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authorNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>2019-06-13 06:35:59 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-06-14 22:27:24 -0400
commitce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26 (patch)
tree8aecfaeb0ff4506107ead6fad531a4b30c31633b
parent6bb9e376c2a4cc5120c3bf5fd3048b9a0a6ec1f8 (diff)
sctp: Free cookie before we memdup a new one
Based on comments from Xin, even after fixes for our recent syzbot report of cookie memory leaks, its possible to get a resend of an INIT chunk which would lead to us leaking cookie memory. To ensure that we don't leak cookie memory, free any previously allocated cookie first. Change notes v1->v2 update subsystem tag in subject (davem) repeat kfree check for peer_random and peer_hmacs (xin) v2->v3 net->sctp also free peer_chunks v3->v4 fix subject tags v4->v5 remove cut line Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c8
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index f17908f5c4f3..9b0e5b0d701a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2583,6 +2583,8 @@ do_addr_param:
2583 case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE: 2583 case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
2584 asoc->peer.cookie_len = 2584 asoc->peer.cookie_len =
2585 ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); 2585 ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
2586 if (asoc->peer.cookie)
2587 kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
2586 asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp); 2588 asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
2587 if (!asoc->peer.cookie) 2589 if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
2588 retval = 0; 2590 retval = 0;
@@ -2647,6 +2649,8 @@ do_addr_param:
2647 goto fall_through; 2649 goto fall_through;
2648 2650
2649 /* Save peer's random parameter */ 2651 /* Save peer's random parameter */
2652 if (asoc->peer.peer_random)
2653 kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
2650 asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p, 2654 asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
2651 ntohs(param.p->length), gfp); 2655 ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
2652 if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) { 2656 if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
@@ -2660,6 +2664,8 @@ do_addr_param:
2660 goto fall_through; 2664 goto fall_through;
2661 2665
2662 /* Save peer's HMAC list */ 2666 /* Save peer's HMAC list */
2667 if (asoc->peer.peer_hmacs)
2668 kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
2663 asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p, 2669 asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
2664 ntohs(param.p->length), gfp); 2670 ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
2665 if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) { 2671 if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
@@ -2675,6 +2681,8 @@ do_addr_param:
2675 if (!ep->auth_enable) 2681 if (!ep->auth_enable)
2676 goto fall_through; 2682 goto fall_through;
2677 2683
2684 if (asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
2685 kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
2678 asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p, 2686 asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
2679 ntohs(param.p->length), gfp); 2687 ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
2680 if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks) 2688 if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)