apply_edit(edit); | ||
1096 | ret = 0; | 1245 | ret = 0; |
1097 | 1246 | ||
1098 | error: | 1247 | error: |
1099 | return ret; | ||
1100 | nomem: | ||
1101 | ret = -ENOMEM; | ||
1102 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | 1248 | up_write(&keyring->sem); |
1103 | goto error; | 1249 | return ret; |
1104 | } | 1250 | } |
1105 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink); | 1251 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink); |
1106 | 1252 | ||
1107 | /* | ||
1108 | * Dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, releasing the keys it | ||
1109 | * links to. | ||
1110 | */ | ||
1111 | static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) | ||
1112 | { | ||
1113 | struct keyring_list *klist; | ||
1114 | int loop; | ||
1115 | |||
1116 | klist = container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu); | ||
1117 | |||
1118 | for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) | ||
1119 | key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop])); | ||
1120 | |||
1121 | kfree(klist); | ||
1122 | } | ||
1123 | |||
1124 | /** | 1253 | /** |
1125 | * keyring_clear - Clear a keyring | 1254 | * keyring_clear - Clear a keyring |
1126 | * @keyring: The keyring to clear. | 1255 | * @keyring: The keyring to clear. |
@@ -1131,33 +1260,25 @@ static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) | |||
1131 | */ | 1260 | */ |
1132 | int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring) | 1261 | int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring) |
1133 | { | 1262 | { |
1134 | struct keyring_list *klist; | 1263 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
1135 | int ret; | 1264 | int ret; |
1136 | 1265 | ||
1137 | ret = -ENOTDIR; | 1266 | if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) |
1138 | if (keyring->type == &key_type_keyring) { | 1267 | return -ENOTDIR; |
1139 | /* detach the pointer block with the locks held */ | ||
1140 | down_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1141 | |||
1142 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | ||
1143 | if (klist) { | ||
1144 | /* adjust the quota */ | ||
1145 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, | ||
1146 | sizeof(struct keyring_list)); | ||
1147 | |||
1148 | rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, | ||
1149 | NULL); | ||
1150 | } | ||
1151 | |||
1152 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1153 | 1268 | ||
1154 | /* free the keys after the locks have been dropped */ | 1269 | down_write(&keyring->sem); |
1155 | if (klist) | ||
1156 | call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal); | ||
1157 | 1270 | ||
1271 | edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops); | ||
1272 | if (IS_ERR(edit)) { | ||
1273 | ret = PTR_ERR(edit); | ||
1274 | } else { | ||
1275 | if (edit) | ||
1276 | assoc_array_apply_edit(edit); | ||
1277 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0); | ||
1158 | ret = 0; | 1278 | ret = 0; |
1159 | } | 1279 | } |
1160 | 1280 | ||
1281 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1161 | return ret; | 1282 | return ret; |
1162 | } | 1283 | } |
1163 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear); | 1284 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear); |
@@ -1169,17 +1290,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear); | |||
1169 | */ | 1290 | */ |
1170 | static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring) | 1291 | static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring) |
1171 | { | 1292 | { |
1172 | struct keyring_list *klist; | 1293 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
1173 | 1294 | ||
1174 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | 1295 | edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops); |
1296 | if (!IS_ERR(edit)) { | ||
1297 | if (edit) | ||
1298 | assoc_array_apply_edit(edit); | ||
1299 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0); | ||
1300 | } | ||
1301 | } | ||
1175 | 1302 | ||
1176 | /* adjust the quota */ | 1303 | static bool gc_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) |
1177 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0); | 1304 | { |
1305 | struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); | ||
1306 | time_t *limit = iterator_data; | ||
1178 | 1307 | ||
1179 | if (klist) { | 1308 | if (key_is_dead(key, *limit)) |
1180 | rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL); | 1309 | return false; |
1181 | call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal); | 1310 | key_get(key); |
1182 | } | 1311 | return true; |
1183 | } | 1312 | } |
1184 | 1313 | ||
1185 | /* | 1314 | /* |
@@ -1192,88 +1321,12 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring) | |||
1192 | */ | 1321 | */ |
1193 | void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) | 1322 | void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) |
1194 | { | 1323 | { |
1195 | struct keyring_list *klist, *new; | ||
1196 | struct key *key; | ||
1197 | int loop, keep, max; | ||
1198 | |||
1199 | kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description); | 1324 | kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description); |
1200 | 1325 | ||
1201 | down_write(&keyring->sem); | 1326 | down_write(&keyring->sem); |
1202 | 1327 | assoc_array_gc(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops, | |
1203 | klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring); | 1328 | gc_iterator, &limit); |
1204 | if (!klist) | ||
1205 | goto no_klist; | ||
1206 | |||
1207 | /* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */ | ||
1208 | keep = 0; | ||
1209 | for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) | ||
1210 | if (!key_is_dead(rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring), | ||
1211 | limit)) | ||
1212 | keep++; | ||
1213 | |||
1214 | if (keep == klist->nkeys) | ||
1215 | goto just_return; | ||
1216 | |||
1217 | /* allocate a new keyring payload */ | ||
1218 | max = roundup(keep, 4); | ||
1219 | new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *), | ||
1220 | GFP_KERNEL); | ||
1221 | if (!new) | ||
1222 | goto nomem; | ||
1223 | new->maxkeys = max; | ||
1224 | new->nkeys = 0; | ||
1225 | new->delkey = 0; | ||
1226 | |||
1227 | /* install the live keys | ||
1228 | * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life | ||
1229 | */ | ||
1230 | keep = 0; | ||
1231 | for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) { | ||
1232 | key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring); | ||
1233 | if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) { | ||
1234 | if (keep >= max) | ||
1235 | goto discard_new; | ||
1236 | RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->keys[keep++], key_get(key)); | ||
1237 | } | ||
1238 | } | ||
1239 | new->nkeys = keep; | ||
1240 | |||
1241 | /* adjust the quota */ | ||
1242 | key_payload_reserve(keyring, | ||
1243 | sizeof(struct keyring_list) + | ||
1244 | KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep); | ||
1245 | |||
1246 | if (keep == 0) { | ||
1247 | rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL); | ||
1248 | kfree(new); | ||
1249 | } else { | ||
1250 | rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new); | ||
1251 | } | ||
1252 | |||
1253 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1254 | |||
1255 | call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal); | ||
1256 | kleave(" [yes]"); | ||
1257 | return; | ||
1258 | |||
1259 | discard_new: | ||
1260 | new->nkeys = keep; | ||
1261 | keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu); | ||
1262 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | 1329 | up_write(&keyring->sem); |
1263 | kleave(" [discard]"); | ||
1264 | return; | ||
1265 | 1330 | ||
1266 | just_return: | 1331 | kleave(""); |
1267 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1268 | kleave(" [no dead]"); | ||
1269 | return; | ||
1270 | |||
1271 | no_klist: | ||
1272 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1273 | kleave(" [no_klist]"); | ||
1274 | return; | ||
1275 | |||
1276 | nomem: | ||
1277 | up_write(&keyring->sem); | ||
1278 | kleave(" [oom]"); | ||
1279 | } | 1332 | } |
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82f4957a7acf --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/persistent.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ | |||
1 | /* General persistent per-UID keyrings register | ||
2 | * | ||
3 | * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. | ||
4 | * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) | ||
5 | * | ||
6 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
7 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence | ||
8 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version | ||
9 | * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. | ||
10 | */ | ||
11 | |||
12 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> | ||
13 | #include "internal.h" | ||
14 | |||
15 | unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry = 3 * 24 * 3600; /* Expire after 3 days of non-use */ | ||
16 | |||
17 | /* | ||
18 | * Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace. | ||
19 | * | ||
20 | * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing. | ||
21 | */ | ||
22 | static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns) | ||
23 | { | ||
24 | struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register", | ||
25 | KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), | ||
26 | current_cred(), | ||
27 | ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | | ||
28 | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), | ||
29 | KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); | ||
30 | if (IS_ERR(reg)) | ||
31 | return PTR_ERR(reg); | ||
32 | |||
33 | ns->persistent_keyring_register = reg; | ||
34 | return 0; | ||
35 | } | ||
36 | |||
37 | /* | ||
38 | * Create the persistent keyring for the specified user. | ||
39 | * | ||
40 | * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing. | ||
41 | */ | ||
42 | static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, | ||
43 | struct keyring_index_key *index_key) | ||
44 | { | ||
45 | struct key *persistent; | ||
46 | key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref; | ||
47 | |||
48 | if (!ns->persistent_keyring_register) { | ||
49 | long err = key_create_persistent_register(ns); | ||
50 | if (err < 0) | ||
51 | return ERR_PTR(err); | ||
52 | } else { | ||
53 | reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true); | ||
54 | persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, index_key); | ||
55 | if (persistent_ref) | ||
56 | return persistent_ref; | ||
57 | } | ||
58 | |||
59 | persistent = keyring_alloc(index_key->description, | ||
60 | uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(), | ||
61 | ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | | ||
62 | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), | ||
63 | KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, | ||
64 | ns->persistent_keyring_register); | ||
65 | if (IS_ERR(persistent)) | ||
66 | return ERR_CAST(persistent); | ||
67 | |||
68 | return make_key_ref(persistent, true); | ||
69 | } | ||
70 | |||
71 | /* | ||
72 | * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated | ||
73 | * keyring. | ||
74 | */ | ||
75 | static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, | ||
76 | key_ref_t dest_ref) | ||
77 | { | ||
78 | struct keyring_index_key index_key; | ||
79 | struct key *persistent; | ||
80 | key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref; | ||
81 | char buf[32]; | ||
82 | long ret; | ||
83 | |||
84 | /* Look in the register if it exists */ | ||
85 | index_key.type = &key_type_keyring; | ||
86 | index_key.description = buf; | ||
87 | index_key.desc_len = sprintf(buf, "_persistent.%u", from_kuid(ns, uid)); | ||
88 | |||
89 | if (ns->persistent_keyring_register) { | ||
90 | reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true); | ||
91 | down_read(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem); | ||
92 | persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, &index_key); | ||
93 | up_read(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem); | ||
94 | |||
95 | if (persistent_ref) | ||
96 | goto found; | ||
97 | } | ||
98 | |||
99 | /* It wasn't in the register, so we'll need to create it. We might | ||
100 | * also need to create the register. | ||
101 | */ | ||
102 | down_write(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem); | ||
103 | persistent_ref = key_create_persistent(ns, uid, &index_key); | ||
104 | up_write(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem); | ||
105 | if (!IS_ERR(persistent_ref)) | ||
106 | goto found; | ||
107 | |||
108 | return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref); | ||
109 | |||
110 | found: | ||
111 | ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK); | ||
112 | if (ret == 0) { | ||
113 | persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref); | ||
114 | ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent); | ||
115 | if (ret == 0) { | ||
116 | key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry); | ||
117 | ret = persistent->serial; | ||
118 | } | ||
119 | } | ||
120 | |||
121 | key_ref_put(persistent_ref); | ||
122 | return ret; | ||
123 | } | ||
124 | |||
125 | /* | ||
126 | * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated | ||
127 | * keyring. | ||
128 | */ | ||
129 | long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid) | ||
130 | { | ||
131 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | ||
132 | key_ref_t dest_ref; | ||
133 | kuid_t uid; | ||
134 | long ret; | ||
135 | |||
136 | /* -1 indicates the current user */ | ||
137 | if (_uid == (uid_t)-1) { | ||
138 | uid = current_uid(); | ||
139 | } else { | ||
140 | uid = make_kuid(ns, _uid); | ||
141 | if (!uid_valid(uid)) | ||
142 | return -EINVAL; | ||
143 | |||
144 | /* You can only see your own persistent cache if you're not | ||
145 | * sufficiently privileged. | ||
146 | */ | ||
147 | if (uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) && | ||
148 | uid_eq(uid, current_suid()) && | ||
149 | uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) && | ||
150 | uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()) && | ||
151 | !ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID)) | ||
152 | return -EPERM; | ||
153 | } | ||
154 | |||
155 | /* There must be a destination keyring */ | ||
156 | dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE); | ||
157 | if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) | ||
158 | return PTR_ERR(dest_ref); | ||
159 | if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) { | ||
160 | ret = -ENOTDIR; | ||
161 | goto out_put_dest; | ||
162 | } | ||
163 | |||
164 | ret = key_get_persistent(ns, uid, dest_ref); | ||
165 | |||
166 | out_put_dest: | ||
167 | key_ref_put(dest_ref); | ||
168 | return ret; | ||
169 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 217b6855e815..88e9a466940f 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c | |||
@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) | |||
182 | 182 | ||
183 | static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | 183 | static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) |
184 | { | 184 | { |
185 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | ||
186 | struct rb_node *_p = v; | 185 | struct rb_node *_p = v; |
187 | struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); | 186 | struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); |
