selinux: extended permissions for ioctls

Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:

allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds

Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.

When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.

The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.

The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

11 files changed, 834 insertions, 60 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 3c17dda9571d..2d5e1b04cd50 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>
 #include <net/af_unix.h>
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct avc_entry {
         u32                     tsid;
         u16                     tclass;
         struct av_decision      avd;
+        struct avc_xperms_node  *xp_node;
 };
 
 struct avc_node {
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ struct avc_node {
         struct rcu_head         rhead;
 };
 
+struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
+        struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
+        struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_node {
+        struct extended_perms xp;
+        struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
 struct avc_cache {
         struct hlist_head       slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
         spinlock_t              slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
@@ -80,6 +92,9 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
 static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
 static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;
 
 static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
@@ -170,7 +185,17 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
         atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
 
         avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
-                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+        avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
+                                        sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
+                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+        avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+                                        "avc_xperms_decision_node",
+                                        sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
+                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+        avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
+                                        sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
+                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 
         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
 }
@@ -205,9 +230,261 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
                          slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
 }
 
+/*
+ * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
+                                        struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+
+        list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+                if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
+                        return &xpd_node->xpd;
+        }
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+                                        u8 perm, u8 which)
+{
+        unsigned int rc = 0;
+
+        if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
+                        (xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+                rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+        else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
+                        (xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+                rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
+        else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
+                        (xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+                rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
+        return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
+                                u8 driver, u8 perm)
+{
+        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+        security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
+        xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+        if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
+                security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
+{
+        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+        xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+        if (xpd->allowed)
+                kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
+        if (xpd->auditallow)
+                kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
+        if (xpd->dontaudit)
+                kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
+        kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
+
+        if (!xp_node)
+                return;
+
+        list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+                list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
+                avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+        }
+        kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+                                        struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+        dest->driver = src->driver;
+        dest->used = src->used;
+        if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+                memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
+                                sizeof(src->allowed->p));
+        if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+                memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
+                                sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
+        if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+                memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
+                                sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this perm
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
+                        struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+                        struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+        /*
+         * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+         * command permission
+         */
+        u8 i = perm >> 5;
+
+        dest->used = src->used;
+        if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+                dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
+        if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+                dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
+        if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+                dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
+                *avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
+{
+        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+        xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
+                                GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+        if (!xpd_node)
+                return NULL;
+
+        xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+        if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+                xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+                                                GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+                if (!xpd->allowed)
+                        goto error;
+        }
+        if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+                xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+                                                GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+                if (!xpd->auditallow)
+                        goto error;
+        }
+        if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+                xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+                                                GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+                if (!xpd->dontaudit)
+                        goto error;
+        }
+        return xpd_node;
+error:
+        avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
+                        struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+
+        node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
+        dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
+        if (!dest_xpd)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+        avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
+        list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
+{
+        struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+
+        xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
+                                GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+        if (!xp_node)
+                return xp_node;
+        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+        return xp_node;
+}
+
+static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+                                struct avc_xperms_node *src)
+{
+        struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
+        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
+
+        if (src->xp.len == 0)
+                return 0;
+        dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
+        if (!dest)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
+        dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
+
+        /* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
+        list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+                dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
+                if (!dest_xpd)
+                        goto error;
+                avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
+                list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
+        }
+        node->ae.xp_node = dest;
+        return 0;
+error:
+        avc_xperms_free(dest);
+        return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
+                                        struct av_decision *avd,
+                                        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+                                        u8 perm,
+                                        int result,
+                                        u32 *deniedp)
+{
+        u32 denied, audited;
+
+        denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+        if (unlikely(denied)) {
+                audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+                if (audited && xpd) {
+                        if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+                                audited &= ~requested;
+                }
+        } else if (result) {
+                audited = denied = requested;
+        } else {
+                audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+                if (audited && xpd) {
+                        if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+                                audited &= ~requested;
+                }
+        }
+
+        *deniedp = denied;
+        return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+                                u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+                                struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+                                u8 perm, int result,
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+        u32 audited, denied;
+
+        audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
+                        requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
+        if (likely(!audited))
+                return 0;
+        return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+                        audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
+}
+
 static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
 {
         struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+        avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
         kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
         avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
 }
@@ -221,6 +498,7 @@ static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
 
 static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
 {
+        avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
         kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
         avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
         atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
@@ -367,6 +645,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
  *
  * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
  * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
@@ -378,7 +657,9 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
  * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+                                struct av_decision *avd,
+                                struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
         struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
         int hvalue;
@@ -391,10 +672,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
         if (node) {
                 struct hlist_head *head;
                 spinlock_t *lock;
+                int rc = 0;
 
                 hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
                 avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-
+                rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
+                if (rc) {
+                        kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+                        return NULL;
+                }
                 head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
                 lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
@@ -523,14 +809,17 @@ out:
  * @perms : Permission mask bits
  * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
  * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
  *
  * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
  * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
  * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
  * will release later by RCU.
  */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-                           u32 seqno)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+                        u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+                        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+                        u32 flags)
 {
         int hvalue, rc = 0;
         unsigned long flag;
@@ -574,9 +863,19 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 
         avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
 
+        if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
+                rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
+                if (rc) {
+                        kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+                        goto out_unlock;
+                }
+        }
+
         switch (event) {
         case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
                 node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+                if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
+                        avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
                 break;
         case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
         case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
@@ -594,6 +893,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
         case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
                 node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
                 break;
+        case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
+                avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
+                break;
         }
         avc_node_replace(node, orig);
 out_unlock:
@@ -665,18 +967,20 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
  * results in a bigger stack frame.
  */
 static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+                         u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+                         struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
         rcu_read_unlock();
-        security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+        security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
         rcu_read_lock();
-        return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+        return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
 }
 
 static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                         unsigned flags,
-                         struct av_decision *avd)
+                                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+                                u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
+                                struct av_decision *avd)
 {
         if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
                 return -EACCES;
@@ -684,11 +988,91 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
         if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
                 return -EACCES;
 
-        avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
-                                tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
+        avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
+                                tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
         return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
+ * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
+ * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
+ * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
+ * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
+ */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+                        u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+        struct avc_node *node;
+        struct av_decision avd;
+        u32 denied;
+        struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
+        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
+        struct extended_perms_data allowed;
+        struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
+        struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
+        struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
+        struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+        int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+        xp_node = &local_xp_node;
+        BUG_ON(!requested);
+
+        rcu_read_lock();
+
+        node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+        if (unlikely(!node)) {
+                node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+        } else {
+                memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+                xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
+        }
+        /* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+        if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
+                goto decision;
+
+        local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
+        local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
+        local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+        xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+        if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
+                /*
+                 * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
+                 * is flagged
+                 */
+                if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
+                        avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+                        goto decision;
+                }
+                rcu_read_unlock();
+                security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
+                                                &local_xpd);
+                rcu_read_lock();
+                avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
+                                ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
+        } else {
+                avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
+        }
+        xpd = &local_xpd;
+
+        if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+                avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+        denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+        if (unlikely(denied))
+                rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
+                                AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+
+        rcu_read_unlock();
+
+        rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+                        &avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
+        if (rc2)
+                return rc2;
+        return rc;
+}
 
 /**
  * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
@@ -716,6 +1100,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                          struct av_decision *avd)
 {
         struct avc_node *node;
+        struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
         int rc = 0;
         u32 denied;
 
