Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
  visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
  care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
  up.

  From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
  ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
  prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
  but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.

  Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
  standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
  children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
  children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
  systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
  regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
  rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
  to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.

  There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
  instances inside a user namespace.

  Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
  namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
  hierachy and properties of namespaces.

  Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
  network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
  in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.

  Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
  on the wrong inode were being checked.

  I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
  be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
  credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
  in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
  executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
  mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
  better.

  A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
  fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
  as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
  to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
  check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.

  Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
  unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
  simpler which benefits CRIU.

  The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
  ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
  fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
  how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
  fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
  uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
  vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
  proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
  mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
  prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
  introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
  fs: Better permission checking for submounts
  exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
  vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
  proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
  exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
  exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
  exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
  inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits

5 files changed, 117 insertions, 89 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 3d773eb9e144..b73b4de8fb36 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1667,12 +1667,63 @@ const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations = {
 
 /* building an inode */
 
+void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, mode_t mode,
+                     kuid_t *ruid, kgid_t *rgid)
+{
+        /* Depending on the state of dumpable compute who should own a
+         * proc file for a task.
+         */
+        const struct cred *cred;
+        kuid_t uid;
+        kgid_t gid;
+
+        /* Default to the tasks effective ownership */
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        cred = __task_cred(task);
+        uid = cred->euid;
+        gid = cred->egid;
+        rcu_read_unlock();
+
+        /*
+         * Before the /proc/pid/status file was created the only way to read
+         * the effective uid of a /process was to stat /proc/pid.  Reading
+         * /proc/pid/status is slow enough that procps and other packages
+         * kept stating /proc/pid.  To keep the rules in /proc simple I have
+         * made this apply to all per process world readable and executable
+         * directories.
+         */
+        if (mode != (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) {
+                struct mm_struct *mm;
+                task_lock(task);
+                mm = task->mm;
+                /* Make non-dumpable tasks owned by some root */
+                if (mm) {
+                        if (get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
+                                struct user_namespace *user_ns = mm->user_ns;
+
+                                uid = make_kuid(user_ns, 0);
+                                if (!uid_valid(uid))
+                                        uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+
+                                gid = make_kgid(user_ns, 0);
+                                if (!gid_valid(gid))
+                                        gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
+                        }
+                } else {
+                        uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+                        gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
+                }
+                task_unlock(task);
+        }
+        *ruid = uid;
+        *rgid = gid;
+}
+
 struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,
                                   struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode)
 {
         struct inode * inode;
         struct proc_inode *ei;
-        const struct cred *cred;
 
         /* We need a new inode */
 
@@ -1694,13 +1745,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,
         if (!ei->pid)
                 goto out_unlock;
 
-        if (task_dumpable(task)) {
-                rcu_read_lock();
-                cred = __task_cred(task);
-                inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
-                inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
-                rcu_read_unlock();
-        }
+        task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
         security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
 
 out:
@@ -1715,7 +1760,6 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
 {
         struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
         struct task_struct *task;
-        const struct cred *cred;
         struct pid_namespace *pid = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
 
         generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
@@ -1733,12 +1777,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
                          */
                         return -ENOENT;
                 }
-                if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
-                    task_dumpable(task)) {
-                        cred = __task_cred(task);
-                        stat->uid = cred->euid;
-                        stat->gid = cred->egid;
-                }
+                task_dump_owner(task, inode->i_mode, &stat->uid, &stat->gid);
         }
         rcu_read_unlock();
         return 0;
@@ -1754,18 +1793,11 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
  * Rewrite the inode's ownerships here because the owning task may have
  * performed a setuid(), etc.
  *
- * Before the /proc/pid/status file was created the only way to read
- * the effective uid of a /process was to stat /proc/pid.  Reading
- * /proc/pid/status is slow enough that procps and other packages
- * kept stating /proc/pid.  To keep the rules in /proc simple I have
- * made this apply to all per process world readable and executable
- * directories.
  */
 int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 {
         struct inode *inode;
         struct task_struct *task;
-        const struct cred *cred;
 
         if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
                 return -ECHILD;
@@ -1774,17 +1806,8 @@ int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
         task = get_proc_task(inode);
 
         if (task) {
-                if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
-                    task_dumpable(task)) {
-                        rcu_read_lock();
-                        cred = __task_cred(task);
-                        inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
-                        inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
-                        rcu_read_unlock();
-                } else {
-                        inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
-                        inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
-                }
+                task_dump_owner(task, inode->i_mode, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
+
                 inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID | S_ISGID);
                 security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
                 put_task_struct(task);
@@ -1881,7 +1904,6 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
         bool exact_vma_exists = false;
         struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
         struct task_struct *task;
-        const struct cred *cred;
         struct inode *inode;
         int status = 0;
 
@@ -1906,16 +1928,8 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
         mmput(mm);
 
         if (exact_vma_exists) {
-                if (task_dumpable(task)) {
-                        rcu_read_lock();
-                        cred = __task_cred(task);
-                        inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
-                        inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
-                        rcu_read_unlock();
-                } else {
-                        inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
-                        inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
-                }
+                task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
+
                 security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
                 status = 1;
         }
diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c
index 4274f83bf100..00ce1531b2f5 100644
--- a/fs/proc/fd.c
+++ b/fs/proc/fd.c
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 {
         struct files_struct *files;
         struct task_struct *task;
-        const struct cred *cred;
         struct inode *inode;
         unsigned int fd;
 
@@ -108,16 +107,7 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
                                 rcu_read_unlock();
                                 put_files_struct(files);
 
-                                if (task_dumpable(task)) {
-                                        rcu_read_lock();
-                                        cred = __task_cred(task);
-                                        inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
-                                        inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
-                                        rcu_read_unlock();
-                                } else {
-                                        inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
-                                        inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
-                                }
+                                task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
 
                                 if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
                                         unsigned i_mode = S_IFLNK;
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index 842a5ff5b85c..7ad9ed7958af 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -43,10 +43,11 @@ static void proc_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
         de = PDE(inode);
         if (de)
                 pde_put(de);
+
         head = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl;
         if (head) {
                 RCU_INIT_POINTER(PROC_I(inode)->sysctl, NULL);
-                sysctl_head_put(head);
+                proc_sys_evict_inode(inode, head);
         }
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 2de5194ba378..5d6960f5f1c0 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct proc_inode {
         struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
         struct ctl_table_header *sysctl;
         struct ctl_table *sysctl_entry;
+        struct list_head sysctl_inodes;
         const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops;
         struct inode vfs_inode;
 };
@@ -97,20 +98,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_proc_task(struct inode *inode)
         return get_pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
 }
 
-static inline int task_dumpable(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-        int dumpable = 0;
-        struct mm_struct *mm;
-
-        task_lock(task);
-        mm = task->mm;
-        if (mm)
-                dumpable = get_dumpable(mm);
-        task_unlock(task);
-        if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_USER)
-                return 1;
-        return 0;
-}
+void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, mode_t mode,
+                     kuid_t *ruid, kgid_t *rgid);
 
 static inline unsigned name_to_int(const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
@@ -249,10 +238,12 @@ extern void proc_thread_self_init(void);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
 extern int proc_sys_init(void);
-extern void sysctl_head_put(struct ctl_table_header *);
+extern void proc_sys_evict_inode(struct inode *inode,
+                                 struct ctl_table_header *head);
 #else
 static inline void proc_sys_init(void) { }
-static inline void sysctl_head_put(struct ctl_table_header *head) { }
+static inline void proc_sys_evict_inode(struct  inode *inode,
+                                        struct ctl_table_header *head) { }
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index d4e37acd4821..3e64c6502dc8 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static void init_header(struct ctl_table_header *head,
         head->set = set;
         head->parent = NULL;
         head->node = node;
+        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&head->inodes);
         if (node) {
                 struct ctl_table *entry;
                 for (entry = table; entry->procname; entry++, node++)
@@ -259,6 +260,27 @@ static void unuse_table(struct ctl_table_header *p)
                         complete(p->unregistering);
 }
 
+/* called under sysctl_lock */
+static void proc_sys_prune_dcache(struct ctl_table_header *head)
+{
+        struct inode *inode, *prev = NULL;
+        struct proc_inode *ei;
+
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        list_for_each_entry_rcu(ei, &head->inodes, sysctl_inodes) {
+                inode = igrab(&ei->vfs_inode);
+                if (inode) {
+                        rcu_read_unlock();
+                        iput(prev);
+                        prev = inode;
+                        d_prune_aliases(inode);
+                        rcu_read_lock();
+                }
+        }
+        rcu_read_unlock();
+        iput(prev);
+}
+
 /* called under sysctl_lock, will reacquire if has to wait */
 static void start_unregistering(struct ctl_table_header *p)
 {
@@ -272,31 +294,22 @@ static void start_unregistering(struct ctl_table_header *p)
                 p->unregistering = &wait;
                 spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
                 wait_for_completion(&wait);
-                spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
         } else {
                 /* anything non-NULL; we'll never dereference it */
                 p->unregistering = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+                spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
         }
         /*
+         * Prune dentries for unregistered sysctls: namespaced sysctls
+         * can have duplicate names and contaminate dcache very badly.
+         */
+        proc_sys_prune_dcache(p);
+        /*
          * do not remove from the list until nobody holds it; walking the
          * list in do_sysctl() relies on that.
          */
-        erase_header(p);
-}
-
-static void sysctl_head_get(struct ctl_table_header *head)
-{
         spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
-        head->count++;
-        spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
-}
-
-void sysctl_head_put(struct ctl_table_header *head)
-{
-        spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
-        if (!--head->count)
-                kfree_rcu(head, rcu);
-        spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+        erase_header(p);
 }
 
 static struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_head_grab(struct ctl_table_header *head)
@@ -440,10 +453,20 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,
 
         inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
 
-        sysctl_head_get(head);
         ei = PROC_I(inode);
+
+        spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
+        if (unlikely(head->unregistering)) {
+                spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+                iput(inode);
+                inode = NULL;
+                goto out;
+        }
         ei->sysctl = head;
         ei->sysctl_entry = table;
+        list_add_rcu(&ei->sysctl_inodes, &head->inodes);
+        head->count++;
+        spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
 
         inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
         inode->i_mode = table->mode;
@@ -466,6 +489,15 @@ out:
         return inode;
 }
 
+void proc_sys_evict_inode(struct inode *inode, struct ctl_table_header *head)
+{
+        spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
+        list_del_rcu(&PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_inodes);
+        if (!--head->count)
+                kfree_rcu(head, rcu);
+        spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+}
+
 static struct ctl_table_header *grab_header(struct inode *inode)
 {
         struct ctl_table_header *head = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl;