vsprintf: Shuffle restricted_pointer()

This is just a preparation step for further changes.

The patch does not change the code.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-2-pmladek@suse.com
To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>

1 files changed, 49 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 791b6fa36905..eb7b4a06e1f0 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -717,6 +717,55 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
         return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
 }
 
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+
+static noinline_for_stack
+char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+                         struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+        switch (kptr_restrict) {
+        case 0:
+                /* Always print %pK values */
+                break;
+        case 1: {
+                const struct cred *cred;
+
+                /*
+                 * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+                 * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+                 */
+                if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+                        if (spec.field_width == -1)
+                                spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+                        return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+                }
+
+                /*
+                 * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+                 * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+                 * same credentials it started with. This is because
+                 * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+                 * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+                 * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+                 * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+                 */
+                cred = current_cred();
+                if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+                    !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+                    !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+                        ptr = NULL;
+                break;
+        }
+        case 2:
+        default:
+                /* Always print 0's for %pK */
+                ptr = NULL;
+                break;
+        }
+
+        return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+}
+
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct dentry *d, struct printf_spec spec,
                   const char *fmt)
@@ -1476,55 +1525,6 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
         return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
 }
 
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
-
-static noinline_for_stack
-char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
-                         struct printf_spec spec)
-{
-        switch (kptr_restrict) {
-        case 0:
-                /* Always print %pK values */
-                break;
-        case 1: {
-                const struct cred *cred;
-
-                /*
-                 * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
-                 * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
-                 */
-                if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
-                        if (spec.field_width == -1)
-                                spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
-                        return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
-                }
-
-                /*
-                 * Only print the real pointer value if the current
-                 * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
-                 * same credentials it started with. This is because
-                 * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
-                 * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
-                 * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
-                 * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
-                 */
-                cred = current_cred();
-                if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
-                    !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
-                    !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
-                        ptr = NULL;
-                break;
-        }
-        case 2:
-        default:
-                /* Always print 0's for %pK */
-                ptr = NULL;
-                break;
-        }
-
-        return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
-}
-
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr,
                   struct printf_spec spec,  const char *fmt)