@@ -725,13 +1110,13 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
         node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
         if (unlikely(!node))
-                node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+                node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
         else
                 memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
 
         denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
         if (unlikely(denied))
-                rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
+                rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
 
         rcu_read_unlock();
         return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 692e3cc8ce23..a049b7216270 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3216,6 +3216,46 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
         file_free_security(file);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+                u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
+        struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+        struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+        struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+        u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+        int rc;
+        u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
+        u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
+
+        ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+        ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+        ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+        ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+        if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+                rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+                                SECCLASS_FD,
+                                FD__USE,
+                                &ad);
+                if (rc)
+                        goto out;
+        }
+
+        if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+                return 0;
+
+        rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+                        requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+out:
+        return rc;
+}
+
 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
                               unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -3258,7 +3298,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
          * to the file's ioctl() function.
          */
         default:
-                error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+                error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
         }
         return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index ddf8eec03f21..db12ff14277b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 }
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2    /* update extended permissions */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                          u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                          unsigned flags,
@@ -151,6 +152,10 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                  u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                  struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
 
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+                u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT              1
@@ -161,6 +166,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE   64
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE  128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS         256
 
 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 36993ad1c067..6a681d26bf20 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -35,13 +35,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS    27
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE   28
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES       29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL   30
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX    CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX    POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX    POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -109,11 +110,38 @@ struct av_decision {
         u32 flags;
 };
 
+#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
+#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
+
+#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
+#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
+struct extended_perms_data {
+        u32 p[8];
+};
+
+struct extended_perms_decision {
+        u8 used;
+        u8 driver;
+        struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
+        struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
+        struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
+};
+
+struct extended_perms {
+        u16 len;        /* length associated decision chain */
+        struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
+};
+
 /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE    0x0001
 
 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+                         u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+                         struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+                         u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 
 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                              u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index b64f2772b030..3628d3a868b6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include "policydb.h"
 
 static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
 
 /* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
  * public domain.
@@ -70,11 +71,24 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
                   struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
         struct avtab_node *newnode;
+        struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
         newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (newnode == NULL)
                 return NULL;
         newnode->key = *key;
-        newnode->datum = *datum;
+
+        if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+                xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+                if (xperms == NULL) {
+                        kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+                        return NULL;
+                }
+                *xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+                newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+        } else {
+                newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+        }
+
         if (prev) {
                 newnode->next = prev->next;
                 prev->next = newnode;
@@ -107,8 +121,12 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
                 if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
                     key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
                     key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
-                    (specified & cur->key.specified))
+                    (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+                        /* extended perms may not be unique */
+                        if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+                                break;
                         return -EEXIST;
+                }
                 if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
                         break;
                 if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -271,6 +289,9 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
                 while (cur) {
                         temp = cur;
                         cur = cur->next;
+                        if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+                                kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+                                                temp->datum.u.xperms);
                         kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
                 }
         }
@@ -359,7 +380,10 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
         AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
         AVTAB_TRANSITION,
         AVTAB_CHANGE,
-        AVTAB_MEMBER
+        AVTAB_MEMBER,
+        AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+        AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+        AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
 };
 
 int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
@@ -369,10 +393,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 {
         __le16 buf16[4];
         u16 enabled;
-        __le32 buf32[7];
         u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
         struct avtab_key key;
         struct avtab_datum datum;
+        struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+        __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
         int i, rc;
         unsigned set;
 
@@ -429,11 +454,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
                         return -EINVAL;
                 }
+                if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+                        printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+                        return -EINVAL;
+                }
 
                 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
                         if (val & spec_order[i]) {
                                 key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
-                                datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+                                datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
                                 rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
                                 if (rc)
                                         return rc;
@@ -476,14 +505,42 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
                 return -EINVAL;
         }
 
-        rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
-        if (rc) {
-                printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
-                return rc;
+        if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+                        (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+                printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  avtab:  policy version %u does not "
+                                "support extended permissions rules and one "
+                                "was specified\n", vers);
+                return -EINVAL;
+        } else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+                memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+                rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+                if (rc) {
+                        printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+                        return rc;
+                }
+                rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+                if (rc) {
+                        printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+                        return rc;
+                }
+                rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+                if (rc) {
+                        printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+                        return rc;
+                }
+                for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+                        xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+                datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+        } else {
+                rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+                if (rc) {
+                        printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+                        return rc;
+                }
+                datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
         }
-        datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
         if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
-            !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
+            !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
                 return -EINVAL;
         }
@@ -543,8 +600,9 @@ bad:
 int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 {
         __le16 buf16[4];
-        __le32 buf32[1];
+        __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
         int rc;
+        unsigned int i;
 
         buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
         buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
@@ -553,8 +611,22 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
         rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
-        buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
-        rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+
+        if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+                rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+                if (rc)
+                        return rc;
+                rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+                if (rc)
+                        return rc;
+                for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+                        buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+                rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+                                ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+        } else {
+                buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+                rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+        }
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
         return 0;
@@ -588,9 +660,13 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
         avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
                                               sizeof(struct avtab_node),
                                               0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+        avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
+                                                sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
+                                                0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
 
 void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
 {
         kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
+        kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index adb451cd44f9..d946c9dc3c9c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
 #define _SS_AVTAB_H_
 
+#include "security.h"
 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
 
 struct avtab_key {
@@ -37,13 +38,43 @@ struct avtab_key {
 #define AVTAB_MEMBER            0x0020
 #define AVTAB_CHANGE            0x0040
 #define AVTAB_TYPE              (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED    0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT  0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS            (AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
+                                AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+                                AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
 #define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
 #define AVTAB_ENABLED           0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
         u16 specified;  /* what field is specified */
 };
 
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION      0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER        0x02
+        /* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+        u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+        /*
+         * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+         * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+         * specifies which permissions are included.
+         */
+        u8 driver;
+        /* 256 bits of permissions */
+        struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
 struct avtab_datum {
-        u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+        union {
+                u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+                struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+        } u;
 };
 
 struct avtab_node {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 62c6773be0b7..18643bf9894d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "security.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
 
 /*
  * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
@@ -612,21 +613,39 @@ int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
 
         return 0;
 }
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+                struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+        struct avtab_node *node;
+
+        if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+                return;
+
+        for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+                        node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+                if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+                        services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+        }
+        return;
+
+}
 /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
  * av table, and if so, add them to the result
  */
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+                struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
         struct avtab_node *node;
 
-        if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+        if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !xperms)
                 return;
 
         for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
                                 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
                 if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
                     (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
-                        avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+                        avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
                 if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
                     (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
                         /* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
@@ -634,10 +653,13 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
                          * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
                          * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
                          */
-                        avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+                        avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
                 if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
                     (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
-                        avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+                        avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+                if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+                                (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+                        services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
         }
         return;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 4d1f87466508..ddb43e7e1c75 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
 int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
 int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
 
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
-
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+                struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+                struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
 
 #endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 74aa224267c1..992a31530825 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
                 .sym_num        = SYM_NUM,
                 .ocon_num       = OCON_NUM,
         },
+        {
+                .version        = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+                .sym_num        = SYM_NUM,
+                .ocon_num       = OCON_NUM,
+        },
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9e2d82070915..b7df12ba61d8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
                                     u32 *scontext_len);
 
 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-                                      struct context *tcontext,
-                                      u16 tclass,
-                                      struct av_decision *avd);
+                                        struct context *tcontext,
+                                        u16 tclass,
+                                        struct av_decision *avd,
+                                        struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
 struct selinux_mapping {
         u16 value; /* policy value */
@@ -565,7 +566,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
                 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
                                           tcontext,
                                           tclass,
-                                          &lo_avd);
+                                          &lo_avd,
+                                          NULL);
                 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
                         return;         /* no masked permission */
                 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@@ -580,7 +582,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
                 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
                                           &lo_tcontext,
                                           tclass,
-                                          &lo_avd);
+                                          &lo_avd,
+                                          NULL);
                 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
                         return;         /* no masked permission */
                 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@@ -596,7 +599,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
                 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
                                           &lo_tcontext,
                                           tclass,
-                                          &lo_avd);
+                                          &lo_avd,
+                                          NULL);
                 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
                         return;         /* no masked permission */
                 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@@ -613,13 +617,39 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 }
 
