xen/privcmd: add IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP_RESOURCE

My recent Xen patch series introduces a new HYPERVISOR_memory_op to
support direct priv-mapping of certain guest resources (such as ioreq
pages, used by emulators) by a tools domain, rather than having to access
such resources via the guest P2M.

This patch adds the necessary infrastructure to the privcmd driver and
Xen MMU code to support direct resource mapping.

NOTE: The adjustment in the MMU code is partially cosmetic. Xen will now
      allow a PV tools domain to map guest pages either by GFN or MFN, thus
      the term 'mfn' has been swapped for 'pfn' in the lower layers of the
      remap code.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

1 files changed, 133 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
index 0a778d30d333..8ae0349d9f0a 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <xen/xen.h>
 #include <xen/privcmd.h>
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
+#include <xen/interface/memory.h>
 #include <xen/interface/hvm/dm_op.h>
 #include <xen/features.h>
 #include <xen/page.h>
@@ -722,6 +723,134 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_restrict(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
         return 0;
 }
 
+struct remap_pfn {
+        struct mm_struct *mm;
+        struct page **pages;
+        pgprot_t prot;
+        unsigned long i;
+};
+
+static int remap_pfn_fn(pte_t *ptep, pgtable_t token, unsigned long addr,
+                        void *data)
+{
+        struct remap_pfn *r = data;
+        struct page *page = r->pages[r->i];
+        pte_t pte = pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(page_to_pfn(page), r->prot));
+
+        set_pte_at(r->mm, addr, ptep, pte);
+        r->i++;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
+{
+        struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
+        struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+        struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+        struct privcmd_mmap_resource kdata;
+        xen_pfn_t *pfns = NULL;
+        struct xen_mem_acquire_resource xdata;
+        int rc;
+
+        if (copy_from_user(&kdata, udata, sizeof(kdata)))
+                return -EFAULT;
+
+        /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+        if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != kdata.dom)
+                return -EPERM;
+
+        down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+        vma = find_vma(mm, kdata.addr);
+        if (!vma || vma->vm_ops != &privcmd_vm_ops) {
+                rc = -EINVAL;
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        pfns = kcalloc(kdata.num, sizeof(*pfns), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!pfns) {
+                rc = -ENOMEM;
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) {
+                unsigned int nr = DIV_ROUND_UP(kdata.num, XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE);
+                struct page **pages;
+                unsigned int i;
+
+                rc = alloc_empty_pages(vma, nr);
+                if (rc < 0)
+                        goto out;
+
+                pages = vma->vm_private_data;
+                for (i = 0; i < kdata.num; i++) {
+                        xen_pfn_t pfn =
+                                page_to_xen_pfn(pages[i / XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE]);
+
+                        pfns[i] = pfn + (i % XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE);
+                }
+        } else
+                vma->vm_private_data = PRIV_VMA_LOCKED;
+
+        memset(&xdata, 0, sizeof(xdata));
+        xdata.domid = kdata.dom;
+        xdata.type = kdata.type;
+        xdata.id = kdata.id;
+        xdata.frame = kdata.idx;
+        xdata.nr_frames = kdata.num;
+        set_xen_guest_handle(xdata.frame_list, pfns);
+
+        xen_preemptible_hcall_begin();
+        rc = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_acquire_resource, &xdata);
+        xen_preemptible_hcall_end();
+
+        if (rc)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) {
+                struct remap_pfn r = {
+                        .mm = vma->vm_mm,
+                        .pages = vma->vm_private_data,
+                        .prot = vma->vm_page_prot,
+                };
+
+                rc = apply_to_page_range(r.mm, kdata.addr,
+                                         kdata.num << PAGE_SHIFT,
+                                         remap_pfn_fn, &r);
+        } else {
+                unsigned int domid =
+                        (xdata.flags & XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned) ?
+                        DOMID_SELF : kdata.dom;
+                int num;
+
+                num = xen_remap_domain_mfn_array(vma,
+                                                 kdata.addr & PAGE_MASK,
+                                                 pfns, kdata.num, (int *)pfns,
+                                                 vma->vm_page_prot,
+                                                 domid,
+                                                 vma->vm_private_data);
+                if (num < 0)
+                        rc = num;
+                else if (num != kdata.num) {
+                        unsigned int i;
+
+                        for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+                                rc = pfns[i];
+                                if (rc < 0)
+                                        break;
+                        }
+                } else
+                        rc = 0;
+        }
+
+out:
+        up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+        kfree(pfns);
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
 static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
                           unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data)
 {
@@ -753,6 +882,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
                 ret = privcmd_ioctl_restrict(file, udata);
                 break;
 
+        case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP_RESOURCE:
+                ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource(file, udata);
+                break;
+
         default:
                 break;
         }