188 | struct timespec now; | 187 | struct timespec now; |
@@ -191,15 +190,23 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
191 | char xbuf[12]; | 190 | char xbuf[12]; |
192 | int rc; | 191 | int rc; |
193 | 192 | ||
193 | struct keyring_search_context ctx = { | ||
194 | .index_key.type = key->type, | ||
195 | .index_key.description = key->description, | ||
196 | .cred = current_cred(), | ||
197 | .match = lookup_user_key_possessed, | ||
198 | .match_data = key, | ||
199 | .flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK | | ||
200 | KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT), | ||
201 | }; | ||
202 | |||
194 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); | 203 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); |
195 | 204 | ||
196 | /* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can | 205 | /* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can |
197 | * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it | 206 | * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it |
198 | */ | 207 | */ |
199 | if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) { | 208 | if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) { |
200 | skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key, | 209 | skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx); |
201 | lookup_user_key_possessed, | ||
202 | true, cred); | ||
203 | if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { | 210 | if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { |
204 | key_ref_put(skey_ref); | 211 | key_ref_put(skey_ref); |
205 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 212 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
211 | * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our | 218 | * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our |
212 | * access to __current_cred() safe | 219 | * access to __current_cred() safe |
213 | */ | 220 | */ |
214 | rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW); | 221 | rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW); |
215 | if (rc < 0) | 222 | if (rc < 0) |
216 | return 0; | 223 | return 0; |
217 | 224 | ||
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 42defae1e161..0cf8a130a267 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c | |||
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) | |||
235 | if (IS_ERR(keyring)) | 235 | if (IS_ERR(keyring)) |
236 | return PTR_ERR(keyring); | 236 | return PTR_ERR(keyring); |
237 | } else { | 237 | } else { |
238 | atomic_inc(&keyring->usage); | 238 | __key_get(keyring); |
239 | } | 239 | } |
240 | 240 | ||
241 | /* install the keyring */ | 241 | /* install the keyring */ |
@@ -319,11 +319,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) | |||
319 | * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the | 319 | * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the |
320 | * returned key reference. | 320 | * returned key reference. |
321 | */ | 321 | */ |
322 | key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | 322 | key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) |
323 | const void *description, | ||
324 | key_match_func_t match, | ||
325 | bool no_state_check, | ||
326 | const struct cred *cred) | ||
327 | { | 323 | { |
328 | key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err; | 324 | key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err; |
329 | 325 | ||
@@ -339,10 +335,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | |||
339 | err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); | 335 | err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); |
340 | 336 | ||
341 | /* search the thread keyring first */ | 337 | /* search the thread keyring first */ |
342 | if (cred->thread_keyring) { | 338 | if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) { |
343 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( | 339 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( |
344 | make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1), | 340 | make_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx); |
345 | cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); | ||
346 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | 341 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
347 | goto found; | 342 | goto found; |
348 | 343 | ||
@@ -358,10 +353,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | |||
358 | } | 353 | } |
359 | 354 | ||
360 | /* search the process keyring second */ | 355 | /* search the process keyring second */ |
361 | if (cred->process_keyring) { | 356 | if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) { |
362 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( | 357 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( |
363 | make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1), | 358 | make_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx); |
364 | cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); | ||
365 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | 359 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
366 | goto found; | 360 | goto found; |
367 | 361 | ||
@@ -379,11 +373,11 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | |||
379 | } | 373 | } |
380 | 374 | ||
381 | /* search the session keyring */ | 375 | /* search the session keyring */ |
382 | if (cred->session_keyring) { | 376 | if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) { |
383 | rcu_read_lock(); | 377 | rcu_read_lock(); |
384 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( | 378 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( |
385 | make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1), | 379 | make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1), |
386 | cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); | 380 | ctx); |
387 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 381 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
388 | 382 | ||
389 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | 383 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
@@ -402,10 +396,10 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | |||
402 | } | 396 | } |
403 | } | 397 | } |
404 | /* or search the user-session keyring */ | 398 | /* or search the user-session keyring */ |
405 | else if (cred->user->session_keyring) { | 399 | else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) { |
406 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( | 400 | key_ref = keyring_search_aux( |
407 | make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1), | 401 | make_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1), |
408 | cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); | 402 | ctx); |
409 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | 403 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
410 | goto found; | 404 | goto found; |
411 | 405 | ||
@@ -437,18 +431,14 @@ found: | |||
437 | * | 431 | * |
438 | * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings(). | 432 | * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings(). |
439 | */ | 433 | */ |
440 | key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | 434 | key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) |
441 | const void *description, | ||
442 | key_match_func_t match, | ||
443 | const struct cred *cred) | ||
444 | { | 435 | { |
445 | struct request_key_auth *rka; | 436 | struct request_key_auth *rka; |
446 | key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err; | 437 | key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err; |
447 | 438 | ||
448 | might_sleep(); | 439 | might_sleep(); |
449 | 440 | ||
450 | key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, | 441 | key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx); |
451 | false, cred); | ||
452 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | 442 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
453 | goto found; | 443 | goto found; |
454 | err = key_ref; | 444 | err = key_ref; |
@@ -457,18 +447,21 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, | |||
457 | * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there | 447 | * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there |
458 | * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method | 448 | * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method |
459 | */ | 449 | */ |
460 | if (cred->request_key_auth && | 450 | if (ctx->cred->request_key_auth && |
461 | cred == current_cred() && | 451 | ctx->cred == current_cred() && |
462 | type != &key_type_request_key_auth | 452 | ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth |
463 | ) { | 453 | ) { |
454 | const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred; | ||
455 | |||
464 | /* defend against the auth key being revoked */ | 456 | /* defend against the auth key being revoked */ |
465 | down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); | 457 | down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); |
466 | 458 | ||
467 | if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { | 459 | if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { |
468 | rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; | 460 | rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; |
469 | 461 | ||
470 | key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, | 462 | ctx->cred = rka->cred; |
471 | match, rka->cred); | 463 | key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx); |
464 | ctx->cred = cred; | ||
472 | 465 | ||
473 | up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); | 466 | up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); |
474 | 467 | ||
@@ -522,19 +515,23 @@ int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target) | |||
522 | key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, | 515 | key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, |
523 | key_perm_t perm) | 516 | key_perm_t perm) |
524 | { | 517 | { |
518 | struct keyring_search_context ctx = { | ||
519 | .match = lookup_user_key_possessed, | ||
520 | .flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK | | ||
521 | KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT), | ||
522 | }; | ||
525 | struct request_key_auth *rka; | 523 | struct request_key_auth *rka; |
526 | const struct cred *cred; | ||
527 | struct key *key; | 524 | struct key *key; |
528 | key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; | 525 | key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; |
529 | int ret; | 526 | int ret; |
530 | 527 | ||
531 | try_again: | 528 | try_again: |
532 | cred = get_current_cred(); | 529 | ctx.cred = get_current_cred(); |
533 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); | 530 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); |
534 | 531 | ||
535 | switch (id) { | 532 | switch (id) { |
536 | case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING: | 533 | case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING: |
537 | if (!cred->thread_keyring) { | 534 | if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) { |
538 | if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)) | 535 | if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)) |
539 | goto error; | 536 | goto error; |
540 | 537 | ||
@@ -546,13 +543,13 @@ try_again: | |||
546 | goto reget_creds; | 543 | goto reget_creds; |
547 | } | 544 | } |
548 | 545 | ||
549 | key = cred->thread_keyring; | 546 | key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring; |
550 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 547 | __key_get(key); |
551 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 548 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
552 | break; | 549 | break; |
553 | 550 | ||
554 | case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING: | 551 | case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING: |
555 | if (!cred->process_keyring) { | 552 | if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) { |
556 | if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)) | 553 | if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)) |
557 | goto error; | 554 | goto error; |
558 | 555 | ||
@@ -564,13 +561,13 @@ try_again: | |||
564 | goto reget_creds; | 561 | goto reget_creds; |
565 | } | 562 | } |
566 | 563 | ||
567 | key = cred->process_keyring; | 564 | key = ctx.cred->process_keyring; |
568 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 565 | __key_get(key); |
569 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 566 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
570 | break; | 567 | break; |
571 | 568 | ||
572 | case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING: | 569 | case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING: |
573 | if (!cred->session_keyring) { | 570 | if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) { |
574 | /* always install a session keyring upon access if one | 571 | /* always install a session keyring upon access if one |
575 | * doesn't exist yet */ | 572 | * doesn't exist yet */ |
576 | ret = install_user_keyrings(); | 573 | ret = install_user_keyrings(); |
@@ -580,13 +577,13 @@ try_again: | |||
580 | ret = join_session_keyring(NULL); | 577 | ret = join_session_keyring(NULL); |
581 | else | 578 | else |
582 | ret = install_session_keyring( | 579 | ret = install_session_keyring( |
583 | cred->user->session_keyring); | 580 | ctx.cred->user->session_keyring); |
584 | 581 | ||
585 | if (ret < 0) | 582 | if (ret < 0) |
586 | goto error; | 583 | goto error; |
587 | goto reget_creds; | 584 | goto reget_creds; |
588 | } else if (cred->session_keyring == | 585 | } else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring == |
589 | cred->user->session_keyring && | 586 | ctx.cred->user->session_keyring && |
590 | lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) { | 587 | lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) { |
591 | ret = join_session_keyring(NULL); | 588 | ret = join_session_keyring(NULL); |
592 | if (ret < 0) | 589 | if (ret < 0) |
@@ -595,33 +592,33 @@ try_again: | |||
595 | } | 592 | } |
596 | 593 | ||
597 | rcu_read_lock(); | 594 | rcu_read_lock(); |
598 | key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring); | 595 | key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring); |
599 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 596 | __key_get(key); |
600 | rcu_read_unlock(); | 597 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
601 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 598 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
602 | break; | 599 | break; |
603 | 600 | ||
604 | case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING: | 601 | case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING: |
605 | if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) { | 602 | if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) { |
606 | ret = install_user_keyrings(); | 603 | ret = install_user_keyrings(); |
607 | if (ret < 0) | 604 | if (ret < 0) |
608 | goto error; | 605 | goto error; |
609 | } | 606 | } |
610 | 607 | ||
611 | key = cred->user->uid_keyring; | 608 | key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring; |
612 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 609 | __key_get(key); |
613 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 610 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
614 | break; | 611 | break; |
615 | 612 | ||
616 | case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING: | 613 | case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING: |
617 | if (!cred->user->session_keyring) { | 614 | if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) { |
618 | ret = install_user_keyrings(); | 615 | ret = install_user_keyrings(); |
619 | if (ret < 0) | 616 | if (ret < 0) |
620 | goto error; | 617 | goto error; |
621 | } | 618 | } |
622 | 619 | ||
623 | key = cred->user->session_keyring; | 620 | key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring; |
624 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 621 | __key_get(key); |
625 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 622 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
626 | break; | 623 | break; |
627 | 624 | ||
@@ -631,29 +628,29 @@ try_again: | |||
631 | goto error; | 628 | goto error; |
632 | 629 | ||
633 | case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY: | 630 | case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY: |
634 | key = cred->request_key_auth; | 631 | key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth; |
635 | if (!key) | 632 | if (!key) |
636 | goto error; | 633 | goto error; |
637 | 634 | ||
638 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 635 | __key_get(key); |
639 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 636 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
640 | break; | 637 | break; |
641 | 638 | ||
642 | case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING: | 639 | case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING: |
643 | if (!cred->request_key_auth) | 640 | if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth) |
644 | goto error; | 641 | goto error; |
645 | 642 | ||
646 | down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); | 643 | down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem); |
647 | if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, | 644 | if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, |
648 | &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) { | 645 | &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) { |
649 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); | 646 | key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); |
650 | key = NULL; | 647 | key = NULL; |
651 | } else { | 648 | } else { |
652 | rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; | 649 | rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; |
653 | key = rka->dest_keyring; | 650 | key = rka->dest_keyring; |
654 | atomic_inc(&key->usage); | 651 | __key_get(key); |
655 | } | 652 | } |
656 | up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); | 653 | up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem); |
657 | if (!key) | 654 | if (!key) |
658 | goto error; | 655 | goto error; |
659 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); | 656 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); |
@@ -673,9 +670,13 @@ try_again: | |||
673 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); | 670 | key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); |
674 | 671 | ||
675 | /* check to see if we possess the key */ | 672 | /* check to see if we possess the key */ |
676 | skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key, | 673 | ctx.index_key.type = key->type; |
677 | lookup_user_key_possessed, | 674 | ctx.index_key.description = key->description; |
678 | cred); | 675 | ctx.index_key.desc_len = strlen(key->description); |
676 | ctx.match_data = key; | ||
677 | kdebug("check possessed"); | ||
678 | skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx); | ||
679 | kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref); | ||
679 | 680 | ||
680 | if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { | 681 | if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { |
681 | key_put(key); | 682 | key_put(key); |
@@ -715,14 +716,14 @@ try_again: | |||
715 | goto invalid_key; | 716 | goto invalid_key; |
716 | 717 | ||
717 | /* check the permissions */ | 718 | /* check the permissions */ |
718 | ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm); | 719 | ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm); |
719 | if (ret < 0) | 720 | if (ret < 0) |
720 | goto invalid_key; | 721 | goto invalid_key; |
721 | 722 | ||
722 | key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; | 723 | key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; |
723 | 724 | ||
724 | error: | 725 | error: |
725 | put_cred(cred); | 726 | put_cred(ctx.cred); |
726 | return key_ref; | 727 | return key_ref; |
727 | 728 | ||
728 | invalid_key: | 729 | invalid_key: |
@@ -733,7 +734,7 @@ invalid_key: | |||
733 | /* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new | 734 | /* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new |
734 | * creds to be installed */ | 735 | * creds to be installed */ |
735 | reget_creds: | 736 | reget_creds: |
736 | put_cred(cred); | 737 | put_cred(ctx.cred); |
737 | goto try_again; | 738 | goto try_again; |
738 | } | 739 | } |
739 | 740 | ||
@@ -856,3 +857,13 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) | |||
856 | 857 | ||
857 | commit_creds(new); | 858 | commit_creds(new); |
858 | } | 859 | } |
860 | |||
861 | /* | ||
862 | * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist. | ||
863 | */ | ||
864 | static int __init init_root_keyring(void) | ||
865 | { | ||
866 | return install_user_keyrings(); | ||
867 | } | ||
868 | |||
869 | late_initcall(init_root_keyring); | ||
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index c411f9bb156b..df94827103d0 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c | |||
@@ -345,33 +345,34 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) | |||
345 | * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a | 345 | * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a |
346 | * race between two thread calling request_key(). | 346 | * race between two thread calling request_key(). |
347 | */ | 347 | */ |
348 | static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type, | 348 | static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, |
349 | const char *description, | ||
350 | struct key *dest_keyring, | 349 | struct key *dest_keyring, |
351 | unsigned long flags, | 350 | unsigned long flags, |
352 | struct key_user *user, | 351 | struct key_user *user, |
353 | struct key **_key) | 352 | struct key **_key) |
354 | { | 353 | { |
355 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | 354 | struct assoc_array_edit *edit; |
356 | unsigned long prealloc; | ||
357 | struct key *key; | 355 | struct key *key; |
358 | key_perm_t perm; | 356 | key_perm_t perm; |
359 | key_ref_t key_ref; | 357 | key_ref_t key_ref; |
360 | int ret; | 358 | int ret; |
361 | 359 | ||
362 | kenter("%s,%s,,,", type->name, description); | 360 | kenter("%s,%s,,,", |
361 | ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description); | ||
363 | 362 | ||
364 | *_key = NULL; | 363 | *_key = NULL; |
365 | mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock); | 364 | mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock); |
366 | 365 | ||
367 | perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR; | 366 | perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR; |
368 | perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; | 367 | perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; |
369 | if (type->read) | 368 | if (ctx->index_key.type->read) |
370 | perm |= KEY_POS_READ; | 369 | perm |= KEY_POS_READ; |
371 | if (type == &key_type_keyring || type->update) | 370 | if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring || |
371 | ctx->index_key.type->update) | ||
372 | perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; | 372 | perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; |
373 | 373 | ||
374 | key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, | 374 | key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description, |
375 | ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred, | ||
375 | perm, flags); | 376 | perm, flags); |
376 | if (IS_ERR(key)) | 377 | if (IS_ERR(key)) |
377 | goto alloc_failed; | 378 | goto alloc_failed; |
@@ -379,8 +380,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type, | |||
379 | set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags); | 380 | set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags); |
380 | 381 | ||
381 | if (dest_keyring) { | 382 | if (dest_keyring) { |
382 | ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, type, description, | 383 | ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit); |
383 | &prealloc); | ||
384 | if (ret < 0) | 384 | if (ret < 0) |
385 | goto link_prealloc_failed; | 385 | goto link_prealloc_failed; |
386 | } | 386 | } |
@@ -390,16 +390,16 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type, | |||
390 | * waited for locks */ | 390 | * waited for locks */ |
391 | mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); | 391 | mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); |
392 | 392 | ||
393 | key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred); | 393 | key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx); |
394 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) | 394 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
395 | goto key_already_present; | 395 | goto key_already_present; |
396 | 396 | ||
397 | if (dest_keyring) | 397 | if (dest_keyring) |
398 | __key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc); | 398 | __key_link(key, &edit); |
399 | 399 | ||
400 | mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex); | 400 | mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex); |
401 | if (dest_keyring) | 401 | if (dest_keyring) |
402 | __key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc); | 402 | __key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit); |
403 | mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock); | 403 | mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock); |
404 | *_key = key; | 404 | *_key = key; |
405 | kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key)); | 405 | kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key)); |
@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ key_already_present: | |||
414 | if (dest_keyring) { | 414 | if (dest_keyring) { |
415 | ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key); | 415 | ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key); |
416 | if (ret == 0) | 416 | if (ret == 0) |
417 | __key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc); | 417 | __key_link(key, &edit); |
418 | __key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc); | 418 | __key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit); |
419 | if (ret < 0) | 419 | if (ret < 0) |
420 | goto link_check_failed; | 420 | goto link_check_failed; |
421 | } | 421 | } |
@@ -444,8 +444,7 @@ alloc_failed: | |||
444 | /* | 444 | /* |
445 | * Commence key construction. | 445 | * Commence key construction. |
446 | */ | 446 | */ |
447 | static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, | 447 | static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, |
448 | const char *description, | ||
449 | const char *callout_info, | 448 | const char *callout_info, |
450 | size_t callout_len, | 449 | size_t callout_len, |
451 | void *aux, | 450 | void *aux, |
@@ -464,8 +463,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, | |||
464 | 463 | ||
465 | construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); | 464 | construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); |
466 | 465 | ||
467 | ret = construct_alloc_key(type, description, dest_keyring, flags, user, | 466 | ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); |
468 | &key); | ||
469 | key_user_put(user); | 467 | key_user_put(user); |
470 | 468 | ||
471 | if (ret == 0) { | 469 | if (ret == 0) { |
@@ -529,17 +527,24 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, | |||
529 | struct key *dest_keyring, | 527 | struct key *dest_keyring, |
530 | unsigned long flags) | 528 | unsigned long flags) |
531 | { | 529 | { |
532 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | 530 | struct keyring_search_context ctx = { |
531 | .index_key.type = type, | ||
532 | .index_key.description = description, | ||
533 | .cred = current_cred(), | ||
534 | .match = type->match, | ||
535 | .match_data = description, | ||
536 | .flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, | ||
537 | }; | ||
533 | struct key *key; | 538 | struct key *key; |
534 | key_ref_t key_ref; | 539 | key_ref_t key_ref; |
535 | int ret; | 540 | int ret; |
536 | 541 | ||
537 | kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx", | 542 | kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx", |
538 | type->name, description, callout_info, callout_len, aux, | 543 | ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description, |
539 | dest_keyring, flags); | 544 | callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags); |
540 | 545 | ||
541 | /* search all the process keyrings for a key */ | 546 | /* search all the process keyrings for a key */ |
542 | key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred); | 547 | key_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx); |
543 | 548 | ||
544 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { | 549 | if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
545 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); | 550 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
@@ -562,9 +567,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, | |||
562 | if (!callout_info) | 567 | if (!callout_info) |
563 | goto error; | 568 | goto error; |
564 | 569 | ||
565 | key = construct_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, | 570 | key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len, |
566 | callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, | 571 | aux, dest_keyring, flags); |
567 | flags); | ||
568 | } | 572 | } |
569 | 573 | ||
570 | error: | 574 | error: |
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 85730d5a5a59..7495a93b4b90 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c | |||
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ | |||
18 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 18 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
19 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> | 19 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> |
20 | #include "internal.h" | 20 | #include "internal.h" |
21 | #include <keys/user-type.h> | ||
21 | 22 | ||
22 | static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, | 23 | static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, |
23 | struct key_preparsed_payload *); | 24 | struct key_preparsed_payload *); |
@@ -222,32 +223,26 @@ error_alloc: | |||
222 | } | 223 | } |
223 | 224 | ||
224 | /* | 225 | /* |
225 | * See if an authorisation key is associated with a particular key. | ||
226 | */ | ||
227 | static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key, | ||
228 | const void *_id) | ||
229 | { | ||
230 | struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; | ||
231 | key_serial_t id = (key_serial_t)(unsigned long) _id; | ||
232 | |||
233 | return rka->target_key->serial == id; | ||
234 | } | ||
235 | |||
236 | /* | ||
237 | * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for | 226 | * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for |
238 | * instantiation of a key. | 227 | * instantiation of a key. |
239 | */ | 228 | */ |
240 | struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id) | 229 | struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id) |
241 | { | 230 | { |
242 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | 231 | char description[16]; |
232 | struct keyring_search_context ctx = { | ||
233 | .index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth, | ||
234 | .index_key.description = description, | ||
235 | .cred = current_cred(), | ||
236 | .match = user_match, | ||
237 | .match_data = description, | ||
238 | .flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, | ||
239 | }; | ||
243 | struct key *authkey; | 240 | struct key *authkey; |
244 | key_ref_t authkey_ref; | 241 | key_ref_t authkey_ref; |
245 | 242 | ||
246 | authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings( | 243 | sprintf(description, "%x", target_id); |
247 | &key_type_request_key_auth, | 244 | |
248 | (void *) (unsigned long) target_id, | 245 | authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx); |
249 | key_get_instantiation_authkey_match, | ||
250 | cred); | ||
251 | 246 | ||
252 | if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) { | 247 | if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) { |
253 | authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref); | 248 | authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref); |
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c index ee32d181764a..8c0af08760c8 100644 --- a/security/keys/sysctl.c +++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c | |||
@@ -61,5 +61,16 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = { | |||
61 | .extra1 = (void *) &zero, | 61 | .extra1 = (void *) &zero, |
62 | .extra2 = (void *) &max, | 62 | .extra2 = (void *) &max, |
63 | }, | 63 | }, |
64 | #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS | ||
65 | { | ||
66 | .procname = "persistent_keyring_expiry", | ||
67 | .data = &persistent_keyring_expiry, | ||
68 | .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned), | ||
69 | .mode = 0644, | ||
70 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, | ||
71 | .extra1 = (void *) &zero, | ||
72 | .extra2 = (void *) &max, | ||
73 | }, | ||
74 | #endif | ||
64 | { } | 75 | { } |
65 | }; | 76 | }; |
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 55dc88939185..faa2caeb593f 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c | |||
@@ -25,14 +25,15 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc); | |||
25 | * arbitrary blob of data as the payload | 25 | * arbitrary blob of data as the payload |
26 | */ | 26 | */ |
27 | struct key_type key_type_user = { | 27 | struct key_type key_type_user = { |
28 | .name = "user", | 28 | .name = "user", |
29 | .instantiate = user_instantiate, | 29 | .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, |
30 | .update = user_update, | 30 | .instantiate = user_instantiate, |
31 | .match = user_match, | 31 | .update = user_update, |
32 | .revoke = user_revoke, | 32 | .match = user_match, |
33 | .destroy = user_destroy, | 33 | .revoke = user_revoke, |
34 | .describe = user_describe, | 34 | .destroy = user_destroy, |
35 | .read = user_read, | 35 | .describe = user_describe, |
36 | .read = user_read, | ||
36 | }; | 37 | }; |
37 | 38 | ||
38 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user); | 39 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user); |
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user); | |||
45 | */ | 46 | */ |
46 | struct key_type key_type_logon = { | 47 | struct key_type key_type_logon = { |
47 | .name = "logon", | 48 | .name = "logon", |
49 | .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, | ||
48 | .instantiate = user_instantiate, | 50 | .instantiate = user_instantiate, |
49 | .update = user_update, | 51 | .update = user_update, |
50 | .match = user_match, | 52 | .match = user_match, |
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4dc31f4f2700..15b6928592ef 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c | |||
@@ -1340,22 +1340,17 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | |||
1340 | return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx); | 1340 | return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx); |
1341 | } | 1341 | } |
1342 | 1342 | ||
1343 | int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) | 1343 | int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, |
1344 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) | ||
1344 | { | 1345 | { |
1345 | return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx, 0); | 1346 | return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc(x, sec_ctx); |
1346 | } | 1347 | } |
1347 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); | 1348 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); |
1348 | 1349 | ||
1349 | int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, | 1350 | int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, |
1350 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) | 1351 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) |
1351 | { | 1352 | { |
1352 | if (!polsec) | 1353 | return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, polsec, secid); |
1353 | return 0; | ||
1354 | /* | ||
1355 | * We want the context to be taken from secid which is usually | ||
1356 | * from the sock. | ||
1357 | */ | ||
1358 | return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, NULL, secid); | ||
1359 | } | 1354 | } |
1360 | 1355 | ||
1361 | int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) | 1356 | int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) |
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a5091ec06aa6..6d0bf5c0c832 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c | |||
@@ -95,7 +95,9 @@ | |||
95 | #include "audit.h" | 95 | #include "audit.h" |
96 | #include "avc_ss.h" | 96 | #include "avc_ss.h" |
97 | 97 | ||
98 | #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 | 98 | #define SB_TYPE_FMT "%s%s%s" |
99 | #define SB_SUBTYPE(sb) (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) | ||
100 | #define SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb) sb->s_type->name, SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? "." : "", SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? sb->s_subtype : "" | ||
99 | 101 | ||
100 | extern struct security_operations *security_ops; | 102 | extern struct security_operations *security_ops; |
101 | 103 | ||
@@ -139,12 +141,28 @@ static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; | |||
139 | * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK | 141 | * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK |
140 | * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than | 142 | * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than |
141 | * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is | 143 | * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is |
142 | * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. | 144 | * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network |
145 | * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. | ||
143 | * | 146 | * |
144 | */ | 147 | */ |
145 | static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) | 148 | static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) |
146 | { | 149 | { |
147 | return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0); | 150 | return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); |
151 | } | ||
152 | |||
153 | /** | ||
154 | * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled | ||
155 | * | ||
156 | * Description: | ||
157 | * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true | ||
158 | * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the | ||
159 | * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling | ||
160 | * is always considered enabled. | ||
161 | * | ||
162 | */ | ||
163 | static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) | ||
164 | { | ||
165 | return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); | ||
148 | } | 166 | } |
149 | 167 | ||
150 | /* | 168 | /* |
@@ -309,8 +327,11 @@ enum { | |||
309 | Opt_defcontext = 3, | 327 | Opt_defcontext = 3, |
310 | Opt_rootcontext = 4, | 328 | Opt_rootcontext = 4, |
311 | Opt_labelsupport = 5, | 329 | Opt_labelsupport = 5, |
330 | Opt_nextmntopt = 6, | ||
312 | }; | 331 | }; |
313 | 332 | ||
333 | #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1) | ||
334 | |||
314 | static const match_table_t tokens = { | 335 | static const match_table_t tokens = { |
315 | {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, | 336 | {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
316 | {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, | 337 | {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
@@ -355,6 +376,29 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, | |||
355 | return rc; | 376 | return rc; |
356 | } | 377 | } |
357 | 378 | ||
379 | static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) | ||
380 | { | ||
381 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | ||
382 | |||
383 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || | ||
384 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || | ||
385 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK) | ||
386 | return 1; | ||
387 | |||
388 | /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ | ||
389 | if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) | ||
390 | return 1; | ||
391 | |||
392 | /* | ||
393 | * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports | ||
394 | * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes. | ||
395 | */ | ||
396 | if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0) | ||
397 | return 1; | ||
398 | |||
399 | return 0; | ||
400 | } | ||
401 | |||
358 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) | 402 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) |
359 | { | 403 | { |
360 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | 404 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
@@ -369,8 +413,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) | |||
369 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have | 413 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have |
370 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ | 414 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ |
371 | if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { | 415 | if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
372 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " | 416 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") has no " |
373 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | 417 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); |
374 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | 418 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
375 | goto out; | 419 | goto out; |
376 | } | 420 | } |
@@ -378,35 +422,27 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) | |||
378 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { | 422 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { |
379 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) | 423 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
380 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | 424 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
381 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", | 425 | SB_TYPE_FMT") has no security xattr handler\n", |
382 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | 426 | sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); |
383 | else | 427 | else |
384 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | 428 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
385 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, | 429 | SB_TYPE_FMT") getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, |
386 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); | 430 | SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), -rc); |
387 | goto out; | 431 | goto out; |
388 | } | 432 | } |
389 | } | 433 | } |
390 | 434 | ||
391 | sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); | ||
392 | |||
393 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) | 435 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
394 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", | 436 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), unknown behavior\n", |
395 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | 437 | sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); |
396 | else | 438 | else |
397 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", | 439 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), %s\n", |
398 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, | 440 | sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), |
399 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); | 441 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); |
400 | 442 | ||
401 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || | 443 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; |
402 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || | 444 | if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) |
403 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || | 445 | sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; |
404 | sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) | ||
405 | sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; | ||
406 | |||
407 | /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ | ||
408 | if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) | ||
409 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP; | ||
410 | 446 | ||
411 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ | 447 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ |
412 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); | 448 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); |
@@ -460,15 +496,18 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, | |||
460 | if (!ss_initialized) | 496 | if (!ss_initialized) |
461 | return -EINVAL; | 497 | return -EINVAL; |
462 | 498 | ||
499 | /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */ | ||
500 | BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS)); | ||
501 | |||
463 | tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; | 502 | tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
464 | /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ | 503 | /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ |
465 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | 504 | for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) { |
466 | if (tmp & 0x01) | 505 | if (tmp & 0x01) |
467 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; | 506 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
468 | tmp >>= 1; | 507 | tmp >>= 1; |
469 | } | 508 | } |
470 | /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ | 509 | /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ |
471 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) | 510 | if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) |
472 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; | 511 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
473 | 512 | ||
474 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); | 513 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
@@ -515,9 +554,9 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, | |||
515 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; | 554 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
516 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; | 555 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
517 | } | 556 | } |
518 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { | 557 | if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { |
519 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; | 558 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; |
520 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; | 559 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT; |
521 | } | 560 | } |
522 | 561 | ||
523 | BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); | 562 | BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); |
@@ -561,7 +600,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, | |||
561 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | 600 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
562 | int rc = 0, i; | 601 | int rc = 0, i; |
563 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | 602 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
564 | const char *name = sb->s_type->name; | ||
565 | struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; | 603 | struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
566 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; | 604 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; |
567 | u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; | 605 | u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; |
@@ -614,14 +652,14 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, | |||
614 | for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { | 652 | for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { |
615 | u32 sid; | 653 | u32 sid; |
616 | 654 | ||
617 | if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) | 655 | if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) |
618 | continue; | 656 | continue; |
619 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], | 657 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], |
620 | strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); | 658 | strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); |
621 | if (rc) { | 659 | if (rc) { |
622 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | 660 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
623 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | 661 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n", |
624 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); | 662 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc); |
625 | goto out; | 663 | goto out; |
626 | } | 664 | } |
627 | switch (flags[i]) { | 665 | switch (flags[i]) { |
@@ -685,9 +723,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, | |||
685 | * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this | 723 | * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this |
686 | * filesystem type. | 724 | * filesystem type. |
687 | */ | 725 | */ |
688 | rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? | 726 | rc = security_fs_use(sb); |
689 | "proc" : sb->s_type->name, | ||
690 | &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); | ||
691 | if (rc) { | 727 | if (rc) { |
692 | printk(KERN_WARNING | 728 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
693 | "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", | 729 | "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", |
@@ -770,7 +806,8 @@ out: | |||
770 | out_double_mount: | 806 | out_double_mount: |
771 | rc = -EINVAL; | 807 | rc = -EINVAL; |
772 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " | 808 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " |
773 | "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); | 809 | "security settings for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id, |
810 | SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); | ||
774 | goto out; | 811 | goto out; |
775 | } | 812 | } |
776 | 813 | ||
@@ -1037,7 +1074,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, | |||
1037 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: | 1074 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
1038 | prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; | 1075 | prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; |
1039 | break; | 1076 | break; |
1040 | case SE_SBLABELSUPP: | 1077 | case SBLABEL_MNT: |
1041 | seq_putc(m, ','); | 1078 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
1042 | seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); | 1079 | seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); |
1043 | continue; | 1080 | continue; |
@@ -1650,7 +1687,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, | |||
1650 | if (rc) | 1687 | if (rc) |
1651 | return rc; | 1688 | return rc; |
1652 | 1689 | ||
1653 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { | 1690 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) { |
1654 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, | 1691 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, |
1655 | &dentry->d_name, &newsid); | 1692 | &dentry->d_name, &newsid); |
1656 | if (rc) | 1693 | if (rc) |
@@ -2438,14 +2475,14 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |||
2438 | u32 sid; | 2475 | u32 sid; |
2439 | size_t len; | 2476 | size_t len; |
2440 | 2477 | ||
2441 | if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) | 2478 | if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) |
2442 | continue; | 2479 | continue; |
2443 | len = strlen(mount_options[i]); | 2480 | len = strlen(mount_options[i]); |
2444 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); | 2481 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); |
2445 | if (rc) { | 2482 | if (rc) { |
2446 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | 2483 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
2447 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | 2484 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n", |
2448 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); | 2485 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc); |
2449 | goto out_free_opts; | 2486 | goto out_free_opts; |
2450 | } | 2487 | } |
2451 | rc = -EINVAL; | 2488 | rc = -EINVAL; |
@@ -2483,8 +2520,8 @@ out_free_secdata: | |||
2483 | return rc; | 2520 | return rc; |
2484 | out_bad_option: | 2521 | out_bad_option: |
2485 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " | 2522 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " |
2486 | "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, | 2523 | "during remount (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id, |
2487 | sb->s_type->name); | 2524 | SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); |
2488 | goto out_free_opts; | 2525 | goto out_free_opts; |
2489 | } | 2526 | } |
2490 | 2527 | ||
@@ -2607,7 +2644,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, | |||
2607 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && | 2644 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && |
2608 | (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) | 2645 | (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) |
2609 | newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; | 2646 | newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
2610 | else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { | 2647 | else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) { |
2611 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, | 2648 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, |
2612 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), | 2649 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), |
2613 | qstr, &newsid); | 2650 | qstr, &newsid); |
@@ -2629,7 +2666,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, | |||
2629 | isec->initialized = 1; | 2666 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2630 | } | 2667 | } |
2631 | 2668 | ||
2632 | if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) | 2669 | if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) |
2633 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 2670 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2634 | 2671 | ||
2635 | if (name) | 2672 | if (name) |
@@ -2831,7 +2868,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, | |||
2831 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); | 2868 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2832 | 2869 | ||
2833 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | 2870 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
2834 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) | 2871 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) |
2835 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 2872 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2836 | 2873 | ||
2837 | if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) | 2874 | if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) |
@@ -3792,8 +3829,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) | |||
3792 | u32 nlbl_sid; | 3829 | u32 nlbl_sid; |
3793 | u32 nlbl_type; | 3830 | u32 nlbl_type; |
3794 | 3831 | ||
3795 | selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); | 3832 | err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); |
3796 | selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); | 3833 | if (unlikely(err)) |
3834 | return -EACCES; | ||
3835 | err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); | ||
3836 | if (unlikely(err)) | ||
3837 | return -EACCES; | ||
3797 | 3838 | ||
3798 | err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); | 3839 | err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); |
3799 | if (unlikely(err)) { | 3840 | if (unlikely(err)) { |
@@ -4247,7 +4288,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |||
4247 | return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); | 4288 | return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); |
4248 | 4289 | ||
4249 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); | 4290 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4250 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); | 4291 | peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); |
4251 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) | 4292 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4252 | return 0; | 4293 | return 0; |
4253 | 4294 | ||
@@ -4629,7 +4670,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, | |||
4629 | 4670 | ||
4630 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); | 4671 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4631 | netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); | 4672 | netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); |
4632 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); | 4673 | peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); |
4633 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) | 4674 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4634 | return NF_ACCEPT; | 4675 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4635 | 4676 | ||
@@ -4781,7 +4822,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, | |||
4781 | return NF_ACCEPT; | 4822 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4782 | #endif | 4823 | #endif |
4783 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); | 4824 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4784 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); | 4825 | peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); |
4785 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) | 4826 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4786 | return NF_ACCEPT; | 4827 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4787 | 4828 | ||
@@ -5785,7 +5826,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { | |||
5785 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, | 5826 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, |
5786 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, | 5827 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, |
5787 | .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, | 5828 | .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, |
5788 | .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, | 5829 | .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, |
5830 | .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, | ||
5789 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, | 5831 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, |
5790 | .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, | 5832 | .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, |
5791 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, | 5833 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, |
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index aa47bcabb5f6..b1dfe1049450 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h | |||
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ struct superblock_security_struct { | |||
58 | u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */ | 58 | u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */ |
59 | u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */ | 59 | u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */ |
60 | u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */ | 60 | u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */ |
61 | unsigned int behavior; /* labeling behavior */ | 61 | unsigned short behavior; /* labeling behavior */ |
62 | unsigned char flags; /* which mount options were specified */ | 62 | unsigned short flags; /* which mount options were specified */ |
63 | struct mutex lock; | 63 | struct mutex lock; |
64 | struct list_head isec_head; | 64 | struct list_head isec_head; |
65 | spinlock_t isec_lock; | 65 | spinlock_t isec_lock; |
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 8fd8e18ea340..fe341ae37004 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h | |||
@@ -45,14 +45,15 @@ | |||
45 | /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ | 45 | /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ |
46 | #define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f | 46 | #define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f |
47 | /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */ | 47 | /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */ |
48 | /* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */ | ||
48 | #define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01 | 49 | #define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01 |
49 | #define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02 | 50 | #define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02 |
50 | #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04 | 51 | #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04 |
51 | #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08 | 52 | #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08 |
53 | #define SBLABEL_MNT 0x10 | ||
52 | /* Non-mount related flags */ | 54 | /* Non-mount related flags */ |
53 | #define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x10 | 55 | #define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100 |
54 | #define SE_SBPROC 0x20 | 56 | #define SE_SBPROC 0x0200 |
55 | #define SE_SBLABELSUPP 0x40 | ||
56 | 57 | ||
57 | #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" | 58 | #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" |