 /*
- * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
- * the permissions in a particular class.
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+                struct extended_perms *xperms,
+                struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+        unsigned int i;
+
+        if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+                /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+                for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+                        xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+        } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+                /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+                security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+                                        node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+        }
+
+        /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
+        if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+                xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
  */
 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-                                      struct context *tcontext,
-                                      u16 tclass,
-                                      struct av_decision *avd)
+                                        struct context *tcontext,
+                                        u16 tclass,
+                                        struct av_decision *avd,
+                                        struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
         struct constraint_node *constraint;
         struct role_allow *ra;
@@ -633,6 +663,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
         avd->allowed = 0;
         avd->auditallow = 0;
         avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+        if (xperms) {
+                memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+                xperms->len = 0;
+        }
 
         if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
                 if (printk_ratelimit())
@@ -647,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
          * this permission check, then use it.
          */
         avkey.target_class = tclass;
-        avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
+        avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
         sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
         BUG_ON(!sattr);
         tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
@@ -660,15 +694,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
                              node;
                              node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
                                 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
-                                        avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+                                        avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
                                 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
-                                        avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+                                        avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
                                 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
-                                        avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+                                        avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+                                else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+                                        services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
                         }
 
                         /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
-                        cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+                        cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+                                        avd, xperms);
 
                 }
         }
@@ -899,6 +936,139 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
         avd->flags = 0;
 }
 
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+                                        struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+        unsigned int i;
+
+        if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+                if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+                        return;
+        } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+                if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+                                        xpermd->driver))
+                        return;
+        } else {
+                BUG();
+        }
+
+        if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+                xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+                if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+                        memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+                                        sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+                }
+                if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+                        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+                                xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+                                        node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+                }
+        } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+                xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+                if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+                        memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+                                        sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+                }
+                if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+                        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+                                xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+                                        node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+                }
+        } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+                xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+                if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+                        memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+                                        sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+                }
+                if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+                        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+                                xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+                                        node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+                }
+        } else {
+                BUG();
+        }
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
+                                u32 tsid,
+                                u16 orig_tclass,
+                                u8 driver,
+                                struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+        u16 tclass;
+        struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+        struct avtab_key avkey;
+        struct avtab_node *node;
+        struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+        struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+        unsigned int i, j;
+
+        xpermd->driver = driver;
+        xpermd->used = 0;
+        memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+        memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+        memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+        read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+        if (!ss_initialized)
+                goto allow;
+
+        scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+        if (!scontext) {
+                printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+                       __func__, ssid);
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+        if (!tcontext) {
+                printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+                       __func__, tsid);
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+        if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+                if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+                        goto allow;
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+
+        if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+                pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        avkey.target_class = tclass;
+        avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+        sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+                                scontext->type - 1);
+        BUG_ON(!sattr);
+        tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+                                tcontext->type - 1);
+        BUG_ON(!tattr);
+        ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+                ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+                        avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+                        avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+                        for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+                             node;
+                             node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+                                services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+                        cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+                                                &avkey, xpermd);
+                }
+        }
+out:
+        read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+        return;
+allow:
+        memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+        goto out;
+}
 
 /**
  * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
@@ -906,6 +1076,7 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
  *
  * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
  * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
@@ -913,13 +1084,15 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
                          u32 tsid,
                          u16 orig_tclass,
-                         struct av_decision *avd)
+                         struct av_decision *avd,
+                         struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
         u16 tclass;
         struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
         avd_init(avd);
+        xperms->len = 0;
         if (!ss_initialized)
                 goto allow;
 
@@ -947,7 +1120,7 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
                         goto allow;
                 goto out;
         }
-        context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+        context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
         map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
 out:
         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
@@ -993,7 +1166,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+        context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
  out:
         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
         return;
@@ -1515,7 +1688,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
         if (avdatum) {
                 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
-                newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
+                newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
         }
 
         /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index e8d907e903cd..6abcd8729ec3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -11,5 +11,11 @@
 
 extern struct policydb policydb;
 
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+                                struct avtab_node *node);
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+                                        struct avtab_node *node);
+
 #endif  /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */