net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/net/atm/lec.c b/net/atm/lec.c
index d7f5cf5b7594..ad4f829193f0 100644
--- a/net/atm/lec.c
+++ b/net/atm/lec.c
@@ -710,7 +710,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, void __user *arg)
 
 static int lec_mcast_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
 {
-        if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF || !dev_lec[arg])
+        if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        arg = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
+        if (!dev_lec[arg])
                 return -EINVAL;
         vcc->proto_data = dev_lec[arg];
         return lec_mcast_make(netdev_priv(dev_lec[arg]), vcc);
@@ -728,6 +731,7 @@ static int lecd_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
                 i = arg;
         if (arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
                 return -EINVAL;
+        i = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
         if (!dev_lec[i]) {
                 int size;