58 | #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" | 59 | #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" |
@@ -68,12 +69,15 @@ extern int selinux_enabled; | |||
68 | enum { | 69 | enum { |
69 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER, | 70 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER, |
70 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM, | 71 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM, |
72 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1, | ||
73 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK, | ||
71 | __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX | 74 | __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX |
72 | }; | 75 | }; |
73 | #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) | 76 | #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) |
74 | 77 | ||
75 | extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; | 78 | extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; |
76 | extern int selinux_policycap_openperm; | 79 | extern int selinux_policycap_openperm; |
80 | extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork; | ||
77 | 81 | ||
78 | /* | 82 | /* |
79 | * type_datum properties | 83 | * type_datum properties |
@@ -172,8 +176,7 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void); | |||
172 | #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE 7 /* use native label support */ | 176 | #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE 7 /* use native label support */ |
173 | #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX 7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */ | 177 | #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX 7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */ |
174 | 178 | ||
175 | int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior, | 179 | int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb); |
176 | u32 *sid); | ||
177 | 180 | ||
178 | int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, | 181 | int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, |
179 | u32 *sid); | 182 | u32 *sid); |
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 6713f04e30ba..0dec76c64cf5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | |||
@@ -10,29 +10,21 @@ | |||
10 | #include <net/flow.h> | 10 | #include <net/flow.h> |
11 | 11 | ||
12 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, | 12 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, |
13 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); | 13 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx); |
14 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, | 14 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, |
15 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp); | 15 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp); |
16 | void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); | 16 | void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); |
17 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); | 17 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); |
18 | int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, | 18 | int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, |
19 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid); | 19 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx); |
20 | int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, | ||
21 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid); | ||
20 | void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); | 22 | void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); |
21 | int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); | 23 | int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); |
22 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); | 24 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); |
23 | int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, | 25 | int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, |
24 | struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl); | 26 | struct xfrm_policy *xp, |
25 | 27 | const struct flowi *fl); | |
26 | /* | ||
27 | * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket) | ||
28 | */ | ||
29 | static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk) | ||
30 | { | ||
31 | if (!sk->sk_socket) | ||
32 | return NULL; | ||
33 | |||
34 | return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security; | ||
35 | } | ||
36 | 28 | ||
37 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | 29 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
38 | extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount; | 30 | extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount; |
@@ -42,10 +34,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) | |||
42 | return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0); | 34 | return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0); |
43 | } | 35 | } |
44 | 36 | ||
45 | int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | 37 | int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, |
46 | struct common_audit_data *ad); | 38 | struct common_audit_data *ad); |
47 | int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | 39 | int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, |
48 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); | 40 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); |
49 | int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); | 41 | int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); |
50 | 42 | ||
51 | static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) | 43 | static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) |
@@ -64,19 +56,21 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) | |||
64 | return 0; | 56 | return 0; |
65 | } | 57 | } |
66 | 58 | ||
67 | static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | 59 | static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, |
68 | struct common_audit_data *ad) | 60 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
69 | { | 61 | { |
70 | return 0; | 62 | return 0; |
71 | } | 63 | } |
72 | 64 | ||
73 | static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | 65 | static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, |
74 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) | 66 | struct common_audit_data *ad, |
67 | u8 proto) | ||
75 | { | 68 | { |
76 | return 0; | 69 | return 0; |
77 | } | 70 | } |
78 | 71 | ||
79 | static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) | 72 | static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, |
73 | int ckall) | ||
80 | { | 74 | { |
81 | *sid = SECSID_NULL; | 75 | *sid = SECSID_NULL; |
82 | return 0; | 76 | return 0; |
@@ -87,10 +81,9 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) | |||
87 | } | 81 | } |
88 | #endif | 82 | #endif |
89 | 83 | ||
90 | static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) | 84 | static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) |
91 | { | 85 | { |
92 | int err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0); | 86 | return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0); |
93 | BUG_ON(err); | ||
94 | } | 87 | } |
95 | 88 | ||
96 | #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ | 89 | #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ |
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index da4b8b233280..6235d052338b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c | |||
@@ -442,8 +442,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) | |||
442 | sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED) | 442 | sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED) |
443 | return 0; | 443 | return 0; |
444 | 444 | ||
445 | local_bh_disable(); | 445 | lock_sock(sk); |
446 | bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); | ||
447 | 446 | ||
448 | /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family | 447 | /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family |
449 | * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset | 448 | * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset |
@@ -464,7 +463,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) | |||
464 | sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED; | 463 | sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED; |
465 | 464 | ||
466 | socket_connect_return: | 465 | socket_connect_return: |
467 | bh_unlock_sock(sk); | 466 | release_sock(sk); |
468 | local_bh_enable(); | ||
469 | return rc; | 467 | return rc; |
470 | } | 468 | } |
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index c5454c0477c3..03a72c32afd7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c | |||
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node) | |||
166 | break; | 166 | break; |
167 | default: | 167 | default: |
168 | BUG(); | 168 | BUG(); |
169 | return; | ||
169 | } | 170 | } |
170 | 171 | ||
171 | /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check | 172 | /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check |
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid) | |||
225 | break; | 226 | break; |
226 | default: | 227 | default: |
227 | BUG(); | 228 | BUG(); |
229 | ret = -EINVAL; | ||
228 | } | 230 | } |
229 | if (ret != 0) | 231 | if (ret != 0) |
230 | goto out; | 232 | goto out; |
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index ff427733c290..5122affe06a8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | |||
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ | |||
44 | /* Policy capability filenames */ | 44 | /* Policy capability filenames */ |
45 | static char *policycap_names[] = { | 45 | static char *policycap_names[] = { |
46 | "network_peer_controls", | 46 | "network_peer_controls", |
47 | "open_perms" | 47 | "open_perms", |
48 | "redhat1", | ||
49 | "always_check_network" | ||
48 | }; | 50 | }; |
49 | 51 | ||
50 | unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; | 52 | unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; |
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 30f119b1d1ec..820313a04d49 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | |||
@@ -213,7 +213,12 @@ netlbl_import_failure: | |||
213 | } | 213 | } |
214 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ | 214 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ |
215 | 215 | ||
216 | int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2) | 216 | /* |
217 | * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally, | ||
218 | * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed | ||
219 | * last_e2bit. | ||
220 | */ | ||
221 | int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit) | ||
217 | { | 222 | { |
218 | struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2; | 223 | struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2; |
219 | int i; | 224 | int i; |
@@ -223,14 +228,25 @@ int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2) | |||
223 | 228 | ||
224 | n1 = e1->node; | 229 | n1 = e1->node; |
225 | n2 = e2->node; | 230 | n2 = e2->node; |
231 | |||
226 | while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) { | 232 | while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) { |
227 | if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) { | 233 | if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) { |
228 | n1 = n1->next; | 234 | n1 = n1->next; |
229 | continue; | 235 | continue; |
230 | } | 236 | } |
231 | for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) { | 237 | for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; ) |
238 | i--; /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */ | ||
239 | if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) { | ||
240 | u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE + | ||
241 | __fls(n2->maps[i]); | ||
242 | if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit) | ||
243 | return 0; | ||
244 | } | ||
245 | |||
246 | while (i >= 0) { | ||
232 | if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i]) | 247 | if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i]) |
233 | return 0; | 248 | return 0; |
249 | i--; | ||
234 | } | 250 | } |
235 | 251 | ||
236 | n1 = n1->next; | 252 | n1 = n1->next; |
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 922f8afa89dd..712c8a7b8e8b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | |||
@@ -16,7 +16,13 @@ | |||
16 | 16 | ||
17 | #include <net/netlabel.h> | 17 | #include <net/netlabel.h> |
18 | 18 | ||
19 | #define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((32 - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32)) \ | 19 | #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT |
20 | #define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 64 | ||
21 | #else | ||
22 | #define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 32 | ||
23 | #endif | ||
24 | |||
25 | #define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\ | ||
20 | / sizeof(unsigned long)) | 26 | / sizeof(unsigned long)) |
21 | #define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG | 27 | #define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG |
22 | #define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE) | 28 | #define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE) |
@@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, | |||
117 | 123 | ||
118 | int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); | 124 | int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); |
119 | int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src); | 125 | int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src); |
120 | int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); | 126 | int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit); |
121 | int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit); | 127 | int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit); |
122 | int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value); | 128 | int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value); |
123 | void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e); | 129 | void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e); |
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 40de8d3f208e..c85bc1ec040c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c | |||
@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, | |||
160 | int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l) | 160 | int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l) |
161 | { | 161 | { |
162 | struct level_datum *levdatum; | 162 | struct level_datum *levdatum; |
163 | struct ebitmap_node *node; | ||
164 | int i; | ||
165 | 163 | ||
166 | if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim) | 164 | if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim) |
167 | return 0; | 165 | return 0; |
@@ -170,19 +168,13 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l) | |||
170 | if (!levdatum) | 168 | if (!levdatum) |
171 | return 0; | 169 | return 0; |
172 | 170 | ||
173 | ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&l->cat, node, i) { | 171 | /* |
174 | if (i > p->p_cats.nprim) | 172 | * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in |
175 | return 0; | 173 | * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than |
176 | if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i)) { | 174 | * p->p_cats.nprim. |
177 | /* | 175 | */ |
178 | * Category may not be associated with | 176 | return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat, |
179 | * sensitivity. | 177 | p->p_cats.nprim); |
180 | */ | ||
181 | return 0; | ||
182 | } | ||
183 | } | ||
184 | |||
185 | return 1; | ||
186 | } | 178 | } |
187 | 179 | ||
188 | int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r) | 180 | int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r) |
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h index 03bed52a8052..e93648774137 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h | |||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2) | |||
35 | static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2) | 35 | static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2) |
36 | { | 36 | { |
37 | return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) && | 37 | return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) && |
38 | ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat)); | 38 | ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0)); |
39 | } | 39 | } |
40 | 40 | ||
41 | #define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \ | 41 | #define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \ |
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index c8adde3aff8f..f6195ebde3c9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | |||
@@ -3203,9 +3203,8 @@ static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr) | |||
3203 | 3203 | ||
3204 | static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) | 3204 | static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) |
3205 | { | 3205 | { |
3206 | size_t nel; | ||
3207 | __le32 buf[1]; | 3206 | __le32 buf[1]; |
3208 | int rc; | 3207 | int rc, nel; |
3209 | struct policy_data pd; | 3208 | struct policy_data pd; |
3210 | 3209 | ||
3211 | pd.p = p; | 3210 | pd.p = p; |
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b4feecc3fe01..ee470a0b5c27 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c | |||
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ | |||
72 | 72 | ||
73 | int selinux_policycap_netpeer; | 73 | int selinux_policycap_netpeer; |
74 | int selinux_policycap_openperm; | 74 | int selinux_policycap_openperm; |
75 | int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork; | ||
75 | 76 | ||
76 | static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); | 77 | static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); |
77 | 78 | ||
@@ -1812,6 +1813,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void) | |||
1812 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER); | 1813 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER); |
1813 | selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, | 1814 | selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, |
1814 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM); | 1815 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM); |
1816 | selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, | ||
1817 | POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK); | ||
1815 | } | 1818 | } |
1816 | 1819 | ||
1817 | static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); | 1820 | static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); |
@@ -2323,43 +2326,74 @@ out: | |||
2323 | 2326 | ||
2324 | /** | 2327 | /** |
2325 | * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem. | 2328 | * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem. |
2326 | * @fstype: filesystem type | 2329 | * @sb: superblock in question |
2327 | * @behavior: labeling behavior | ||
2328 | * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock) | ||
2329 | */ | 2330 | */ |
2330 | int security_fs_use( | 2331 | int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb) |
2331 | const char *fstype, | ||
2332 | unsigned int *behavior, | ||
2333 | u32 *sid) | ||
2334 | { | 2332 | { |
2335 | int rc = 0; | 2333 | int rc = 0; |
2336 | struct ocontext *c; | 2334 | struct ocontext *c; |
2335 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | ||
2336 | const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name; | ||
2337 | const char *subtype = (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) ? sb->s_subtype : NULL; | ||
2338 | struct ocontext *base = NULL; | ||
2337 | 2339 | ||
2338 | read_lock(&policy_rwlock); | 2340 | read_lock(&policy_rwlock); |
2339 | 2341 | ||
2340 | c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; | 2342 | for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; c; c = c->next) { |
2341 | while (c) { | 2343 | char *sub; |
2342 | if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0) | 2344 | int baselen; |
2345 | |||
2346 | baselen = strlen(fstype); | ||
2347 | |||
2348 | /* if base does not match, this is not the one */ | ||
2349 | if (strncmp(fstype, c->u.name, baselen)) | ||
2350 | continue; | ||
2351 | |||
2352 | /* if there is no subtype, this is the one! */ | ||
2353 | if (!subtype) | ||
2354 | break; | ||
2355 | |||
2356 | /* skip past the base in this entry */ | ||
2357 | sub = c->u.name + baselen; | ||
2358 | |||
2359 | /* entry is only a base. save it. keep looking for subtype */ | ||
2360 | if (sub[0] == '\0') { | ||
2361 | base = c; | ||
2362 | continue; | ||
2363 | } | ||
2364 | |||
2365 | /* entry is not followed by a subtype, so it is not a match */ | ||
2366 | if (sub[0] != '.') | ||
2367 | continue; | ||
2368 | |||
2369 | /* whew, we found a subtype of this fstype */ | ||
2370 | sub++; /* move past '.' */ | ||
2371 | |||
2372 | /* exact match of fstype AND subtype */ | ||
2373 | if (!strcmp(subtype, sub)) | ||
2343 | break; | 2374 | break; |
2344 | c = c->next; | ||
2345 | } | 2375 | } |
2346 | 2376 | ||
2377 | /* in case we had found an fstype match but no subtype match */ | ||
2378 | if (!c) | ||
2379 | c = base; | ||
2380 | |||
2347 | if (c) { | 2381 | if (c) { |
2348 | *behavior = c->v.behavior; | 2382 | sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior; |
2349 | if (!c->sid[0]) { | 2383 | if (!c->sid[0]) { |
2350 | rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], | 2384 | rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], |
2351 | &c->sid[0]); | 2385 | &c->sid[0]); |
2352 | if (rc) | 2386 | if (rc) |
2353 | goto out; | 2387 | goto out; |
2354 | } | 2388 | } |
2355 | *sid = c->sid[0]; | 2389 | sbsec->sid = c->sid[0]; |
2356 | } else { | 2390 | } else { |
2357 | rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid); | 2391 | rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid); |
2358 | if (rc) { | 2392 | if (rc) { |
2359 | *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; | 2393 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; |
2360 | rc = 0; | 2394 | rc = 0; |
2361 | } else { | 2395 | } else { |
2362 | *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; | 2396 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; |
2363 | } | 2397 | } |
2364 | } | 2398 | } |
2365 | 2399 | ||
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index d03081886214..a91d205ec0c6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c | |||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ | |||
56 | atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); | 56 | atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
57 | 57 | ||
58 | /* | 58 | /* |
59 | * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context | 59 | * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context. |
60 | */ | 60 | */ |
61 | static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | 61 | static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) |
62 | { | 62 | { |
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | |||
66 | } | 66 | } |
67 | 67 | ||
68 | /* | 68 | /* |
69 | * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux | 69 | * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux. |
70 | */ | 70 | */ |
71 | static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) | 71 | static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) |
72 | { | 72 | { |
@@ -74,48 +74,111 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) | |||
74 | } | 74 | } |
75 | 75 | ||
76 | /* | 76 | /* |
77 | * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use | 77 | * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security |
78 | * a xfrm policy rule. | 78 | * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context. |
79 | */ | 79 | */ |
80 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) | 80 | static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, |
81 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) | ||
81 | { | 82 | { |
82 | int rc; | 83 | int rc; |
83 | u32 sel_sid; | 84 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
85 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; | ||
86 | u32 str_len; | ||
84 | 87 | ||
85 | /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ | 88 | if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL || |
86 | if (ctx) { | 89 | uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM || |
87 | if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) | 90 | uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) |
88 | return -EINVAL; | 91 | return -EINVAL; |
89 | |||
90 | sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; | ||
91 | } else | ||
92 | /* | ||
93 | * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an | ||
94 | * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This | ||
95 | * would prevent inadvertent "leaks". | ||
96 | */ | ||
97 | return 0; | ||
98 | 92 | ||
99 | rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, | 93 | str_len = uctx->ctx_len; |
100 | ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, | 94 | if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE) |
101 | NULL); | 95 | return -ENOMEM; |
102 | 96 | ||
103 | if (rc == -EACCES) | 97 | ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
104 | return -ESRCH; | 98 | if (!ctx) |
99 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
105 | 100 | ||
101 | ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; | ||
102 | ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; | ||
103 | ctx->ctx_len = str_len; | ||
104 | memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len); | ||
105 | ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0'; | ||
106 | rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid); | ||
107 | if (rc) | ||
108 | goto err; | ||
109 | |||
110 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, | ||
111 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); | ||
112 | if (rc) | ||
113 | goto err; | ||
114 | |||
115 | *ctxp = ctx; | ||
116 | atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | ||
117 | return 0; | ||
118 | |||
119 | err: | ||
120 | kfree(ctx); | ||
106 | return rc; | 121 | return rc; |
107 | } | 122 | } |
108 | 123 | ||
109 | /* | 124 | /* |
125 | * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure. | ||
126 | */ | ||
127 | static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | ||
128 | { | ||
129 | if (!ctx) | ||
130 | return; | ||
131 | |||
132 | atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | ||
133 | kfree(ctx); | ||
134 | } | ||
135 | |||
136 | /* | ||
137 | * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule. | ||
138 | */ | ||
139 | static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | ||
140 | { | ||
141 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); | ||
142 | |||
143 | if (!ctx) | ||
144 | return 0; | ||
145 | |||
146 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, | ||
147 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, | ||
148 | NULL); | ||
149 | } | ||
150 | |||
151 | /* | ||
152 | * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy | ||
153 | * rule. | ||
154 | */ | ||
155 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) | ||
156 | { | ||
157 | int rc; | ||
158 | |||
159 | /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable | ||
160 | * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */ | ||
161 | if (!ctx) | ||
162 | return 0; | ||
163 | |||
164 | /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ | ||
165 | if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) | ||
166 | return -EINVAL; | ||
167 | |||
168 | rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid, | ||
169 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL); | ||
170 | return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc); | ||
171 | } | ||
172 | |||
173 | /* | ||
110 | * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches | 174 | * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches |
111 | * the given policy, flow combo. | 175 | * the given policy, flow combo. |
112 | */ | 176 | */ |
113 | 177 | int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, | |
114 | int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, | 178 | struct xfrm_policy *xp, |
115 | const struct flowi *fl) | 179 | const struct flowi *fl) |
116 | { | 180 | { |
117 | u32 state_sid; | 181 | u32 state_sid; |
118 | int rc; | ||
119 | 182 | ||
120 | if (!xp->security) | 183 | if (!xp->security) |
121 | if (x->security) | 184 | if (x->security) |
@@ -138,187 +201,80 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * | |||
138 | if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid) | 201 | if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid) |
139 | return 0; | 202 | return 0; |
140 | 203 | ||
141 | rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, | 204 | /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA |
142 | ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, | 205 | * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch |
143 | NULL)? 0:1; | 206 | * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */ |
144 | 207 | return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, | |
145 | /* | 208 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, |
146 | * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check | 209 | NULL) ? 0 : 1); |
147 | * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and | ||
148 | * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened | ||
149 | * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. | ||
150 | */ | ||
151 | |||
152 | return rc; | ||
153 | } | 210 | } |
154 | 211 | ||
155 | /* | 212 | /* |
156 | * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the | 213 | * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the |
157 | * incoming packet. | 214 | * incoming packet. |
158 | */ | 215 | */ |
159 | |||
160 | int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) | 216 | int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) |
161 | { | 217 | { |
218 | u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; | ||
162 | struct sec_path *sp; | 219 | struct sec_path *sp; |
163 | 220 | ||
164 | *sid = SECSID_NULL; | ||
165 | |||
166 | if (skb == NULL) | 221 | if (skb == NULL) |
167 | return 0; | 222 | goto out; |
168 | 223 | ||
169 | sp = skb->sp; | 224 | sp = skb->sp; |
170 | if (sp) { | 225 | if (sp) { |
171 | int i, sid_set = 0; | 226 | int i; |
172 | 227 | ||
173 | for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) { | 228 | for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
174 | struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; | 229 | struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; |
175 | if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { | 230 | if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { |
176 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; | 231 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; |
177 | 232 | ||
178 | if (!sid_set) { | 233 | if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) { |
179 | *sid = ctx->ctx_sid; | 234 | sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid; |
180 | sid_set = 1; | ||
181 | |||
182 | if (!ckall) | 235 | if (!ckall) |
183 | break; | 236 | goto out; |
184 | } else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid) | 237 | } else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) { |
238 | *sid = SECSID_NULL; | ||
185 | return -EINVAL; | 239 | return -EINVAL; |
240 | } | ||
186 | } | 241 | } |
187 | } | 242 | } |
188 | } | 243 | } |
189 | 244 | ||
190 | return 0; | ||
191 | } | ||
192 | |||
193 | /* | ||
194 | * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state | ||
195 | * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input | ||
196 | */ | ||
197 | static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, | ||
198 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid) | ||
199 | { | ||
200 | int rc = 0; | ||
201 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); | ||
202 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; | ||
203 | char *ctx_str = NULL; | ||
204 | u32 str_len; | ||
205 | |||
206 | BUG_ON(uctx && sid); | ||
207 | |||
208 | if (!uctx) | ||
209 | goto not_from_user; | ||
210 | |||
211 | if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) | ||
212 | return -EINVAL; | ||
213 | |||
214 | str_len = uctx->ctx_len; | ||
215 | if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE) | ||
216 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
217 | |||
218 | *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + | ||
219 | str_len + 1, | ||
220 | GFP_KERNEL); | ||
221 | |||
222 | if (!ctx) | ||
223 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
224 | |||
225 | ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi; | ||
226 | ctx->ctx_len = str_len; | ||
227 | ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg; | ||
228 | |||
229 | memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, | ||
230 | uctx+1, | ||
231 | str_len); | ||
232 | ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0; | ||
233 | rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, | ||
234 | str_len, | ||
235 | &ctx->ctx_sid); | ||
236 | |||
237 | if (rc) | ||
238 | goto out; | ||
239 | |||
240 | /* | ||
241 | * Does the subject have permission to set security context? | ||
242 | */ | ||
243 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, | ||
244 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, | ||
245 | ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); | ||
246 | if (rc) | ||
247 | goto out; | ||
248 | |||
249 | return rc; | ||
250 | |||
251 | not_from_user: | ||
252 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len); | ||
253 | if (rc) | ||
254 | goto out; | ||
255 | |||
256 | *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + | ||
257 | str_len, | ||
258 | GFP_ATOMIC); | ||
259 | |||
260 | if (!ctx) { | ||
261 | rc = -ENOMEM; | ||
262 | goto out; | ||
263 | } | ||
264 | |||
265 | ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; | ||
266 | ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; | ||
267 | ctx->ctx_sid = sid; | ||
268 | ctx->ctx_len = str_len; | ||
269 | memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, | ||
270 | ctx_str, | ||
271 | str_len); | ||
272 | |||
273 | goto out2; | ||
274 | |||
275 | out: | 245 | out: |
276 | *ctxp = NULL; | 246 | *sid = sid_session; |
277 | kfree(ctx); | 247 | return 0; |
278 | out2: | ||
279 | kfree(ctx_str); | ||
280 | return rc; | ||
281 | } | 248 | } |
282 | 249 | ||
283 | /* | 250 | /* |
284 | * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to | 251 | * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy. |
285 | * xfrm_policy. | ||
286 | */ | 252 | */ |
287 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, | 253 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, |
288 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) | 254 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) |
289 | { | 255 | { |
290 | int err; | 256 | return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx); |
291 | |||
292 | BUG_ON(!uctx); | ||
293 | |||
294 | err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0); | ||
295 | if (err == 0) | ||
296 | atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | ||
297 | |||
298 | return err; | ||
299 | } | 257 | } |
300 | 258 | ||
301 | |||
302 | /* | 259 | /* |
303 | * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to | 260 | * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new |
304 | * new for policy cloning. | 261 | * for policy cloning. |
305 | */ | 262 | */ |
306 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, | 263 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, |
307 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) | 264 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) |
308 | { | 265 | { |
309 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx; | 266 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx; |
310 | 267 | ||
311 | if (old_ctx) { | 268 | if (!old_ctx) |
312 | new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, | 269 | return 0; |
313 | GFP_ATOMIC); | 270 | |
314 | if (!new_ctx) | 271 | new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, |
315 | return -ENOMEM; | 272 | GFP_ATOMIC); |
273 | if (!new_ctx) | ||
274 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
275 | atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | ||
276 | *new_ctxp = new_ctx; | ||
316 | 277 | ||
317 | memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx)); | ||
318 | memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len); | ||
319 | atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | ||
320 | *new_ctxp = new_ctx; | ||
321 | } | ||
322 | return 0; | 278 | return 0; |
323 | } | 279 | } |
324 | 280 | ||
@@ -327,8 +283,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, | |||
327 | */ | 283 | */ |
328 | void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | 284 | void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) |
329 | { | 285 | { |
330 | atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | 286 | selinux_xfrm_free(ctx); |
331 | kfree(ctx); | ||
332 | } | 287 | } |
333 | 288 | ||
334 | /* | 289 | /* |
@@ -336,31 +291,55 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | |||
336 | */ | 291 | */ |
337 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) | 292 | int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) |
338 | { | 293 | { |
339 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); | 294 | return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx); |
340 | 295 | } | |
341 | if (!ctx) | ||
342 | return 0; | ||
343 | 296 | ||
344 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, | 297 | /* |
345 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, | 298 | * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using |
346 | NULL); | 299 | * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state. |
300 | */ | ||
301 | int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, | ||
302 | struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) | ||
303 | { | ||
304 | return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx); | ||
347 | } | 305 | } |
348 | 306 | ||
349 | /* | 307 | /* |
350 | * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to | 308 | * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based |
351 | * xfrm_state. | 309 | * on a secid. |
352 | */ | 310 | */ |
353 | int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, | 311 | int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, |
354 | u32 secid) | 312 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) |
355 | { | 313 | { |
356 | int err; | 314 | int rc; |
315 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; | ||
316 | char *ctx_str = NULL; | ||
317 | int str_len; | ||
318 | |||
319 | if (!polsec) | ||
320 | return 0; | ||
357 | 321 | ||
358 | BUG_ON(!x); | 322 | if (secid == 0) |
323 | return -EINVAL; | ||
359 | 324 | ||
360 | err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid); | 325 | rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len); |
361 | if (err == 0) | 326 | if (rc) |
362 | atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | 327 | return rc; |
363 | return err; | 328 | |
329 | ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC); | ||
330 | if (!ctx) | ||
331 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
332 | |||
333 | ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; | ||
334 | ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; | ||
335 | ctx->ctx_sid = secid; | ||
336 | ctx->ctx_len = str_len; | ||
337 | memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len); | ||
338 | kfree(ctx_str); | ||
339 | |||
340 | x->security = ctx; | ||
341 | atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | ||
342 | return 0; | ||
364 | } | 343 | } |
365 | 344 | ||
366 | /* | 345 | /* |
@@ -368,24 +347,15 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct | |||
368 | */ | 347 | */ |
369 | void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) | 348 | void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) |
370 | { | 349 | { |
371 | atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); | 350 | selinux_xfrm_free(x->security); |
372 | kfree(x->security); | ||
373 | } | 351 | } |
374 | 352 | ||
375 | /* | 353 | /* |
376 | * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs. | 354 | * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs. |
377 | */ | 355 | */ |
378 | int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) | 356 | int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) |
379 | { | 357 | { |
380 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); | 358 | return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security); |
381 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; | ||
382 | |||
383 | if (!ctx) | ||
384 | return 0; | ||
385 | |||
386 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, | ||
387 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, | ||
388 | NULL); | ||
389 | } | 359 | } |
390 | 360 | ||
391 | /* | 361 | /* |
@@ -395,14 +365,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) | |||
395 | * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have | 365 | * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have |
396 | * gone thru the IPSec process. | 366 | * gone thru the IPSec process. |
397 | */ | 367 | */ |
398 | int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | 368 | int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, |
399 | struct common_audit_data *ad) | 369 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
400 | { | 370 | { |
401 | int i, rc = 0; | 371 | int i; |
402 | struct sec_path *sp; | 372 | struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp; |
403 | u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | 373 | u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
404 | |||
405 | sp = skb->sp; | ||
406 | 374 | ||
407 | if (sp) { | 375 | if (sp) { |
408 | for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { | 376 | for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { |
@@ -410,23 +378,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | |||
410 | 378 | ||
411 | if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { | 379 | if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { |
412 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; | 380 | struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; |
413 | sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; | 381 | peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; |
414 | break; | 382 | break; |
415 | } | 383 | } |
416 | } | 384 | } |
417 | } | 385 | } |
418 | 386 | ||
419 | /* | 387 | /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, |
420 | * This check even when there's no association involved is | 388 | * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in |
421 | * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a | 389 | * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ |
422 | * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless | 390 | return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, |
423 | * explicitly allowed by policy. | 391 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); |
424 | */ | ||
425 | |||
426 | rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, | ||
427 | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); | ||
428 | |||
429 | return rc; | ||
430 | } | 392 | } |
431 | 393 | ||
432 | /* | 394 | /* |
@@ -436,49 +398,38 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | |||
436 | * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been | 398 | * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been |
437 | * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above. | 399 | * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above. |
438 | */ | 400 | */ |
439 | int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, | 401 | int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, |
440 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) | 402 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) |
441 | { | 403 | { |
442 | struct dst_entry *dst; | 404 | struct dst_entry *dst; |
443 | int rc = 0; | ||
444 | |||
445 | dst = skb_dst(skb); | ||
446 | |||
447 | if (dst) { | ||
448 | struct dst_entry *dst_test; | ||
449 | |||
450 | for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL; | ||
451 | dst_test = dst_test->child) { | ||
452 | struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm; | ||
453 | |||
454 | if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) | ||
455 | goto out; | ||
456 | } | ||
457 | } | ||
458 | 405 | ||
459 | switch (proto) { | 406 | switch (proto) { |
460 | case IPPROTO_AH: | 407 | case IPPROTO_AH: |
461 | case IPPROTO_ESP: | 408 | case IPPROTO_ESP: |
462 | case IPPROTO_COMP: | 409 | case IPPROTO_COMP: |
463 | /* | 410 | /* We should have already seen this packet once before it |
464 | * We should have already seen this packet once before | 411 | * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled |
465 | * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the | 412 | * check. */ |
466 | * unlabeled check. | 413 | return 0; |
467 | */ | ||
468 | goto out; | ||
469 | default: | 414 | default: |
470 | break; | 415 | break; |
471 | } | 416 | } |
472 | 417 | ||
473 | /* | 418 | dst = skb_dst(skb); |
474 | * This check even when there's no association involved is | 419 | if (dst) { |
475 | * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a | 420 | struct dst_entry *iter; |
476 | * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless | ||
477 | * explicitly allowed by policy. | ||
478 | */ | ||
479 | 421 | ||
480 | rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, | 422 | for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) { |
481 | ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); | 423 | struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm; |
482 | out: | 424 | |
483 | return rc; | 425 | if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) |
426 | return 0; | ||
427 | } | ||
428 | } | ||
429 | |||
430 | /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, | ||
431 | * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in | ||
432 | * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ | ||
433 | return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, | ||
434 | SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); | ||
484 | } | 435 | } |