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authorNayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>2018-10-09 13:30:34 -0400
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2018-12-11 07:10:33 -0500
commitb5ca117365d960fe5e4fe272bcc8142c28769383 (patch)
tree6e306a5c52ad13271a2d947c9a41922f1ddf709d /security
parent0914ade209c452cff6a29b1c0ae6fff3167fa1d0 (diff)
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled. This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with secureboot enabled. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: add missing mesage on kexec_load failure] Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c19
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1b88d58e1325..df0b2ee49fa2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -505,20 +505,26 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
505 */ 505 */
506int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) 506int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
507{ 507{
508 bool sig_enforce; 508 bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
509 509
510 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) 510 ima_enforce =
511 return 0; 511 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
512 512
513 switch (id) { 513 switch (id) {
514 case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: 514 case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
515 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) { 515 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG)
516 && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
517 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
518 return -EACCES;
519 }
520
521 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
516 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); 522 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
517 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 523 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
518 } 524 }
519 break; 525 break;
520 case LOADING_FIRMWARE: 526 case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
521 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) { 527 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
522 pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); 528 pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
523 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 529 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
524 } 530 }
@@ -526,7 +532,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
526 case LOADING_MODULE: 532 case LOADING_MODULE:
527 sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); 533 sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
528 534
529 if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { 535 if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce
536 && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) {
530 pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); 537 pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
531 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 538 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
532 } 539 }