fanotify: Allow copying of file handle to userspace

When file handle is embedded inside fanotify_event and usercopy checks
are enabled, we get a warning like:

Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected
from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)!
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
mm/usercopy.c:78

Annotate handling in fanotify_event properly to mark copying it to
userspace is fine.

Reported-by: syzbot+2c49971e251e36216d1f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: a8b13aa20afb ("fanotify: enable FAN_REPORT_FID init flag")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

1 files changed, 11 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 56992b32c6bb..a90bb19dcfa2 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ static int copy_fid_to_user(struct fanotify_event *event, char __user *buf)
 {
         struct fanotify_event_info_fid info = { };
         struct file_handle handle = { };
+        unsigned char bounce[FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN], *fh;
         size_t fh_len = event->fh_len;
         size_t len = fanotify_event_info_len(event);
 
@@ -233,7 +234,16 @@ static int copy_fid_to_user(struct fanotify_event *event, char __user *buf)
 
         buf += sizeof(handle);
         len -= sizeof(handle);
-        if (copy_to_user(buf, fanotify_event_fh(event), fh_len))
+        /*
+         * For an inline fh, copy through stack to exclude the copy from
+         * usercopy hardening protections.
+         */
+        fh = fanotify_event_fh(event);
+        if (fh_len <= FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN) {
+                memcpy(bounce, fh, fh_len);
+                fh = bounce;
+        }
+        if (copy_to_user(buf, fh, fh_len))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         /* Pad with 0's */