kasan: detect invalid frees for large objects

Patch series "kasan: detect invalid frees".

KASAN detects double-frees, but does not detect invalid-frees (when a
pointer into a middle of heap object is passed to free).  We recently had
a very unpleasant case in crypto code which freed an inner object inside
of a heap allocation.  This left unnoticed during free, but totally
corrupted heap and later lead to a bunch of random crashes all over kernel
code.

Detect invalid frees.

This patch (of 5):

Detect frees of pointers into middle of large heap objects.

I dropped const from kasan_kfree_large() because it starts propagating
through a bunch of functions in kasan_report.c, slab/slub nearest_obj(),
all of their local variables, fixup_red_left(), etc.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b45b4fe1d20fc0de1329aab674c1dd973fee723.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

6 files changed, 44 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index e3eb834c9a35..fc9e642533f8 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
 void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object);
 
 void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
-void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr);
+void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr);
 void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr);
 void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object, size_t size,
                   gfp_t flags);
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                 const void *object) {}
 
 static inline void kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags) {}
-static inline void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr) {}
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {}
 static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr) {}
 static inline void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
                                 size_t size, gfp_t flags) {}
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 2724f86c4cef..e9c5d765be66 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -94,6 +94,37 @@ static noinline void __init kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right(void)
         ptr[size] = 0;
         kfree(ptr);
 }
+
+static noinline void __init kmalloc_pagealloc_uaf(void)
+{
+        char *ptr;
+        size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 10;
+
+        pr_info("kmalloc pagealloc allocation: use-after-free\n");
+        ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!ptr) {
+                pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        kfree(ptr);
+        ptr[0] = 0;
+}
+
+static noinline void __init kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free(void)
+{
+        char *ptr;
+        size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 10;
+
+        pr_info("kmalloc pagealloc allocation: invalid-free\n");
+        ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!ptr) {
+                pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        kfree(ptr + 1);
+}
 #endif
 
 static noinline void __init kmalloc_large_oob_right(void)
@@ -505,6 +536,8 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
         kmalloc_node_oob_right();
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB
         kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right();
+        kmalloc_pagealloc_uaf();
+        kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free();
 #endif
         kmalloc_large_oob_right();
         kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more();
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index 8aaee42fcfab..ecb64fda79e6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -511,8 +511,7 @@ bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 
         shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
         if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
-                kasan_report_double_free(cache, object,
-                                __builtin_return_address(1));
+                kasan_report_invalid_free(object, __builtin_return_address(1));
                 return true;
         }
 
@@ -602,12 +601,11 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr)
                 kasan_poison_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr);
 }
 
-void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
+void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr)
 {
-        struct page *page = virt_to_page(ptr);
-
-        kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
-                        KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+        if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
+                kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, __builtin_return_address(1));
+        /* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
 }
 
 int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 9a768dd71c51..bf353a18c908 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
 
 void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
                 bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
-void kasan_report_double_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                                        void *ip);
+void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, void *ip);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB)
 void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index eff12e040498..55916ad21722 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -326,8 +326,7 @@ static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr)
         }
 }
 
-void kasan_report_double_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                                void *ip)
+void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, void *ip)
 {
         unsigned long flags;
 
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index cc71176c6eef..b54f8787c674 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ static inline void kmalloc_large_node_hook(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
         kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
 }
 
-static inline void kfree_hook(const void *x)
+static inline void kfree_hook(void *x)
 {
         kmemleak_free(x);
         kasan_kfree_large(x);
@@ -3910,7 +3910,7 @@ void kfree(const void *x)
         page = virt_to_head_page(x);
         if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
                 BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
-                kfree_hook(x);
+                kfree_hook(object);
                 __free_pages(page, compound_order(page));
                 return;
         }