scripts/setlocalversion


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#!/bin/sh
# Print additional version information for non-release trees.

usage() {
	echo "Usage: $0 [srctree]" >&2
	exit 1
}

cd "${1:-.}" || usage

# Check for git and a git repo.
if head=`git rev-parse --verify HEAD 2>/dev/null`; then
	# Do we have an untagged version?
	if git name-rev --tags HEAD | grep -E '^HEAD[[:space:]]+(.*~[0-9]*|undefined)$' > /dev/null; then
		if tag=`git describe 2>/dev/null`; then
			echo $tag | awk -F- '{printf("-%05d-%s", $(NF-1),$(NF))}'
		fi
	fi

	# Are there uncommitted changes?
	git update-index --refresh --unmerged > /dev/null
	if git diff-index --name-only HEAD | grep -v "^scripts/package" \
	    | read dummy; then
		printf '%s' -dirty
	fi

	# All done with git
	exit
fi

# Check for mercurial and a mercurial repo.
if hgid=`hg id 2>/dev/null`; then
	tag=`printf '%s' "$hgid" | cut -d' ' -f2`

	# Do we have an untagged version?
	if [ -z "$tag" -o "$tag" = tip ]; then
		id=`printf '%s' "$hgid" | sed 's/[+ ].*//'`
		printf '%s%s' -hg "$id"
	fi

	# Are there uncommitted changes?
	# These are represented by + after the changeset id.
	case "$hgid" in
		*+|*+\ *) printf '%s' -dirty ;;
	esac

	# All done with mercurial
	exit
fi

# Check for svn and a svn repo.
if rev=`svn info 2>/dev/null | grep '^Revision'`; then
	rev=`echo $rev | awk '{print $NF}'`
	changes=`svn status 2>/dev/null | grep '^[AMD]' | wc -l`

	# Are there uncommitted changes?
	if [ $changes != 0 ]; then
		printf -- '-svn%s%s%s' "$rev" -dirty "$changes"
	else
		printf -- '-svn%s' "$rev"
	fi

	# All done with svn
	exit
fi
/*
 * A security context is a set of security attributes
 * associated with each subject and object controlled
 * by the security policy.  Security contexts are
  * externally represented as variable-length strings
 * that can be interpreted by a user or application
 * with an understanding of the security policy.
 * Internally, the security server uses a simple
 * structure.  This structure is private to the
 * security server and can be changed without affecting
 * clients of the security server.
 *
 * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
 */
#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_

#include "ebitmap.h"
#include "mls_types.h"
#include "security.h"

/*
 * A security context consists of an authenticated user
 * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
 */
struct context {
	u32 user;
	u32 role;
	u32 type;
	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
	struct mls_range range;
	char *str;	/* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
};

static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
{
	memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
}

static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
{
	int rc;

	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
		return 0;

	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
	if (rc)
		goto out;

	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
	if (rc)
		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
out:
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
 */
static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
{
	int rc;

	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
		return 0;

	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
	if (rc)
		goto out;

	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
	if (rc)
		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
out:
	return rc;
}

static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
{
	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
		return 1;

	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
		(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat, &c2->range.level[1].cat));
}

static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
{
	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
		return;

	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
	mls_context_init(c);
}

static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
{
	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
}

static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
{
	int rc;

	dst->user = src->user;
	dst->role = src->role;
	dst->type = src->type;
	if (src->str) {
		dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
		if (!dst->str)
			return -ENOMEM;
		dst->len = src->len;
	} else {
		dst->str = NULL;
		dst->len = 0;
	}
	rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
	if (rc) {
		kfree(dst->str);
		return rc;
	}
	return 0;
}

static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
{
	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
	kfree(c->str);
	c->str = NULL;
	c->len = 0;
	mls_context_destroy(c);
}

static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
{
	if (c1->len && c2->len)
		return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
	if (c1->len || c2->len)
		return 0;
	return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
		(c1->role == c2->role) &&
		(c1->type == c2->type) &&
		mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
}

#endif	/* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */