net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1

ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
'dev_lec'

Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/net/atm/lec.c b/net/atm/lec.c
index 01d5d20a6eb1..3138a869b5c0 100644
--- a/net/atm/lec.c
+++ b/net/atm/lec.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ static unsigned char bridge_ula_lec[] = { 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00 };
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include "lec.h"
 #include "lec_arpc.h"
 #include "resources.h"
@@ -687,8 +690,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, void __user *arg)
         bytes_left = copy_from_user(&ioc_data, arg, sizeof(struct atmlec_ioc));
         if (bytes_left != 0)
                 pr_info("copy from user failed for %d bytes\n", bytes_left);
-        if (ioc_data.dev_num < 0 || ioc_data.dev_num >= MAX_LEC_ITF ||
-            !dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num])
+        if (ioc_data.dev_num < 0 || ioc_data.dev_num >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        ioc_data.dev_num = array_index_nospec(ioc_data.dev_num, MAX_LEC_ITF);
+        if (!dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num])
                 return -EINVAL;
         vpriv = kmalloc(sizeof(struct lec_vcc_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!vpriv)