1 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 928188902901..91dc3783ed94 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -101,11 +101,13 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
         ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
         memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
         ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
-        rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+        rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+                                     &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
         if (rc)
                 goto err;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+        rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+                          tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
                           SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
         if (rc)
                 goto err;
@@ -141,7 +143,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
         if (!ctx)
                 return 0;
 
-        return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+        return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+                            tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
                             SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
                             NULL);
 }
@@ -163,7 +166,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
         if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+        rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+                          fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
                           SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
         return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
@@ -202,7 +206,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
         /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
          * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
          * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
-        return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+        return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+                             fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
                             SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
                             NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
@@ -352,7 +357,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
         if (secid == 0)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+        rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+                                     &str_len);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -420,7 +426,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
         /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
          * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
          * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
-        return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+        return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+                            sk_sid, peer_sid,
                             SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
@@ -463,6 +470,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
         /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
          * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
          * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
-        return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+        return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
                             SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 }