<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>litmus-rt-edfsc.git/kernel/Makefile, branch wip-joshua</title>
<subtitle>LITMUS^RT with the EDF-SC plugin for Real-Time Systems journal paper</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.</title>
<updated>2016-08-08T18:18:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-30T18:58:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=dbec28460a89aa7c02c3301e9e108d98272549d2'/>
<id>dbec28460a89aa7c02c3301e9e108d98272549d2</id>
<content type='text'>
Limit per userns sysctls to only be opened for write by a holder
of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.

Add all of the necessary boilerplate for having per user namespace
sysctls.

Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Limit per userns sysctls to only be opened for write by a holder
of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.

Add all of the necessary boilerplate for having per user namespace
sysctls.

Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ELF/MIPS build fix</title>
<updated>2016-05-24T00:04:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ralf Baechle</name>
<email>ralf@linux-mips.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-23T23:22:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=f43edca7ed08fc02279f2a62015da5cb6aa0ad61'/>
<id>f43edca7ed08fc02279f2a62015da5cb6aa0ad61</id>
<content type='text'>
CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the
following linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x23dbc): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x246e4): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x248d0): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x24ac4): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

CONFIG_MIPS32_O32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the following
linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x28a04): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29330): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x2951c): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29710): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

This is because binfmt_elfn32 and binfmt_elfo32 are using symbols from
elfcore but for these configurations elfcore will not be built.

Fixed by making elfcore selectable by a separate config symbol which
unlike the current mechanism can also be used from other directories
than kernel/, then having each flavor of ELF that relies on elfcore.o,
select it in Kconfig, including CONFIG_MIPS32_N32 and CONFIG_MIPS32_O32
which fixes this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160520141705.GA1913@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" &lt;macro@linux-mips.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the
following linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x23dbc): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x246e4): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x248d0): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x24ac4): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

CONFIG_MIPS32_O32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the following
linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x28a04): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29330): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x2951c): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29710): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

This is because binfmt_elfn32 and binfmt_elfo32 are using symbols from
elfcore but for these configurations elfcore will not be built.

Fixed by making elfcore selectable by a separate config symbol which
unlike the current mechanism can also be used from other directories
than kernel/, then having each flavor of ELF that relies on elfcore.o,
select it in Kconfig, including CONFIG_MIPS32_N32 and CONFIG_MIPS32_O32
which fixes this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160520141705.GA1913@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" &lt;macro@linux-mips.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel: add kcov code coverage</title>
<updated>2016-03-22T22:36:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Vyukov</name>
<email>dvyukov@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-22T21:27:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=5c9a8750a6409c63a0f01d51a9024861022f6593'/>
<id>5c9a8750a6409c63a0f01d51a9024861022f6593</id>
<content type='text'>
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/Makefile: remove the useless CFLAGS_REMOVE_cgroup-debug.o</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T10:11:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Bin</name>
<email>huawei.libin@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-30T03:54:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=e11b956e9ebef098cc4f81964a1f57e40fe75cd4'/>
<id>e11b956e9ebef098cc4f81964a1f57e40fe75cd4</id>
<content type='text'>
The file cgroup-debug.c had been removed from commit fe6934354f8e
(cgroups: move the cgroup debug subsys into cgroup.c to access internal state).
Remain the CFLAGS_REMOVE_cgroup-debug.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
useless in kernel/Makefile.

Signed-off-by: Li Bin &lt;huawei.libin@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The file cgroup-debug.c had been removed from commit fe6934354f8e
(cgroups: move the cgroup debug subsys into cgroup.c to access internal state).
Remain the CFLAGS_REMOVE_cgroup-debug.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
useless in kernel/Makefile.

Signed-off-by: Li Bin &lt;huawei.libin@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sys_membarrier(): system-wide memory barrier (generic, x86)</title>
<updated>2015-09-11T22:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathieu Desnoyers</name>
<email>mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-11T20:07:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=5b25b13ab08f616efd566347d809b4ece54570d1'/>
<id>5b25b13ab08f616efd566347d809b4ece54570d1</id>
<content type='text'>
Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which
executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system.  It is
implemented by calling synchronize_sched().  It can be used to
distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by
transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of
sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier.  For synchronization primitives
that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g.  userspace RCU
[1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving
the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side.

The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by
this system call are as follows:

* Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so)
  - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/
  - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/)
  - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/)
  - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org)
  - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/)
  - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf)
  - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189)

Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and
scalability compared to locking.  Especially in the case of RCU used by
libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of
the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu().

* Direct users of sys_membarrier
  - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198)

Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect()
side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement
Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux.  They are referring to
sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that
sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for.

To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads:

Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu())
Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock())

In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses
with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each
smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each
smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()".

Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs:

Thread A                    Thread B
previous mem accesses       previous mem accesses
smp_mb()                    smp_mb()
following mem accesses      following mem accesses

After the change, these pairs become:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory
accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they
do (2).

1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()
follow mem accesses
                            prev mem accesses
                            barrier()
                            follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK,
because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in
ordering them with respect to its own accesses.

2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program
order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full
smp_mb() by synchronize_sched().

* Benchmarks

On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores)
(one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy
looping)

1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call.

* User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library

Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes
permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly
accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler
barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the
write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all
active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this
synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process
threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake
ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running
threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are
implied by the scheduler context switches.

Results in liburcu:

Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers:

memory barriers in reader:    1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes
signal-based scheme:          9830061167 reads,    6700 writes
sys_membarrier:               9952759104 reads,     425 writes
sys_membarrier (dyn. check):  7970328887 reads,     425 writes

The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to
the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that,
sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However,
this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace
period than signal and memory barrier schemes.

Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the
membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not
need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries,
and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we
cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application.

An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed
up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading
the cpu_curr()-&gt;mm without holding each CPU's rq lock.

This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic.

[1] http://urcu.so

membarrier(2) man page:

MEMBARRIER(2)              Linux Programmer's Manual             MEMBARRIER(2)

NAME
       membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads

SYNOPSIS
       #include &lt;linux/membarrier.h&gt;

       int membarrier(int cmd, int flags);

DESCRIPTION
       The cmd argument is one of the following:

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY
              Query  the  set  of  supported commands. It returns a bitmask of
              supported commands.

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED
              Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on  the  system.
              Upon  return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that
              all running threads have passed through a state where all memory
              accesses  to  user-space  addresses  match program order between
              entry to and return from the system  call  (non-running  threads
              are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90
              cesses running on the system.  This command returns 0.

       The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions.

       All memory accesses performed  in  program  order  from  each  targeted
       thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If
       we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing
       memory  accesses  to  be performed in program order across the barrier,
       and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full  memory
       ordering  across  the barrier, we have the following ordering table for
       each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb():

       The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered):

                              barrier()   smp_mb() sys_membarrier()
              barrier()          X           X            O
              smp_mb()           X           O            O
              sys_membarrier()   O           O            O

RETURN VALUE
       On success, these system calls return zero.  On error, -1 is  returned,
       and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags
       argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the
       same value until reboot.

ERRORS
       ENOSYS System call is not implemented.

       EINVAL Invalid arguments.

Linux                             2015-04-15                     MEMBARRIER(2)

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Miell &lt;nmiell@comcast.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pranith Kumar &lt;bobby.prani@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuahkh@osg.samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which
executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system.  It is
implemented by calling synchronize_sched().  It can be used to
distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by
transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of
sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier.  For synchronization primitives
that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g.  userspace RCU
[1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving
the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side.

The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by
this system call are as follows:

* Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so)
  - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/
  - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/)
  - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/)
  - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org)
  - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/)
  - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf)
  - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189)

Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and
scalability compared to locking.  Especially in the case of RCU used by
libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of
the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu().

* Direct users of sys_membarrier
  - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198)

Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect()
side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement
Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux.  They are referring to
sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that
sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for.

To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads:

Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu())
Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock())

In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses
with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each
smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each
smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()".

Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs:

Thread A                    Thread B
previous mem accesses       previous mem accesses
smp_mb()                    smp_mb()
following mem accesses      following mem accesses

After the change, these pairs become:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory
accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they
do (2).

1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()
follow mem accesses
                            prev mem accesses
                            barrier()
                            follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK,
because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in
ordering them with respect to its own accesses.

2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program
order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full
smp_mb() by synchronize_sched().

* Benchmarks

On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores)
(one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy
looping)

1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call.

* User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library

Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes
permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly
accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler
barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the
write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all
active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this
synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process
threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake
ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running
threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are
implied by the scheduler context switches.

Results in liburcu:

Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers:

memory barriers in reader:    1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes
signal-based scheme:          9830061167 reads,    6700 writes
sys_membarrier:               9952759104 reads,     425 writes
sys_membarrier (dyn. check):  7970328887 reads,     425 writes

The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to
the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that,
sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However,
this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace
period than signal and memory barrier schemes.

Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the
membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not
need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries,
and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we
cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application.

An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed
up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading
the cpu_curr()-&gt;mm without holding each CPU's rq lock.

This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic.

[1] http://urcu.so

membarrier(2) man page:

MEMBARRIER(2)              Linux Programmer's Manual             MEMBARRIER(2)

NAME
       membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads

SYNOPSIS
       #include &lt;linux/membarrier.h&gt;

       int membarrier(int cmd, int flags);

DESCRIPTION
       The cmd argument is one of the following:

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY
              Query  the  set  of  supported commands. It returns a bitmask of
              supported commands.

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED
              Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on  the  system.
              Upon  return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that
              all running threads have passed through a state where all memory
              accesses  to  user-space  addresses  match program order between
              entry to and return from the system  call  (non-running  threads
              are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90
              cesses running on the system.  This command returns 0.

       The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions.

       All memory accesses performed  in  program  order  from  each  targeted
       thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If
       we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing
       memory  accesses  to  be performed in program order across the barrier,
       and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full  memory
       ordering  across  the barrier, we have the following ordering table for
       each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb():

       The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered):

                              barrier()   smp_mb() sys_membarrier()
              barrier()          X           X            O
              smp_mb()           X           O            O
              sys_membarrier()   O           O            O

RETURN VALUE
       On success, these system calls return zero.  On error, -1 is  returned,
       and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags
       argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the
       same value until reboot.

ERRORS
       ENOSYS System call is not implemented.

       EINVAL Invalid arguments.

Linux                             2015-04-15                     MEMBARRIER(2)

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Miell &lt;nmiell@comcast.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pranith Kumar &lt;bobby.prani@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuahkh@osg.samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kexec: split kexec_load syscall from kexec core code</title>
<updated>2015-09-10T20:29:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Young</name>
<email>dyoung@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-09T22:38:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=2965faa5e03d1e71e9ff9aa143fff39e0a77543a'/>
<id>2965faa5e03d1e71e9ff9aa143fff39e0a77543a</id>
<content type='text'>
There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
 kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.

And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.

The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.

Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.

Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
kexec_load syscall.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Tesarik &lt;ptesarik@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
 kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.

And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.

The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.

Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.

Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
kexec_load syscall.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Tesarik &lt;ptesarik@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kexec: split kexec_file syscall code to kexec_file.c</title>
<updated>2015-09-10T20:29:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Young</name>
<email>dyoung@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-09T22:38:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=a43cac0d9dc2073ff2245a171429ddbe1accece7'/>
<id>a43cac0d9dc2073ff2245a171429ddbe1accece7</id>
<content type='text'>
Split kexec_file syscall related code to another file kernel/kexec_file.c
so that the #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE in kexec.c can be dropped.

Sharing variables and functions are moved to kernel/kexec_internal.h per
suggestion from Vivek and Petr.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix bisectability]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare the various arch_kexec functions]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Tesarik &lt;ptesarik@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Split kexec_file syscall related code to another file kernel/kexec_file.c
so that the #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE in kexec.c can be dropped.

Sharing variables and functions are moved to kernel/kexec_internal.h per
suggestion from Vivek and Petr.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix bisectability]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare the various arch_kexec functions]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Tesarik &lt;ptesarik@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm</title>
<updated>2015-09-08T21:35:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-08T21:35:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=12f03ee606914317e7e6a0815e53a48205c31dae'/>
<id>12f03ee606914317e7e6a0815e53a48205c31dae</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
 "This update has successfully completed a 0day-kbuild run and has
  appeared in a linux-next release.  The changes outside of the typical
  drivers/nvdimm/ and drivers/acpi/nfit.[ch] paths are related to the
  removal of IORESOURCE_CACHEABLE, the introduction of memremap(), and
  the introduction of ZONE_DEVICE + devm_memremap_pages().

  Summary:

   - Introduce ZONE_DEVICE and devm_memremap_pages() as a generic
     mechanism for adding device-driver-discovered memory regions to the
     kernel's direct map.

     This facility is used by the pmem driver to enable pfn_to_page()
     operations on the page frames returned by DAX ('direct_access' in
     'struct block_device_operations').

     For now, the 'memmap' allocation for these "device" pages comes
     from "System RAM".  Support for allocating the memmap from device
     memory will arrive in a later kernel.

   - Introduce memremap() to replace usages of ioremap_cache() and
     ioremap_wt().  memremap() drops the __iomem annotation for these
     mappings to memory that do not have i/o side effects.  The
     replacement of ioremap_cache() with memremap() is limited to the
     pmem driver to ease merging the api change in v4.3.

     Completion of the conversion is targeted for v4.4.

   - Similar to the usage of memcpy_to_pmem() + wmb_pmem() in the pmem
     driver, update the VFS DAX implementation and PMEM api to provide
     persistence guarantees for kernel operations on a DAX mapping.

   - Convert the ACPI NFIT 'BLK' driver to map the block apertures as
     cacheable to improve performance.

   - Miscellaneous updates and fixes to libnvdimm including support for
     issuing "address range scrub" commands, clarifying the optimal
     'sector size' of pmem devices, a clarification of the usage of the
     ACPI '_STA' (status) property for DIMM devices, and other minor
     fixes"

* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (34 commits)
  libnvdimm, pmem: direct map legacy pmem by default
  libnvdimm, pmem: 'struct page' for pmem
  libnvdimm, pfn: 'struct page' provider infrastructure
  x86, pmem: clarify that ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API implies PMEM mapped WB
  add devm_memremap_pages
  mm: ZONE_DEVICE for "device memory"
  mm: move __phys_to_pfn and __pfn_to_phys to asm/generic/memory_model.h
  dax: drop size parameter to -&gt;direct_access()
  nd_blk: change aperture mapping from WC to WB
  nvdimm: change to use generic kvfree()
  pmem, dax: have direct_access use __pmem annotation
  dax: update I/O path to do proper PMEM flushing
  pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()
  pmem, x86: clean up conditional pmem includes
  pmem: remove layer when calling arch_has_wmb_pmem()
  pmem, x86: move x86 PMEM API to new pmem.h header
  libnvdimm, e820: make CONFIG_X86_PMEM_LEGACY a tristate option
  pmem: switch to devm_ allocations
  devres: add devm_memremap
  libnvdimm, btt: write and validate parent_uuid
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
 "This update has successfully completed a 0day-kbuild run and has
  appeared in a linux-next release.  The changes outside of the typical
  drivers/nvdimm/ and drivers/acpi/nfit.[ch] paths are related to the
  removal of IORESOURCE_CACHEABLE, the introduction of memremap(), and
  the introduction of ZONE_DEVICE + devm_memremap_pages().

  Summary:

   - Introduce ZONE_DEVICE and devm_memremap_pages() as a generic
     mechanism for adding device-driver-discovered memory regions to the
     kernel's direct map.

     This facility is used by the pmem driver to enable pfn_to_page()
     operations on the page frames returned by DAX ('direct_access' in
     'struct block_device_operations').

     For now, the 'memmap' allocation for these "device" pages comes
     from "System RAM".  Support for allocating the memmap from device
     memory will arrive in a later kernel.

   - Introduce memremap() to replace usages of ioremap_cache() and
     ioremap_wt().  memremap() drops the __iomem annotation for these
     mappings to memory that do not have i/o side effects.  The
     replacement of ioremap_cache() with memremap() is limited to the
     pmem driver to ease merging the api change in v4.3.

     Completion of the conversion is targeted for v4.4.

   - Similar to the usage of memcpy_to_pmem() + wmb_pmem() in the pmem
     driver, update the VFS DAX implementation and PMEM api to provide
     persistence guarantees for kernel operations on a DAX mapping.

   - Convert the ACPI NFIT 'BLK' driver to map the block apertures as
     cacheable to improve performance.

   - Miscellaneous updates and fixes to libnvdimm including support for
     issuing "address range scrub" commands, clarifying the optimal
     'sector size' of pmem devices, a clarification of the usage of the
     ACPI '_STA' (status) property for DIMM devices, and other minor
     fixes"

* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (34 commits)
  libnvdimm, pmem: direct map legacy pmem by default
  libnvdimm, pmem: 'struct page' for pmem
  libnvdimm, pfn: 'struct page' provider infrastructure
  x86, pmem: clarify that ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API implies PMEM mapped WB
  add devm_memremap_pages
  mm: ZONE_DEVICE for "device memory"
  mm: move __phys_to_pfn and __pfn_to_phys to asm/generic/memory_model.h
  dax: drop size parameter to -&gt;direct_access()
  nd_blk: change aperture mapping from WC to WB
  nvdimm: change to use generic kvfree()
  pmem, dax: have direct_access use __pmem annotation
  dax: update I/O path to do proper PMEM flushing
  pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()
  pmem, x86: clean up conditional pmem includes
  pmem: remove layer when calling arch_has_wmb_pmem()
  pmem, x86: move x86 PMEM API to new pmem.h header
  libnvdimm, e820: make CONFIG_X86_PMEM_LEGACY a tristate option
  pmem: switch to devm_ allocations
  devres: add devm_memremap
  libnvdimm, btt: write and validate parent_uuid
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit</title>
<updated>2015-09-08T20:34:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-08T20:34:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=425afcff13a4bea2a3cf6f395cbc66fc158852be'/>
<id>425afcff13a4bea2a3cf6f395cbc66fc158852be</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull audit update from Paul Moore:
 "This is one of the larger audit patchsets in recent history,
  consisting of eight patches and almost 400 lines of changes.

  The bulk of the patchset is the new "audit by executable"
  functionality which allows admins to set an audit watch based on the
  executable on disk.  Prior to this, admins could only track an
  application by PID, which has some obvious limitations.

  Beyond the new functionality we also have some refcnt fixes and a few
  minor cleanups"

* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
  fixup: audit: implement audit by executable
  audit: implement audit by executable
  audit: clean simple fsnotify implementation
  audit: use macros for unset inode and device values
  audit: make audit_del_rule() more robust
  audit: fix uninitialized variable in audit_add_rule()
  audit: eliminate unnecessary extra layer of watch parent references
  audit: eliminate unnecessary extra layer of watch references
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull audit update from Paul Moore:
 "This is one of the larger audit patchsets in recent history,
  consisting of eight patches and almost 400 lines of changes.

  The bulk of the patchset is the new "audit by executable"
  functionality which allows admins to set an audit watch based on the
  executable on disk.  Prior to this, admins could only track an
  application by PID, which has some obvious limitations.

  Beyond the new functionality we also have some refcnt fixes and a few
  minor cleanups"

* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
  fixup: audit: implement audit by executable
  audit: implement audit by executable
  audit: clean simple fsnotify implementation
  audit: use macros for unset inode and device values
  audit: make audit_del_rule() more robust
  audit: fix uninitialized variable in audit_add_rule()
  audit: eliminate unnecessary extra layer of watch parent references
  audit: eliminate unnecessary extra layer of watch references
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2015-09-08T19:41:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-08T19:41:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/cgit/cgit.cgi/litmus-rt-edfsc.git/commit/?id=b793c005ceabf6db0b17494b0ec67ade6796bb34'/>
<id>b793c005ceabf6db0b17494b0ec67ade6796bb34</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
     module signing.  See comments in 3f1e1bea.

     ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
        must be installed, e.g.  the openssl-devel on Fedora **

   - Smack
      - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
      - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data

   - SELinux:
      - add ioctl whitelisting (see
        http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
      - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change

   - Seccomp:
      - add ptrace options for suspend/resume"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
  PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
  Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
  scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
  modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
  modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
  Move certificate handling to its own directory
  sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
  PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
  Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
  sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
  PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
  KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
  PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
  modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
  extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
  sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
  PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
  X.509: Change recorded SKID &amp; AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
  PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
  MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
     module signing.  See comments in 3f1e1bea.

     ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
        must be installed, e.g.  the openssl-devel on Fedora **

   - Smack
      - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
      - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data

   - SELinux:
      - add ioctl whitelisting (see
        http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
      - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change

   - Seccomp:
      - add ptrace options for suspend/resume"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
  PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
  Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
  scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
  modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
  modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
  Move certificate handling to its own directory
  sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
  PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
  Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
  sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
  PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
  KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
  PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
  modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
  extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
  sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
  PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
  X.509: Change recorded SKID &amp; AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
  PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
  MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
